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Introduction
Gert Oostindie and Jessica Vance Roitman
The historiography of the Atlantic has long dismissed its importance for the 
Dutch Republic. This view is summed up by the doyen of Dutch economic his-
tory, Jan de Vries, who remarked that the history of the Dutch in the Atlantic 
was “filled with frustration and disappointment, never resulting in a territorial, 
political or cultural presence that answered to the grand visions of successive 
generations of advocates.” Elsewhere, de Vries and his co-author, Ad van der 
Woude, remarked that “the 200 year history of the Dutch Atlantic economy is 
one of repeated cycles of hope, frustration, and failure.” De Vries and van der 
Woude were echoed by historian Piet Emmer, who dedicated his entire career 
to Dutch Atlantic history, yet nonetheless concluded that “the Dutch were not 
very important in that part of the world.”1 However, in recent years, this dismis-
sive historiographical tradition has been reconsidered and reevaluated.
The first challenge to this view was economic, perhaps not surprisingly 
given the long Dutch empirical tradition in economic history. A volume on the 
Dutch Atlantic edited by Victor Enthoven and Johannes Postma, Riches from 
Atlantic Commerce, asserted that the Atlantic was far more important econom-
ically than had heretofore been admitted by historians. Recent research has, 
indeed, produced upwards revisions of the importance of the Dutch Caribbean 
colonies to metropolitan trade.2 Likewise, many contributions to this volume 
are cautiously revisionist in terms of the economic importance of the Dutch 
Atlantic. While the contrast between initial Dutch expectations for their 
Atlantic endeavors and the eventual outcomes was stark, most of the essays in 
this volume show, either explicitly or implicitly, that the Dutch Atlantic mat-
tered more than was long assumed.
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But how, exactly, did the Atlantic matter to the Dutch? And why was the 
Atlantic engagement of the Dutch important for the Dutch themselves, but 
also for all the other actors involved in the Atlantic in the early modern period? 
Cautious calculations of the volume of trade, and the subsequent economic 
impact accruing to the Dutch from their Atlantic engagements, only illustrate 
a fraction of the complex story – even on the economic side of things. Hence, 
the need for this volume bringing together the multifaceted findings of a group 
of experts in Atlantic history as they grappled with the difficulties in delineat-
ing the ways in which a small, highly decentralized, eminently heterogeneous 
European country interacted with, influenced, and was impacted by, a vast, 
hotly contested oceanic space over more than a century.
The contributions to this volume begin to answer the questions of how and 
why the Atlantic was important to the Dutch and the Dutch important to the 
Atlantic by utilizing approaches that privilege entanglement, connections, and 
interaction. In fact, one of the unifying themes to come out of the disparate 
essays is that trans-imperial, and the concomitant regional, connections were 
constitutive for the Atlantic as whole, and for the Dutch in the Atlantic specifi-
cally. Yet there is a tension that lies at the heart of many of these chapters – a 
tension that is evident in much of Atlantic history. This is the fact that, as much 
as we may acknowledge that there was room for self-organization and cross- 
and interimperial connections, we cannot dismiss the centrality of the metro-
politan state and its institutions to how the Atlantic functioned.
 What is the “Dutch Atlantic”?
The authors of the essays in this volume almost uniformly come to the conclu-
sion that it makes little sense to think of one integrated, much less one uni-
form, “Dutch Atlantic.” Even ascertaining what territories constituted the 
“Dutch Atlantic” is difficult in the extreme. Such a classification is dependent 
upon both chronology and definition. The roughest of outlines of the Dutch 
involvement in the Atlantic would run something like this: an ambitious start 
around 1600, coinciding with the triumphant phase of the Dutch revolt against 
the Habsburg monarchy and the rise of the Republic as the commercial center 
of Europe; the founding of the first Dutch West India Company (wic), explora-
tions, conquests both in the Americas and Africa, crowned by a significant role 
in the spread of the plantation complex, including African slavery, to the 
Caribbean. Next came a phase of geographical contraction starting in the mid-
seventeenth century, which, by 1680, resulted in a modest, though endur-
ing,  Dutch Atlantic “empire” of a few scattered islands in the Caribbean 
3Introduction
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(St. Eustatius, Curaçao, Aruba, Bonaire, Saba, St. Maarten [shared with 
France]), some territories on the “Wild Coast” of Northeastern South America 
(Suriname, Essequibo, Berbice, Demerara), and the trading outpost of Elmina 
located on the West Coast of Africa. For the purposes of this book, this is the 
“Dutch Atlantic.” This choice, limiting though it may be, is based on the inter-
twined rationales of chronology and methodological delineations.
In terms of chronology, Dutch Atlantic history could be divided as follows. 
The first period extended from 1600 through the 1670s, started with scat-
tered  explorations but only got underway seriously with the establishment 
of the first wic and the colonization, in this order, of New Netherland, Brazil, 
the Antilles and finally the Guianas. This “Dutch moment in Atlantic history” 
was a period of military ambitions, framed in the wider context of the 
Dutch Revolt against the Spanish and the ensuing short-lived Dutch hege-
monic role. The second phase covers almost the entire period discussed in 
this  book, starting circa 1680 and ending a bit more than a century later. 
This was a century of economic growth but also of shifts in centers of gravity 
within the Dutch orbit. The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) sealed the 
fate not only of the Dutch Republic, but equally of its Atlantic possessions, 
which would never again regain their previous significance. This marks the 
beginning of the third phase in Dutch Atlantic history, a phase of growing 
insignificance.
This choice to focus on the seemingly inglorious period from 1680–1800 – a 
period in which the major settlement colonies of Brazil and New Netherland 
had already been lost, the first wic bankrupted and the Dutch Atlantic “empire” 
had narrowed to some isolated fortresses in West Africa, a few nascent planta-
tion colonies in the Guianas and six small islands in the Caribbean Sea – may 
seem odd, but it is in line with the overarching aims of the book. A reconsid-
eration and reevaluation of why and how the Dutch mattered in the Atlantic 
and the Atlantic mattered for the Dutch requires moving beyond the glory days 
of Atlantic military might, expansion, and control. This story is well-known, 
often repeated, and the answers to the questions are clear.3 What is less clear, 
and what the chapters in this book help illuminate, is how and why the Dutch 
managed to maintain modest economic growth, and a limited, though visible, 
political, intellectual, and cultural presence in the Atlantic against a backdrop 
4 Oostindie and Roitman 
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of the geographic contraction of their Atlantic territories, economic stagna-
tion and decline in the metropole, and dwindling naval might.
This decision to center the studies in this book on the territories remaining 
to the Dutch after 1680 was compelled not only by chronological boundaries, 
but also by related methodological and definitional rationales. Our narrowly 
defined Dutch Atlantic was composed of the places colonized and ruled by 
representative institutions of the Dutch Republic. From the 1680s until the 
late  eighteenth century, Elmina and the Antillean islands were adminis-
tered directly by the wic, Suriname by the Sociëteit van Suriname in which 
the  wic participated, and Berbice and Essequibo (and its dependency 
Demerara) in various ad hoc arrangements.4 The political and institutional 
contours of the Dutch Atlantic remained stable throughout the chronology of 
the book and nothing more would be added or ceded to this empire until the 
Napoleonic Wars.
Defining the Dutch Atlantic, at least during the period from 1680–1800, as 
being bounded by territories under the political and institutional control of 
representatives of the Dutch Republic is clear, simple and straightforward. But 
it is not without conceptual limitations. After all, the cultural staying power of 
“Dutch New York” (the former colony of New Netherland taken over by the 
English in 1664) was impressive.5 Many Dutch residents stayed in the colony 
after it was ceded to the English.6 As late as 1790 (the date of the first us cen-
sus), about 100,000 Americans (or roughly 3.4 percent of the total population) 
were of (distant) Dutch descent.7 In fact, during the debate about the American 
5Introduction
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Constitution in 1788, a translation of the draft proposal was printed in Dutch in 
Albany, which had, at the time, 17.5 percent of the population who claimed 
Dutch ancestry. 8 This would seem to show that Dutch, in some form or another, 
was still used widely enough to necessitate this translation. And the Dutch 
Reformed Church in America continued to use Dutch liturgical forms through-
out the eighteenth century, and did not gain independence from the 
Amsterdam classis until 1772 – over a century after the colony became English.
But, as Jaap Jacobs cogently points out, this persistence of Dutch religious, 
material culture (such as jambless fireplaces in New York colonial homes) and 
linguistic forms had far more to do with the dynamic of otherness in the col-
ony than it did with any inherent adherence to, or affiliation with, the 
Netherlands per se. The colonial Dutch were defined by the English as being 
Dutch and came to define themselves through this prism. Thus, this fascinat-
ing endurance of Dutch culture was less about Dutch institutions or links with 
the Dutch Republic and more about identification over and against an “other” 
on a daily basis.9 Moreover, as Jacobs also points out, there is a tendency to 
oversimplify and mythologize the maintenance of Dutch cultural forms in 
North America, and, thereby, to assume an unbroken link from past to present 
when, in fact, Dutch culture in North America was in an ongoing state of 
change and (re) creation.10 This, of course, does not mean that it could not or 
should not be included in a study of the Dutch Atlantic, but, coupled with the 
fact that it was not under Dutch political rule between 1680–1800, it falls out-
side the purview of this book.
There was a similar dynamic of a persistence of Dutch cultural forms in the 
Cape Colony, which also falls outside the scope of our book, but for different 
reasons. For instance, Theodore Roosevelt (one of the most famous Americans 
of Dutch descent) could exchange Dutch nursery rhymes with the Afrikaners 
on his trip to South Africa in 1909.11 Colonized by the Dutch East India Company 
(voc) in 1652, over the next century and a half the Cape Colony developed into 
the one real settler colony in the Dutch colonial orbit, populated by some 
20,000 Europeans by the late eighteenth century. As a midway point between 
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the Republic and the Dutch settlements in Asia, the colony provided indis-
pensable provisions and maritime facilities to the voc fleet. The Cape Colony 
developed into a hub in a commercial and migratory web linking it to Europe 
and even more to Asia. The thriving trade included captives brought in to per-
form various types of work, though not in export-driven plantation agriculture. 
Some slaves were brought in from Madagascar and Mozambique, though the 
great majority came from Asia. The local Khoikhoi population was subjugated, 
driven further inland and made peripheral, both demographically and socially. 
Thus, the voc developed the Southern tip of Africa into a place largely discon-
nected from the sub-Saharan part of the continent that was fundamental to 
the creation of the early modern Atlantic world.
Recent scholarly work aims to demonstrate “how Cape Town both shaped 
and was shaped by the wider Indian Ocean world,” rather than exclusively or 
even predominantly by the Dutch.12 Very early on, certain Asian luxury goods 
shipped by the voc via the Cape Colony to the Republic were re-exported by 
Dutch merchants to Atlantic markets. In contrast to the Spanish bullion trade, 
however, this Asian-Atlantic trade was of little economic importance and cer-
tainly did not produce significant integration of these various markets.13 
Although further research could demonstrate heretofore unacknowledged 
links between the Cape Colony and the Dutch Atlantic territories between 
1680–1800, the current state of the art does not justify including the Cape 
Colony and its marginal links to the Dutch Atlantic in this book.14
7Introduction
<UN>
 and Ad van der Woude, First Modern Economy, 267; Paul Butel, The Atlantic (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 95.
If, as we have discussed above, defining what territories constituted the 
“Dutch Atlantic” is conceptually tricky, getting a handle on what, if any, charac-
teristics could be said to define the Dutch Atlantic and its relations to a wider 
Atlantic world is also somewhat fraught. Nevertheless, as the chapters in this 
book will illustrate, there are four broad and overarching features that seem to 
be indicative of the Dutch Atlantic writ large. First, there is the exceptional 
economic heterogeneity and openness of the Dutch Atlantic “empire.” In the 
Republic, it was mainly the two coastal provinces (Holland and Zeeland) that 
participated in the Atlantic economy, and the dominance of Amsterdam was 
evident as the center holding the entire Dutch Atlantic together. In Africa, 
there was no such thing as Dutch colonization except for a handful of for-
tresses in and around Elmina, perhaps better defined as tolerated by, rather 
than imposed upon, local rulers. The trade in enslaved people soon dominated 
the African side of the Dutch Atlantic, but there was no question of a Dutch 
metropolitan or Caribbean control over the conditions or supply of captives. 
In the Caribbean, the Dutch-owned territories were either plantation colo-
nies  operated as much as possible along mercantilist lines, or, conversely, 
as free trade centers which thrived by undermining the larger powers’ mercan-
tilist systems.
The connections between the Guianas and the Antilles were remarkably 
weak. In contrast, not only Curaçao and St. Eustatius, but also the plantation 
colonies were intimately linked to other empires – though, for the Guianas, 
this was predominantly to (British) North America only. Crucially important 
for the functioning of this Dutch Atlantic economy was the geopolitical set-
ting. An increasingly weak naval power, the Republic could not guarantee the 
protection of its colonies and commercial networks in times of international 
war and was, therefore, critically dependent on conditions of peace or, con-
versely, on the willingness of France, Spain and, particularly, Great Britain to 
respect Dutch neutrality in times of war.
Secondly, and linked to this economic heterogeneity, was the remarkable 
variety of institutional arrangements, in sharp contrast to the monopoly on 
Dutch trading and governance exercised by the voc in Asia and the Cape, but 
also different from the more uniform Atlantic arrangements imposed by the 
other European powers. While the wic governed the Antilles and Elmina, vari-
ous semi-public bodies governed the Guianas. Likewise, trade arrangements 
varied, but the wic failed to ensure a lasting monopoly, to the benefit of 
both the other semi-public institutions in the Guianas and private merchants 
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and financers. As for governance, within the Republic, the States General, 
the wic with its varying provincial Chambers (dominated by Amsterdam and, 
at times, the Stadtholder) all had their own stakes and claims in the Atlantic. 
The resulting condition of perpetual contestation of authority was typical of 
the Dutch Republic and influenced the emergence of a West Indian interest 
group. In the Atlantic, this decentralized governance structure allowed for a 
significant variety in governmental policies and practices, not to mention 
causing constant bickering over the distribution of military costs and 
economic gains.
A third defining characteristic pertains to the patterns of migration and 
identity formation. The Dutch Atlantic’s heterogeneity was vitally linked to 
migration patterns which, in turn, reflected the natural resources overseas and 
the economic and governance decisions made in the Republic. Because the 
Guianas were developed as plantation colonies and expanded almost perma-
nently, over 90 percent of their populations were slaves, either enslaved 
Africans or, increasingly, their Creole descendants. In the major Antillean 
islands, the share of the enslaved population was considerably lower and 
demographic creolization proceeded at a higher pace. Although the Amer-
indian population living under Dutch rule was likely quite low (reliable figures 
are lacking), they played a vital role in maintaining Dutch control on the 
Guianas.15 European migration was characterized by an exceptional diversity 
in the origin of these immigrants. Large portions of the European settlers 
originated not in the Dutch Republic, but in Germany, the Iberian peninsula, 
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the British isles, France, Scandinavia, or elsewhere, and brought their own lan-
guages and religions.
Facing a dearth in the local Dutch supply of migrants, no attempt was made 
to keep the Atlantic colonies either fully Dutch by nationality or language. 
Nevertheless, there was certainly an imperative to maintain at least a nomi-
nally Dutch Reformed presence in the colonies, despite the diversity of the 
populations in these territories.16 Toleration of other religions was neither so 
clear-cut nor so self-evident in the Dutch Atlantic territories as later myths 
might lead one to believe.17 Yet, in addition to the Lutheran, Moravian, and 
various other Protestant groups in the Dutch colonies, the vast majority of the 
free colored population of Curaçao was Catholic, and the arrival of priests 
from the mainland of South America to serve this population was condoned. 
Particularly striking is the large proportion of Jewish settlers in the major 
Caribbean colonies, a presence which not only helped the Dutch Atlantic to 
tap into important commercial networks, but which also shaped specific pro-
cesses of creolization within the Jewish community and beyond. With the 
exception of the post-1654 exodus from Brazil, there was little European migra-
tion between the Dutch Atlantic colonies, again undermining the idea of the 
Dutch Atlantic empire as a cohesive unit. The cosmopolitan character of the 
white population in the separate Dutch Caribbean colonies occasionally gave 
rise to questions about identities and collective loyalties to the Republic. On a 
practical level, in the overseas Dutch Atlantic, the Dutch language was spoken 
by only a tiny minority, and the two major Creole languages that emerged had 
no Dutch vocabulary, but rather English (Sranan Tongo in Suriname) or 
Portuguese/Spanish (Papiamentu in Curaçao).
Fourthly, and obviously connected to the bifurcation in the economic mod-
els the Dutch employed, slavery regimes varied considerably, and so did slave 
resistance. Ironically, slavery was not a dominant institution in Elmina. In 
Curaçao and possibly also in St. Eustatius, a great deal of slave work was not in 
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agriculture but rather in the urban domestic and particularly the commercial 
and maritime sectors, and here the division between free and enslaved labor 
became increasingly blurred. Of course, the slavery regime in the Guianas, 
quintessential plantation economies, was far more typical of slavery elsewhere 
in plantation America. Slave resistance, on the other hand, resulted in the truly 
extraordinary development of substantial maroon communities in Suriname’s 
tropical rain forest, eventually recognized by Dutch authorities who lacked the 
means to contain this menace to the colony otherwise. Internal marronage 
was not an option on the Lesser Antilles, but there was some maritime marron-
age from Curaçao to the Spanish Main. On the other hand, and perhaps in 
contrast to the long-held idea that slavery in Curaçao was relatively mild, 
the  island had several slave revolts. The uprising in 1795, in reaction to the 
Haitian Revolution, was among the most significant in the late eighteenth 
century Caribbean.
All the contributions to this volume speak, in one way or another, to these 
characteristics of heterogeneity and diversity in economics, institutional gov-
ernance systems, and slavery regimes, as well as in the composition of the 
populations and their respective processes of identity formation in the territo-
ries under Dutch rule. Furthermore, the various chapters all acknowledge that 
the Dutch-controlled part of the Atlantic could only develop by developing 
strong trans-imperial connections, which in turn contributed to the further 
economic and cultural expansion of the Atlantic world at large. The essays 
reinforce the importance of both interimperial encounters and of regional 
connections which, certainly in the Caribbean, were really one and the same. 
Thus, the chapters in this volume emphasize that these trans-imperial connec-
tions were visible on the economic level, but also in the interpersonal sphere. 
These essays are informed by the search for trans-imperial dynamics – an 
acknowledgement of the tension between the individual, the network, the 
regional, and the (inter)national. This basically reflects the state of the art in 
the writing of Atlantic history today, where the study of individual territories 
and sub-empires is increasingly framed in a larger comparative and interdisci-
plinary framework.
 Bridging Borders, Linking Empires
Wim Klooster’s piece on “Curaçao as a Transit Center to the Spanish Main and 
the French West Indies” is centered on the connections between three impe-
rial actors in the Caribbean – the Dutch, the Spanish, and the French. Klooster 
argues that the main commercial development in eighteenth century Curaçao 
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was the intensification of contacts with the French Caribbean. This is an 
important point that has been ignored in the historiography of the island, 
which generally emphasizes the role Curaçao played as a gateway to the 
Spanish American markets, particularly on the Venezuelan coast in the cacao 
trade, or else, to a lesser extent, focuses on the importance of North American 
merchants and English subjects residing on the island for the provision of des-
perately needed foodstuffs to the colony. Klooster summarizes this research on 
the Spanish and North American trades in his chapter, but particularly takes 
his readers beyond these relatively well-trodden paths.
Klooster shows how merchants in metropolitan Dutch ports and their cor-
respondents on the island itself capitalized on the vast quantities of sugar, cof-
fee, and indigo produced on Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Saint-Domingue. 
Curaçaoan merchants found an additional niche in the seemingly mundane 
mule trade. Mules were vital to the functioning of the sugar plantations on the 
French islands, and Curaçaoan merchants used their already-established con-
tacts on the Spanish Main to ship these beasts to the French colonies where 
the market seemed nearly insatiable. There was also a voracious market for 
slaves on the French islands, especially in Saint-Domingue – a market the 
Curaçoan merchants were happy to feed. What also comes to the fore in 
Klooster’s essay is the pervasive tension between attempts at mercantilist con-
trol versus free trade. He show that the traders of Curaçao were continually 
evading other empire’s trade restrictions, whether on the Spanish mainland or 
on the British and French sugar islands – and found willing partners there.
Christian Koot’s work on “Anglo-Dutch Trade in the Chesapeake and the 
British Caribbean, 1621–1733” reinforces these points about the tension between 
mercantilist control and free trade. His piece emphasizes the role of personal 
connections between Dutch and English traders in the Chesapeake and British 
Caribbean in creating long-lasting and durable commercial networks that 
transcended national boundaries. These personal, cross-national, relation-
ships were also important in shaping British colonists’ perceptions of, and 
reactions to, their own role within the increasingly mercantilist empire. He 
shows how Dutch and British settlers were allies in circumventing British trade 
rules for much of the seventeenth century, until their interests began to diverge 
in the early eighteenth century. Koot argues that Dutch trade, especially in the 
Chesapeake and the British Caribbean, was important to the early develop-
ment of British colonies and, thus, the British Atlantic, which highlights the 
centrality of interimperial contacts in shaping the Atlantic.
Koot asserts that Dutch trade mattered in shaping an understanding of the 
evolution of the British Atlantic both because it aided economic development 
at the fringes of the empire and also because it shaped the political economy 
12 Oostindie and Roitman 
<UN>
of that empire. To support his arguments, Koots’ essay examines the extent and 
scope of Anglo-Dutch colonial exchange, the ways Dutch and British mer-
chants transacted business, the networks they constructed, and the colonial 
nodal points where trade was based. Koot pays special attention to the legal 
and political structures that allowed this trade to flourish and, eventually, to 
whither. His essay demonstrates that British colonists pivoted towards driving 
their own intercolonial trade in the eighteenth century, as well as that British 
planters’ embrace of mercantilist policies that protected their interests in the 
West Indies and Chesapeake should, according to Koot, remind scholars that 
the politics of empire always mattered in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.
In his chapter on Paramaribo, Karwan Fatah-Black similarly acknowledges 
the importance of personal relationships in his discussion of the ways in which 
settlers helped intensify interregional and interimperial connections. For 
instance, healthy colonists were an important “commodity,” especially colo-
nists who had survived a year in the tropics, and Fatah-Black details how 
interimperial conflicts arose between the Dutch and the English over retaining 
such colonists. He also shows how the migration of Jews to Suriname from 
Barbados, and, after Zeeland’s take-over in the 1660s, back from Suriname to 
Barbados created ties between the two colonies – ties that were largely outside 
of the control of the government officials and were of vital importance to the 
functioning of trade in the colony.
Fatah-Black argues that intercolonial networks, most of which were based 
on circuits of exchange outside the control of the Suriname Company, which 
governed the territory, were constitutive for the colony. He shows that, over the 
course of the eighteenth century, Dutch colonists and North-American mer-
chants found ways to cooperate and circumvent the rules and regulations 
issued from Amsterdam and London. In fact, he asserts that not a single Dutch 
Guianese settlement would have grown and blossomed without creating ties 
to other non-Dutch colonies and relying on the resources available under the 
formal rule of other empires and states operating in the Americas. Importantly, 
Fatah-Black challenges the assumption of a unique Dutch intermediary 
function in the Atlantic by confirming the research of Johannes Postma, 
which posited a world of connections operated by non-Dutch ships and 
non-Dutch merchants.
This world of connections led to constant tensions between attempts to 
assert mercantilist control in Suriname, over and against settlers’ desires for 
greater flexibility and freedom to conduct their own trade on their own terms. 
While Curaçao and St. Eustatius were largely free of these mercantilist restric-
tions, metropolitan policies for the Guianas retained more of a mercantilist 
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character. As Fatah-Black discusses, metropolitan decision-making still 
allowed for an opening up of trade to the British Atlantic colonies in the early 
eighteenth century. Despite this opening up of trade with the British Atlantic 
colonies, Fatah-Black also notes the divergence in interests between the 
English and the Dutch remarked upon by Koot.
This underlines that the politics of empire always mattered in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. This is a point also brought up by Henk den 
Heijer, who studies petitions made by merchants engaged in the West Indies 
trade. Den Heijer asserts that these petitions demonstrate that merchants 
were continuously working, in varying alliances, to defend their West Indian 
trade interests via the States General. The States General, in turn, were usually 
willing to grant these requests because they too had an interest in the 
continuity of Atlantic shipping and trade, even if the financial resources they 
could provide were limited. Den Heijer’s chapter illustrates, again, the con-
stant tension between individual actors, consortiums of merchants operating 
within various networks, and the effect of metropolitan policies on the Dutch 
Atlantic colonies.
Kenneth Morgan’s essay “Anglo-Dutch Economic Relations in the Atlantic 
World, 1688–1783” pays special attention to the legal and political structures 
that allowed trade between the Dutch and the English to flourish and eventu-
ally, as noted by Fatah-Black and Koot, to wither. Morgan examines some of 
the underlying economic mechanisms between European powers in the 
Atlantic. Morgan’s research validates and reinforces the assertion of other 
scholars that the Dutch supported Britain’s public credit by significant amounts 
of investment in the British national debt. Morgan’s work goes on to show that 
the Dutch contributed financially to the strength of public credit in Britain 
and, thereby, assisted in the British attempt to stave off the rivalry of the French 
in the eighteenth century Atlantic trading world.
Morgan also underscores the well-studied point that Anglo-Dutch eco-
nomic connections were extensive in the Atlantic world between the so-called 
“Glorious Revolution” in England (1688) and the American Revolution (1776). 
Morgan repeats the point that, despite the English takeover of New Netherland, 
the merchants of New York continued to have an important Dutch component 
until at least the American War of Independence. This meant that trade 
between New York and other English territories, especially in the Caribbean, 
had a significant Dutch influence between 1689 and 1776.
Morgan reemphasizes the important role played by Curaçao and 
St. Eustatius as transit points for the international exchange of goods and how 
this served Anglo-Dutch economic relations in a mutually beneficial way, a 
role also discussed in Wim Klooster’s essay. Moreover, Dutch smuggling to 
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North America, in defiance of mercantilist restrictions, demonstrated the links 
between Dutch and Anglophone merchants as part of the Atlantic trading sys-
tem, a point mirrored in the work of Koot and Fatah-Black. In addition, Morgan 
makes the new point that Bermuda’s merchants and mariners found a signifi-
cant outlet for their maritime activities through commercial contacts with 
Dutch Caribbean islands in yet another example of the importance of interim-
perial contacts. Lastly, Morgan addresses the issue of these sorts of so-called 
“leaks” in the mercantilist system. His contribution shows how important this 
porousness of the mercantilist systems of Britain and France were, and how 
well-situated the Dutch were to take advantage of these seemingly necessary 
escape valves in imperial systems.
Silvia Marzagalli’s work on “The French Atlantic and the Dutch, Late 
Seventeeth-Late Eighteenth century” also grapples with the necessity of “escape 
values” in the mercantilist system. Her contribution reinforces the importance of 
porousness in the mercantilist systems of Britain and France and shows how the 
Dutch were centrally placed to profit from holes in these systems. Marzagalli also 
shows how the exclusion of the Dutch from direct trade to French America was 
less effective in wartime, when French colonies were opened up to trade by neu-
tral parties such as the Dutch. More significantly for Marzagalli’s argument, 
the exclusive colonial system created by France was viable in the 
long run only if some mechanisms compensated for the structural unbalance of 
trade it generated. She believes that the Dutch trade with France and its Atlantic 
colonies are a case study for testing the hypothesis that war played a central role 
in the viability of the French Atlantic system.
Her work details the ways in which the Dutch played a role in the emergence 
and viability of French colonial trade from the second part of the seventeenth 
century up to the French Revolution. This role evolved over time. Whereas 
Dutch capital proved essential in the rise of French-based shipping to the West 
Indies, the Dutch were, thereafter, essential mainly in organizing a flourishing 
re-export trade of colonial goods from the French ports to the Netherlands on 
Dutch ships. The point that underlies Marzagalli’s essay is that the French colo-
nial trade originated, flourished and persisted only through the collaboration 
of non-French merchants and the existence of non-French markets, among 
which the Dutch and the Netherlands were a relevant element, though no lon-
ger the most dynamic as time passed. Her essay also reinforces the importance 
of metropolitan policies. She emphasizes the importance of European states in 
defining identities and citizenships – definitions which played a huge role in 
determining who could and could not participate in colonial trade.
Marzagalli’s conclusions are echoed in Ana Crespo Solana’s “A Network-
Based Merchant Empire: Dutch Trade in the Hispanic Atlantic context 
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(1680–1740)” in which the issue of citizenship is of major importance. Crespo 
Solano discusses the various means for determining who could become natural-
ized and thereby participate in Spain’s trade with the Americas. Specifically, she 
looks at the ways the Flemish and Dutch immigrants to Cádiz maintained their 
own identities, manifested in their merchant networks, while also belonging to 
the larger Spanish empire. She explores this topic in order to illustrate how 
Spain depended on foreigners to conduct its trade with the Americas.
Using a case study of the Dutch and Flemish “nations” in the city of Cádiz, 
Crespo Solana demonstrates that through family and “nation”-based networks, 
these Dutch and Flemish merchants played a vital role in the American trade 
based in Cádiz. These trans-imperial networks of Dutch and Flemish mer-
chants help Crespo Solana make her case that the Spanish empire was a truly 
multinational undertaking since its inception in the fifteenth century, and was 
involved in a process of what might be termed internationalization that only 
intensified in the latter part of the seventeenth through the mid-eighteenth 
century with the active participation of these Dutch and Flemish Cádiz-based 
networks.
Victor Wilson and Han Jordaan’s work on “The Eighteenth-century Danish, 
Dutch, and Swedish Free Ports in the Northeastern Caribbean: Continuity and 
Change,” is, by its very nature, a study of cross-imperial connections and 
emphasizes what a truly multinational undertaking Atlantic engagement was. 
Wilson and Jordaan argue that the commercial networks on these small 
Danish, Dutch, and Swedish islands were operated similarly, despite belonging 
to different European empires. They demonstrate that merchants based on 
these islands often had contacts in all three free ports, due to their proximity to 
each other as well as to the existing regional systems of trade. These examples 
show that the merchant communities of these small and relatively obscure 
islands formed part of a complicated and eminently trans-imperial network 
that extended to neighboring colonies as well as to various countries in 
Europe directly.
Yet as self-organized and trans-imperial as these networks were, imperial 
policies were certainly influential, if not determinate. In fact, as Jordaan and 
Wilson argue, the experience of Dutch free trade informed and influenced 
Danish and Swedish colonial policy towards the creation of their own free 
ports of St. Barthélemy and St. Thomas to a considerable extent. And wars were 
turning points in the Dutch Atlantic – turning points which ruptured interim-
perial networks. Jordaan and Wilson insist upon the importance of the Fourth 
Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) as the beginning of the end for the Dutch in the 
Atlantic. As Jordaan and Wilson note, one critical component had been lost in 
this war for the Dutch: neutrality in international conflicts. Beginning in 1793 
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the Dutch were involved in two decades of almost continuous warfare. The 
Fourth Anglo-Dutch War was, for example, the death knell to St. Eustatius’ role 
as regional market, and, hence, the impetus for emigration from the island. For 
St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy the decline of the Dutch colonies, which began 
as a consequence of the war, had a lasting impact. Immigration from St. 
Eustatius to the Danish and Swedish free ports increased and helped spur on 
an admittedly brief economic boom.
In this vein, Gert Oostindie argues in his piece “Dutch Atlantic Decline 
During ‘The Age of Revolutions’” that, as important as all these aspects of law, 
politics, and governance were, it was ultimately war, peace, and neutrality that 
were central to the course of the Dutch in the Atlantic between 1680 and 1800. 
As Oostindie shows, the Republic, by scale and military and naval power no 
match for the major Atlantic players, had used its neutrality to build itself a 
niche as a broker greasing the mercantilist system. The decentralized fiscal sys-
tem of the Dutch Republic, coupled with the relative weakness of the Dutch 
navy, meant that the Republic became dependent upon its neutrality vis-à-vis 
Britain for its Atlantic trade to function between 1689 and 1783. This neutrality 
was, to a large extent, predicated upon the fiscal-military strength of Britain, 
which protected Anglo-Dutch commercial endeavors from enemy incursion. 
He shows how the years between 1780–1815 taught the Dutch the lesson that a 
weak state’s neutrality lasts only as long as larger states condone it. Oostindie 
argues that, after 1815, in the emerging post-mercantile Atlantic, there was no 
longer a need for trade zones such as Curaçao or St. Eustatius at all, and no 
need for illicit connections on the margins of mercantilism, so the very issue of 
neutrality became insignificant. The imperfect monopolies of the West Indian 
companies were challenged and broken, eventually giving way to direct Dutch 
state control of colonial affairs.
Oostindie goes on to show that the changes that really mattered in the 
Dutch Atlantic – abolition, geographical contraction, the loss of the brokerage 
function – were all externally imposed by other empires, mostly the British, 
and grudgingly taken on in the Netherlands and by the local elites in the colo-
nies. His findings reinforce those of the other authors in the volume who assert 
the importance of metropolitan policies, the imposition of legal and institu-
tional regimes in the Atlantic, and the centrality of war, peace, and neutrality 
in the functioning of Atlantic systems, even while acknowledging the impor-
tance of personal, cross-imperial connections that often circumvented the 
restrictions placed upon them by governments.
Piet Emmer’s chapter on “The Rise and Decline of the Dutch Atlantic, 1600–
1800” addresses some of the same themes that concern Oostindie such as why 
and how the Dutch empire in the Atlantic, which had managed to maintain 
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itself and even grow modestly economically, declined. Emmer argues for both 
internal and external factors. The fact that the Dutch were unable to hold on to 
one or more large-scale settlement colonies was due to an external factor: the 
lack of naval power. Even France, a much larger, more powerful and more pop-
ulous country than the Netherlands, lost its settlement colony in North 
America, albeit a century later than the Dutch. However, the declining Dutch 
share in the Atlantic trade was caused by an internal factor: the relative decline 
in the productivity of Dutch trade and shipping. That is why the Dutch share in 
the trade in goods and slaves to non-Dutch colonies diminished relative to that 
of its competitors in areas where protective legislation hardly made the differ-
ence. It also explains why the Dutch were unable to profit commercially from 
the opening up of Latin America and relied heavily on protectionist legislation 
in order to prevent being outcompeted by British and us firms in the trade and 
shipping to their own colonies. Trade barriers, the much-hated stumbling 
block for Dutch expansion in the seventeenth century, had, Emmer writes, 
become a protective wall.
The contributions discussed so far emphasize the political and economic 
nature of linkages from and to the Dutch Atlantic. But it was not just in the 
economic and political arenas that trans-imperial connections were of great 
importance. Karel Davids challenges existing historiography and shows that 
the evolution of knowledge networks in the North Atlantic in the eighteenth 
century was a more complex affair than an exercise with merely two teams: the 
British and the American colonials, as it is so often depicted. Players on both 
sides of the Atlantic not only entertained bilateral relations but often corre-
sponded with people in more than one region at the same time. Multilateral 
relationships were by no means uncommon. And these sorts of relationships 
developed not just between actors based in Britain, the Continent and the 
British American colonies, but also between American colonials or European 
continentals and people living in South America, notably in the Dutch Guianas. 
During the course of the eighteenth century, networks of knowledge thus cut 
right across different imperial spaces. Thus, the scholarly Atlantic transcended 
boundaries between the British, Dutch, French or Spanish Atlantics.
The Dutch academics or members of learned societies Karel Davids studied 
were aware of the West Indies, and played a central role in the emergence and 
evolution of scholarly networks of knowledge. They communicated with each 
other through written correspondence and journals of a scholarly or general 
nature about these territories. This was a small group of people whose interest 
in, and knowledge of, the Dutch Atlantic possessions was not quickly, easily, or 
widely disseminated to the general populace. But, as Davids admits, colonial 
possessions were not a sine qua non for Dutch actors to play a part in flows of 
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knowledge. Cross-Atlantic networks of knowledge emerged and evolved in 
part independently of the existence of colonial empires. What Davids demon-
strates, then, is that while the Atlantic, in general, figured in literate circuits, 
and the Dutch Atlantic territories mattered for it, there was no specific recog-
nition or understanding of a Dutch Atlantic per se.
Jessica Roitman and Aviva Ben-Ur’s chapter “Adultery Here and There: 
Crossing Sexual Boundaries in the Dutch Jewish Atlantic” also looks at the pre-
eminent importance of information flows. They, too, show how information 
flowed back and forth between the Amsterdam Jewish community and its 
“daughter” communities in the Dutch colonies of Curaçao and Suriname, and 
demonstrate through the lens of specific cases of legal and social transgres-
sions the reciprocal cultural and legal influence the Jewish communities in the 
colonies had on the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam. This is a different take on 
linkages and connections than the economic and political one taken by most 
of the other chapters, but the dynamics are the same. Roitman and Ben-Ur 
look at the interplay of, and tensions between, the multiple strands of law – 
Jewish, Dutch metropolitan, and Dutch law as actually practiced in the colo-
nies – under which Jewish communities in Dutch territories lived. In their 
study, they look at particular incidents of adultery, a crime under Dutch civil, 
Christian, and Jewish law, and how this crime was dealt with. Interwoven in 
their story is a discussion of how these legal systems impacted the surrounding 
enslaved, Eurafrican, and free black populations.
Ben-Ur and Roitman’s essay on Portuguese Jewish communities in Curaçao 
and Suriname approaches issues such as the maintenance of communal 
boundaries, relations across and between religious and ethnic boundaries, and 
the creation of a creolized society. By focusing on a highly mobile, diasporic, 
and, by its very nature, trans-imperial community within the Dutch Atlantic, 
Ben-Ur and Roitman bring to the fore the importance of identification, affilia-
tion, and, importantly, demographics. And, as was the case in both Marzagalli 
and Crespo Solana’s essays, the definition of identities and citizenship is an 
underlying theme in the chapter. Citizenship status was of particular impor-
tance to the Jewish population in the Dutch Atlantic, which often had to fight 
to assert its rights to settle and trade in the region, despite the liberal privileges 
extended by the Dutch authorities.
Identification, or lack thereof, is a theme also picked up in Benjamin 
Schmidt’s chapter “The ‘Dutch’ ‘Atlantic’ and the Dubious Case of Frans Post.” 
Schmidt makes the case that the Dutch served as entrepreneurs of exoticism, 
manufacturing products that, first, tended to dilute the distinct parts of the 
world, mix and match geographic spaces, and highlight the bits and pieces of 
the world that seemed vaguely “exotic” rather than particular to this or that 
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national interest. This meant that these products tended to efface as much as 
possible the Dutch presence overseas in order to create books and pictures 
depicting an exotic world that appealed not particularly to a Dutch, but to a 
broadly European audience. They abnegated any sense of their own (Dutch) 
colonial and imperial presence – which, by this period, were but poor reflec-
tions of the imperial profiles of Spain, Britain, and France – preferring to pro-
mote a kind of hyper-imperial or pan-colonial European sensibility. They 
invented, thus, not only an exotic subject but also a European consumer of the 
exotic world. And this means, according to Schmidt, that there is no distinctly 
Dutch Atlantic in these sources so much as a generically “European” “exotic” 
world, behind which, to be sure, stood numerous entrepreneurial Dutch ate-
liers. What Schmidt demonstrates, then, is that while the Atlantic, in general, 
figured in literate circuits, the Dutch Atlantic, specifically, was of limited sig-
nificance, an idea also echoed in Davids’ essay.
Alison Games summarizes the essays in the book in the final chapter and 
emphasizes the underlying narratives that emerge in the collection – the interna-
tional orientation of the Dutch Atlantic as seen in settlement patterns and lan-
guage, the important economic ties the Dutch forged (as middlemen, as traders, as 
brokers, as inhabitants of trade entrepôts) with other polities and people, and its 
decentralization. Games also contextualizes the essays in this book within trends 
in Atlantic history. Atlantic historiography is moving away from national or impe-
rial perspectives and is taking a transnational and global turn. As Games points 
out, transnational themes have special salience for the Dutch, with their global 
enterprises in this era, and in light of their greater financial success in the East 
Indies. Games goes to say that the Dutch Atlantic might be even more important 
to Atlantic history than it is to the history of the Netherlands. A study of the Dutch 
in the Atlantic world reveals just the kind of Atlantic history that people have been 
calling for – entangled, international, multilingual, networked, connected.
Yet this entangled, international, multilingual (Dutch Atlantic) world was 
also multicultural, and Games critiques the book for its focus on the networks 
and connections of Europeans and their descendants. Amerindians and their 
vital role in the maintenance of Dutch military and political authority in the 
Guianas are left out. The maroons against whom the Amerindians helped 
the Dutch in the Guianas and their persistent challenges to Dutch control in 
the region receive little mention. In fact, the role of enslaved Africans and 
free people of color are only mentioned in passing in a few of the essays. 
Moreover, Africa, Games observes, is in this book not connected to the Dutch 
Atlantic despite the fact that Elmina was governed by the Dutch between 1680 
and 1800. And religion, with the notable exception of discussions of Portuguese 
Jews and their communities and networks, is largely ignored in this volume.
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Games, we acknowledge, is right to point out these omissions. Obviously 
this volume is not exhaustive, nor was it intended to be. Cogent, challenging, 
and enlightening as all these essays are, they can only do so much. The scope 
of the authors’ briefs were limited in chronology and geography. They were to 
begin to answer the questions of how, exactly, did the Atlantic matter to the 
Dutch? And why was the Atlantic engagement of the Dutch important not 
only for the Dutch themselves, but also for all the other actors involved in the 
Atlantic in the early modern period? The authors’ attempts to answer these 
questions have been presented. And it is not surprising that most of the 
answers are grounded in economics. The Atlantic was more important for the 
Dutch economically in the period between 1680 and 1800 than has been 
acknowledged to date. Many of the authors get beyond this simple fact and 
show us how this economic growth happened – via personal connections that 
were often regional, intra-imperial, cross-national, and multicultural. But this 
economic growth (and eventual decline), as many of the chapters also demon-
strate, occurred within a set of international laws governing trade and against 
a backdrop of the extension of European politics into the Atlantic domains, 
including neutrality, war, and social movements such as revolutions and calls 
for abolition. A few of the authors also show that the Dutch in the Atlantic 
mattered for other nations such as the English, French and Spanish who 
depended on foreigners to maintain their own empires, and that Dutch imper-
atives for settlement mattered a great deal for ethnic and religious minorities 
such as the Portuguese Jews. And the Atlantic mattered for Dutch intellectual 
and artistic circuits and vice versa, though, as two of the essays argue, there 
was little recognition of the space as particularly Dutch.
But questions remain. Due to logistical and practical reasons, not all topics 
pertaining to the vast oceanic space that comprised the Dutch Atlantic, even 
with a limited chronology and geographical focus, could be addressed in one 
volume. Indeed, as Games notes, perhaps the most illustrative examples of 
connections, linkages, entanglement, are yet to come. How did Elmina con-
nect culturally and economically with the rest of the Atlantic world? How can 
the Dutch cultural legacy in North America and the Cape Colony be included 
in a conceptualization of the Dutch Atlantic? What were the Cape Colony’s 
linkages to the (Dutch) Atlantic world? Furthermore, although some work has 
already been done on the dynamic role of Amerindians in the Dutch settle-
ments, further comparative research would help shed light on all sorts of fasci-
nating questions about European colonization.18 Likewise, although much 
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scholarship has produced on religion in the Dutch colonies, a synthesis is lack-
ing. Again, many questions remain.
For now, we hope this volume takes up the challenge formulated by Jan de 
Vries that the contradictory nature of the early modern “Dutch” Atlantic may 
offer the perfect test of the viability of the very concept of an Atlantic world – 
an assertion echoed by Alison Games.19 By studying the “expansion without 
empire” of the most loosely national and least centralized of all European 
states involved, we are, by definition, looking at historical phenomena that 
were transatlantic and trans-imperial. We have advocated an approach to the 
Dutch Atlantic that privileges connections, and believe that any study should 
be conceptualized, at least partially, in terms of its linkages with other locales. 
This kind of transnational or entangled history is easily called for, but very hard 
to do, as is seen by the limitations of this volume. For all its challenges how-
ever – challenges with which all the authors in this book have grappled – it is 
vitally important to try to do this kind of research: transnational, multilingual, 
looking at the Atlantic in terms of intersections, entanglements, and interac-
tions. This perspective will help us in reflecting on the question of whether all 
of the globalizing early modern Atlantic was really an integrated world, and if 
so, by what standards precisely. This volume opens up new perspectives on our 
understanding of the place of Dutch colonies and networks in the early mod-
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Curaçao as a Transit Center to the Spanish Main 
and the French West Indies
Wim Klooster
An official Dutch government report described Curaçao in the late eighteenth 
century as “the only safe port that the state has in the West Indies, one in which 
more than 300 ships of the largest size can be sheltered and where they are 
shielded against the force of wind and sea, where all the ships can be keel-
hauled and recover from sustained damage, where a defeated fleet or mer-
chantmen coming from our colonies can always flee because of its leeward 
location…”1 Ideal for shipping traffic, the island had long since been an impor-
tant regional market, described by a contemporary author as a “small paradise 
of earthly abundance.”2 The aim of this chapter is to review the island’s com-
mercial heyday, its connections with the Republic, its place in Caribbean trade 
networks, and the concomitant mobility of its populations.
Captured from Habsburg Spain during the last stages of the Dutch Revolt, 
Curaçao did not immediately become a center of commercial activity. It began 
its life under Dutch rule as a naval base. Although some military raids were 
launched from the island to inflict damage on settlements on the Venezuelan 
coast, Curaçao did not play a key role in the Atlantic theater of the war with 
Spain. The West India Company even considered abandoning the former 
Spanish cattle ranch in the startup years. It was not until the late 1650s, a 
decade after the Dutch Republic and Spain had signed the Treaty of Münster 
(1648), that trade – especially with nearby Spanish colonies – became the 
island’s lifeblood. In the eighteenth century, Curaçao also forged close ties with 
the French Caribbean, a connection that historians have virtually ignored.
The transformation of Curaçao from a sleepy, sparsely inhabited island to a 
bustling commercial hub was a rapid one. Even before the Dutch West India 
Company (WIC) declared Willemstad a free port in 1675, Curaçao had earned a 
reputation for the wide array of European manufactures and African slaves 
available for sale. Often in defiance of foreign mercantilist laws, the island’s 
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pioneer merchants established commercial contacts with English settlers in 
North America and populations across the Greater Caribbean. The buttress of 
Curaçao’s trade was the business conducted in Spanish America, in particular 
the nearby Spanish Main. Venezuela was a rich provider of tobacco and hides 
and, especially, cacao, of which it was the world’s leading producer. The regions 
to its West between Panama and Río Hacha offered copious amounts of silver, 
which the Dutch usually received in exchange for their supplies at Portobelo. 
In the first half of the eighteenth century, this was the source of virtually all 
cash on Curaçao.3 Many sloops and schooners also left Willemstad for Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo. So intensive and valuable was the traffic with 
these areas that authorities in metropolitan Spain came to view Curaçao along 
with Colônia do Sacramonte in the Southern Cone of South America as the 
two main gates through which smuggled goods entered the Spanish colonies.4 
In view of the scope of the illegal trade, the administrator of the coast guard of 
Florida and Cuba therefore once suggested that the Spanish invade Curaçao. 
He called the island one of the worst “hangnails” in America.5
British and Dutch vessels also established trade links between the Thirteen 
Colonies and the Dutch island. Due to its poor soil and lack of rainfall, 
Curaçao was unable to produce its own food. Provisions had to be imported, 
first from the Dutch Republic, but soon most foodstuffs were supplied by 
North American merchants and imported by English subjects residing on the 
island.6 A voyage from New York took only three weeks, while ocean-going 
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Dutch ships often needed several months to complete the trip to Curaçao, 
frequently causing the provisions to decay. Besides, the New Yorkers and 
New Englanders offered their provisions at a lower price. In 1724, for exam-
ple, flour from New York cost 14 cents, that from the Netherlands at least 
18 cents per pound.7 Dependence on these supplies could become a liability 
in wartime. During the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739–1748), fought in the 
Caribbean between Britain and Spain, the governor of New York refused to 
sell even one barrel of flour or meat to the Curaçaoans, causing serious 
embarrassment on the Dutch island.8
From an early date, the commercial fortunes of Curaçao were linked to the 
interimperial slave trade. In 1642, a West India Company official first suggested 
to make the island a transit center in the slave trade from Luanda to the Spanish 
Caribbean. Portuguese merchants had traditionally provided ports such as 
Veracruz and Cartagena with bonded Central Africans whom they had 
embarked in Luanda, but that town had fallen into Dutch hands the year 
before.9 While this plan failed to materialize, some 15 years later Dutch slave 
ships began to call at Curaçao and sell their human cargoes. The creation of a 
slave market on the island fulfilled economic needs for both sides involved. 
Dutch slave traders had survived the collapse of Brazil by selling slaves to 
foreign colonies, but the notion of a reliable single market must have been 
attractive to them. At the same time, a Spanish colonist took the initiative to 
approach Curaçao’s Director Mathias Beck and suggest he sell slaves in 
Portobelo in order to blaze a trail by which settlers on the Spanish Main would 
come and trade for slaves in the future.10 The trade in humans was so success-
ful that the Genoese holders of the asiento, the monopoly of slave shipments 
to Spanish America, signed a contract with the Dutch West India Company in 
1662 that allowed them to buy slaves in Curaçao. The trend was thus set for the 
decades to come, during which the island became the largest transit port in 
the inter-American slave trade. The slave trade to Venezuela and 
New Granada was not even interrupted by the War of the Spanish Succession 
(1702–1713), which found the Dutch suppliers and their Spanish American 
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customers in opposite camps.11 In all, some 70,000 slaves found their way from 
Africa to Curaçao in the period 1656–1730, most of whom were reshipped to 
Spanish colonies.12 For those deemed unfit for Spanish bondage, Curaçao was 
their final destination. In these years, Han Jordaan has argued, “nearly every 
free person seems to have been involved in the slave trade to some degree.”13
Once the regular availability of enslaved Africans attracted customers from 
the Spanish colonies, Dutch merchants began to offer a wide variety of dry 
goods for sale. As a consequence, their purchases of products grown in foreign 
parts of the Americas increased rapidly. By 1663, large amounts of Venezuelan 
cacao were already being exported from Curaçao to the Dutch Republic. The 
proximity to Venezuela, the world’s largest cacao producer, allowed the Dutch 
to play a large role in the transatlantic cacao trade and Amsterdam to become 
one of the foremost global cacao markets. The holds of ships leaving Curaçao 
for Dutch metropolitan ports also included tobacco from Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
Venezuela, and Santo Domingo, sugar and coffee from the French West Indies, 
as well as indigo, logwood, and hides. Besides, bullion and specie from the 
Spanish Main accounted for more than a quarter of the value of the home-
bound cargoes.
International warfare greatly enhanced the fortunes of the Dutch entrepôt. 
Trade was especially brisk during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, the Seven Years’ 
War (1756–1763), and the War of American Independence (1775–1783), but 
declined once peaceful relations returned and foreign authorities could 
focus on the fight against smugglers. The 1730s and the early 1750s stand out 
as periods in which officials in Venezuela successfully blocked the 
Curaçaoans’ access to local products, creating hardship on the Dutch island.14 
During the Seven Years’ War, merchants from Curaçao and St. Eustatius were 
so active in their trade with Saint-Domingue that they helped maintain com-
mercial communication between France and the Antilles.15 Due to Dutch 
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neutrality, Curaçao’s trade with the belligerents also thrived in the season 
of war. When, in 1779, France’s participation in the American War of 
Independence (1775–1783) induced French authorities to invite all nations, 
except the British, to come and trade freely, many Curaçaoan shipowners 
heeded the call.16
 Connections with the French Antilles
All of this has been documented and distilled in monographs.17 What has 
been understudied are the commercial ties with the French Caribbean and 
the eighteenth-century slave trade. Curaçao’s French connections assumed a 
growing significance in the course of the eighteenth century due to the eco-
nomic development of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and especially the Southern 
parts of Saint-Domingue. Historians have overlooked the vital link Curaçao 
provided between the French colonies and the Spanish American markets.18 
Thus, in the 1740s, French merchants based in the French colonies sold silk 
products to shipowners on Curaçao, making a handsome profit, since their 
merchan dise was cheaper than the same French silk arriving on Dutch ships 
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from Amsterdam.19 In the second half of the century, the French islands sent 
large amounts of syrup, rum, and brandy to Curaçao.
In the first quarter of the eighteenth century, Curaçao became a transit 
point in the mule trade from Tierra Firme to the French colonies, a business 
that eventually developed into the main branch of Curaçao’s commerce.20 
Mules were used as a mode of transport and as pack animals, but predomi-
nantly as draft animals on Caribbean sugar plantations. Because of their 
strength, their short lifespan, and their inability to reproduce, they were in 
perennial demand. As early as 1723, the governor of Coro (Venezuela) com-
plained about the annual export of 1500 mules to Caribbean islands by way of 
Curaçao.21 Curaçaoan sailors were soon experts in handling and transporting 
these animals, which they often introduced illegally in Curaçao by steering 
their vessels to the island’s outer bays.22 In the early years of the nineteenth 
century, Alexander von Humboldt witnessed the embarkation of mules in 
Puerto Cabello (Venezuela): “They are thrown down with ropes, and then 
hoisted on board the vessels by means of a machine resembling a crane. 
Ranged in two files, the mules with difficulty keep their footing during the roll-
ing and pitching of the ship; and in order to frighten and render them more 
docile, a drum is beaten during a great part of the day and night.”23 The ten-
dency of the mules to kick and bite made it easy to smuggle all kinds of goods 
on the vessels carrying them, since customs collectors preferred safety over 
vigilance.24
The French Caribbean import of the mules, whose role in the sugar mills 
was crucial, took off dramatically in the second half of the century. In the year 
1786, French planters imported 6487 mules from the Spanish Main and on the 
eve of the Haitian Revolution, 50,000 mules were counted in Saint-Domingue, 
where a single plantation could use 80 of these animals. Not all of these ani-
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mals, incidentally, originated on the Spanish Main. They were also imported 
from Poitou, France, and in small numbers from the Greater Antilles.25
Venezuelan traders needed the mule business in order to finance their slave 
purchases in foreign colonies, as bonded Africans were always in demand and 
not regularly supplied through the regular channels. The main alternative, 
cacao, could not be legally shipped out, at least until 1777, when the Spanish 
authorities in Venezuela legalized trade with the French colonies. Although 
Curaçao remained off limits to traders from the mainland, Dutch merchants 
kept a firm hold on the mule trade.26 Nor was it in anybody’s interest to side-
line the Curaçaoans, on whom French merchants continued to call, since they 
valued the commercial networks they maintained in Venezuela and New 
Granada.27 The Curaçaoans also received support from the island’s governor, 
Jean Rodier, who exempted the sloops active in this trade from paying import 
duties, as long as they sailed on after taking in water and provisions.28 Curaçao 
did not always serve as a transit port in the mule trade. Not only did some 
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mules originate on the island itself, a number of local traders carried on a 
direct trade from the Venezuelan coast to the French islands, while others 
shipped the animals to Jamaica.29
The mules’ main destination was Saint-Domingue, whose planters paid in 
cash crops, their sugar shipments accounting for almost 90 percent of 
Curaçao’s French West Indian sugar imports in the period 1736–1755.30 In the 
decades that followed, this flow of sugar must have increased further, as 
Saint-Domingue developed into the world’s largest producer of the sweet 
substance, but data are missing to confirm this hypothesis. The re-export of 
French colonial products from Curaçao and St. Eustatius to the Dutch 
Republic reached such heights that an interruption in commerce seriously 
hurt merchants in the Dutch Republic. The interruptions were not always 
caused by privateers. When the French army invaded Dutch territory in 1747 
in the closing stages of the War of the Austrian Succession, the States General 
responded by banning the export of “French” refined sugar. More than 100 
Amsterdam merchants, virtually making up the entire merchant elite, then 
signed a request to exempt the sugar that entered the Republic by way of the 
Dutch Caribbean islands.31
In view of the economic dependence on Saint-Domingue, which only 
increased in the second half of the century, the Haitian Revolution was an 
unmitigated disaster for the Curaçaoan economy, contributing to the island’s 
decline in the late eighteenth century. Curaçao’s leading merchant, David 
Morales, who owned property in the French colony, was hard hit, but many 
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others were ruined.32 The island’s governor-general would later write that ever 
since the revolt in Saint-Domingue “entire families have been reduced to beg-
gary. Swarms of beggars, white, colored and black, are seen these days in the 
streets, inconveniencing the passers-by.”33 The loss of Saint-Domingue as a 
trading partner, nonetheless, was not the sole reason for Curaçao’s economic 
decline. At an earlier date, commerce with Portobelo, traditionally a major 
supplier of specie, had begun to fall off by the 1770s, when at most one vessel 
returned from that port and then with a cargo that was hardly valuable.34 Trade 
with nearby Venezuela continued to thrive, but was increasingly controlled by 
merchants on the Spanish Main and conducted in their vessels, a stark con-
trast with the days when Curaçaoan vessels had accounted for the bulk of this 
trade.35 The War of American Independence offered Curaçao’s traders a 
reprieve, but by the late 1780s a slump set in. The number of vessels arriving in 
Willemstad declined by more than half in the decade after 1786.36 Ships from 
the United States even began to transport Caribbean produce from Curaçao 
to the Netherlands.37 Curaçao had seen booms and busts before, but no new 
heyday would follow this steep decline. Having ranked behind Suriname 
throughout the eighteenth century in terms of the volume and value of prod-
ucts shipped to the Republic, after 1788 Curaçao also fell behind St. Eustatius.38
Similar to Curaçao, St. Eustatius or “Statia” was an important Caribbean 
transit center. Settled in 1636, the island had gradually forged commercial ties 
with foreign colonies in its vicinity. By 1688, eight ocean-going ships left from 
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the island with Amsterdam as their destination, their cargoes filled with sugar 
from the surrounding French and English islands.39 Attracting merchants 
looking for both provisions and dry goods, St. Eustatius did not depend on 
commercial expertise from Curaçao. It was perfectly capable of standing on its 
own two feet. Beef and salted fish from Ireland and North American flour were 
always available, while Dutch imports included hats, stockings, spices, paper, 
glassware, axes, pots, printed cotton fabric, and coarse linen from Osnabrück, 
Germany.40 If Curaçao had become a commercial bridge between the Spanish 
Main and the French West Indies, a major feature of Statia’s commerce in the 
eighteenth century was its role in facilitating trade between French and British 
merchants. The governor of St. Christopher (St. Kitts) correctly opined: “The 
pretence of the Dutch buying of the English and then selling to the French is a 
mere fallacy. The produce of all St. Eustatius is not above 500 or 600 of our 
hogsheads of sugar a year…The English and French vessels meet there and deal 
together as principals, or they have their agents, Steward and Sagran, for the 
purpose. The Dutch have no concern but to receive the company’s duties.”41 
From neighboring Guadeloupe alone, 55 vessels arrived at Statia in 1733 carry-
ing sugar, rum, and molasses, for which there were always British American 
customers.42 In exchange, the Guadeloupeans received slaves and provisions. 
Guadeloupe’s dependence on Statian foodstuffs was such that its merchants 
were given permission at least three times between 1749–1751 to purchase pro-
visions in the Dutch island.43
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Statia experienced its own crisis in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, 
immediately following its “Golden Age,” which saw an unprecedented volume of 
imports and re-exports in the 1770s. After a few hundred islanders had perished 
in hurricanes in 1780,44 a British naval squadron under Admiral George Rodney 
punished Statia in February 1781 for its massive support of the American rebels in 
the form of arms and ammunition. The raid was very costly. Not only did Rodney 
seize three million British pounds worth of ships, merchandise, and property, 
another four million pounds worth of bullion was stolen from the residents as 
well.45 To add insult to injury, the French authorities opened some free ports on 
Guadeloupe, starting in 1785.46 And yet, Statia did not decline yet, as its exports 
in the early 1790s reached levels almost comparable to the mid-1770s.47 Nor did 
the island suffer from the Haitian Revolution, since Saint-Domingue had never 
been more than a marginal trading partner. The French invasion of the Dutch 
Republic of 1795, the establishment of the Batavian Republic, and the conse-
quent long-term interruption of shipping traffic to and from Dutch ports seem, 
however, to have wreaked havoc on the mercantile community of Oranjestad, 
many of whose members relocated to other parts of the Caribbean.
 The Slave Trade
If a few historians have studied Curaçao’s commerce with the French 
Caribbean, the later history of the island’s slave trade has been almost entirely 
neglected.48 It is clear that slave imports from Africa dwindled after the War of 
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the Spanish Succession (1701–1713), during which the Dutch colony acted for 
the last time as a transit center for the asiento slave trade to the Spanish colo-
nies. The Colonial Council in Dutch Elmina on the African Gold Coast informed 
the West India Company Board in 1716 that, henceforth, no slaves would be 
sent to Curaçao, since they remained unsold there. Suriname was now the pre-
ferred destination.49 Indeed, in the subsequent 23 years (1717–1739), no more 
than 3105 slaves arrived on Curaçao, constituting an average of 135 per year, 
compared to an annual average of 1049 during the previous four decades 
(1675–1716). Dutch slavers did revive their shipments to Curaçao in times of 
international warfare, inducing local merchants to add enslaved Africans to 
the supplies they offered to foreign colonies. Thus, seven slave ships arrived 
from Africa in the 1740s and ten more in the period 1755–1764.50 Yet even in 
those years, the numbers did not match those of an earlier period.
What is largely unknown is Curaçao’s intra-Caribbean slave trade after the 
island’s involvement in the asiento business came to an end in 1713. An irregu-
lar demand for slaves seems to have remained in Spanish America. During the 
War of Jenkins’ Ear Curaçaoan merchants cultivated contacts with the British 
island of St. Christopher. From there, they brought their human cargoes to 
Curaçao and had the Africans shipped to the Spanish Main.51 After this war, 
one merchant in Maracaibo imported some 600 slaves from Curaçao over the 
course of a few years.52 To the West of Maracaibo, in Santa Marta and Río 
Hacha, slaves arrived from the Dutch island in the 1760s and 1770s in exchange 
for local dyewood.53 Curaçaoan slaves were also marketed in the French and 
British colonies.54 In the first 17 years after Georgia legalized slavery in 1750, 
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139 slaves were furnished by Curaçaoans.55 It is not unlikely that one of the 
human cargoes introduced into Georgia carried smallpox. The epidemic that 
ravaged the port of Savannah in 1764 was said to have arrived from Curaçao.56
Curaçaoan traders were also eager to sell to customers in Saint-Domingue, 
whose demand for slaves was virtually insatiable.57 In 1775, planters on Curaçao 
may have intended to buy slaves from the arriving ship de Jonge Ruijter, but 
the local traders bought all 238 Africans and shipped them immediately to 
Saint-Domingue for sale.58 Slaves also went in the opposite direction, from 
Saint-Domingue to Curaçao. In the 1770s, Curaçaoan masters manumitted no 
fewer than 42 slaves who hailed from the French Antilles. Most of them were 
creoles from Saint-Domingue, while a few had been born in Île à Vache (just 
off Southern Saint-Domingue) and Martinique. At least another ten 
originated in Congo and other parts of Africa, but slave ships had brought 
them to the French colonies. Conspicuous among the manumitting Cura-
çaoans are the names of merchants and ship captains conducting trade with 
Saint-Domingue.59 In the same years, letters of freedom were regularly issued 
by white Frenchmen who happened to find themselves on Curaçao. Without 
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an exception, they were merchants, although it is unclear whether they trav-
eled in the company of the slaves they freed.60
After 1780, the archives are increasingly silent about the slave trade.61 
Shipments now typically involved three, four or half a dozen slaves, whereas 
past supplies to foreign American markets had sometimes numbered in the 
hundreds. If warfare had opened up slave markets in decades past, the 
American Revolutionary War failed to do so for Curaçao. After the war’s end, it 
was evident that owners of slave ships in the Dutch Republic preferred to deal 
with Suriname, Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerara. In 1786, six years after the 
last slave ship had arrived from Africa, Curaçao’s ruling Council did still not 
give up its hope to restore the trade in human cargoes, revealing a project to 
use the slave trade to reinvigorate commerce with the Spanish colonies.62 This 
was no idle talk. Shortly afterwards, one local merchant approached the vice-
roy of New Granada with a plan to supply slaves to any part of the viceroyalty.63 
The initiative was bound to fail, since Spanish Americans could now procure 
their enslaved workers through numerous other channels. The ban issued in 
Venezuela on importing slaves from the Dutch island after the slave revolt of 
August 1795, therefore, did not cause, but merely hastened, the demise of the 
Curaçaoan slave market.64
 Commercial Actors and Practices
Who were the residents of Curaçao, whose fate was inextricably bound up 
with the vicissitudes of interimperial trade? We know much about Curacao’s 
contraband trade on an aggregate level, but little about the various groups of 
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islanders involved in interimperial trade. The least pecunious group, apart 
from the enslaved residents, were the sailors, who formed a significant part of 
Willemstad’s population. At the start of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 1781, 
crew members sailing on local trading vessels numbered no fewer than 832.65 
These men usually supplemented their monthly wages by engaging in petty 
trade. Buying small amounts of merchandise on credit from metropolitan mer-
chants or local shipowners, the sailors brought these commodities wherever 
their vessels took them. The risks were manifold, since ship and cargo could be 
seized by enemies, pirates, and coastguard ships seeking to intercept contra-
band goods. In the event the ship was captured, the sailor lost his wage and his 
trading goods, and still had to pay his creditors. In the 1750s, scores of sailors’ 
families were thus impoverished and condemned to eat what was considered 
slave food.66
Local merchants and shipowners were the ones usually taking the initiative 
in organizing the trading voyages. Most of them were not monied men. One 
governor wrote that the island’s trade was conducted by less well-off people 
who bought a sloop on credit and could not afford to pay it off until the sloop’s 
return.67 Investing all their fluid assets in a single voyage, shipowners were, 
indeed, usually not men of substance. Agreements with Dutch sellers of 
European dry goods for the Spanish American markets therefore stipulated 
payment only after the completion of a trading expedition to the Spanish 
Main.68 Among the local traders, Sephardi Jews dominated. Enjoying religious 
freedom on Curaçao and fluent in Spanish, they established widespread com-
mercial contacts in the nearby Spanish colonies.69
Most local shipowners were connected to merchants in Amsterdam or 
Middelburg, while others purchased goods from ships that arrived from 
Dutch metropolitan ports or from local import–export companies. 
A Curaçaoan trader by the name of Van Lennep, for example, involved in 
both re-exports to the Spanish Main and the French Caribbean, did busi-
ness with Thomas and Adriaan Hope of Amsterdam. Interestingly, the 
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70 Chassaigne, “L’économie des îles sucrières,” 101.
71 The prohibition did not convince the governor to abandon his commercial pursuits. 
It seems more than a little suspicious that over 60,000 pesos were found among his 
possessions upon his death: Han Jordaan, “James Love en ‘des Zwitsers hand’: Van 
kaapvaart, contrebande en geruchten van corruptie,” in Caraïbische cadens: Liber 
Amicorum opgedragen aan de Gevolmachtigde Minister van de Nederlandse Antillen, ed. 
Henny E. Coomans, Maritza Coomans-Eustatia, and Peter Prins (Bloemendaal: Stichting 
Libri Antilliani, 1995), 258–65, 264.
Hope brothers paid the costs of the transport of indigo from Saint-
Domingue to Curaçao.70
Detailed information is available regarding two Curaçaoan companies, 
which will provide some insights into the multiplicity of commercial contacts 
that existed between the Dutch island, on the one hand, and Europe and 
the Americas, on the other. One of these two companies was co-founded by 
Isaac Faesch (1687–1758), a Swiss native who was Curaçao’s governor from 1740 
through 1758. After fighting on both sides during the War of the Spanish 
Succession, Faesch joined the company of his brother Johann Rudolf in 
Amsterdam. Their activities included the dispatch of French and Dutch tex-
tiles to the Caribbean. After his brother’s premature death in 1718, Isaac contin-
ued the business with his widowed sister-in-law, but lost most of its capital by 
speculating in shares of the Compagnie d’Occident, a joint-stock company that 
had received monopoly trading rights in the Caribbean and North America 
from the French government. As profits could not keep up with speculation in 
the company’s shares, in 1720 the bubble burst. Isaac’s fortunes changed after 
he took up his duties at the Dutch West India Company and his appointment 
as commander of St. Eustatius. En route to his destination, Faesch met Johann 
Jakob Hoffmann, a fellow native of Basel, whom he may have known before. 
Hoffmann was on his way to become the secretary of the neighboring Dutch 
colony of St. Martin, but beyond his administrative expertise, he had unmis-
takable commercial talents as well. The two soon joined hands as business 
associates and founded a company on St. Eustatius. Following Faesch’s appoint-
ment as governor of Curaçao in 1740, they dissolved their company. Hoffmann 
became the company’s front man, since Faesch was told by the West India 
Company to discontinue his commercial pursuits.71 During the next two years, 
Hoffmann displayed tremendous commercial activity before returning to 
Europe and leaving the company to Isaac’s nephew, the son of the governor’s 
merchant brother.
It was men like Faesch and Hoffmann who constructed the ever closer com-
mercial ties between Curaçao and the French West Indies. Both men were 
agents for firms in Amsterdam, Haarlem, and Leiden, receiving their products 
41Curaçao as a Transit Center to the Spanish Main
<UN>
on consignment and selling them in Curaçao or sending them on to their own 
agents on other Dutch islands. Alongside their commission business, both 
men exported colonial American crops for their own account, which they sent 
to Amsterdam. There, they maintained commissioners who sold on commis-
sion. The crops included sugar from Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Saint-
Domingue, tobacco from Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and St. Vincent, coffee 
from Guadeloupe and Martinique, and cacao from Venezuela. In addition, the 
couple from Basel arranged for the sale of these same products to the Dutch 
Republic for the account of locally established Dutch merchants. On behalf of 
French merchants, they also sold products from Guadeloupe and Martinique 
in Amsterdam. In addition, Hoffmann was involved in purchasing slaves from 
the British islands, planning at one point to bypass the tax on slaves who 
arrived in Willemstad by dressing the slaves up as sailors. Hoffmann frequently 
acted as an agent of the Dutch merchants in St. Eustatius, on whose orders he 
sold goods they had received directly or indirectly from Europe and North 
America, in particular provisions such as meat, bacon, flour, oranges, and pota-
toes. At the same time, Hoffmann purchased cacao, hides, and mules for the 
Statians, which they then resold. Hoffmann seems to have been involved in 
virtually every imaginable commercial pursuit. He was an intermediary in the 
sale of ships, provided vessels in transit with provisions, paid crews’ wages on 
behalf of his superiors, and took part in the money changing business. And, 
finally, Faesch and Hoffmann were active in brokerage and in the insurance 
business, insuring both regular inter-Caribbean trade and smuggling ventures 
by Curaçaoan and French West Indian vessels.
The sale of European products on Curaçao and the re-export of American 
products to Europe were parallel worlds, although they were not each other’s 
mirror image. Most re-exported crops originated in French America, while 
Spanish America was the main destination for most European manufactures 
introduced on Curaçao. Faesch and Hoffmann themselves were not involved in 
the illicit trade with the Spanish colonies, preferring to sell the manufactures 
to a wide variety of small shipowners who sent their own vessels to the shores 
of Spanish America.
These manufactures imported from the Republic were varied. Textiles 
formed the main category, especially linen and woolen materials. Fine linen 
originating in France and Flanders, coarse Dutch linen, and decorated linen 
from Silesia and Bohemia called platillas were all destined to find a ready mar-
ket in the Spanish colonies. Luxury products included white satin, black satin 
crêpe, grey silk fabric, as well as richly decorative brocades made in silk fabric 
and embroidered with gold and silver, garters, hats, and buttons with threads 
of gold and silver. For a larger clientele, both locally and foreign, Faesch and 
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73 Mark Häberlein and Michaela Schmölz-Häberlein, Die Erben der Welser: Der Karibikhandel 
der Augsburger Firma Obwexer im Zeitalter der Revolutionen, Studien zur Geschichte des 
Bayerischen Schwabens 21 (Augsburg: Dr. Bernd Wißner, 1995), 65, 87–94, 102–104.
74 Ibid., 89–90, 92.
75 Obwexer was not the first German textile firm to forge a connection to Curaçao. Abraham 
Dürninger & Co. from Herrnhut in Saxony, a leading linen exporter, maintained a ware-
house in Willemstad: Jörg Ludwig, Der Handel Sachsens nach Spanien und Lateinamerika, 
1760–1830: Warenexport, Unternehmerinteressen und staatliche Politik (Leipzig: Nouvelle 
Alliance, 1994), 75, 124.
Hoffmann also procured hawsers, sailcloth, mirrors, brandy, Madeira wine, 
provisions, and spices from the East Indies. They obtained some of these items 
from the company where Faesch had worked in Amsterdam, the same one that 
sold sugar and tobacco for Faesch and Hoffmann in Amsterdam.72
In 1778, a few decades after Hoffmann’s whirlwind Caribbean career, another 
European merchant moved to Curaçao. Pierre Brion (c.1751–1799), born in a 
village near Liège and raised in Amsterdam, arrived in Willemstad as the factor 
of the Amsterdam-based firm Turri & Co. (later succeeded by Tonella & Co.). In 
due course, Brion came to represent four other Amsterdam companies. Apart 
from loading ships sailing exclusively for Turri & Co., Brion organized the ship-
ment of company goods on other vessels leaving Amsterdam for Curaçao. In 
the Caribbean, he developed ties to virtually every major port on the Spanish 
Main, including Cumaná, La Guaira (and nearby Caracas), Coro, Río Hacha, 
Santa Marta, Maracaibo, and Cartagena, as well as with a few ports in Santo 
Domingo, Puerto Rico, and Saint-Domingue, Especially Cap Français, Les 
Cayes, and Jacmel. In 1781 alone, two vessels that Brion had fitted out for the 
Curaçao-Cap Français run were captured by English privateers. In the last 
years of his life, when his reputation earned him a position on the island’s 
council, he added contacts in St. Thomas and ports on the Eastern seaboard of 
the United States.73 In the wide range of his endeavors, Brion resembled 
Hoffmann. He bought and sold ships (and, on one occasion, gunpowder) 
across imperial borders, collected debts in foreign colonies on behalf of other 
foreigners, and assumed the administration of one Curaçaoan plantation.74
In the year before he moved to Curaçao, Brion – already in the employ of 
Turri & Co. – had visited the two brothers Joseph Anton and Peter Paul Obwexer 
in Augsburg, who ran a banking firm that had branched out into the textile 
business, buying textiles throughout Germany and running a cotton factory. 
The company hired Brion as their factor on Curaçao, using Turri & Co. as 
their agents in Amsterdam.75 One of Brion’s main tasks was to determine 
which manufactures Obwexer had to send in order to buy the usual New World 
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products of cacao, tobacco, sugar, coffee, and hides, but also cotton and 
indigo. He kept himself abreast of changes in fashion in the Spanish and 
French colonies, describing in detail in two letters from 1780 the types of 
printed cottons of which he wanted to order two chests. The best colors for 
this fabric printed in a floral pattern were, he argued, dark violet, pink, red, 
blue, and coffee brown. Another chest of cottons had to be printed in very 
fine brocade patterns with stripes that were not too wide, and moderately 
priced, since the brocade fashion was fading. On this occasion alone, Brion 
ordered 15 chests of printed cottons, 11 chests of calicoes, and eight chests 
and 900 pieces of other cottons.76
 Curaçaoan Mobility
By the mid-eighteenth century, Willemstad’s wharves lined “both sides of the 
bay deep into the interior, well past the fort and port complex at the harbor 
entrance,” to accommodate the expanding shipping traffic.77 Population 
growth had accompanied the port’s development. In the 1660s, the population 
had been so small that the arrival of a slaver put a serious strain on the food 
supply, since the residents had to share the provisions with the disembarked 
Africans.78 It was not until the early eighteenth century that the town, which in 
the past had been overshadowed by the military base, transformed into a full-
fledged port city. In 1789, when Curaçao’s only eighteenth-century census was 
taken, 11,543 people called the city home, making it the nineteenth port city in 
Atlantic America, substantially smaller than Havana, Salvador and Rio de 
Janeiro, similar in size to the estimated population of Paramaribo, and more or 
less comparable to Charleston or Cartagena de Indias (Table 1.1). At the same 
time, Willemstad was the seventh port in the insular Caribbean, smaller only 
than Havana, Kingston, Cap Français, Santiago de Cuba, and Bridgetown, 
larger than Santo Domingo, Port-au-Prince, and San Juan (Puerto Rico) 
(Table  1.2), and much larger than Oranjestad. Most of these ports had seen 
their populations grow in the same period, from the late seventeenth to the 
late eighteenth century.
76 Häberlein and Schmölz-Häberlein, Erben der Welser, 19, 60–62.
77 Linda M. Rupert, Creolization and Contraband: Curaçao in the Early Modern Atlantic World 
(Athens, Ga. and London: The University of Georgia Press, 2012), 129.
78 Resolution, wic Chamber of Amsterdam, 13 June 1669, in Documenten behoorende bij 
‘De Nederlanders op de West-Indische Eilanden’, ed. J.H.J. Hamelberg, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: 
De Bussy, 1901–03), 1,83.
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Rio de Janeiro 38,707 1780
New York 33,131 1790
Buenos Aires 29,920* 1778
Philadelphia 28,522 1790
Kingston 26,478 1788





Cap Français 15,696 1788
Santiago de Cuba 15,000* 1792
Bridgetown (Barbados) 14,000* 1773
Attention has traditionally focused on the activities of merchants in shap-
ing Curaçao’s transit center. As organizers of trading ventures, they provided 
the island with an economic foundation, and did so in the face of multiple 
challenges. When Johann Hoffmann returned to the Old World in 1742, he con-
sidered a young man with a job in Europe infinitely happier than the foremost 
merchant in the Americas, where fortunes were no longer made so fast.79 The 
merchants were, of course, not alone in constructing Curaçao’s commercial 
world. Sailors, fishermen, caulkers, dockhands, warehouse workers, and sail-
makers were all needed to keep the entrepôt afloat. As the eighteenth century 
advanced, more and more blacks and colored men held these jobs and by mid-
century, slaves came to dominate the port-related occupations. Members of 
the island’s ruling Council estimated as early as 1741 that two-thirds of the sail-
ors were either slaves or free people of color, a share that only increased in the 
decades ahead.80
79 Bodmer, “Tropenkaufleute und Plantagenbesitzer,” 305.
80 NL-HaNA, wic, 1.05.01.02, inv. no. 588, fol. 890, information provided by delegates of the 
Council of Curaçao, J.G. Pax, Johannes Stuijlingh, and Jan van Schagen, 18 June 1741.
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The population figures with an asterisk are estimates.
Sources: Havana: María Dolores González-Ripoll Navarro, Cuba, isla de los ensayos: Cultura y 
sociedad (1790–1815) (Madrid: CSIC, 2000), 109; Salvador: A.J.R. Russell-Wood, “Ports of 
Colonial Brazil,” in Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture, and Society in the Atlantic World, 
1650–1850, ed. Franklin W. Knight and Peggy K. Liss (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1991), 196–239, 222; Rio de Janeiro and Recife: Jacob M. Price, “Summation: The 
American Panorama of Atlantic Port Cities,” in Atlantic Port Cities, ed. Knight and Liss, 
262–76, 263; New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and Salem: United States census of 
1790: http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab02.txt; Buenos 
Aires: Lyman L. Johnson, “Estimaciones de la población de Buenos Aires en 1744, 1778 y 1810,” 
Desarrollo Económico 19, no. 73 (April-June 1979): 107–119; Kingston: Emma Hart and Trevor 
Burnard, “Kingston, Jamaica, and Charleston, South Carolina: A New Look at Comparative 
Urbanization in Plantation Colonial British America,” The Journal of Urban History 39, no. 2 
(March 2013): 214–234, 7; Saint-Pierre: Frédéric Régent, La France et ses esclaves: de la 
colonization aux abolitions (1620–1848) (Paris: Éditions Grasset & Frasquelle, 2007), 120; 
Campeche: Adriana Delfina Rocher Salas, “Religiosidad e identidad en San Francisco de 
Campeche. Siglos XVI y XVII,” Anuario de Estudios Americanos 63, no. 2 (2006): 27–47, 44, no. 
39; Cap Français: Paul Butel, Histoire des Antilles françaises, XVIIe–XXe siècle (s.l.: Perrin, 2002), 
190; Santiago de Cuba: Leví Marrero, Cuba: economía y sociedad. Azúcar, Ilustración y 
conciencia (1763–1788) (Madrid: Editorial Playor, 1983), 147; Bridgetown: Pedro L.V. Welch, Slave 
Society in the City: Bridgetown, Barbados, 1680–1834 (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers & Oxford: 
James Currey Publishers, 2003), 53; Veracruz: my calculation, based on Jackie R. Booker, 
Veracruz Merchants, 1770–1829: A Mercantile Elite in Late Bourbon and Early Independent 
Mexico (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993), 7; Cartagena de Indias: Manuel Lucena Giraldo, 
A los cuatro vientes: Las ciudades de la América hispánica (Madrid: Fundación Carolina Centro 
de Estudios Hispánicos e Iberoamericanos, Marcial Pons Historia, 2006), 141; Paramaribo: 
Cornelis Ch. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the Guianas 1680–1791 (Assen, 
Maastricht and Dover, New Hampshire: Van Gorcum, 1985), 519; Willemstad: Wim Klooster, 
Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), 61; In 1790, 
São Paulo and adjacent parishes had over 8000 inhabitants: Richard M. Morse, From 
Community to Metropolis: A Biography of São Paulo, Brazil (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 1958), 30.
Veracruz 14,000* 1790




Table 1.1 Top Twenty Port City Populations of Atlantic America, ca. 1790. (cont.)
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Cap Français 15,696 1788
Santiago de Cuba 15,000* 1792
Bridgetown 14,000* 1773
Willemstad 11,543 1789
Santo Domingo 10,702 1782–1783
Port-au-Prince 6200 1789
San Juan 6005 1771
The population figures with an asterisk are estimates.
Sources: see Table 1.1; San Juan: Bibiano Torres Ramírez, La isla de Puerto Rico (1765–1800)  
(San Juan de Puerto Rico: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1968), 16; Santo Domingo:  
Maria Rosario Sevilla Soler, Santo Domingo Tierra de Frontera (1750–1800) (Sevilla: Escuela  
de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1980), 35; Port-au-Prince: David Geggus, “The Major Port 
Towns of Saint Domingue in the Later Eighteenth Century,” in Atlantic Port Cities, ed. Knight 
and Liss, 87–116, 108.
Although blacks working in the maritime economy often did not work under 
close supervision of their masters, they still longed for more autonomy. The 
maritime economy itself helped them escape from slavery. Since the island 
was too small to accommodate viable maroon communities, maritime flight 
offered the only alternative. Stealing a boat and rowing to Venezuela was the 
main route to freedom, especially since slaves were declared free upon arrival 
if they announced their willingness to convert to Catholicism. Other black sail-
ors simply absconded during trading voyages.81 Still, most slaves traveling on 
board trading vessels stayed put. One of these slaves, a man named Jean, 
accompanied his master, the merchant David Senior, to Cap Français in June 
1793, when, on the 20th of that month, one of the landmark events of the 
Haitian Revolution took place. That day saw street fighting between whites 
and colored people, slaves being freed from jails, and multiple fires spreading 
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through the city. Jean apparently protected his master and was rewarded with 
manumission two weeks later.82
Curaçao’s government repeatedly took precautions to prevent slaves from 
fleeing. A law from 1742 made it illegal for captains sailing from Curaçao to take 
on blacks and mulattoes who failed to produce a document that proved their 
freedom. The law was at odds with the practice of many urban slaveholders to 
employ their slaves on board the trading vessels. This was in itself risky, since 
capture by a Spanish coastguard vessel might result in the auctioning off not 
only of the ship and the trade goods, but of enslaved crew members.83 The 
slaveholders’ solution was to issue temporary manumissions, which offered 
slaves protection against pirates and privateers, and shielded their owners 
from the loss of their human property. Linda Rupert has found 153 such pro 
forma manumissions for the period 1741–1775.84
The main destination of maritime maroons was Coro in Venezuela, 
where over the course of the century countless enslaved Curaçaoans 
embraced a life of freedom upon formal conversion to Catholicism.85 In 
the year 1774 alone, with Curaçao facing a severe food crisis, 140 slaves suc-
ceeded in escaping from the island to Coro. That number could have been 
even higher if the massive flight attempted by all 72 slaves from the de Fuijk 
plantation in October of that year had been crowned with success. The 
large canoe that they stole to make their way to Coro was, however, spotted 
by watchmen who started yelling and were soon joined by some fishermen. 
The slaves then went back ashore and withdrew to the woods. Most were 
eventually captured and many were sold to Saint-Domingue.86 By the clos-
ing years of the century, no fewer than 400 former Curaçaoans lived in the 
Southern part of the Venezuelan town, while other refugees had moved on 
to nearby mountainous terrain or runaway communities.87 Nor did they 
relinquish their ties to what had often been their native island. Various 
82 Van der Lee, Curaçaose vrijbrieven, 288.
83 From 1730 through 1737, at least 51 black and four mulatto Curaçaoans were seized off the 
Venezuelan coast by coastguard ships fitted out by the Compañía Guipuzcoana: NL-HaNA 
1.05.12.01, Curaçao, Bonaire en Aruba tot 1828, inv. no. 806, fols. 622ff, Notes from the 
Governor and Council, January–June 1747.
84 Rupert, “Marronage,” 370–372.
85 Many – if not most – of them were already Catholics upon arrival, but the local priests 
were probably unaware of this.
86 NL-HaNA, wic, 1.05.01.02, inv. no. 1166, fol. 17, Governor Jean Rodier to the wic, Chamber 
of Amsterdam, Curaçao, 10 January 1775.
87 Lucas Guillermo Castillo Lara, Curiepe: Orígenes históricos (Caracas: n.p., 1981), 61, 285. 
Ramón Aizpurua, “En torno a la aparición de un pueblo de esclavos fugidos de Curazao en 
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religious brotherhoods in both places maintained close ties in the 1760s 
and 1770s, one of which in Coro sent delegates to the Dutch island to col-
lect alms from their brothers.88
Although Venezuelan slaves rarely went in the opposite direction, perhaps 
the most notorious person in their midst did flee to Curaçao. Andresote, a man 
described as a maroon, rallied a large group of Indians and runaway slaves in 
the early 1730s, allegedly committing crimes in defiance of the authorities, who 
attempted to root out the contraband trade with Curaçao.89 Andresote’s 
followers included blacks from Coro who had successfully escaped from the 
Dutch island. Shielded by armed Curaçaoan traders, Andresote fled from 
Venezuela to Curaçao, where he was described several years later as a runaway, 
who had committed murders and other crimes. As before in Venezuela, he 
counted many maroons among his supporters.90
Most slaves were not so fortunate to find freedom. They spent their lives in 
bondage on Curaçao or were shipped off to other parts of the Caribbean. Once 
they moved to foreign soils, exported slaves usually stopped leaving traces. 
Only during extraordinary circumstances, especially insurgencies, do we find 
references to slaves from Curaçao, and presumably only to those born on the 
island. One of the suspects in the 1741 conspiracy in New York City was Curacoa 
Dick. Although his master, the Dutch American Cornelius Tiebout, testified on 
his behalf, he was sentenced with three others to be burnt at the stake.91 
Curaçaoans were also found among maroons in South Carolina, Saint-
Domingue, and Santo Domingo.92 Natives of Curaçao who turned maroon in 
 la Sierra de Coro en el siglo XVIII,” Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia [Caracas], 
87–345 (2004): 109–28.
88 Rupert, Creolization and Contraband, 179.
89 Carlos Felice Cardot, La rebelión de Andresote (Valles de Yaracuy, 1730–1733): Discurso de 
recepción como individuo de número de la Academia Nacional de la Historia (Caracas: Impr. 
Nacional, 1952). Another case involving a flight from Venezuela to Curaçao ended badly 
for the slave in question. On Curaçao the refugee, Juan Inocencio, earned his living as a 
sailor but when his vessel reached Chuao in 1772 and he went ashore, he was recognized 
as having fled from that town and put in chains: Carlos Salazar et al., La Obra Pía de Chuao 
1568–1825 (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1968), 349.
90 Klooster, Illicit Riches, 153–154.
91 Thomas J. Davis, A Rumor of Revolt: The “Great Negro Plot” in Colonial New York (New York: The 
Free Press and London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1985), 65, 121. This conspiracy probably 
only existed in the imagination of the white population: Philip D. Morgan, “Conspiracy Scares,” 
The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 59, no. 1 (January 2002): 164–165.
92 Perry L. Kyles, “Resistance and Collaboration: Political Strategies within the Afro-
Carolinian Slave Community, 1700–1750,” The Journal of African American History 93, no. 4 
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Saint-Domingue probably included Marie, a woman described as “Dutch.” She 
escaped from her master, an apothecary on board a ship in Cap Français, when 
she was eight months pregnant.93 In Santo Domingo, runaways joined the 
exclusively male floating population of a runaway logwood community, where 
they were described in the year 1790 as living “without God, law or King.” 
During the 1795 Pointe Coupée conspiracy in Louisiana, a creole slave from 
Curaçao encouraged slaves to rebel by telling the story that “they are awaiting 
at the Capital an Order of the King which declares all the slaves free…”94 
Finally, a slave named José María Curazao informed the overseer of a Cuban 
sugar mill in 1798 about an imminent slave insurrection. Among the leaders of 
the revolt were apparently, once again, Curaçaoans.95
Like their enslaved brother and sisters, free Curaçaoans of color were 
remarkably mobile, sojourning and settling in a variety of foreign colonies.96 
One of them took part in the British siege of Havana in 1762. Towards the end 
of the siege, the “sailor Francisco Antonio, a black man from Curaçao” was 
listed as one of the deserters of the expedition that the Spanish kept in jail.97 
Most of these itinerant men and women traveled individually, but at least in 
one place, a large group of Curaçao-born blacks and mulattoes settled down. 
A total of 156 of them lived on the Danish island of St. Thomas in 1803, repre-
senting the largest contingent of people of color not native to that island, 
with native Statians occupying third place. The women in their midst listed 
 (Fall 2008): 502. Bernard Foubert, “Le marronage sur les habitations Laborde à Saint-
Domingue dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle,” Annales de Bretagne et des pays de 
l’Ouest 95, no. 3 (1988): 277–310, 287. Martín Lienhard, Disidentes, rebeldes, insurgentes: 
Resistencia indígena y negra en América Latina. Ensayos de historia testimonial (Frankfurt: 
Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2008), 97–98.
93 Jason Daniels, “Recovering the Fugitive History of Marronage in Saint-Domingue, 1770–
1791,” Journal of Caribbean History 46, no. 2 (2012): 134–35.
94 Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole 
Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge, London: Louisiana State University Press, 
1992), 352.
95 María Dolores González-Ripoll, Consuelo Naranjo, Ada Ferrer, Gloria García, and Josef 
Opatrný, El rumor de Haití en Cuba: temor, raza y rebeldía, 1789–1844 (Madrid: Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2004), 280.
96 For the free people of color in general, see Wim Klooster, “Subordinate but Proud: 
Curaçao’s Free Blacks and Mulattoes in the Eighteenth Century,” New West Indian Guide/
Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 68, nos. 3–4 (1994): 283–300; Han Jordaan, “Free Blacks and 
Coloreds in the Administration of Justice in Eighteenth-Century Curaçao,” New West 
Indian Guide 84, nos. 1–2 (2010): 63–86.
97 Elena Schneider, “The Occupation of Havana: War, Trade, and Slavery in Eighteenth-
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themselves as seamstresses and cooks, but were in reality petty traders whose 
knowledge of Spanish and Spanish customs served them well.98
The trading routes also enabled free blacks and mulattoes from other parts 
of the Caribbean to make their way to Curaçao. Those from Spanish-speaking 
areas came to squat on plantations and on the conucos, the small plots of land 
cultivated by free and enslaved Curaçaoans. On various occasions, the govern-
ment took action against them by forcing them to help repair the main fort or 
threatening them with forced labor if they did not leave within two weeks.99 
Alternatively, the authorities used the free foreign non-whites to boost the 
militia ranks.100
 Conclusion
The main commercial development in eighteenth-century Curaçao was the 
intensification of contacts with the French Caribbean. While merchants in 
metropolitan Dutch ports and their Curaçaoan correspondents had previously 
used the island primarily as a gateway to the Spanish American markets, they 
now discovered the possibilities of trade with Guadeloupe, Martinique, and 
Saint-Domingue, producers of vast amounts of sugar, coffee, and indigo. 
Traders on Curaçao itself sent vessels to these colonies and devised an original 
way to tap French colonial markets by using their long-established contacts on 
the Spanish Main to transport mules to the French islands, where these ani-
mals propelled the sugar mills.
98 David W. Knight and Laurette de T. Prime, eds., St. Thomas 1803: Crossroads of the Diaspora 
(The 1803 Proceedings and Register of the Free Colored) (St. Thomas, United States Virgin 
Islands: Little Nordside Press, 1999); Neville A.T. Hall, Slave Society in the Danish West 
Indies: St. Thomas, St. John, St. Croix, ed. B.W. Higman (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992), 180–181.
99 NL-HaNA, wic, 1.05.01.02, inv. no. 1156, fol. 64, Juan Pedro van Collen to the wic Board, 
Curaçao, 31 May 1737. Placards of 2 April 1731 and 24 October 1743, in West Indisch 
Plakaatboek: Publikaties an andere wetten alsmede de oudste resoluties betrekking heb-
bende op Curaçao, Aruba, Bonaire, 2 vols., ed. J.A. Schiltkamp and J.Th. de Smidt 
(Amsterdam: Emmering, 1978), 1:156, 234. Spanish-speaking whites who did not report to 
the authorities would be deported to their colonies of origin: Lucas Guillermo Castillo 
Lara, La aventura fundacional de los isleños: Panaquire y Juan Francisco de León (Caracas: 
Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1983), 497.
100 Placards of 4 March and 20 May 1761, in Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch 
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Old and new trading routes alike did not only convey commodities. They 
also enabled the mobility of the crews of the numerous sloops and schooners 
owned by islanders, and of free people who could afford the costs of their pas-
sage. And while Curaçaoan vessels continued to transport bonded Africans for 
sale throughout the Caribbean, blacks used the same shipping lanes to escape 
their enslavement. If, then, for some, the island’s interconnectedness offered 
the promise of profit, for others it signaled the hope of a better life.
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The Sociëteit van Suriname (Suriname Company, 1683–1795) aimed to turn 
Suriname into a plantation colony to produce tropical products for Dutch mer-
chants, and simultaneously provide a market for finished products and stimu-
late the shipping industry.1 To maximize profits for the Republic the charter of 
the colony banned merchants from outside the Republic from connecting to 
the colony’s markets. The strict mercantilist vision of the Dutch on how the 
tropical plantation colony should benefit the metropolis failed to materialize, 
and many non-Dutch traders serviced the colony’s markets.2 The significant 
breaches in the mercantilist plans of the Dutch signify the limits of metropoli-
tan control over the colonial project.
This chapter takes ship movements to and from Paramaribo as a very basic 
indication for breaches in the mercantilist plans of the Dutch: the more non-
Dutch ships serviced Suriname relative to the number of Dutch ships, the less 
successful the Suriname Company was in realizing its “walled garden” concept 
of the colony. While Suriname had three European villages (Torarica, 
Jodensavanne and Paramaribo) in the seventeenth century, Paramaribo 
became its sole urban core in the eighteenth century. This centralization and 
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urbanization was mainly due to the town’s location near to where Suriname’s 
main waterways flow into the Atlantic. This made the town both central to 
local, regional and transatlantic shipping routes.3 Sailing ships were able to go 
much further upstream to Torarica, Jodensavanne and many of the planta-
tions, but this was rather unpractical given the strong currents and the great 
influence of the tide on the rivers. An analysis of ship movement to and from 
Paramaribo over a long period not only shows that the Dutch were not able to 
close off the colony at any time during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
tury, but also that there were periods when they had more exclusive access to 
the colony than in others.
Obviously, ship movements do not denote either tonnage or value. The ships 
in the regional trade were about a fifth of the size of the trans-Oceanic freighters 
that sailed between Suriname and the Dutch Republic.4 However, given the 
absence of major technological divergence between intra-American and transat-
lantic shipping during the period, the relative numbers of Dutch versus non-
Dutch ships give an indication of their relative importance to the colony. This 
chapter shows that while formal rules and regulations issued by metropolitan 
and local governmental bodies had some impact on trade and shipping, changes 
in credit systems that were used to finance plantations were a more significant 
determinant of the success of Dutch attempts at excluding non-Dutch shipping 
from the colony. The mercantilist scheme for the plantation colony only func-
tioned when the Republic had the financial instruments to enforce control.
Historians of the British Atlantic have fairly well established the extent to 
which Atlantic trade networks crossed formal imperial boundaries.5 By taking 
the case of Suriname, the largest plantation colony in the Atlantic under Dutch 
rule, this contribution seeks to investigate the Dutch side of this system and 
argue that intercolonial networks were constitutive for the colony, that colo-
nists and merchants found ways to cooperate and circumvent the rules and 
regulations, and that over the course of the eighteenth century prevailing 
credit systems impacted the salience of intercolonial shipping. The study 
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shows (1) how central intercolonial exchange was to the colonial project, (2) 
that the connectors between the colonies were not the prototypical Dutch 
middlemen, and (3) that Dutch metropolitan-led state institutions had only 
limited success in regulating the trade routes between Suriname and the 
Atlantic world.
 Plantation Colonies in the Dutch Atlantic
In the Dutch historical literature on early modern Suriname the overwhelming 
dominance of the connection between Suriname and the Netherlands is taken 
for granted.6 And even though the existence of regional connections from 
Suriname has not been denied, these have not received a lot of attention from 
historians. The first scholar to take a detailed look at these connections was 
Johannes Postma, and in two articles he uncovered a world of connections, 
mainly operated by non-Dutch ships connecting the plantation colony to the 
Caribbean and especially to North America. In terms of figures and shipping 
data Johannes Postma has done groundbreaking work in this field by showing 
how multifaceted the connections between Suriname and the Atlantic world 
were. He showed that half the ships in Paramaribo in the eighteenth century 
were non-Dutch and hailed from non-Dutch ports.7 The data that he collected 
is presented in Graph  1. Given the cliché of the Dutch as middlemen in the 
Atlantic world and the mercantilist regulations that were to control shipping, it 
might therefore come as a surprise that Dutch shipping was not the only sup-
plier of goods to Suriname. A second surprise in this regard will be that the colo-
nists were banned from fitting out ships from the colony to regional destinations, 
even if they were Dutch. This is a world away from nodal points such as Curaçao 
and St. Eustatius where intercolonial connections were encouraged by the 
Dutch West India Company (wic).
The importance of non-Dutch shipping for Dutch Atlantic colonies contra-
dicts the prevailing image of the Dutch, who have often been praised for their 
role as intermediaries between the empires in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century. Piet Emmer summed up Dutch Atlantic activities as turning from 
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“aggressive and expensive” to profiting “from a neutral position vis-à-vis the 
imperial rivalries.”8 As the debate on the Dutch Atlantic progressed many have 
argued that the Dutch presence in the Atlantic remained sizeable, but mainly 
in areas of shipping and trade.9 Jan de Vries has emphasized that after the loss 
of Brazil the Dutch Atlantic activities did not simply retreat into shipping 
between imperial rivals and some plantation colonies were developed in the 
Guianas, but that the most notable development has been the increase in New 
World trade after 1680.10 The Dutch shipping that developed was more transat-
lantic than intercolonial.
As de Vries noted there was a tension in such an arrangement, because “the 
administrators represented the trading interests of the company and of the 
Republic more generally” and they were finding themselves “frequently at odds 
with the interests of settlers.”11 This tension between settlers and administrators 
surfaced in the area of trade and shipping because of the apparent limits to 
Dutch freight shipping in the Atlantic. This limit was a new problem to the 
Dutch, for as Christian Koot discusses in this volume, the Dutch had been the 
ones providing cheap and versatile shipping services to the nascent English col-
onies in the Atlantic world. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Dutch actors remained eager to ship products across the ocean, but became 
unable or unwilling to profitably service the short shipping lines between 
American colonies that were needed to provision daily supplies or haul low 
value bulk goods such as molasses. Therefore – as Postma has shown for 
Suriname and Gert Oostindie for Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo – non-Dutch 
connections played an important role in expanding plantation production in 
Dutch colonies.12 The result of this was that the Dutch colonies in the Atlantic 
had a nodal character. They were places where actors from a range of European 
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and colonial backgrounds came to organize their business, despite metropolitan 
restrictions. But while the need for such connections were obvious from a colo-
nial-entrepreneurial perspective, the metropolitan institutions were not eager 
to accept the colonial project as one where they should provide military and 
institutional security and let merchants and traders do as they please (Figure 2.1).
 Institutional Context
Suriname was not ruled by the wic alone. The wic had been founded in 1621, 
and after a bankruptcy it was restarted in 1674 as the second wic. The Company 
transformed from a combative Calvinist organization set up to sabotage 
Iberian-Atlantic power into a (slave) trade organization, and later one that 
mainly generated income from levying taxes on Atlantic voyages by private 
companies. During the second wic it did rule several colonies, but these were 
mostly trading posts, rather than plantation or settler colonies. Despite their 
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Figure 2.1 Number of ships per year in Paramaribo (slavers, Dutch freighters and non-Dutch 
ships), 1683–1795.
Source: Dutch Atlantic Connections Database (https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/
ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:33898) and Postma, Suriname North American 
Data Collection (psnadc). Slave ships mostly arrived directly from 
Africa. The bilateral freighters sailed directly between Suriname and 
the Dutch Republic. The non-Dutch ships were predominantly from New 
England and often returned to the same port they had arrived from.
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Southern Africa, they out-sourced the set-up and management of plantations 
to private companies. One of these was the Suriname Company, which was 
chartered by the Dutch States General and consisted of three parties, who all 
had an equal share, and delegated directors to oversee the colony. The three 
parties which made up the Suriname Company in 1683 were the wic, the city 
of Amsterdam and the family Aerssen van Sommelsdijck. That last party sold 
their share in the company in 1771, after which the wic and Amsterdam both 
owned half the colony.
The Suriname Company had a different aim than the wic had in the 
Atlantic. The directors bore the responsibility for striking a balance between 
gaining revenue from taxing shipping as well as privately owned plantations, 
and to simultaneously guarantee that there was a profitable business climate 
in which plantations could prosper. This meant that the planters should be 
provided with capital, land, labor and protection. At the same time the colony 
was set up with the idea of benefiting the Dutch Republic as a whole by increas-
ing the shipping, trade and power of the republic. The charter of the colony of 
Suriname covered all these areas, and created a general outline that was fol-
lowed for much of the period between its inception in 1683 and the disbanding 
of the Suriname Company in 1795.
The central ordinance that is of importance here is article XII from the 1682 
charter, which reads:
That the trade and navigation on the aforementioned colony [Suriname] 
shall only take place directly from this country [the Republic]. Fruits, 
wares and produce are not allowed to go anywhere else than to this coun-
try. The same goes for the provisions needed by said colony. They can 
only come from this country, and from nowhere else.13
The article in the charter is clear in this respect, and for the directors this was not 
just lip service to the interests of their fellow countrymen. The first governor who 
ruled the colony for the Suriname Company reported in his letters that he indeed 
tried to prevent non-Dutch ships trading in the colony. Also, in the following 
decades several committees discussed how to preserve the XIIth article of the 
charter despite infringement by North-American vessels. In the end article XII 
did not hold, and the Suriname Company directors moved to issue a bylaw in 1704 




16 Request by Major Bannister and the English inhabitants to Commander Crijnssen, July 
1668, Plakaatboek, 13–15.
maintain the ban on Suriname-based regional trade until 1783 when the Fourth 
Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) forced the colonists to rely on regional supply lines 
and they were allowed to fit out their own vessels.15 The Suriname Company 
clearly had a rather different stance on intercolonial trade in the Caribbean than 
did the wic. The Suriname Company attempted to close off the connection 
between Suriname and regional ports, but over time they had to cave in and 
issued regulations allowing limited intercolonial and interimperial trading.
 Intercolonial Beginnings
Connections across imperial borders in the Atlantic world were not only com-
mon; they were constitutive of Dutch efforts to settle on the “Wild Coast”. Not a 
single Dutch Guianese settlement would have grown and blossomed without cre-
ating ties to other non-Dutch colonies and relying on the resources available 
under the formal rule of other empires and states operating in the Americas. 
Healthy colonists were one such resource. The disease environment on the Wild 
Coast deteriorated with the arrival of forms of malaria in the seventeenth century. 
Colonists who had spent and survived a first year in the tropics were therefore a 
much sought after resource, and conflicts arose between the Dutch and the 
English over retaining colonists once the colony had changed hands. Much of the 
Dutch experience with sugar planting, enslavement and colonial trade had its ori-
gin in the short-lived experience in Dutch Brazil (1630–1654). The exodus of Jews 
and the Dutch during the Portuguese reconquest of Brazil resulted in a dissemina-
tion of experienced colonists throughout the Atlantic. By a myriad of routes some 
of these people ended up in Suriname and other Caribbean colonies.
The main push for plantation activities in Suriname was initiated by the 
English colonization from Barbados, which had been ordered by Lord 
Willoughby of Parham in 1651. Later, Suriname was taken from the English by 
the States of Zeeland under the leadership of Abraham Crijnssen in 1667. 
When in 1668 the English planters who had remained in Suriname requested 
from the Zeelanders the right to continue trading with Barbados, Crijnssen, as 
the acting Zeelandic governor, balanced between appeasing the English and 
limiting the trade. For Barbados the supplies of Surinamese wood were of great 
necessity because years of sugar cultivation had rid the land of wood. After a 
fire caused the “total ruin and destruction of the town in Barbados” the colo-
nists requested to be allowed to ship “timber for the rebuilding of the city.”16 
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Crijnssen wanted to showcase the Dutch as good “allies and neighbors,” and 
allowed for the shipment of wood to take place in exchange for Barbadian 
sugar (most likely for re-export to the Dutch Republic), but only on Dutch ves-
sels. About further trade he wrote that he “could not allow the trading from 
Barbados.”17 On the other side Dutch vessels were blocked as well. Ships from 
Zeeland refused to take cargo to Barbados after two of them – with the consent 
of Crijnssen – went to Barbados and were confiscated there for breaking 
English navigation laws.18
Jewish merchants played a role in connecting Suriname to non-Dutch colo-
nies. The migration of Jews to Suriname from Barbados – and after Zeeland’s 
take-over in the 1660s from Suriname back to Barbados and onwards to 
Jamaica – created ties between the two colonies that were outside of the control 
of the Zeelanders. While the Zeelanders were ill at ease with the existence of 
this trade route, they saw its potential use. In February 1670 Governor Lichtenberg 
wrote that Louis Dias from Barbados told Isack de Mesa (his brother-in-law) 
that “furnishing a ship to bring planters from Suriname to Barbados was only a 
pretext to get a ship to Suriname, to see if they could trade in wood between 
Suriname and Barbados.” The captain indeed found no one to leave the colony, 
and asked to export some wood, which Lichtenberg allowed him. This bold 
move by Dias worked, and Lichtenberg asked Isack de Mesa to write Dias:
…if those from Barbados bring sugar or other goods, and those of 
Barbados would allow the Dutch ships with cargo, there would be no 
objections from this side, and a regular trade could be established.19
The governor argued that this “would be a very good thing for Suriname.”20 The 
Jews who previously resided on Barbados went on to tell Lichtenberg that he 
should “create a trade between New England and this colony, and bring horses, 
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flour, and fish in exchange for Kilduijvel [rum] and syrup [molasses].” 
Lichtenberg was tempted by the idea and asked Henrico de Casseres to contact 
his correspondents in his name, to see if such could be organized because that 
“would be very important for the sugar mills in Suriname and greatly increase 
the exchange of goods between both places.”21 After these initial steps the out-
break of hostilities with England in 1672 during the so-called Dutch “Year of 
Disaster” closed off the trade again. In that year several European states 
invaded the Dutch Republic and the trade between Suriname and Barbados – 
or any other English port for that matter – was hampered. The lack of interco-
lonial and interimperial contacts in the Zeelandic period of the colony might 
partly explain the lack of success the Zeelandic colonists had in developing 
Suriname. The hostilities in Europe not only impacted the intercolonial 
exchanges but also strained the transatlantic shipping connections.
The prolonged conflict of the Dutch with the combined forces of indige-
nous Caribs and Arawacs (and on occasion helped by escaped Africans) that 
broke out in the late 1670s strengthened the need of the colonists to reestablish 
a regional connection to acquire supplies to be able to combat the indigenous 
assailants.22 The return of contact with Barbados was made in 1677 by 
Surinamese Governor Abel Thisso requesting supplies for the sustenance of 
his armed forces from his British counterpart on Barbados, Governor Jonathan 
Atkin.23 After the initial reestablishment of contact Barbados “became 
Suriname’s most important colonial provider for provisions of all kind,” with 
private merchants joining in the trade.24 As Claudia Schnurrmann has shown, 
the Jewish settlers Louis Dias and Samuel Cohen Nassy (a Jewish entrepreneur 
in Suriname) played a prominent role in maintaining this connection, Nassy 
on the Surinamese side, Dias on the Barbadian side. They had organized 
intercolonial shipments in 1677 of limestone in exchange for wood.25 When in 
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March 1678 the ship Morgenstarre with Captain Jan van der Spijck was sent 
to  Barbados, David de Fonseca was on board as factor.26 A year later Nassy 
and  Governor Heinsius sent Jan van der Spijck out to Cayenne to bring in 
supplies.27 Besides the Barbadian connection, Nassy also connected 
Suriname to Curaçao and New England, a connection already proposed to the 
Zeelanders by Surinamese Jews in the early days of their rule. While Curaçao 
remained of limited importance for Suriname, the connections to Barbados 
and New England continued. In 1680 Nassy’s ship the Trent sailed the triangle 
New York – Suriname – Barbados. After the takeover of the colony by the 
Suriname Company, Nassy continued this trade and outfitted the Betty with 
Captain Marshall Cobie who sailed for Nassy from New York to Paramaribo 
and from there onward to Barbados in 1686.28
When the Zeelanders had taken Suriname in 1667 they had attempted to 
choke the regional connection with Barbados, which had existed since the 
founding of the colony by the English, but the connection never disap-
peared completely. A new possible break-up of the connection came with 
the transfer of the colony into the hands of the wic in 1682 and the 
Suriname Company in 1683, but again the regional connection proved 
stronger than restrictive measures from the metropolis. On the precedent 
of his role in other intercolonial shipments, Nassy made a bold move: in 
February 1683 he requested to be allowed to bring horses from New England 
to Suriname and to continue the voyage onwards with that same ship to 
bring “sugar in exchange to Holland or Zeeland.” According to Nassy the 
ship would bring about 100 to 150 horses, which could only be transported 
“in English ships.” The sugar to be shipped to Holland or Zeeland was the 
payment for those horses. The Suriname Company agreed on the “condi-
tion that those loaded sugars will be brought directly to Holland or 
Zeeland.”29 The intercolonial connections proved to be a very practical 
solution to the problems that colonists encountered when setting up  a 
plantation colony in the tropics, but they also severely challenged 
the  monopolistic vision of the directors in the Dutch Republic. In the 
first  decade and a half after the Zeelandic takeover of the colony both 
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Zeelandic  and Jewish traders operated and set up the intercolonial and 
interimperial shipping connections, but already then, non-Dutch ships 
operated by North Americans started to take a significant share of the 
intercolonial trading.
 Formalizing Non-Dutch Access to Suriname
In the 1680s Nassy continued to challenge the directors of the Suriname 
Company and the local Surinamese authorities by arguing against the 
restrictions imposed on the colony by the XIIth article in the charter. Nassy 
managed to convince the local council to allow several individual ship-
ments. When Governor Aerssen van Sommelsdijck assumed the post of gov-
ernor, the English ships kept arriving, and Sommelsdijck commented that 
he did not “find it reasonable or fair or in the interest of the colony to send 
the ships back.” But van Sommelsdijck realized that the laws of the Company 
needed to be upheld, and an English ship that arrived from Barbados was 
told “not to come here anymore,” and to warn the others “that this trade and 
shipping is now forbidden and closed to them.”30 After Sommelsdijck 
assured the directors of the Suriname Company that he was doing his part 
in closing off the English trade, he went on to stress how important it would 
be to import horses, because “more than ten mills are standing still because 
of the lack of horses or other animals.” According to the governor this was 
all to the “noticeable detriment of both the private parties and the Company 
as well as the return ships.” The freighters were indeed sailing back with less 
sugar than they could load.
After the mutiny of 1688 in which Governor Van Sommelsdijck was killed, 
the governing Council spoke out strongly in favor of regional supplies. The 
mutiny mainly took place due to the lack of rations handed out to the soldiers. 
One of the officers wrote to the Directors of the Suriname Company in 
Amsterdam that the troops would have rebelled again if goods were not 
imported from the New England colonies to Suriname.31 When Nassy made 
another request to the Council in August 1689, they granted him the right to 
bring goods from English ships to shore. This, according to the Council, should 
prevent them sailing away to other destinations. It was of great importance 
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because they thought that the future of the colony depended on the goods 
brought from New England.32
The non-Dutch trade in the period was comparable to ordinary coastal trade 
in content: mostly provisions, foodstuffs, building material and no luxuries. 
It connected North America and Barbados with Suriname and formed a web of 
connections between different regions on the Atlantic’s Western Coast. Many 
skippers sailing to Paramaribo came there more than once, and often from the 
ports of Boston and New York. Especially on the import side the English North 
American colonies were important. They supplied the goods as requested by 
Nassy: provisions and horses.33 Because Suriname had not yet become a full-
fledged sugar plantation colony but was also engaged in trade with the 
Amerindians and logging, the ships that arrived from North America with 
provisions had hardly anything they could legally load to bring back there, 
since plantation products could only be shipped to the Dutch Republic. In 1678 
no molasses of Dutch origins entered the Boston harbor.34 However, the lack of 
wood on Barbados and the abundance of it upstream the Suriname River made 
triangular voyages between New England – Suriname – Barbados viable. The 
destination for the non-Dutch ships was Barbados. Returning to New England 
was another option, but not a route that was often taken. For example, ships 
did arrive from Rhode Island, but none of the ships that left Paramaribo in the 
early period declared it as their destination.35
Sometimes the directors of the Suriname Company would allow sales to be 
made. While generally lenient when it came to horses, they would be stricter in 
cases that involved sugar. When an Englishman arrived in the colony of 
Suriname in 1701 to ship sugar he was refused his shipment. According to the 
governor he was using an old permit that was not even in his name. The cap-
tain was looking to transport sugar, a “high good” (a valuable commodity 
intended for the European market) according to the governor and forbade the 
captain to load the hold.36 Many months later, the Board of the Suriname 
Company confirmed this policy of the governor. The decision was primar-
ily  based on the goods that the Englishman was trying to trade. In 1701 the 
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Company Directors connived to bring horses on shore by turning a blind eye. 
If anything else was unloaded, however, all goods and the ship that brought 
them had to be confiscated.37
The regional connection was efficient in supplying food and provisions. 
Captains had the option to sell their goods elsewhere and move onward to 
other ports in case there were problems on the Paramaribo market. The ships 
were also notably smaller than the large ocean going vessels of the Dutch. This 
resulted in a very quick turnover of English ships in Suriname. The War of the 
Spanish Succession (1701–1713) had no negative influence on the regional ship-
ping, which increased tremendously over the war years. Despite the increase in 
ships (and therefore the availability of tonnage) the ships still retained waiting 
times of less than two months in port. The comparative advantage of regional 
shipping over transatlantic shipping hardly needs explaining. While vessels 
were indeed much smaller in the regional trade, their average waiting time in 
the colony also suggests that they were able to deal with local market condi-
tions efficiently. By the end of the war their total number well exceeded that of 
Dutch ships.38
The increase of non-Dutch regional shipping triggered a response from the 
directors of the Suriname Company. From their perspective it was undercut-
ting their business, but they understood that the connection was fundamental 
to the survival of their colony. The directors of the Suriname Company also felt 
responsible for supporting the Amsterdam merchants connected to Suriname, 
rather than only the Company’s own tax revenue. While the Dutch lacked any 
formal West India interest, the Suriname Company not only functioned as a 
company to manage the colony, but also as a special interest group for entre-
preneurs with private interests in the colony. The issue of the regional trade, as 
discussed in den Heijer’s contribution to this volume, had immediately come 
up during the drafting of the colony’s charter in the 1680s. From time to time 
requests regarding the freeing up of the regional trade were sent to the direc-
tors, and the governor pleaded to allow English ships to sell their goods. The 
Suriname Company continued to discuss the issue of regional trade in their 
meetings. In 1702 they wrote an ordinance based on the advice of the commis-
sion they had instated. The plan was to only allow horse sales, and confiscate 
the entire ship and its cargo of anyone who tried to trade other goods. Such a 
strict order would likely have killed off the trade entirely if it had been imple-
mented. Governor Van Der Veen wrote that he was disappointed by the fact 
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that the Suriname Company had only allowed him to import horses, and had 
disallowed the buying of general provisions, which was “one of the two legs 
that the colony has to walk on.” He also made clear to the Board members that 
it was causing many political conflicts between him and the local governing 
council.39
To resolve the issue the board in Amsterdam and their governor in Suriname 
had to consult with the local governing Council who would be instrumental in 
enforcing the law. They discussed an early draft of the order that came down to 
levying a tax on imported English horses, and to confiscate all other goods the 
North Americans brought to the colony. Especially the confiscation was 
deemed unreasonable by the councilors and they protested loudly. The Council 
argued that the board “did not have to worry” about the competition from New 
England.40 The horses, their hay and water were said to take so much space on 
board the “small and hellish” ships that there was no space to carry any other 
merchandise.41 It is very likely that the Suriname Company directors knew that 
those arguments did not make much sense. However, they must have realized 
that if the colonists would not cooperate they could just let the ships enter 
Suriname illicitly and the Company would be powerless to police it efficiently.
The issue of liberalizing regional trade continued to be investigated by special 
commissions and remained a point of discussion in the boardroom of the 
Suriname Company. When planters asked in 1700 that they be allowed to orga-
nize coastal trade along the Coast of Spanish America the idea was completely 
buried.42 In 1703 the Suriname Company finally ordained that there could be 
imports from North America, provided that they kept to strict regulations.43 The 
reluctant directors of the Suriname Company were realistic enough to allow for 
this indispensable interimperial trade.44 This compromise between the colonists 
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and the Suriname Company that came out of this remained in place for about 
80 years until the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War stopped most Dutch shipping and 
the Surinamese were allowed to fit out vessels themselves. In the case of 
Suriname the size of the plantation-production, the history of the regional con-
nections, and maybe also the inclination of directors from Amsterdam towards 
unhampered trade broke the initial mercantilism of the charter of 1682.
In the final published version of the law on English shipping to Suriname 
in 1704, the concern with maintaining control over who shipped what is 
clearly shown in the level of detail with which the directors described what 
could and could not be shipped. It stated that the inhabitants of Suriname 
were allowed to trade with skippers from New England, New Netherland 
(sic) as well as neighboring islands. The final order read that “The alien 
ships shall not be allowed to bring European manufactures of gold, silver, 
copper, steel, wool, silk or linen, nor wheat, rye, barley and oats nor meat, or 
East Indian goods or spices” or “slaves.” Ships sailing from the colony for 
North America could not carry any sugar, but they were allowed to have 
“molasses, dram [rum], timber and any and all wares shipped to Suriname 
from the Republic.” With this regulation the directors sought to prevent 
European and East Indian wares from being shipped to the colony via non-
Dutch intermediaries and to bar them from taking on direct shipping 
between Europe and Suriname. As further discouragement, the Company 
levied a 5 percent tariff on both foreign imports and exports – double the 
amount of the duty on goods shipped to the Republic. For cattle, horses and 
sheep an extra fee was compulsory.45 The bylaw was translated and pub-
lished in the Boston Newsletter the following year.46
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Even though the issue seemed to be resolved, there still was the request to 
allow Surinamese ships to trade regionally. Around 1716 a pamphlet was pub-
lished in the Dutch Republic by a “group of interested parties,” led by former 
principal accountant of the colony Jan van der Marsche. The petitioners 
were concerned about the supply of slaves, military defense, and free trade 
from the colony. In their pamphlet they complained that all the other 
Caribbean colonies (they used Barbados as example) prospered thanks to 
the freedom granted to them by their motherland. They claimed that the 
Surinamese planters and traders had to watch how their syroop (molasses) 
was rotting away because they were restricted in their trade within the 
Caribbean and with North America.47 They demanded further freedoms for 
the regional trade; the central issue being that the planters wanted to be able 
to trade locally themselves instead of having to wait for the English to come 
and pick up the molasses. It was argued that regional trade by the Dutch 
would also increase the number of local ships and able-bodied seamen in 
port to strengthen the colony’s defenses in case of an attack. They proposed 
to start a symbiotic relation with Curaçao to get “Salt, flint, and limestone.” 
In case the English supply of horses would be stopped, the colonists would 
be able to get their horses from Portuguese Brazil, Essequibo, or from the 
Orinoco. The lastgeld (tax on shipping tonnage) and import tax would still 
come to the Suriname Company, and the growth of the colony would increase 
shipping, production and consumption in the colony for the benefit of the 
Republic.48 Their suggestions had much in common with the position taken 
by the North American colonists who were demanding freedom in trade 
between their colonies and the other colonies in the Americas. These pro-
tests turned out to be in vain. The regulation that had been issued in 1703 and 
adopted in Suriname in 1704 remained the official compromise between the 
interests of the colonists and the power of the Company.
 Credit and Shipping
While the directors of the Suriname Company failed to prevent non-Dutch 
shipping to and from Suriname, the changes in the credit system did for a time 
successfully promote Dutch shipping at the expense of the New Englanders. At 
the beginning of the eighteenth century Suriname was no longer a precarious 
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colony in a tropical borderland, but it had consolidated both inland as well as in 
terms of its shipping connections. The non-Dutch trade, the bilateral freighting 
between the Republic and Suriname as well as the slave trade became more 
dependable in the decades following the War of the Spanish Succession. In this 
period the Surinamese plantation economy also began to grow quickly.49 This 
growth depended on the forced labor of enslaved Africans who were shipped 
across the Atlantic by Dutch slave traders. The buying of an enslaved laborer was 
a transaction involving a complicated transatlantic credit system. When the slave 
trade was still the monopoly of the wic the system was still relatively clear: when 
buying a slave a plantation manager would either pay in kind, or enter into debt 
with the company. The wic had an arrangement whereby the plantation owners 
could pay for the enslaved in three installments. The wic therefore carried much 
of the debt of the Surinamese plantation owners.50 The wic carried this debt as 
part of the expenses to support the Dutch activities in the Atlantic, and the wic’s 
obligation to deliver “sufficient” numbers of enslaved laborers to Suriname.
When the slave trade was liberalized and free market slave traders began to 
supply Suriname with captive workers this system changed. The demand for 
privately financed credit increased as private slave traders were more anxious 
about getting paid for their expensive slaving voyages than the wic had been. 
After roughly ten years of free slave trading during the 1740s, the debts of the 
plantation owners had risen so excessively that the system was in danger of 
grinding to a halt.51 To revive the slave trade and the plantation economy an 
Amsterdam banker devised a credit scheme whereby investment funds, called 
negotiatie, would bundle capital from multiple investors and extend loans to 
various plantations. Without going into the obvious problems with such a sys-
tem and the inevitable bubble and subsequent collapse that followed, it suf-
fices to sketch the timeline of that development. In 1753 the first negotiatie was 
founded which bought up debt from planters with capital invested primarily 
by the Amsterdam banker Gideon Deutz. In 1765 the investments increased 
rapidly, until in 1769 there was far more credit than there were possibilities to 
invest, resulting in overinvestment into unprofitable plantations. In 1773 the 
bubble burst and investors came to reconsider the inflated expectations of 
plantation-based profits. Despite the ensuing caution by investors, investment 
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continued well into the 1770s, but stopped in 1780s.52 Over the period roughly 
36 million Dutch guilders had been invested in Suriname.53
Despite the bad reputation of the credit system as being the cause for the 
decline in plantation profits, it did result in a massive expansion of the planta-
tion system and it influenced the business model by which plantations were 
run. When we follow the trends in shipping in Figure 2.1 the result of the nego-
tiatie on Dutch and non-Dutch shipping is clear. For the first time since the 
1690s, the late 1750s until the end of the 1760s is the first period in which the 
number of Dutch ships in Paramaribo is greater than non-Dutch ships. This 
continues in the second half of the 1770s until the outbreak of the Fourth 
Anglo-Dutch War. The reason for the relative increase in Dutch shipping com-
pared to non-Dutch shipping is the negotiatie investment system. The funds 
had a major influence on the supply-lines the plantation managers could use 
to acquire provisions. The investment fund director extended credit on the 
basis of the tropical products that the plantation managers would send across 
the Atlantic to the Dutch Republic. But in the organization of the funds these 
directors also demanded to supply the provisions to the plantations (taking a 
handsome commission). To ensure that the plantation managers followed the 
instructions of the investment funds so-called agendarissen were placed in 
Paramaribo, controlling the individual plantations within their fund, greatly 
diminishing the autonomy of plantation managers to organize their business. 
While the molasses trade certainly continued during this period, it is evident 
from the shipping figures that Dutch shipping to and from the colony increased.
The relatively high level of Dutch compared to non-Dutch shipping came to 
a definite end around the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. By then the negotiaties no 
longer expanded at any great rate, many plantations had gone bankrupt, and 
their management centralized into the hands of several large funds. The out-
break of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War not only coincided with the fizzling out 
of new investments by the negotiaties, it also impeded the Dutch control of the 
seas as discussed by Oostindie elsewhere in this volume. At the same time the 
star of the newly independent United States was rising and the Americans 
were quickly expanding their navy and merchant fleet, both in the Atlantic as 
well as the Mediterranean, Pacific and Indian Ocean. While Dutch shipping 
and export did revive after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, the New England 
ports had taken the position as freighters in the Atlantic world. They no longer 
just serviced the connection between North America and Suriname, they had 
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also started to ship sugar between Suriname and Amsterdam, and in the 1790s 
became the colony’s most important supplier of enslaved Africans.54
 Conclusion
Non-Dutch shipping was a constant and elastic factor in the colonization of 
Suriname. The small vessels of the North Americans quickly adapted to the 
changes in the market conditions. While the Dutch had been renowned for 
operating in intercolonial and interimperial circuits in much of the seventeenth 
century, non-Dutch shipping clearly became instrumental to the colonization 
of Suriname in the late seventeenth century. It increased in importance after the 
founding of the Suriname Company in 1683 and defied the mercantilist restric-
tions that this company imposed. It remained an important factor throughout 
the expansion of Suriname’s plantation system. During the period of the nego-
tiatie funds from the mid-1750s to late 1770s Dutch shipping was boosted, but 
non-Dutch shipping quickly increased to meet the demands of the colony once 
Dutch shipping collapsed in the wake of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War.
The issue of regional exchange came up almost immediately after the 
Zeelanders had taken over the colony in 1667. The response of Abraham 
Crijnssen, who had captured the colony for the Dutch, was to block non-Dutch 
shipping to and from Suriname. However, lack of food and supplies made suc-
cessive governors more benevolent when it came to non-Dutch shipping with 
English colonies. The Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–1674) cut the connections 
short, but these were resumed quickly after hostilities ceased and the 
Surinamese colonists were in great need of provisions. In the following decades 
the network of regional trade went through a major transformation. The con-
tact between Suriname and its former colonizer Barbados (with which it had 
maintained a symbiotic relationship for many decades) was fading away and 
was being replaced by trade more fitting to the changing nature of the colony. 
Surinamese plantations were producing molasses as a byproduct, and were 
limiting wood production. The initial mutual exchange between the two colo-
nies came under pressure now that there was a competition between the two, 
both with regard to the sales of molasses, as well as the buying up of North 
American provisions. With the end of Zeelandic rule in 1682, the Suriname 
Company again tried to ban the non-Dutch trade to and from Suriname with a 
very restrictive article in its charter. The Suriname Company, however, failed to 
do so and a more lenient bylaw was passed in 1704.
54 Postma, “Suriname and Its Atlantic Connections,” 287–322.
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While the charter had been insufficient to restrict non-Dutch trading, a 
change in the credit system did impact the shipping patterns between 
Suriname and the Atlantic world. The only time when Dutch shipping began to 
regain terrain from the non-Dutch New Englanders was at a time when gross 
overinvestment from the Dutch Republic flooded Suriname and created 
restrictions on who could supply the plantation with provisions. The managers 
of the investment funds extended credit on the precondition that they would 
not only receive a plantation’s products, but also exclusive rights to sell the 
plantation the provisions it needed. In the end the credit system collapsed dur-
ing the 1770s. When at the beginning of the 1780s Dutch shipping entered trou-
bled waters during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, New Englanders quickly took 
much of the shipping to and from the colony.
The production of sugar, coffee, cacao and other tropical products on 
Surinamese plantations for the European market relied on land, labor, capital 
and military protection. Capital came in the form of Dutch investment, labor 
through the enslavement of Africans and land primarily through the conquest 
and subsequent defense of Suriname by Dutch armed forces. However this 
chapter has shown that regional, intercolonial and often interimperial supply 
lines were fundamental to sustain colonization efforts in Suriname. Despite 
their reputation, the Dutch conceded their position as successful middlemen 
in the later decades of the seventeenth century to captains and merchants 
based in non-Dutch colonies. During the eighteenth century the New 
Englanders were able to provide provisions at competitive prices to the planta-
tion managers in Suriname, while the Dutch focused on the transatlantic ship-
ping of tropical products. Dutch shipping did increase its relative importance 
to the colony in the 1760s and 1770s, but only based on a phenomenal invest-
ment of Dutch capital. Once Dutch power at sea was severely challenged by 
the British, New England captains decidedly took over Suriname’s shipping 
connections in the 1790s.
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In recent years scholars have produced a flurry of work describing the Dutch 
influence on Britain and its empire during the early modern period. The 
celebration of the 400th anniversary of the arrival of Henry Hudson in what 
would become New York City and the publication of several new works has 
reinvigorated the study of Anglo-Dutch relations and cultural borrowing. This 
scholarship has charted Dutch influence on a number of English develop-
ments during the seventeenth century, including those in the fields of cartog-
raphy, finance, national accounting, and even landscape design. Other works 
have concentrated on the strong cultural, political, diplomatic, and religious 
links that the Dutch and English shared and the ways that migration and com-
merce buttressed these bonds. In the aggregate these works have offered a 
thoroughly international history of the origins of the British state.1
As scholars of early modern Britain have revised our understanding of state-
building there, historians of the early modern Atlantic world have also been at 
work reconsidering the nature of Atlantic empires. Moving away from an ear-
lier view that focused on the institutional character of early modern empires, 
Atlantic historians are increasingly finding that imperial economies grew out 
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of local decision-making and self-organized, often interimperial, networks as 
much as they did from centralized planning and metropolitan coordination.2 
Scholars have uncovered particularly close ties between the commercially 
powerful Dutch Republic and England’s fledgling colonies. Encouraged by the 
vulnerabilities of colonial life and less affected by the cross-sea rivalry that 
sometimes tempered Anglo-Dutch relations in Europe, English and Dutch col-
onists forged close cross-national relationships in the Americas that endured 
for more than a century.3
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Intended to evaluate and characterize the nature and meaning of the 
American dimensions of Anglo-Dutch trade during the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, this essay will examine the extent and scope of Anglo-
Dutch colonial exchange, the ways Dutch and British merchants transacted 
business, the networks they constructed, and the colonial nodal points where 
trade was based. In assessing the importance of Anglo-Dutch trade for 
the British empire, it will also consider the ways that British colonists under-
stood the meaning of these exchanges and in turn the character of their 
empire. Largely focused on the places where Anglo-Dutch trade was most 
significant – the Chesapeake and the British Caribbean – I argue that Dutch 
trade was important to the development of British colonies and thus the 
British Atlantic. More than providing needed trade, colonists’ experience with 
Dutch commerce also spurred them to advocate for the flexibility to determine 
their own commercial futures even if this approach clashed with England’s 
increasingly mercantilist empire. British colonists, in other words, always 
understood their Anglo-Dutch trade as political as well as economic. Dutch 
trade matters in our understanding of the evolution of the British Atlantic 
both because it aided economic development at the fringes of the empire and 
because it shaped the political economy of that empire.
 The General Structure of Anglo-Dutch Trade in British America
Though Anglo-Dutch trade was a feature of nearly every British colonial econ-
omy during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, its intensity and 
the mechanisms merchants of both empires used to conduct trade varied over 
time and by location. Trade was most vigorous in the important agricultural 
staple producing regions, namely the Chesapeake and Caribbean, and was 
most common when English merchants could not meet colonists’ needs for 
imports and shipping services, as was true before 1650 and during periods of 
imperial warfare thereafter. The chief determinant of the methods colonists 
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used to trade was the relative intensity of commerce and the legal situation in 
which both groups operated. When demand for Anglo-Dutch exchange was 
highest, such as during the Caribbean and Chesapeake export booms of the 
1640s and 1650s, Dutch and English actors alike built durable networks backed 
by credit relationships and facilitated by the presence of Dutch agents in 
English colonies to manage trade. As trade slowed or as English mercantile 
laws erected barriers to direct trade, both groups adapted, returning to less 
structured exchange relationships and moving their direct interactions to 
more receptive colonies, such as Dutch St. Eustatius or Danish St. Thomas.
While the frequency of Anglo-Dutch trade and the means of executing it 
varied according to economic and regulatory changes, what remained largely 
consistent over the course of the first century of settlement in the English 
Atlantic was the general pattern of trade. In most cases Dutch merchants pro-
vided English settlers with a range of products that supported their settle-
ments and plantations. These included European manufactured goods, 
especially ceramics, textiles, and metal wares; provisions, including beer, wine, 
flour, cheese, and, for those not in the Caribbean, sugar and its byproducts; and 
livestock, mainly horses but also cattle and goats. Less common, but at times 
more valuable, Dutch traders also brought British colonists exotic goods such 
as spices and silks from the East Indies. In return for these items, Dutch mer-
chantmen usually returned to the Dutch Republic from English colonies bear-
ing tropical commodities, mainly sugar and tobacco. Even when demand for 
European goods was low, English planters still welcomed Dutch traders 
because of the relatively inexpensive shipping services they offered. Finally, 
Dutch merchants also sold enslaved Africans in British colonies, though the 
trade was numerically insignificant when compared to English slavers.4
 Establishing Trade, 1620s–1630s
The first Anglo-Dutch commercial interactions in the Americas were an out-
growth of the nations’ close relationship within Europe and Elizabeth I’s com-
mitment to provide troops to help the Dutch in their struggle against Spain 
after 1585. When the Virginia Company (1606) sought new leaders to bring 
order to their fledging settlement at Jamestown in 1611 they turned to two 
English men with extensive military experience in the Netherlands, Sir Thomas 
Gates and Sir Thomas Dale. Though it is uncertain what specific commercial 
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connections these men encouraged between the new English colony and the 
Dutch Republic, it is clear that the States General was willing to release them 
to the Virginia Company because they believed the men would help the 
Republic “to establish a firm market there [Virginia] for the benefit and 
increase of trade.”5
As Virginians began to produce successful tobacco harvests in the 1620s, 
Dutch merchants capitalized on earlier inroads and quickly captured a portion 
of the colony’s exports. Although there is little detailed evidence of Anglo-
Dutch exchange in these years it is clear that Dutch vessels were common in 
Virginia. After receiving a charter in 1621, the Dutch West India Company 
moved to gain monopoly control of the Virginia trade, banning private trade to 
the region and dispatching a vessel there. Meanwhile, English traders also 
learned to take advantage of Dutch markets for tobacco. Already by 1622, for 
example, the Virginia Company had begun to send tobacco to Flushing and 
Middelburg to circumvent James I’s efforts to limit England’s tobacco imports. 
By the end of the decade, however, the English Crown’s reluctance to embrace 
tobacco dissipated as officials became aware that Dutch traders’ domination of 
the Chesapeake’s tobacco exports prevented English merchants from engaging 
in this valuable trade.6 Selling tobacco to the Dutch was so appealing to English 
colonists in the Chesapeake because Dutch merchants both brought scarce 
European goods and offered better prices for their tobacco than planters could 
secure in England. Governor John Harvey of Virginia reported in 1632, for 
example, that Dutch masters offered as much as “eighteen peance p. pound” 
for tobacco, a price he claimed was greater than that which English traders 
offered. Meanwhile, Dutch vessels, well stocked with “sugar, strong waters, 
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lemons, hats, shirts, stockings, frying-pans, &c” brought the kinds of necessi-
ties for which Chesapeake planters were always desperate.7
In the Caribbean, where the English established settlements in 
St. Christopher, Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat, and Barbados during the 1620s 
and 1630s, Anglo-Dutch trade was also an important feature of colonial life. 
Having already cooperated in privateering raids against the Spanish since 
the 1580s, it was not unusual for Dutch and English colonists to collaborate 
in the Caribbean. On English islands like St. Christopher these interactions 
usually entailed Dutch vessels calling to obtain water, provisions, and intelli-
gence. For poorly supported colonists struggling to build viable settlements 
the arrival of Dutch vessels provided essential trade and information.8 Regular 
small-scale exchange between Dutch and English settlers in the 1620s blos-
somed into more sustained trade in the mid-1630s as planters began to 
introduce tobacco.9
Familiar with these islands and with Dutch colonies nearby, Dutch shipmas-
ters almost immediately arrived to purchase tobacco. An outgrowth of their 
trade with Virginia, Dutch captains added the English Caribbean to what schol-
ars refer to as the Dutch Atlantic cruising trade. Under this arrangement, one or 
more merchants hired a vessel in the Netherlands, loaded it with a cargo of provi-
sions, wine and beer, textiles, glazed earthenware, and other manufactured 
goods, and engaged a captain and crew to transport the cargo to the Americas 
where the captain was instructed to exchange it for tobacco or other colonial 
produce. Because they had not arranged trade beforehand and usually did not 
have established contacts in the Caribbean, the organizers gave their shipmasters 
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wide leeway in determining where they would trade. In 1635, for example, 
Guilliemeli van der Grindt instructed shipmaster Adriaek Turck to take the 
St. Catarina van Grint, from Amsterdam to Barbados and the other Caribbean 
islands. Turck ultimately visited both St. Christopher and Barbados and 
exchanged his cargo of salt, wine, bread, peas, and manufactured goods for 
tobacco. Other times, these Dutch vessels also included stops in Virginia or even 
New England, such as the 160-ton Dutch vessel that called at Marblehead in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1635 carrying “one hundred and forty tons of salt, 
and ten thousand weight of tobacco” from St. Christopher. Already having loaded 
salt and tobacco in the West Indies, this vessel was most likely completing its voy-
age by selling salt to Massachusetts’ cod fisherman before returning to Europe. 
Though less common, Dutch masters sometimes even sold on credit; in 1635, for 
example, the Dutch traders Gilles Vertangen, Gilles de Croede, and David 
Aijbrantsz traveled to Barbados and St. Christopher to collect more than 13,000 
pounds of tobacco due to them as payment for an earlier delivery.10 Extending 
credit to planters on distant islands without a representative in place to manage 
their debts was a risky proposition and indicates the lengths some Dutch mer-
chants were willing to take to gain access to English tobacco. At the same time, 
the fact that some traders were willing to offer credit suggests that they traded to 
English islands regularly enough to be confident that they could collect the debts. 
Although masters had to call at a number of ports to fill their vessels and the 
value of individual exchanges was often small, the cruising trade flourished dur-
ing the 1630s. As English colonists learned about the benefits of Dutch trade they 
too began to more actively seek Dutch commerce.11
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Soon, English authorities began to complain that Anglo-Dutch trade was 
eroding English custom duties, prompting Charles I to order colonists in the 
Chesapeake and the “islands of St. Christopher’s, Barbadoes, and the other 
Caribbee Islands” to end their trade with the Dutch. Particularly worrisome to 
Charles was the news that his colonists had become so dependent on Dutch 
imports of foodstuffs that they had not planted “corn and grain sufficient for 
the support of those plantations.”12 Eager to capture the duties tobacco pro-
duced and hopeful that the colonies could become self-sustainable enough to 
produce even greater returns, the English government was beginning to under-
stand that if they wanted to benefit most from colonial endeavors they would 
need to regulate trade. Colonists, though, saw things differently. Instead of 
trying to prevent foreign trade in Barbados, for example, Governor Henry 
Hawley decided to capitalize on it, requiring that all foreign ships that “Anchor 
here, for Relief, Refreshment, or Trade…pay to the Governor Twenty Shillings 
in Money, or Goods” and then a further “Seven per Cent on all the Goods” 
sold while in port.13 Not only would Anglo-Dutch commerce provide needed 
trade for Hawley’s nascent colony, it would also help to fund the island’s 
development.
As a whole, through the 1630s Anglo-Dutch trade in the Americas relied 
upon loosely organized speculative ventures that involved vessels arriving 
from great distances hoping to trade at English ports. Leading these ventures 
were most commonly Dutch sojourners looking for immediate trading oppor-
tunities. English colonists welcomed Dutch vessels but they played small roles 
in initiating trade. As ad hoc as this exchange was during the 1620s and 1630s, 
the growing metropolitan resistance to allowing foreign merchants to benefit 
from the English colonies reveals how prevalent it had become. These efforts 
80 koot
<UN>
14 David Pietersz. de Vries, Voyages from Holland to America: 1632–1644, trans. Henry 
C. Murphy (New York, 1853), 107–113.
to limit Anglo-Dutch exchange, in turn, indicate that within the first decade of 
settlement it was becoming increasingly clear that English colonists and met-
ropolitan officials had begun to develop different understandings about the 
role Dutch trade should play in imperial development.
 Building Networks, 1640s–1650s
With a firm foundation based on ad hoc interaction the domestic turmoil of 
the 1640s helped transform Anglo-Dutch trade in the Atlantic and thrust 
Dutch traders into a more central position in English colonial economies. Key 
to the evolution of more intensive Anglo-Dutch networks in these decades was 
the expansion of tobacco and sugar cultivation in the English colonies and the 
disruptions to trade the English Civil War (1642–1646) caused. These develop-
ments enhanced opportunities for Dutch traders who rushed to take advan-
tage of English colonists’ unmet needs. What metropolitan Dutch merchants 
found, however, was that in order to intensify their trade with English planta-
tions in the Caribbean and Chesapeake, they would need to improve on the 
cruising trade which increasingly proved unsatisfactory in building stable 
trade. The Dutch shipmaster David Pietersz. de Vries realized this in 1635 when 
he called at Virginia. Sailing from the Caribbean to New Amsterdam De Vries 
hoped to purchase tobacco in Virginia before continuing on his voyage but 
“as it was out of season to obtain tobacco,” he was forced to “let…[his] cargo lie 
[t]here.” Giving “directions to trade [it] when the crop of tobacco should be 
ripe,” he continued on to New Amsterdam. When he returned in September, 
however, De Vries found his instructions had not been followed and he was 
unable to obtain a cargo.14 The shipmaster’s experience indicates the disad-
vantages inherent in the cruising trade: it depended upon arriving to trade at 
exactly the right moment and without a permanent Dutch presence in the 
colonies it was difficult to arrange convenient and reliable exchange.
To address these deficiencies Dutch traders began to rely upon local Dutch 
agents to direct trade. In the Chesapeake, Dutch firms accomplished this by 
either sending factors to live in English colonies, or by using those based in 
nearby New Amsterdam. Two of the most prominent Dutch agents to take up 
residence in Virginia during this period were the brothers Derrick Cornelisz. 
and Arent Cornelisz. Stam. The Stams arrived in Virginia as the representatives 
of Killiaen van Rensselaer, the founder of the colony of Rensselaerswyck. 
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Initially on the scene to organize trade for the patroon, the Stams decided to 
stay. By 1639 they had purchased property on Virginia’s Eastern Shore, a place 
where Dutch traders found much opportunity, and were organizing trade for a 
number of Amsterdam merchants. In 1640 their network of planters was large 
enough to allow them to ship more than 60,000 pounds of tobacco to the Dutch 
Republic and a further 16,000 pounds to London. In 1641 the Stam’s exports had 
reached 100,000 pounds, surpassing the trade of any individual London 
merchant.15
The growth of New Amsterdam as a commercial center in the 1640s further 
enabled Amsterdam firms to base their agents close to their tobacco suppliers. 
Living only a short sail from the Chesapeake, middlemen such as Govert 
Loockermans soon established strong ties in Virginia and Maryland. 
Loockermans, who had arrived in New Amsterdam as an employee of the 
Dutch West India Company  (wic), organized trade for years for the prominent 
Amsterdam merchant Gillis Verbrugge.16 Able to journey back and forth 
between his Dutch base in New Amsterdam and the Chesapeake plantations, 
Loockermans and others like him were able to efficiently manage their employ-
ers’ fleets, coordinate the arrival of European goods, and prepare tobacco ship-
ments. Moreover, with New Amsterdam’s residents now producing grain and 
lumber and importing horses and salted fish, local Dutch factors could respond 
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to Virginians’ immediate demands better than those merchants who depended 
on supercargoes traveling directly from the Netherlands.
While most Dutch trade to the Caribbean and Chesapeake depended upon 
metropolitan organization through the 1640s, increasingly Dutch colonists liv-
ing in New Amsterdam came to direct and initiate the Chesapeake’s Anglo-
Dutch trade themselves. As tobacco prices fell in the late 1640s and as English 
mercantilist laws and the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–1654) made bilateral 
trade from the Dutch Republic more difficult, traders in nearby New Amsterdam 
found greater opportunities. With extensive experience as agents of Dutch 
firms, New Amsterdam traders like Loockermans soon gained control of Anglo-
Dutch trade in the Chesapeake.17
In the English Caribbean where ready access to a nearby Dutch community 
was not an option, metropolitan firms and their agents remained in control of 
Anglo-Dutch trade into the 1650s. To overcome the managerial deficiencies of 
the cruising trade Dutch traders there began to take up residence in English 
colonies and to establish storehouses. By 1652 Dutch merchants living in 
the English Leeward Islands had established at least five warehouses in 
St. Christopher and several in Montserrat from which to direct their trade.18 
Also serving Antigua and Nevis, these storehouses allowed Dutch traders to 
purchase tobacco, sugar, and other tropical produce over an extended period 
and then to quickly load it into arriving Dutch vessels. Being able to prepare 
cargoes in advance of ships’ arrivals increased efficiency and lowered transac-
tion costs. Moreover, having a physical presence in the islands made it easier 
for the agents to offer credit to planters who were desperate to meet rising 
capital costs. In turn, Dutch traders used their enhanced position to routinely 
beat English competitors on price. According to one official in St. Christopher, 
Dutch merchants sold “shewes at 12 [pounds of tobacco]…and shirts [,] 
Cassocks and drawers at the same price.” Without Dutch trade, he contended, 
“the Countrey payes 40 and 50 [pounds]…ready tobaccoe for the like” goods.19 
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Not fully abandoning the cruising trade, Dutch merchants’ decision to estab-
lish trading bases in the English Caribbean during the 1640s and 1650s indi-
cates their optimism about the prospects of Anglo-Dutch exchange.
While the mechanisms they used to trade and the make-up of their net-
works changed during the 1640s and 1650s, the pattern of Anglo-Dutch 
exchange remained constant. Backed by the credit markets of Amsterdam and 
the commercial advantages of the Dutch empire, Dutch traders both beat 
English merchants on freight and merchandise prices and were able to supply 
goods when their English rivals could not. These included manufactured goods 
such as “browd-brimd white or black hatts,” “new fashioned shoes,” “whyted 
osenbridge linen,” and glazed earthenware as well as provisions such as meat, 
butter, and wine. Dutch merchants were also important suppliers of horses to 
drive the planters’ mills.20 The situation was similar in the Chesapeake where, 
as the Directors of the wic noted, English colonists “receive from their own 
nation in England no such goods as they need” and instead buy these things 
from the Dutch.21
The full extent of Anglo-Dutch trade is almost impossible to quantify, 
but nevertheless several snapshots of the situation during these decades 
reveal its growing importance. In Virginia, for example, David Pietersz. de Vries 
found that of a total of 34 vessels engaged in the tobacco trade there 
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in 1643, only four were Dutch. Five years later, however, that number had 
risen to 12 of 31. Historian John Pagan estimates that between 1643 and 1649 
33 Dutch vessels voyaged to Virginia, up from four six years earlier.22 In 
Barbados, the island for which we have the best evidence, seven or eight and as 
many as 30 Dutch vessels a year called at Barbados between 1640 and 1660, 
making up between 10 and 20 percent of the total number of ships arriving 
at the port.23
What statistics fail to capture are the circumstances under which Dutch mer-
chants traded at English colonies like Barbados. These conditions reveal much 
more about the importance of Anglo-Dutch exchange to the English empire. The 
1640s and 1650s were years of rapid transformation in Barbados as planters 
shifted away from tobacco, cotton, and ginger into sugar, a crop they had only 
recently learned to cultivate and process. While new research has overturned 
scholars’ earlier belief that Dutch merchants introduced sugar to Barbados and 
financed its cultivation, it is clear that Dutch trade helped to sustain the colony.24 
Because planters had to import plantation supplies, manufactured goods, and a 
great portion of their provisions, access to ready trade at good prices was vital. 
And with English merchants often unable to meet their needs (especially when 
the Civil War disrupted trade), Dutch merchants who supplied English colonists 
with “manufactures, brewed beer, linen cloth, brandies,…duffels, [and] coarse 
cloth” were always welcome, especially when they could rescue English settlers 
from “exteme ruin” with “food and raiment” as one group of Dutch traders 
noted.25 As islanders scrambled to cultivate sugarcane and invest in sugar-works 
in Barbados and to find markets for their tobacco in the Chesapeake, Dutch mer-
chants helped support their plantations.
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An even clearer indication of the importance of Dutch trade to English 
colonies was planters’ reaction to English efforts to exclude the Dutch from 
colonial trade. As part of English state-builders’ broader attempt to gain com-
mercial dominance over the Dutch Republic, in 1650 and 1651 Parliament 
enacted the first two of what would be a series of provisions designed to take 
control of England’s Atlantic colonial trade. Parliament aimed the Act of 1650 
at subduing those colonies that still had not acknowledged their supremacy 
by placing an embargo on their commerce, in so doing making it clear that it 
was in their power to regulate colonial trade. The second more sweeping of 
these laws, the Act of Trade and Navigation (1651), attempted to damage Dutch 
commerce and to capture colonial trade for English merchants by confining 
overseas exchange to English ships and stipulating that the bulk of colonial 
trade must pass through England.26
In response to metropolitan efforts to halt Anglo-Dutch exchange colonists 
petitioned their government to change course and restore the relatively free 
trade they had formerly enjoyed. It was in Barbados and Virginia where colo-
nists most clearly articulated this position. Barbadians, for example, greeted 
Parliament’s new laws with a robust defense of Dutch trade. “All the old 
Planters [of Barbados],” they wrote, “well know how much they have ben 
houlding to the Dutch for their subsistence, and how difficult it would have ben 
(without their assistances) ever to have settled” the island. In a period in which 
they had been desperate for goods it was Dutch merchants who had brought 
them “necessary comforts” and sold “their Commondities” much “cheaper” 
than did merchants of their “own nation.” This feeling was so widespread, the 
Assembly and Council contended, that they could “not imagine that there is so 
meane & base minded a fellow amongst us, that will not prefer…[trade with] 
an honorable Dutch, before being bound by the regulations of the Parliament.”27
In Virginia, colonists likewise defended their colony’s reliance on Dutch trade. 
Former Virginia merchant John Bland captured this position best. Targeting the 
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1660 Navigation Act Bland pointed out that Dutch trade was indispensible to 
Virginia because English merchants neglected the colony. “If the Hollanders 
must not trade to Virginia how shall the Planters dispose of their Tobacco… 
[if] The English will not buy it[?].” “Debarring the Hollanders” from the 
Chesapeake, he continued, “will utterly ruinate the colonies commerce and cus-
tomes together in a short time; for if the Inhabitants be destroyed, of necessity 
the Trade there must cease.”28 In an effort to alleviate the risk England’s mercan-
tilist legislation presented to their livelihoods, Dutch and English colonists 
worked to formalize their commercial relationship. Most active in this attempt 
was New Netherland’s Director-General Petrus Stuyvesant who sent emissaries 
to Virginia and traveled to Barbados himself in order to negotiate free trade pacts. 
Unrecognized by metropolitan authorities these agreements testify to the impor-
tance colonists from both empires placed on Anglo-Dutch exchange.29
British colonists’ heralding of the role Dutch traders played in their econo-
mies and their efforts to maintain these links during the 1650s reflects their 
view that it had been Anglo-Dutch trade in the previous four decades that had 
made settlement possible. For these colonists, writing in the midst of sustained 
British efforts to eliminate foreign trade in the colonies and to create an exclu-
sive empire, the Dutch stood for an earlier cross-national legacy that they 
believed provided the best means to structure an imperial economy. Colonists’ 
celebration of Anglo-Dutch trade therefore was the product of both a distinc-
tive interimperial commercial culture and of ongoing colonial efforts to resist 
what they considered burdensome and dangerous imperial policies.
 New Strategies for Illegal Trade, 1660s–80s
Despite colonial resistance, between 1660 and 1688 England’s new Restoration 
government maintained and enhanced Commonwealth policies designed to 
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end Anglo-Dutch trade in the colonies. New laws and the Second Anglo-Dutch 
War (1665–1667) worked to make interimperial exchange more difficult but, 
because these laws did not eliminate the circumstances that made it desirable, 
the regulations did not end Dutch trade in English colonies. In fact in some 
ways the passage of additional Navigation Acts in 1660, 1663, and 1673 actually 
increased opportunity for illegal commerce and enhanced its importance for 
colonial economies. By restricting “enumerated goods” like tobacco and sugar 
to English ships and markets and giving English exporters a monopoly on sup-
plying many goods to the colonies, the laws often inadvertently pushed down 
the prices planters received for their produce and inflated the cost of imports.30 
Planters in Barbados and the Leeward Islands noticed these effects almost 
immediately. In 1661 settlers there began to petition the king and parliament to 
remove the Navigation Acts and allow them “to transport their produce…to 
any port in amity with his Majesty” as a way of avoiding the “glut, and a still 
further fall in the value of sugar” that must be the result of having their 
sugar “forced into one market.”31 Meanwhile English West Indians also soon 
found that lower sugar prices reduced their wealth and diminished English 
traders’ interest. English “merchants,” they complained in 1661, “bring noe 
Commoditiyes” to their islands but “emptie shipps” to load their sugar.32 In 
contrast, Jamaica’s governor reported that Dutch traders who benefited from 
low Dutch shipping costs and who avoided costly English duties routinely sold 
European goods in the West Indies and did so between 20 and 30 percent 
cheaper and “paye[d] deerer for American Goods.”33 The concurrent lack of 
sufficient English shipping and the better prices Dutch traders offered meant 
that colonists around the British Atlantic worked to maintain Anglo-Dutch 
trade because it was economically rewarding.
In order to capitalize on the continued opportunity, both parties involved in 
Anglo-Dutch trade had to adapt the mechanics of their trade. The expulsion of 
Dutch residents from some English colonies and a more robust regulatory 
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regime meant that it was more difficult for Dutch agents to remain in English 
colonies than it had been a decade before. The solution was for colonists to 
smuggle or to work within the regulatory framework to give a veneer of legality 
to what was more often illegal trade. Smuggling was the option that most 
Anglo-Dutch traders chose in the Caribbean. Here the close proximity of Dutch 
islands stocked with inventories of European goods and the difficulties author-
ities had in constantly monitoring miles of coastline scattered across a half-
dozen or more English islands encouraged illicit trade. The Dutch colony most 
important in facilitating this exchange was St. Eustatius. Located amidst the 
English Leeward Islands and just a short sail from each colony, Dutch traders 
used Statia as a base from which they could venture to English colonies. 
The common practice was for Dutch merchants to call at English islands in 
small sloops and boats when tobacco and sugar harvests were coming in, a vari-
ety of trade at the water’s edge reminiscent of that which colonists had used in 
the 1630s.34 For planters in Barbados and Jamaica, Curaçao offered the same 
opportunities that Statia did for those in the Leewards, and trade between these 
islands was commonplace in the second half of the seventeenth century.35 In 
the Chesapeake – which likewise had an extensive coastline – Dutch traders 
used similar methods and benefited from close access to New Netherland.36
Reliant upon subterfuge and good timing, illicit commerce succeeded in 
allowing trade but it often worked against colonists’ ability to build reli-
able and stable Anglo-Dutch networks. Nevertheless some in both North 
America and the West Indies did succeed in blending Dutch and English 
capital, experience, and connections to extend their trade. By employing 
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English partners alongside of those from the Dutch Republic, colonists had 
the added advantage of making Anglo-Dutch trade legal. The groups of 
merchants who most fully integrated Dutch and English networks were 
those Dutch colonists who remained in New York following the English 
conquest of 1664. After a brief period in which direct trade with the 
Netherlands was legal, the Navigation Acts increasingly complicated Dutch 
New Yorkers’ access to former trading partners in the Netherlands and in 
turn hurt American planters who had come to depend on them as interme-
diaries for Dutch trade. To remedy the situation New Yorkers learned to 
exploit a provision in the Navigation Acts that allowed English vessels to 
travel between the colonies and foreign ports provided they stopped to pay 
duties in an English port. Benefiting from England’s decision to give Dutch 
New Yorkers denization, merchants, such as longtime New Yorker Frederick 
Philipse, routinely sent their vessels between New York and Amsterdam 
during the 1670s, often stopping at Dover, Portsmouth, or Falmouth to 
pay duties. Over time traders like Philipse cultivated relationships with 
Englishmen in these ports to receive the vessels and pay the duties. Though 
many of these voyages were legal, New Yorkers also began to exploit the 
outport trade by concealing portions of their Dutch cargoes to avoid bur-
densome duties.37 Other times New Yorkers stood in for silent Dutch part-
ners who were the true freighters and organizers of some ventures, even 
going to significant lengths to make Dutch vessels appear to be English by 
hiring English captains and crews and falsifying registration records.38
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Even in Barbados where there were few who had direct access to Dutch net-
works some colonists secured Anglo-Dutch trade through a similar blending of 
Dutch and English contacts. Rather than relying upon Dutchmen, however, 
Barbadians benefited from Bridgetown’s Jewish population. Resident in 
Barbados from at least the 1650s, the mostly Sephardic Jewish community 
maintained extensive international networks that spanned the Atlantic. 
Profiting from these extensive connections and the lower transactions costs 
that kinship and religious ties provided early modern merchants, Jewish set-
tlers, including the more than 300 who lived in Barbados in 1680, were impor-
tant for Atlantic trade.39 English customs official Samuel Hayne nicely 
illustrated an example of how Jewish traders connected English colonists with 
Dutch markets in a 1685 pamphlet. In 1680 Hayne intercepted the 300-ton 
Experiment bound from Barbados to Amsterdam. Though this vessel had 
landed in Falmouth to pay duties the master did not unload “her whole Cargo” 
as the law stipulated. When Hayne investigated further, he found “one hundred 
Butts and upwards” of sugar along with tobacco, ginger, and fustic (a dyestuff) 
belonging to more than thirty different Barbadians hidden in the hold. This 
voyage, Hayne later determined, had been instigated by a group of Amsterdam 
Jewish merchants who used family connections in Barbados and England to 
organize the venture.40
In the face of increased English efforts to disrupt Anglo-Dutch networks, 
Atlantic traders from both empires adapted their practices between 1660 and 
1688. No longer were their ties as close or permanent as they had been in previ-
ous decades, but nonetheless both groups still found ways to come together for 
profitable exchange. At the same time, these years saw colonists continue to 
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push for a relaxation of the Navigation Acts so as to make Anglo-Dutch trade 
legal. This was particularly important when natural disasters or other exoge-
nous events disrupted usual trade. Suffering from a deficit of trade during and 
immediately after the Second Anglo-Dutch War, for example, English West 
Indians launched a letter-writing campaign to the king and parliament which 
was typical of colonists’ and their supporters’ arguments for free trade in these 
years. In their petition, colonists used their suffering from the lack of trade 
and the danger this presented to both their own and the empire’s wealth as 
evidence of the folly of trade restrictions. More significantly, colonists called 
upon their past experience with the benefits of cross-national trade in arguing 
for the right to “export…commodities to any place in amity with England, in 
English bottoms, on paying customs either in Barbadoes or in England.”41 
Evoking the wealth and success of their “former daies” during which “the Dutch 
were very beneficial to us,” colonists urged a return to the policies that had 
enabled them to flourish. Such a move would, planters contended, in turn ben-
efit the empire as their success translated into imperial success.42
It is possible to see illegal Anglo-Dutch trade as driven by naked self- 
interest, and surely, for some, it was. At the same time, however, that colonists 
simultaneously smuggled and lobbied parliament and the crown to allow 
Anglo-Dutch trade throughout the second half of the seventeenth century sug-
gests a more complicated story. For those who bore the risks, smuggling could 
be richly rewarding and politically powerful planters and merchants – includ-
ing assemblymen, councilors and governors like Christopher Codrington of 
the Leeward Islands – engaged in illegal trade.43 But that these same men also 
petitioned for Dutch trade to be made legal – an act which would eliminate the 
risks that made smuggling so attractive and had helped create their wealth – 
suggests that many colonists pursued illicit trade not only because of self-
interest but also because they had made the reasoned decision that open trade 
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would best allow their colonies, and thus the empire, to prosper. In this way, 
British colonists’ experience with Dutch trade continued to shape their under-
standing of the empire’s structure.
 Local Adjustments to War, 1690s–1730s
In the 1690s and first decade of the eighteenth century imperial developments 
once again made trade more difficult for all and thus encouraged intercolonial 
trade. The War of the League of Augsburg (1689–1697) and the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1702–1713) – chiefly Anglo-French wars – interrupted Atlantic trade, 
led to the capture of hundreds of English, Dutch (who fought alongside the 
English), and French merchantmen, and distracted European merchants. In 
British America the wars resulted in a scarcity of goods, higher freight and insur-
ance costs, and a slump in trade.44 While making transatlantic trade more bur-
densome and expensive, the wars had the opposite effect on intercolonial 
shipping. To meet their continuing needs many colonists increasingly sought out 
trade at surrounding colonies. Because geography facilitated this practice it was 
in the Caribbean where most Anglo-Dutch exchange continued after the 1680s. 
The decentralized and self-organized Atlantic commerce that emerged in this 
period helped support colonial economies and overcome wars’ disturbances.
By using small vessels that embarked on short voyages colonial traders 
could better avoid the hazards of privateers and adjust to rapidly changing cir-
cumstances. Particularly important in this trade were Dutchmen operating in 
emerging commercial nodes such as St. Eustatius, Curaçao, and increasingly 
the Danish-owned but Dutch-dominated St. Thomas. Though Dutch shippers 
faced the same risks as English merchantmen during these two conflicts, many 
British colonists found that “the Dutch our neighbours” could sell goods they 
“wanted at easy rates.”45 Dutch merchants had established this interisland 
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West Indian sloop trade during the mid-seventeenth century but the warfare 
between 1689 and 1713 enhanced its importance for Anglo-Dutch trade, a 
situation which would persist in later decades. Moreover, with larger and 
more diverse mercantile communities developing in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, increasingly British colonists began to take the initiative in 
driving trade.
Every year hundreds of vessels engaged in the Atlantic coasting trade, but 
because the best evidence of this interimperial sloop trade comes from general 
descriptions and Dutch and English shipping registers, the precise shape of the 
networks that made it possible remain obscure.46 It is likely, though, that this 
trade relied less on stable networks than on improvisational decision making. 
Merchants and shipmasters active in the sloop trade knew the location of 
markets and the timing of trade, but likely had little knowledge of whom they 
were going to trade with when they arrived in exchange nodes like St. Thomas, 
St. Eustatius, and Curaçao. Instead they relied upon their long experience, 
their familiarity with each port’s mercantile community, and what intelligence 
they could gather about prices and commercial conditions to arrange wharf-
side exchanges.
The makeup of interisland cargoes in the early eighteenth century generally 
resembled those of previous years. English West Indians continued to send 
sugar and other plantation goods to Dutch islands where they sought provi-
sions, European goods, and other plantation supplies, like lumber and, over 
time, slaves. Again the extent of this trade is unclear. In 1701 Governor 
Christopher Codrington claimed that colonists secreted “many millions of sug-
ars to St. Eustatius, Curaçao and Danish St. Thomas” from the Leeward Islands 
each year.47 Though enslaved Africans never constituted a large percentage of 
Anglo-Dutch trade in the early modern Caribbean, it was during the warfare 
of the 1690s and early eighteenth century when they did expand their role. 
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The Anglo-French wars were especially damaging to the slave trade so when 
faced with shortages English planters turned to Dutch suppliers in Curaçao, 
St. Eustatius, and St. Thomas.48
Continuing to make Anglo-Dutch trade possible were middlemen who were 
well-placed to smooth commerce. While Dutch merchants living in Atlantic 
trading nodes remained valuable, of growing importance in organizing the 
sloop trade after 1700 were middling British West Indian merchants sometimes 
described as “mean persons” by island elites.49 A product of British America’s 
expanding and diversifying economy, this new group of merchants began to 
shift the make-up of Anglo-Dutch cargoes. Still sending sugar, molasses, and 
rum to Dutch islands in exchange for dry goods, these traders, often acting as 
their own supercargoes and sometimes the masters of their own vessels, also 
began to re-export flour, lumber, and beef they imported from Boston, New 
York, and Philadelphia to surrounding Dutch and French islands.50 One por-
tion of this commercial community that was particularly important in smooth-
ing interimperial trade was the Sephardic population. With cross-national 
networks that spanned the Atlantic it was Barbados’ Jewish merchants, for 
example, that provided that colony with its strongest ties to Curaçao, through 
the Henriquez/Senior family. In Nevis, it was the Pinheiro family whose con-
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Merchants hailing from other British American maritime colonies, like 
New York and Bermuda, also were key in helping to keep Anglo-Dutch trade 
flourishing. Employing their prized “Bermuda Sloops,” which evolved origi-
nally from a Dutch design, Bermudians offered freight rates that were among 
the most competitive in the Atlantic in the eighteenth century. Relying on a 
thoroughly maritime community and the efficiencies their vessels offered, 
Bermudians served as carriers for many British colonies; it was often these 
traders that owned and manned the small vessels that brought sugar into 
St. Eustatius and carried manufactured goods away.52 Likewise, New Yorkers, 
who benefited primarily from that city’s productive hinterland, were among 
the key suppliers of flour to the Dutch West Indies.53
The involvement of island traders with little political power, those from 
other colonies, and Jewish colonists in Anglo-Dutch trade made it easy for 
British officials to continue to decry the trade as they had done since the 1640s. 
What was new after 1700, however, was that ever greater numbers of elite West 
Indian planters began to join them in opposing interimperial trade. Reinforcing 
this new opposition was a change in the structure of the sugar business. By the 
1720s the first several generations of entrepreneurial planters who had intro-
duced and perfected sugar cultivation and who had direct experience with 
Dutch trade were no longer on the scene. Plantation ownership, especially in 
the richest colonies of Barbados, Antigua, and Nevis, had largely passed to 
heirs who were likely to be absentees or to London firms who had gained con-
trol of large estates during the economic boom that followed the Treaty of 
Utrecht (1713).54 As importantly, increased competition from the French and 
expanding worldwide production of sugar continued to push its price down-
ward so that the global price of sugar fell below the British price. As a result 
British planters began to pivot in their support for trade restrictions. Previously 
frustrated that these laws raised the costs of imports and restricted their ability 
to find the best market for sugars, planters now came to see the protected 
British sugar market as vital to their success. At the same time, they also began 
to criticize British Americans, such as those in New York, who traded to the 
foreign West Indies. Because American traders supplied goods to these colo-
nies and carried away sugar and its byproducts, planters and their London 
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allies argued, they were driving planters’ costs upward while reducing their 
market for sugar. By furnishing the “French and Dutch Sugar Settlements in the 
West-Indies” with “those very Supplies, without which they could not enlarge 
their Plantations, as they daily do,” British North Americans were undermining 
the British sugar trade. Hoping to forestall competition from these foreign 
islands British planters and their allies in London began to petition parliament 
to pass new legislation to end this trade.55 The subsequent law, the Molasses 
Act (1733) was woefully inadequate in stopping trade but did signal a diver-
gence in the way English colonists had begun to understand cross-national 
exchange. West Indian planters made the decision that Anglo-Dutch trade was 
now a threat rather than an aid to their success and thus mobilized their politi-
cal power to end it.
A similar change in politics in the Chesapeake effectively finished most 
Anglo-Dutch trade in that region. As in the Caribbean, the several generations 
of early colonists with Dutch ties had mostly died by the eighteenth century 
and thus there were fewer residents who had first-hand experience with cross-
national exchange. More importantly, though, an alliance of politically power-
ful London merchants and elite Virginia planters worked together to exploit 
the convoy system used to protect the tobacco fleet during the War of the 
League of Augsburg and the War of the Spanish Succession to capture much of 
the region’s tobacco trade for themselves. One result of this process was that 
there was significantly less opportunity for Dutch traders and because the 
British naval power protected the fleets these vessels’ presence in the 
Chesapeake further discouraged cross-national exchange.56
Anglo-Dutch trade in British America did not end abruptly in the 1730s, but 
it was in this decade that its meaning for British colonists largely changed.57 
During the remainder of the eighteenth century, trade with other empire’s 
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Caribbean colonies, especially the French, became more important to British 
Americans. As the economies of New York, New England, and Pennsylvania 
continued to expand and diversify in the eighteenth century, merchants there 
who were already trading with British and Dutch colonies in the Caribbean 
expanded their routes and more frequently called at French islands. With abun-
dant fresh land and encouragement from their government, French planters 
rapidly increased their sugar cultivation. Between 1713 and 1730 the number of 
sugar works in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Saint-Domingue doubled. By the 
1760s French planters produced more sugar than did the British. Eager to sup-
plement what many saw as insufficient opportunities for trade in the British 
West Indies, New Yorkers now regularly supplied French planters with “Boards, 
Shingle, Joist, Plank, Hogshead-Staves, Hoops, Horses, Bread, Flower, Gammons, 
Salt Fish, and many other [goods of] the like.”58 Whereas it had been Dutch 
merchants who had traded these goods to British planters desperate for sup-
plies, British America’s own colonies were now, as one former captain noted, 
playing the role of “the Dutch” to the French colonies.59 New commercial oppor-
tunities for British American traders in the French colonies did not mean an end 
to Anglo-Dutch trade in the Americas, but this trade was now only one (increas-
ingly minor) part of American colonists’ broader interimperial exchange. So 
that, for example, when New Yorkers opposed the Molasses Act more often than 
not it was French, not Dutch, trade that colonists said they most hoped to pre-
serve.60 No longer would British colonists single out the Dutch as instrumental 
in their economic success as they had done fifty years before.
 Conclusion: Interimperial or Supranational?
British colonists’ pivot towards driving their own intercolonial trade in the 
eighteenth century and British planters’ (in the West Indies and Chesapeake) 
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embrace of mercantilist policies that protected their interests reminds us that 
the politics of empire always mattered in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. The impressive achievements of those cosmopolitan and entrepreneur-
ial traders who built durable interimperial networks spanning the Atlantic 
creates the temptation to abandon nationalist frameworks in our understand-
ing of Atlantic history. To the extent that it helps us recognize the important 
self-organized and cross-national origins of Atlantic empires and complicates 
the rise of colonial economies, this shift in thinking is productive. But if we 
begin to see early modern actors in the Atlantic as truly supranational and thus 
as belonging to a community that transcended national boundaries, we run 
the risk of pushing the argument too far. The use of the term “supranational,” a 
word that emerged in scholarly discourse between the mid-nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as political thinkers strove to understand the power 
of proposed international political and economic bodies, suggests that indi-
vidual actors in the Atlantic lived outside their national contexts and created a 
community beyond the authority of any one empire, and that they in turn 
existed independently of those empires.61 While often able to function with 
impunity at the fringes of European empires and to unite actors across empires, 
interimperial networks were always entangled with empires. Undoubtedly 
these networks and communities shaped imperial projects and were a signifi-
cant aspect of colonists’ lives, but European settlers were never able to stand 
beyond empire.62 Oftentimes it was precisely the workings of empire – the 
instability imperial warfare caused and the openings for profit that mercantile 
restrictions created – that fostered interimperial communities during the sev-
enteenth and early eighteenth centuries.
Meanwhile, as the decision of English sugar magnates to change course and 
pursue greater commercial regulation in the 1730s suggests, colonial actors did 
not create intercolonial networks for the sake of solely building a transnational 
community. Rather they did so because their lived experience taught them it 
was the logical choice as they struggled to build successful economies at the 
edge of the advancing empire. Their subsequent efforts to reshape imperial 
policies based on their local experiences indicates their continued engage-
ment with imperial politics. As English colonists’ petitions attest, they came to 
understand their economic success, even if buttressed by Dutch trade, as 
99Anglo-Dutch Trade
<UN>
productive for the British Empire as a whole. They often disagreed vehemently 
over the terms and character of the empire, but they supported and worked to 
advance it.
As we continue to trace the kinds of transnational networks that allowed 
economic and cultural exchange within the Atlantic we need to keep in mind 
developing European states and the role they played in shaping colonists’ 
affections and behavior. One way to do this, as I have contended here, is to 
constantly evaluate the ways that interimperial trade shaped the make-up of 
Atlantic empires. This appeal to remember the imperial contexts within which 
colonists conducted transnational trade is not meant to suggest that interim-
perial networks and the cosmopolitan mindset they created were not real and 
did not matter. Rather it is a reminder that we also must think about how they 
mattered to the empires that colonies constituted. Uncovering the material 
contributions this trade made, how its participants understood themselves as 
commercial actors, and the ways it shaped imperial development are key to 
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The French Atlantic and the Dutch,  
Late Seventeenth–Late Eighteenth Century
Silvia Marzagalli
Beginning in the early sixteenth century, French merchants and captains 
became involved in the new Atlantic trade. Private ventures, and occasionally 
voyages of exploration co-sponsored by the monarchy, contributed to shaping 
French perceptions of Atlantic opportunities and progressively influenced 
royal decisions regarding the direction French colonization would take. 
By 1650, the French crown had built an empire both on the American mainland 
and in the islands of the West Indies. Parallel to the rise of the French West 
Indies, the French established permanent trading posts both in the Indian 
Ocean and on the African coast to procure slaves. Although in the eighteenth 
century France lost parts of its empire,1 both its West Indian and slave trades 
flourished. By the eve of the French Revolution, France was not only one of 
the major colonial powers, but was also the world’s foremost producer of sugar 
and coffee.
The boundaries of the French Empire did not limit or contain all the 
activities of French merchants, however. In fact, French merchants looked for 
opportunities all over the Atlantic. They were very active, for example, in Cádiz 
(and thus in the Spanish American trade) and in the Levant (which increas-
ingly imported colonial crops).2 This chapter deals exclusively with French 
colonial trade, the leading growth sector for the country in the eighteenth 
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century. I will analyze the role played by Dutch merchants and the United 
Provinces in the emergence, consolidation and functioning of this French 
colonial trade in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Whereas states tried to set rules for channeling profits in order to increase 
the prosperity of their subjects and the territories under their control, early 
modern trade relied on merchant networks operating well beyond political 
boundaries. In looking at these networks’ composition and at how they func-
tioned, historians have considered citizenship, ethnicity, religion, or kinship 
as pertinent factors. But in talking about “Dutch” or “French” merchants, we 
should be aware that we run the risk of essentializing one element among 
these actors’ multiple identities and thereby unduly attributing an exclusive, 
or at least preponderant, explanatory value to it. My sense is that merchants 
played with multiple identities and affiliations, depending on the nature of the 
economic transactions in which they were involved, and on the equally blurred 
identities of the partners with whom they were dealing. From the perspective 
of the governments involved, the question of assessing identities and affilia-
tions was crucial because it was connected with the capacity of states to 
impose their sovereignty over individuals and spaces. Thus, states contributed 
to shaping the notion of what it meant to be a “Dutch,” “French,” or “British” 
merchant. In this sense, governments determined categories which oversim-
plified the reality of networks built on elements other than place of birth – 
elements such as confessional belonging or kinship. For example, the son of a 
Dutch couple born in France was defined as French by the French authorities, 
though he might have relatives in the United Provinces and belong to a 
Protestant congregation, affiliations that might influence, sometimes quite 
heavily, his mercantile activities. As legislation largely adopted categories 
determined by the state, however, they could be decisive in opening or closing 
the boundaries of legal trade.
The use of categories such as “Dutch,” “British,” or “French” applied to 
merchants or even to the larger oceanic space of the Atlantic is, therefore, not 
self-evident. We have to question how such an identity was chosen or ascribed 
and how it was used by the actors, especially with respect to the institutions 
with which they interacted, and to the legal framework in which they 
decided or were forced to operate. I cannot answer these questions about how 
merchants used their multiple identities in any detail. This would require 
massive empirical research into sources such as merchant and legal papers. 
This chapter can, at most, provide an overall picture of the main ways in which 
the Netherlands and the Dutch – defined here as subjects of the United 
Provinces – were relevant for French colonial trade. I will start by reviewing the 
importance of the Dutch in the initial phases of the French West Indian trade, 
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and show how changes induced by Colbert’s policy of excluding foreign and, 
most especially, Dutch merchants from French colonial trade put an end to the 
massive direct trade of the Dutch in the French West Indies. Secondly, I will 
show the persistent relevance of the Dutch in the re-export trade of French 
colonial goods throughout the eighteenth century. Finally, I will suggest that 
closed colonial mercantilistic systems such as the French one could only work 
in the long run because of the regular recurrence of warfare, which disrupted 
the peacetime patterns of colonial trade. Neutral carriers such as the Dutch 
allowed, then, for the rebalancing of capital flows between France and the 
United Provinces, as well as among other nations.
 Dutch Merchants, Ships and Capital in the Seventeenth Century 
French West Indian Trade
France established permanent settlements in Canada and in the West Indies in 
the first half of the seventeenth century, but it was not until Colbert’s ministry 
in the 1660s that the crown managed to make colonial trade profitable for 
merchants based in France. His mercantilist policy helped confirm contempo-
rary conceptions of the usefulness of colonies. Whereas the economic utility of 
New France was still debatable in the seventeenth century, the French West 
Indies produced two profitable products: tobacco and, increasingly, sugar, 
once Dutch colonists introduced the techniques and know-how in the 1640s 
and 1650s.
By the mid-seventeenth century, merchants from Holland dominated a 
large part of the West Indian trade. As Wim Klooster put it, “The Dutch even 
managed to gain mercantile supremacy, albeit short-lived, in […] Guadeloupe 
and Martinique.”3 This situation began to change in the 1660s. In 1662, a report 
presented to the minister of finance, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, estimated that of 
150 ships trading with the French Caribbean, no more than three or four were 
French-owned. The minister spent the rest of his life trying to reverse this 
situation.4 This led to a two-pronged strategy: firmer control by the crown on 
the local administration in the colonies; and the implementation of a policy 
for the exclusion of foreigners from the colonial trade – a policy specifically 
aimed at the Dutch. Colonies were put under direct state control, instead 
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of under the control of chartered companies or private landlords who had 
previously been granted proprietary rights (propriétaires-seigneurs). In 1671, 
foreign ships were banned from colonial ports while French exports to the 
colonies were exempted from all duties. Duties on French colonial imports 
were reduced from 5 percent to 3 percent. These decisions laid the basis for 
what was later labeled the “exclusive system,” a policy excluding foreigners 
from colonial trade and obliging the colonists to trade exclusively with the 
ports and merchants of the home country. French shipping and shipbuilding 
grew as a consequence of this policy shift.5 These policies were part of a larger 
project meant to assert French economic interests in Europe, and was imple-
mented via various decisions, notably the toll tariffs of 1667. It came at a cost, 
though. Among others, the war against the Dutch (1672–1679) resulted from 
it, and the permanent subordination of colonists’ interests had political conse-
quences, but as far as the colonial trade was concerned, it proved quite 
effective. Similar policies were being adopted in these years by other European 
countries as well.
The failure of the chartered Compagnie des Indes Occidentales in 1666 
opened up the opportunity for French merchants to ship on their own 
account to the colonies. Despite the almost continuous state of warfare which 
characterized the last 40 years of the reign of Louis XIV – wars which bought 
Saint-Domingue under French dominion (1697), and secured temporary access 
to Spanish America during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) – 
French merchants were able to create the commercial networks that would 
allow them to rise to prominence in Atlantic trade in the eighteenth century.6 
In this process, they benefited from the assistance of pre-existing commercial 
networks and the capital mobilized by these networks, notably the Dutch ones. 
Whereas Italians dominated sixteenth-century French businesses, Flemish 
and Dutch merchants and bankers took over this role in the seventeenth 
century. Many of them had settled in the main Atlantic ports in France to 
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control the salt, wine and other export trades. They were, therefore, well- 
positioned to take advantage of the emergence of French colonial trade.
From the beginning, La Rochelle participated intensively in the West Indian 
trade, whereas Nantes specialized in the slave trade. Bordeaux’s shipowners 
also converted their businesses to the colonial trade – successfully competing 
with the aforementioned Atlantic ports – which proved more profitable than 
the Newfoundland fisheries. As Bordeaux was to become the most important 
French port for colonial trade, its case deserves closer attention. By the 1660s, a 
few wealthy French merchants in Bordeaux fitted out expeditions to both 
Newfoundland and to the West Indies. Some of these merchants were Catholic, 
like François Saige and Pierre Cornut; others were Huguenots, like Etienne 
Dhariette, who fitted out the first known expedition from Bordeaux to Quebec 
in 1671, as well as the first triangular shipping venture from Bordeaux to Quebec 
and to the West Indies in 1672.7 For the latter voyage, Dhariette freighted the 
ship of his Catholic colleague, Saige. Whether Catholic or Protestant-owned, 
most of the funds for these Newfoundland ventures were obtained through 
bottomry loans granted by a naturalized Dutch merchant living in Bordeaux, 
Jean de Ridder, and his brother-in-law, the British wine merchant Thomas 
Arundell. Between 1660 and his death in 1671, Ridder financed 86 bottomry 
loans in Bordeaux for expeditions to the Newfoundland fisheries, often in part-
nership with Everhard Jabach, a banker who settled in Paris, who was also 
director of the French East Indian Company.8 Ridder also financed and insured 
the first Bordeaux ventures to the West Indies.9 This group of wealthy mer-
chants was also the originator of Bordeaux’s increasing involvement in the 
West Indian trade, which developed from the 1660s onwards. By 1685, Bordeaux 
fitted out 50 ships to the West Indies. Huguenot merchant Etienne Dhariette 
participated, alone or in partnership with other merchants, in a quarter of the 
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(Bordeaux: Mollat/Fédération Historique du Sud-Ouest, 2002), 1:85–115.
11 Paul Butel, Les négociants bordelais, l’Europe et les Iles au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Aubier-
Montaigne, 1974); Charles Carrière, Négociants marseillais au XVIIIe siècle (Marseille: 
Institut historique de Provence, 1973).
12 On the legal status of foreigners in France, see Silvia Marzagalli, “L’évolution de la 
politique française vis-à-vis des étrangers à l’époque moderne: conditions, discours, 
343 voyages sent out from Bordeaux to the West Indies from the 1660s until 
1685.10 Although it is difficult to generalize in the absence of detailed research 
on the specific contribution of Dutch capital in the rise of colonial shipping in 
other French ports, this case supports the widespread contemporary percep-
tion of the trade supremacy of the Dutch in the second half of the seventeenth 
century.
Whereas Dutch capital and insurance services were decisive for the West 
Indian trade in this phase, within a generation French merchants in Bordeaux 
were able to send expeditions to the West Indies using their own financial 
resources. A similar evolution toward autonomy in financing long-distance 
trade has been observed in Marseille.11 This might have been the result of the 
high returns upon investment of these expeditions, on the one hand, and of 
the implementation of French colonial policy aimed at excluding foreigners 
from its colonial trade on the other. Foreign participation, however, continued 
to be of great importance in Bordeaux, as it was in other major French ports. 
Northern Europeans remained in charge of most of France’s European import 
and export trade, and the United Provinces was a vital market for French colo-
nial re-exports throughout the eighteenth century.
 The Dutch and the Re-export of French Colonial Goods
Whereas Dutch merchants initiated sugar production in the French West 
Indies, carried on most of its colonial trade in the mid-seventeenth century, 
and financed the first French expeditions to the West Indies beginning in the 
1660s, colonial shipping and trade was largely taken over in the eighteenth cen-
tury by French businesses funded by French capital. Although firms involved 
in French colonial trade could occasionally include naturalized merchants and 
descendants of foreigners born in France – who were considered by the French 
authorities as French subjects – French merchants nonetheless dominated 
this protected market.12
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ucts (wine, salt, cereals) was dominated by foreign interests – and most significantly 
the Dutch – who had commission merchants in most of these French ports. French 
merchants were generally in charge of the local trades, or acted as commission 
merchants, without investing in shipping and the export trade on their own account. 
For Nantes, see Jean Meyer, L’armement nantais dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle 
(Paris: Sevpen, 1969); for Saint-Malo, Lespagnol, Messieurs de Saint-Malo, 273. For the 
Dutch trade in French wine, see Henriette de Bruyn Kops, A spirited exchange: the 
wine and brandy trade between France and the Dutch Republic in its Atlantic framework, 
1600–1650 (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2007) and Anne Wegener Sleeswjik, Les vins français 
aux Provinces-unies au 18e siècle: négoce, dynamique institutionnelle et la restructuration du 
marché// Franse wijn in de republiek in de 18e eeuw: economish handelen, institutionele 
dynamiek en de herstructurering van de mark (unpublished PhD diss., EHESS and the 
University of Amsterdam, 2006), 3 vols. Competition occasionally led to conflicts, like in 
Nantes, where demonstrations against Portuguese New Christians (1636–1637) and the 
Dutch (1640) took place. See Guy Saupin, Nantes au XVIIe siècle: vie politique et société 
urbaine (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1996), 247–249.
Within a few decades after Spain’s official recognition of French sovereignty 
over Saint-Domingue (1697), the French part of the island became the world’s 
major sugar and coffee producer. Increasing quantities of colonial goods were, 
therefore, shipped to France, where four ports (Bordeaux, Nantes, Marseille 
and Le Havre/Rouen) monopolized 90 percent of colonial trade.13
National consumption of colonial goods, however, was comparatively 
low, although France, with its 24 million inhabitants in 1750 and 28 million in 
1789, was by far the most populated country in Europe. Despite French cities 
shifting to new consumption patterns directly linked to imports from the 
Americas (coffee, tobacco, textiles colored with indigo, mahogany furniture, 
etc.), France re-exported 80 percent of its colonial imports to other European 
countries as well as to the Levant. This was due to the fact that the capacity of 
the national market was limited by low incomes and high inland transport 
costs. The main markets were in Northern Europe, and the Dutch played an 
important role in the redistribution of colonial goods imported to French ports 
in accordance with dictates of the mercantilist system. Colonial goods found 
their way to their final markets on foreign ships, as a natural extension of the 




15 On Navigocorpus, see http://navigocorpus.org/ and http://navigocorpus.hypotheses.org/. 
For a description of the database, see Jean-Pierre Dedieu, et al., “Navigocorpus, a database 
for shipping information. A methodological and technical introduction,” International 
Journal of Maritime History 33, no. 2 (2011): 241–262, and id., “Navigocorpus at work. A brief 
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24, no. 1 (2012): 331–359.
16 Spanish ships were exempted from some duties, which affects the statistics. A compari-
son with other statistics shows that between 75 percent and 85 percent of total foreign 
shipping in Provence was concentrated in Marseille. Ports in the Languedoc (notably 
Sète) had a total of foreign shipping (Spanish shipping excluded) which, between 1774 
and 1790, represented about 15 percent of the corresponding figures for ports in the 
Provence. Roussillon had hardly any foreign, non-Spanish shipping. See Christian 
Pfister-Langanay and Silvia Marzagalli, “La navigation des ports français en Méditerranée 
au XVIIIe siècle: premiers aperçus à partir d’une source inexploitée,” Cahiers de la 
Méditerranée 83 (2011): 273–295.
17 With 16 percent of the known Dutch clearances from France and 26 percent of the total 
known Dutch tonnage, Bordeaux had 74 of the 121 known Dutch ships exporting French 
colonial goods.
Using the data we have entered into the online Navigocorpus database,15 we 
can provide a global overview of the presence of Dutch ships in France in 1787. 
Data have been collected for all available clearances (i.e. for a total of 98 French 
ports, encompassing 80 percent of all clearances in the Channel and Atlantic 
ports, but only 3 percent of Mediterranean ports). In order to compensate for 
the absence of equivalent sources on the clearances for French Mediterranean 
ports, we have also entered into the database all entries from the Health Office 
data in Marseille (corresponding to 32 percent of all Mediterranean clearances. 
These entries, however, do cover 80 percent of all non-Spanish foreign ship 
movements in the French Mediterranean ports).16 Without being exhaustive, 
available data for 1787 offer a quite accurate picture of Dutch shipping in 
France.
The database provides information on 828 Dutch entries or clearances in 
France, representing a total of 582 different ships. Their tonnage, as far as the 
information provided in the clearances reveals, is shown in Figure 4.1. We do 
not have any data on the tonnage of the 33 Dutch ships entering Marseille 
that year.
Out of 32 different recorded French ports which were frequented by Dutch 
ships in 1787, information on the main exported item(s) in the cargo is pro-
vided for 18 ports only, among which was Bordeaux,17 but not for 
the three other main colonial ports. Sugar was on board 105 ships, coffee on 18 
additional ships (in 40 instances, coffee is mentioned together 
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with sugar). As Figure 4.2 shows, the United Provinces was by far the main 
destination of these ships.
In Bordeaux, 88 of the 338 ships exporting sugar or coffee abroad in 1787 (26 
percent) were Dutch. Figure 4.3 shows the flags and destinations of these ships. 
As these figures show, most of the Dutch shipping in French colonial goods was 
bound for the United Provinces, although a part of it was subsequently re-
exported to other areas. As far as the Baltic trade is concerned, the online 
Sound Toll Register provides a complementary picture. A total of 484 ships 
passed the Sound coming from a French port and bound for the Baltic in 1787.18 
Sixty-eight of them had a captain who declared himself to be living in the 
United Provinces (14 percent). All of these Dutch ships cleared from a French 
Atlantic port. Twenty-two of them declared either sugar or coffee on board 
(nine of which also had indigo as cargo), whereas the French sources in 
Navigocorpus allowed for the identification of only nine ships bound for the 
Baltic with colonial goods. Differences with the data contained in Navigocorpus 
are due to the fact that cargoes are described in much more detail in the Sound 
Toll registers than in French clearance registers. Moreover, Dutch captains 
clearing from a French port might have declared a Dutch destination, when 
they eventually made a stop before crossing the Sound. All but three of these 
ships entering the Baltic came from Bordeaux. The others cleared from Nantes. 
With 22 ships out of a total of 158 ships entering the Baltic from a French 
18 Two of them in the first week of January 1787, thus with a departure from the French port 
in 1786.




FIGURE 4.1 Total tonnage of Dutch ships clearing French ports in 1787. 
Source: Navigocorpus database. http://navigocorpus.org/.
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FIGURE 4.3 Total tonnage of the ships clearing Bordeaux with sugar or coffee  
in 1787, per destination and flag. 





FIGURE 4.2 Destination of Dutch ships clearing French Atlantic ports with sugar or coffee on 
board, 1787. 
Source: Navigocorpus database, data from 18 French Atlantic ports. 
http://navigocorpus.org/.
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20 Paul Butel, Les négociants bordelais, 53.
21 Using the balances of trade, Butel provides some figures of this relative decline both for 
Bordeaux and for France: Butel, Les négociants bordelais, 52–67.
22 For Bordeaux, Voss showed that the Dutch were already outnumbered by Hanseatic mer-
chants by 1715. See Peter Voss, “Une communauté sur le déclin? Les marchands hollandais 
à Bordeaux, 1650–1715,” Bulletin du Centre d'Histoire des Espaces Atlantiques 7 (1995): 
33–57. In Marseille, Carrière has identified a total of 22 merchants from the United 
Provinces and from the Austrian Netherlands between 1715 and 1789. This equaled 22 out 
of the total of 489 foreigners, which was less than 5 percent. Dutch ships represented 
almost 12 percent of the total foreign entrances in Marseille. Carrière, Négociants marseil-
lais, 1: 273, 584.
Atlantic port with either sugar or coffee on board, the Dutch owned 
14 percent of the ships which carried French colonial re-export trade to this 
area.19
This data about 1787 reflects the situation after at least four decades of 
relative decline in the position held by Dutch shipping in French import 
and export markets. From his analysis of Bordeaux, Paul Butel showed that 
Dutch ships represented 65 percent of total foreign tonnage in Bordeaux in 
1715, 44 percent in 1746, 29 percent in 1773 and 18 percent in 1787.20 Despite this 
decline, which is consistent with the general trend in the relative position of 
the Dutch in the international transport markets, these data show that the 
Dutch still played a significant role in the re-export trade of French colonial 
goods at the end of the ancien régime, given the fact that colonial trade had 
increased impressively in the eighteenth century. The position of the Dutch in 
the re-export markets for French colonial goods, notably in Bordeaux, was still 
important on the eve of the French Revolution, even if their growth rate was 
slower than that of other Northern Europeans.21 This achievement relied on 
solid merchant networks which did not require an overly large presence of 
Dutch middlemen in France. As a matter of fact, the Dutch were only a small 
community in most major French ports.22
 The Role of Dutch Neutrality and the Necessity of Warfare
The trade relations we have discussed so far concerns peacetime. During 
peace, the mercantilist system worked at its best, and West Indian products 
found their way to European consumers through a French port and the con-
comitant re-export trade. War, however, disrupted peacetime colonial trade 
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(thèse d’Etat, Lille, Service de reproduction des thèses, 2 vols., 1973), 146–147.
25 See Klooster, Illicit Riches, chapter 5; Christian Schnakenbourg, Les sucreries de la 
Guadeloupe dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle (1760–1790): contribution à l'étude 
de la crise de l'économie coloniale à la fin de l'ancien régime (Thèse d’Etat, Université 
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26 I have developed the argument I suggest in this section with more details in a chapter 
entitled “Is warfare necessary to the functioning 18th century colonial systems? Some 
reflections on the necessity of cross-imperial and foreign trade in the French case,” in 
Beyond Empires: Self-Organizing Cross-Imperial Economic Networks versus Institutional 
Empires, 1500–1800, ed. Catia Antunes and Amelia Polonia, forthcoming.
and the système exclusif. Chased by the British navy and enemy privateers, 
French ships were no longer able to supply colonists with goods and slaves, nor 
could they safely carry colonial goods to France. More generally, trade under 
the French flag during a conflict was dangerous, and this resulted in taking 
recourse to neutral carriers, among which the Dutch were well-positioned 
during most of the eighteenth-century conflicts. The Dutch, in fact, consis-
tently carried a portion of the shipping in French metropolitan ports. During 
the War of the Spanish Succession, France issued, for instance, over 4000 
passes to Dutch captains.23 In order to take part in the colonial trade, mer-
chants and colonists also organized alternative trade routes, and made use of 
neutral ports. In 1780, for instance, Bordeaux merchant Gradis supplied his 
plantations in Martinique and Saint-Domingue through St. Eustatius, from 
which he also dispatched his sugar to London, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam.24 
In some instances, such as in 1793, French colonial ports were opened to for-
eign neutral ships.
Without exploring the role played by Dutch ships and the Dutch colonies in 
the Americas in warfare any further – not to mention the endemic smuggling 
which went on even in peacetime with other imperial systems25 – I would 
instead like to develop some more general reflections on the role played 
by warfare and neutrality and how these impacted the way Atlantic trade 
worked.26
Warfare is often considered an exogenous element disrupting the regular 
course of transatlantic trade. There are at least two reasons which lead me 
to believe that we should rethink this picture. The first reason is that warfare 
was just as frequent as peace, and there is no particular reason why we should 
consider that the latter represents the norm, and that warfare was an excep-
tion. Neither was warfare exogenous to the Atlantic system. European empires 
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in the Americas generated tensions, as states tried to keep their colonies closed 
to foreigners while, at the same time, trying to penetrate the colonial markets 
of other European empires. Imperial struggles to take over parts of colonial 
markets regularly generated warfare. Violence and wars can thus be seen as 
intrinsic elements of the colonial empires of the early modern European 
powers.
The second reason why I believe we should try to include war in the narra-
tive of colonial trade is based upon economic considerations. Michel Morineau 
noticed that in 1788 the United Provinces imported from France twice the 
value of their exports to France.27 The imbalance was even greater for other 
Northern European territories, notably for the Hanseatic towns. Morineau 
suggested that some mechanisms of compensation were necessarily at work, 
making it possible for the Northern Europeans to withstand a structural imbal-
ance in the long run. Besides insurance and shares in French trade, Morineau 
pointed to war as the major factor in reestablishing the balance, as interna-
tional conflicts provoked an increased recourse to neutral shipping on the one 
hand, and consistent French war expenditures abroad on the other.28 In an 
Atlantic perspective, warfare could be considered an element which was 
necessary to equalize imbalances in trade which were generated by the 
existence of closed imperial systems – systems which obliged colonists to trade 
exclusively (or mainly29) with the home country. Morineau’s interpretation 
is particularly interesting because it views warfare as a part of a system, and 
not as an exogenous element interfering with an otherwise progressive expo-
nential growth of trade, as most of French historians have interpreted France 
eighteenth-century trade.30 Smuggling and interimperial trade might have 
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played an analogous role in peacetime by providing a balance in an interna-
tional system of exchange. More globally, compensation mechanisms could 
follow complex patterns of multilateral relations, including both colonial and 
international trade.31 This is not to say that such processes were consciously 
put into being by precise identifiable actors. Rather, I am suggesting that the 
system based on theoretically closed imperial systems could last for over a cen-
tury because of its structural leaks (smuggling) and because of readjustments 
of imbalances caused by warfare.
The French colonial and re-export trade allowed France to compensate for 
trade imbalances with Great Britain, Central Europe and Asia in peacetime. 
By imposing limitations on colonial trade and forcing it to pass through French 
ports, however, the mercantilist system generated other imbalances (notably 
between France and Northern Europe). Warfare might have served as an overall 
adjustment variable which contributed frequently enough to recalibrate the 
system, especially given the fact that these Northern European countries were 
generally neutral and took advantage of warfare to increase their trade and 
shipping substantially. In this sense, the policy of neutrality adopted by the 
United Provinces during most of eighteenth-century conflicts was crucial, and 
its case is comparable to the Hanseatic city of Hamburg. Conflicts, however, also 
led to the progressive loss of France’s first colonial empire (1713, 1763, 1804, 1815), 
thus emphasizing a further element of its fragility. Other elements were increas-
ing colonial debts, decreasing profit margins, and the deportation of an increas-
ing number of captives, which meant that on the eve of the Haitian Revolution 
the majority of slaves in Saint-Domingue were born in Africa, and, therefore, 
less integrated into the colonial society than were West-Indian born slaves.
 Conclusion
This chapter analyzed a few ways in which the Dutch played a role in the 
emergence and viability of French colonial trade from the second part of the 
seventeenth century up to the French Revolution. This role evolved over time. 
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Whereas Dutch capital proved essential for the rise of French-based shipping 
to the West Indies, the Dutch were thereafter essential mainly for organizing a 
flourishing re-export trade of colonial goods from the French ports to the 
United Provinces on Dutch ships. The exclusion of the Dutch from direct trade 
to French America was less effective in wartime, when French colonies might 
be opened up to neutral trade. More significantly, the exclusive colonial system 
created by France was viable in the long run only if some mechanisms com-
pensated for the structural imbalance of trade it generated. The United 
Provinces is a case in point – although not the only one – to test the hypothesis 
that war played a central role. I did not aim to be exhaustive in any of my con-
siderations of these elements. Further research is badly needed. Nor could I 
examine all possible aspects of the questions I raised. Some of them have been 
neglected, such as the role played by Amsterdam as a major international 
financial center for remittances and payments and as an insurance market for 
shipping, which was essential in enabling international trade and shipping.
The aim of this chapter was to present a case study. Atlantic imperial sys-
tems – taking for granted that they existed – cannot be studied as atomized, 
disconnected entities. To understand the way they worked we must adopt a 
systemic approach. In order to stress this point here, I have deliberately and 
artificially constrained the “French Atlantic” within the framework of the 
French colonial mercantilist system, without even examining its leaks and 
constant compromises at the local, colonial level. Nor have I discussed the way 
French merchants profited on the margins of it, while at the same time they 
lobbied for the maintenance of protective legislation.32 The point I make is 
that French colonial trade originated, flourished and persisted only through 
the collaboration of non-French merchants and the existence of non-French 
markets, among which the Dutch and the United Provinces were a vital 
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element, but certainly not the only one, and actually no longer the most 
dynamic as time passed. In order to move beyond this general picture, we need 
to investigate far more sources, including the private papers of merchants and 
the records left in notarial archives. Only then can we shed new light on the 
fascinating historiographical questions about neutrality, trans-imperial trade, 
and constantly reconfigured merchant networks.
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Anglo-Dutch Economic Relations in the Atlantic 
World, 1688–1783
Kenneth Morgan
Between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution, Britain and 
the Netherlands had significant economic connections that affected the 
Atlantic trade of both countries. Anglo-Dutch economic relations had their 
foundations in various factors. Anglo-Dutch trade had flourished from the 
Middle Ages onwards. London and Amsterdam were the major financial capi-
tals of Europe, with considerable interaction among them. The English and the 
Dutch were natural allies as maritime powers between 1674, the end of the 
Third Anglo-Dutch War, and 1780, when after a century of almost complete 
neutrality in major wars, Britain and Holland became embroiled in conflict 
during the American Revolutionary War. In the period covered in this paper, 
harmonious relations between Britain and the Netherlands were embedded in 
formal treaties dated 1674, 1675 and 1678.1 Anglo-Dutch involvement in colonial 
affairs antedated that time: Dutch merchants had carried out extensive com-
merce with Virginia in the mid-seventeenth century and the Dutch communi-
ty’s commercial activities in New Netherland continued after England captured 
that colony in 1664 and renamed it New York. The Dutch connection with 
Virginia declined in the 1690s but Dutch economic and cultural influence in 
New York continued well into the eighteenth century.2 Anglo-Dutch economic 
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relations were also influenced by the restructuring of Dutch capital input into 
the long-established Anglo-European trades in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. This helped to facilitate British expansion in transatlan-
tic trade in the same period by allowing British merchants to undertake a 
substantial range of commission trades with colonies.3
Britain had a much larger stake in the Americas than the Netherlands and 
France, the two other main European powers in the North Atlantic trading 
world. By 1775 British America covered 467,836 square miles with a population 
of 3.1 million; the Dutch empire in the Americas comprised 146,466 square 
miles with less than 0.2 million settlers; and the French empire in the Americas 
consisted of 45,339 square miles with a population of almost 0.5 million.4 
Whereas Britain could always count on numerous emigrants to destinations 
across the Atlantic and military-fiscal support for her colonies, the Dutch 
lacked significant numbers of out-migrants and sufficient military and naval 
support to protect colonies from the incursions of rival powers.5 Between 1688 
and 1783 Britain and the Netherlands had no rivalry for territory in the Americas 
whereas competition between Britain and France for command of the ocean 
and overseas territories led to frequent wars.
This chapter analyzes Anglo-Dutch economic relations between the 
Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution to highlight the interaction 
of Britain and the Netherlands in the burgeoning Atlantic trading world of that 
period. The essay is divided into two sections. The first section considers the 
Dutch financial contribution to British public credit as the foundation of main-
taining safety in the Atlantic against French rivalry. As we will see, Britain had 
the financial and administrative means, coupled with naval power, to weather 
the slings and arrows of regular wartime disruption. The financial, administra-
tive and naval support offered by the state was necessary for the success of 
British trade and expansion in the Atlantic world. The protective framework of 
the Navigation Acts and the fiscal-military strength of the British state were 
especially important in this regard. This chapter shows that the Dutch contrib-
uted financially to the strength of public credit in Britain and thereby assisted 
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The second section discusses Anglo-Dutch economic relations in the eigh-
teenth-century Atlantic. Britain pursued mercantilist policies initially created 
to combat Dutch commercial rivalry. It might seem that such acts of trade 
would limit Anglo-Dutch economic relations in the Atlantic trading world sim-
ply because the laws were intended to restrict trade to the benefit of the mother 
country. But such restrictions were not the whole story. Anglo-Dutch economic 
relations flourished within the Atlantic sphere of trade in several ways. First, 
within the parameters of the English Navigation Acts, there was legitimate 
scope for Anglo-Dutch connections in relation to English re-exports of colonial 
staple produce from London and Glasgow to Amsterdam and Rotterdam. This 
turned out to be an important branch of trade for both Britain and the 
Netherlands. Second, despite the English takeover of New Netherland, the mer-
chants of New York continued to have an important Dutch component until at 
least the American War of Independence. This meant that trade between New 
York and other English territories, especially in the Caribbean, had a significant 
Dutch influence between 1689 and 1776. Third, the important role played by two 
tiny Dutch Caribbean islands – Curaçao and St. Eustatius – as transit points for 
the international exchange of goods served Anglo-Dutch economic relations in 
a mutually beneficial way. Fourth, Dutch smuggling to North America, in defi-
ance of mercantilist restrictions, demonstrated the links between Dutch and 
Anglophone merchants as part of the Atlantic trading system. Fifth, Bermuda’s 
merchants and mariners found a significant outlet for their maritime activities 
through commercial contacts with Dutch Caribbean islands. Together, as this 
chapter shows, a series of mutually beneficial overlapping commercial connec-
tions, partly licit, and partly illicit, linked Anglophone and Dutch-speaking trad-
ers in North America and the Caribbean in the period between 1688 and 1783. 
The analysis underscores the importance of considering Anglo-Dutch commer-
cial connections in the Atlantic both within and beyond national jurisdictions.
I
Protectionism, coupled with a powerful navy, a strong state, and the funding to 
prosecute war, became part of the “inseparable connections” that combined to 
forge Britain’s rise to global power over the course of the eighteenth century.6 
122 Morgan
<UN>
 of the British Empire. Volume 2: The Eighteenth Century, ed. P.J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 53–77.
7 Kenneth Morgan, “Mercantilism and the British Empire, 1688–1815,” in The Political Economy 
of British Historical Experience 1688–1914, ed. Donald Winch and Patrick K. O’Brien (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 165–191.
8 John J. McCusker, “British Mercantilist Policies and the American Colonies” in The Cambridge 
Economic History of the United States, 3 vols., 1: The Colonial Era, ed. Stanley L. Engerman and 
Robert E. Gallman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 337–362; Patrick O’Brien, 
“Mercantilism and Imperialism in the Rise and Decline of the Dutch and British Economies, 
1585–1815,” De Economist 148 (2000): 459–501, 483–484.
9 Niels Steensgaard, “The Growth and Composition of the Long-Distance Trade of England and 
the Dutch Republic before 1750,” in The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the 
Early Modern World 1350–1750, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 102–152.
Protection afforded by the Navigation Acts and the Royal navy was an essential 
feature of the pursuit of mercantilist objectives. The five Navigation Acts 
implemented between 1651 and 1696, and the three Anglo-Dutch Wars of 1652–
1654, 1665–1657 and 1672–1674, eliminated the Dutch from much of the carry-
ing trade and ensured that Amsterdam did not become a greater trading 
entrepôt than London. The Act of 1660, for instance, stipulated that all com-
modities taken to and from the colonies should be carried in English or colo-
nial ships, and that masters and three-quarters of the crew were to be English 
or colonial subjects. The act was intended to oust the Dutch from trade with 
Virginia. The Acts of Trade continued throughout the eighteenth century. The 
only major changes to them were the inclusion of Scotland within the free 
trade area after the creation of Great Britain in 1707 and the exclusion of the 
North American colonies after they declared independence in 1776. Ireland, 
regarded as a rival to English trade and navigation, was excluded from operat-
ing under the navigation system except for the trades in linen, provisions and 
servants.7
The Navigation Acts were reinforced by fiscal policies that gave colonists 
considerable preference in the British domestic market through heavy duties 
on foreign products, such as tobacco and sugar, entering Britain. This con-
trasted with the Dutch situation in which protection was not granted to prod-
ucts shipped from the Americas.8 By 1750 the Navigation Acts had effectively 
restricted Dutch commercial activities in the Atlantic and Britain’s extra- 
European trade was much larger than that of the Dutch.9 Moreover, Britain 
had the resources to ensure that its shipping and trade was backed up 
by strong naval power. Between 1689 and 1763 annual investment in the 
army and navy nearly always accounted for two-thirds of government 
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expenditure.10 Investment in the Royal navy (operating at much higher levels than 
funds poured into the army) enabled Britain to establish dominance in European 
waters during the eighteenth century and thereby support overseas operations.11
Nevertheless, trade also occurred between different national flags beyond the 
confines of the Acts of Trade, whether legally or illegally. The best-informed esti-
mates of the scale of this commerce suggest that it was significant in value. Thus 
Robert Dinwiddie’s reports of 1743 and 1748 both reckoned that the trade from 
colonies in British North America and the West Indies to foreign possessions 
held by the Spanish, French and Dutch amounted annually to £1,115,000.12 It is 
not known what proportion of this commerce comprised smuggling, but the 
extent of illegal trade in the Caribbean was extensive and involved every colony 
in the Americas. The Dutch in particular were deeply involved in smuggling in 
the West Indies.13 The prevalence of significant levels of illicit commerce is not 
surprising. Individual states developed laws for the conduct of oceanic trade 
and shipping along mercantilist lines, but merchants and consumers had a 
growing demand for European manufactured goods in the colonies as well as 
interests in commodities that could not be delivered through legal means.
Mercantilist policies increased the burden of taxation and the accumula-
tion of a national debt. Funds to support British overseas trade and 
expansion came from indirect taxes and from the ability of the Bank of 
England, founded in 1694 under a Dutch monarch, to raise loans and maintain 
a national debt. Parliament agreed that government loans would be guaran-
teed against tax yields. Indirect taxation in the form of customs and excise 
revenue (including colonial sugar, rice, and tobacco) rose significantly in 
the eighteenth century.14 The national debt escalated from £16.7 million 
to £744.9 million between 1697 and 1815. Peacetime taxation multiplied by 
a factor of 15 over that period. The success of the state’s handling of a “financial 
revolution” after the Glorious Revolution is an important reason why Britain 
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was able to limit French territorial ambitions in North America at the Peace of 
Paris in 1763.15
The Dutch played a significant role in establishing sound, effective public 
credit in Britain after the Glorious Revolution. Dutch financiers and advisors 
accompanying William of Orange to London brought with them practices 
such as the resale of shares in joint-stock corporations. This helped to establish 
stock exchanges in Britain. The Bank of England was modeled on the 
Amsterdam Wisselbank; the national debt also followed Dutch practice. Adam 
Smith noted the importance of Dutch overseas investment: “The mercantile 
capital of Holland is so great that it is…continually overflowing, sometimes 
into the public funds of foreign countries.”16 Dutch investors were attracted to 
British securities by the high return on English bonds and by the convergence 
of Dutch and English public debt institutions.17
After the financial storm of the South Sea Bubble in 1720 had passed, foreign 
holdings of British government securities (especially by the Dutch) reached a 
substantial size in 1723–1724 and increased until the 1780s, when over half of 
the 350 million guilders of Dutch holdings in foreign government debt were 
invested in England. In addition, Dutch investment dominated the foreign 
holdings of the London-based South Sea Company in the 1720s and 1730s.18 
These developments occurred because the Dutch had substantial surpluses 
that they could not invest at home owing to the decline in their own industrial 
base and because of the efficiency with which public credit was established in 
England as part of the “financial revolution.”19 Moreover, interest rates were 
often higher in London than in Amsterdam and the British government was 
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more reliable in repaying loans than the French parlements. During the early 
1780s, the Dutch sharply reduced their investments in Britain because the 
Netherlands and Britain became enemies in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War 
(1780–1784) and the continuing American Revolutionary War was a threat to 
public credit. Until then, however, the Dutch regarded the government debt 
serviced by the Bank of England to be as secure as the state debt of the 
Netherlands. Dutch loans helped significantly in paying for Britain’s Continental 
armies and Continental allies during the eighteenth century.20 Thus Holland 
made a significant contribution to the level of public credit in Britain, enabling 
Anglo-Dutch economic relations to be conducted peacefully, with British 
fiscal-military backing, in the Atlantic world.
II
The Navigation Acts permitted the re-export of colonial commodities to 
non-Anglophone centers after the goods had entered and cleared a British or 
British-colonial port. Anglo-Dutch economic relations benefited from this 
commerce, especially in relation to the re-export of North American rice and 
tobacco from Britain to the Netherlands. Between 60 and 80 percent of the rice 
exported from South Carolina and Georgia to Britain ended up in Holland 
and Germany. Britain was a low consumer of rice, but rice was an important 
substitute commodity for grain in several continental European markets, 
including the Dutch Republic. By the early 1750s, contemporaries noted that 
the Dutch were the most consistent Northern European buyers of such rice 
and that they dominated the market. Indeed, between 1760–1763 and 1772–1774 
British re-exports of rice to Holland trebled.21 The Dutch were also avid con-
sumers of tobacco imports even though tobacco was manufactured in the 
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United Provinces.22 Already by 1700 Holland imported one-third of the tobacco 
imported to England and then re-exported. A half-century later over half 
of all re-exported tobacco from Britain (notably from Scotland) went to the 
Netherlands: between 1755 and 1759, for instance, the Netherlands imported 
almost twice as much British colonial re-exported tobacco as France. Between 
1771 and 1792 The Dutch market was the most important destination for 
re-exports of British tobacco.23
After peace talks were concluded between England and the Netherlands in 
1674, trade and economic cooperation between the two countries resumed 
rapidly. New York in this process became a leading player in Anglo-Dutch 
economic relations in the Atlantic world for nearly a century thereafter as the 
Dutch contingent of merchants in Manhattan continued to trade with both 
England and the Netherlands. Some of this trade was conducted legally. 
Holland supplied German osnaburghs (cheap linens), Indian calicoes, muslins 
and taffeta, paper and glazed tiles. Dutch city inhabitants were entitled to 
receive letters of denization which gave them the right to send vessels from the 
British North American colonies to the Netherlands provided they entered an 
English port on their outward and return journeys to observe British customs 
procedures under the Navigation Acts. Dutch-speaking merchants in New York 
were joined there by factors of some Amsterdam trading houses. New England, 
notably Massachusetts and Rhode Island, also conducted trade with Dutch 
merchants in the Netherlands and the West Indies.24
A substantial amount of Dutch trade with Britain’s American colonies, 
however, involved smuggling via various loopholes in the mercantilist system. 
This “informal supranational trade” was part and parcel of transatlantic inter-
connections in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.25 In the 1740s, for 
example, Thomas Hancock sent ships via a triangular route between Boston, 
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the Caribbean islands and Holland. Fish was dispatched from Boston to the 
West Indies on these voyages, payment taken in bills or produce, and freight 
loaded for Holland. Hancock also received goods from Amsterdam via 
St. Eustatius.26 Plenty of smuggled Bohea tea made its way either directly from 
the Netherlands or via overland routes to New England. It sold for much less 
than the price of tea supplied by the English East India Company. It has been 
argued that such smuggling of tea from the Netherlands helped to create the 
conditions for the Boston Tea Party in 1773.27 Irish merchants and ship captains 
were responsible for some of this trade by sending tea aboard provisions ships 
from Irish ports to the West Indies whence it was shipped to mainland North 
America among vessels laden with molasses.28
New Yorkers found it relatively easy before 1776 to land goods clandestinely 
at coves and inlets along the shores of New Jersey, Connecticut and Long 
Island Sound, especially where there was no customs house. Sometimes these 
shipments arrived via elaborate multilateral routes to avoid customs regula-
tions and searches.29 On other occasions, roundabout voyages were unneces-
sary because false ships’ papers could be purchased or agreements made 
with foreign merchants for secret landings. On still other occasions, goods 
were dispatched from Dutch ports, transferred to English- or colonial-owned 
vessels in small Caribbean islands, and then sent to a landing place such as 
Sandy Hook, where cargoes could be off-loaded and taken overland to New 
York while the vessels arrived empty in the Hudson River.30 Coarse woolen 
cloths, guns, gunpowder, tea and fine cloth were among the goods landed in 
these places from Amsterdam at lower wholesale prices than from English 
merchant firms. Dutch merchants usually offered 12 months’ credit to pay for 
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these goods. Payments were made in bills of exchange on Amsterdam or by 
shipping wine from the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands. To facilitate 
such trade, four prominent merchant partnerships in Amsterdam had 
close connections with Dutch-speaking merchants in New York: John de 
Neufville & Son, John Hodshon, Daniel Crommelin & Son, and Levinus 
Clarkson.31 For the return voyage from New York or New England ports to 
the Netherlands, mercantilist regulations could sometimes be avoided by 
sending ships via the Orkneys, where they cleared part of their cargo and then 
continued their voyage around the east coast of Scotland and England to 
Amsterdam or Rotterdam.32
During the eighteenth century, New York’s trade with Dutch merchants was 
not just confined to voyages that followed various routes between Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and Manhattan; it also involved considerable commercial activity 
with the Caribbean and the “Wild Coast” of Dutch settlements in Northeastern 
South America. A flourishing trade was maintained between Colonial British 
North America, primarily New York and New England, and the Dutch colony of 
Suriname. This was a legitimate trade within the rules of the Navigation Acts, 
which did not restrict Americans from exporting provisions to the colonies 
of Continental European powers.33 Such trade was illicit under Dutch laws, but 
Suriname merchants were willing participants because Dutch shipowners 
avoided servicing the shipping routes between Paramaibo and American colo-
nies for provisions or low value cargoes.34 
North American ships accounted for 90 percent of the trans-Caribbean traffic 
through Suriname. Merchants in New York and New England largely financed 
this trade. The total value of Suriname exports to North America between 1705 
and 1744 was over 1.5 million guilders while the total value of North American 
imports into Suriname in the same period was over 3 million guilders. Suriname 
sent molasses and rum to New England ports. New York and New England 
ports shipped building supplies and household items to Suriname but particu-
larly followed a specialized trade in supplying small horses, suitable for no 
other market, to Suriname’s plantations. Horses were needed as draught 
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animals for sugar mills, but they could not survive an Atlantic crossing.35 In 
1720 it was noted that Suriname received all its mill horses from Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island, as well as fish and stores.36
Two other Dutch colonies on the Northeastern coast of South America had 
substantial trading contacts with North America. These were the adjacent 
settlements of Demerara-Essequibo and Berbice. Between 1700 and 1819, 1965 
ships entered Essequibo from North America. Demerara’s North American 
trade was larger than this. Between 1740 and 1819 some 7044 ships entered 
Demerara from North America, including many vessels from New England 
ports, New York City, Philadelphia and Baltimore. As with Suriname, there was 
a regular trade in horses to drive sugar mills.37 As most plantations in Demerara 
were owned by British investors by 1760, the trade between North America and 
that Dutch colony was stimulated partly by the need for livestock and com-
modities to suit joint Anglo-Dutch needs.38
Curaçao and St. Eustatius were essential nodes for shipments involving 
trade with either Britain or its colonies. These Dutch islands were well-situated 
to take advantage of intercolonial trade across national boundaries: they had 
proactive middlemen who maintained their livelihoods by oiling the wheels 
of legal and illegal commerce.39 St. Eustatius lay near the British islands of 
Nevis, St. Kitts, Antigua and Montserrat and the French island of Guadeloupe. 
Curaçao was less than 40 miles from the Venezuelan Coast, offering a gateway 
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to Spanish American possessions. Both St. Eustatius and Curaçao benefited 
from the growth of the intra-Caribbean commodity trade – the kleine vaart or 
small circuit – after 1700.40 They served “as general emporia for everything that 
was bought or sold in the Caribbean.” Both islands had limited produce of their 
own. But the range and turnover of goods from elsewhere available at these 
free ports ensured that ship captains could find cargoes suitable for destina-
tions elsewhere in the Caribbean, in North America or back in Europe. It was 
reported in 1766 that all sorts of North American goods were brought to St. 
Eustatius. The French were active in trading there and exchanged their molas-
ses, rum and cotton in St. Eustatius for North American provisions.41
Curaçao and St. Eustatius had further advantages as transit points to facili-
tate Anglo-Dutch economic relations. Speculative ventures to Curaçao and 
St. Eustatius stood a very good chance of acquiring the commodities, commer-
cial information and bills of exchange they needed.42 Sloops were supplied 
from Bermuda to Curaçao and St. Eustatius to facilitate trade on those islands.43 
Goods were often cheaper in these Dutch islands than elsewhere in the 
Caribbean. Dutch and East India goods were taxed at a modest 2 percent ad 
valorem duty in Statia. In 1770 rum could be purchased in these Dutch islands 
at six pence per gallon (or 40 percent less) than in Barbados or Jamaica.44 
Anglo-American merchants were drawn to St. Eustatius partly because trade 
there helped to overcome their negative balance of payments with Britain. 
New Englanders could earn significant credits in their carrying trade to the 
Dutch Caribbean islands.45
Curaçao was originally a base for Dutch smuggling to Spanish America. 
It had a capital city, Willemstad, with a natural port, multilingual merchants 
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with access to bills of exchange, and facilities for ship repairs. Representatives 
of Dutch-speaking New York commercial houses were resident there.46 It was 
noted in 1710/1711 that Curaçao received many provisions (bread, butter, flour 
cheese, rice) from British colonies in North America and rum, sugar, cotton, 
ginger and indigo from Jamaica and other British West Indian islands. 
Cacao, linens, muslins, canvas, riggings and sails were among the commodities 
exchanged in return for these products. Curaçao’s trade with British West 
Indian settlements became an important facet of the commerce of those 
islands. This can be seen from a contemporary observation from 1726 that the 
current problems of private traders in Jamaica arose from insufficient ships to 
pursue an effective illicit trade with Curaçao.47
St. Eustatius was an important rendezvous point for North American trad-
ers to transport fish and lumber indirectly to the French Windward Islands and 
to receive French Caribbean produce in return.48 Curaçao and St. Eustatius 
had few plantations but were widely used for the exchange of goods across 
imperial boundaries. Dutch, British, American, French and Spanish merchants 
and shipowners all made use of the convenience of these small places for the 
circulation of goods either to North America or within a flourishing intra-
Caribbean trade.49 After Parliament passed the Molasses Act (1733), which 
imposed heavy duties on rum, molasses and sugar imported into the North 
American colonies, St. Eustatius became a nodal point – or black market – 
through which cheap French molasses and sugar reached North America.50  
In 1770 some 58,000 gallons of molasses was exported to British North America 
from Suriname.51 In 1744, 525 ships from the British West Indies entered 
St. Eustatius and 476 vessels cleared from there to the British Caribbean. 
In 1776, 354 vessels entered St. Eustatius from the British Caribbean islands 
and 475 ships left St. Eustatius for the British islands. Ships plying between 
St. Eustatius and St. Kitts were prominent in this trade.52
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Curaçao and St. Eustatius served a particular purpose for British and Colonial 
North American merchants as rendezvous points because they were neutral in 
wartime. The Dutch at Curaçao and St. Eustatius (both of which had sizeable 
Sephardic Jewish trading communities) had continuing trade links with mer-
chants in Barbados and the British Leeward Islands of Anguilla, Montserrat, St. 
Kitts and Nevis.53 Sephardic Jewish merchants forged strong connections 
between Barbados and Curacao.54 Governor Henry Worsley of Barbados in 1723 
claimed there was an extensive network of illicit trade with Barbados that 
included Curaçao and St. Eustatius, both of which served as a vital source of 
specie for Barbadians.55 Other parties benefited from the commercial centers 
of Curaçao and St. Eustatius. Dutch merchants exploited their West Indian 
islands as transit points for the exchange of commodities and finance by some-
times falsifying papers in order to trade with the settlements of other European 
powers in the Caribbean. They were quick to exploit lax customs procedures.56 
But the English also made full use of St. Eustatius as a commercial nodal point: 
by 1750 most of the island’s inhabitants were English and some of these settlers 
had set up stillhouses there to distill French rum. Evidence survives from 1758 of 
extensive cargoes of beef arriving at St. Eustatius from Ireland.57 Madeira wine 
also flowed via the Dutch Caribbean islands for smuggling into North America.58
Curaçao shipped many of its Caribbean imports to the Netherlands: in 
1710/1711 it was noted that about 50 ships left the island each year laden with 
English plantation goods for Holland.59 But Curaçao also sent cacao, slaves, 
molasses and bills of exchange to New York to be credited against the accounts 
of those who had sent Dutch goods to the Caribbean. St. Eustatius reshipped 
many goods it received to other parts of the West Indies.60 American tobacco 
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arriving at St. Eustatius was transferred to ships sailing for Holland. Smuggled 
goods were sent back for clandestine landing on the shores of New York, New 
Jersey, Connecticut and Rhode Island. Merchants based in the British West 
Indies stored goods at St. Eustatius because they feared French attacks on their 
own islands. Statia’s textile sales to other Caribbean islands exceeded £100,000 
sterling a year in the 1750s.61
New York and New England maintained continuing commercial connec-
tions with Curaçao and St. Eustatius. Thus between December 1729 and 
December 1730, for example, 29 ships cleared New York for Curaçao and 12 ves-
sels entered New York from Curaçao. Most of these vessels maintained trade 
balances in favor of New York.62 These links aided the illegal shipment of goods 
from Dutch to British hands and vice versa in North America and the West 
Indies. During the 1740s, for example, the New York merchant William Beekman 
sent provisions (flour, beef, pork, sometimes butter) to Curaçao and St. 
Eustatius. These shipments were mainly intended for French and Spanish sub-
jects. Beekman received payment from Curaçao in cash (mainly Spanish pieces 
of eight). He was paid from St. Eustatius in molasses, sugar, cotton wool or 
gunpowder.63 By 1756 it was common for ships from New York to clear customs 
for Nevis and St. Kitts, thereby observing the provisions of the Navigation Acts, 
but then to head for St. Eustatius, often using forged certificates to smooth 
their passage. These vessels dropped off embargoed grain for French buyers 
and picked up cacao and sugar intended for Amsterdam without paying 
duties.64 It was claimed at the time that New Yorkers acquired considerable 
riches by carrying goods for the French by way of St. Eustatius (and also via the 
Danish Caribbean islands).65 But commodity shipments also flowed back from 
St. Eustatius to North America. A statement from 1771 suggested “it was well 
known that St. Eustatius is the channel through which the colonies are now 
chiefly supplied with tea.”66
New York had a significant commercial involvement with Curaçao during 
the Seven Years’ War. This has been explained by New York and Curaçao both 
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having numerous Dutch-speaking merchants and by the wide-ranging com-
modities available through commerce with New York.67 In addition, examples 
abound of New York vessels calling at Curaçao and St. Eustatius in the Seven 
Years’ War to purchase prize goods for shipment to Holland, relying on London 
merchants to transfer funds to pay for the transaction, and to load logwood on 
Dutch vessels bound to Amsterdam.68 These international exchanges of goods 
were not always welcomed by national rivals. Thus Britain tried to reduce 
French commercial activity in neutral St. Eustatius during the Seven Years’ War 
by authorizing the seizure of Dutch ships supplying the French.69
Considerable Dutch-Irish cooperation also existed during the Seven Years’ 
War in relation to Curaçao and St. Eustatius. Merchants in Ireland chartered 
ships to provide salted provisions for these Dutch islands for transfer to 
the French West Indies. Irish expatriate firms in Holland shipped goods to 
St. Eustatius and Curaçao under the Dutch flag’s protection. Irish merchants 
were found among the expatriate community on St. Eustatius, sometimes in 
the guise of naturalized Dutch citizens. Irish firms in the French West Indies 
had commercial links with the Dutch West Indies and acted as factors for 
Dutch merchant houses in Europe and the Caribbean. Bills of exchange arising 
from trade with Curaçao and St. Eustatius were sometimes cleared by mem-
bers of London’s Irish community. Irish merchants also sent salted beef and 
pork from Cork and Waterford to the Dutch and French West Indies on vessels 
registered in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.70
St. Eustatius was a bustling site of international flows of trade during the 
American War of Independence. It was a cosmopolitan site for trade, with 
French, Spanish, English and Dutch merchants based there.71 In May 1776 
Sir Joseph Yorke, the British ambassador at The Hague, stated that “St. Eustatius 
is the rendezvous of everything and everybody meant to be clandestinely 
conveyed to America.”72 Thus, during the American Revolutionary War, arms 
shipments were made to the island. These were mainly intended for the 
Americans. It has been suggested that St. Eustatius was “probably the single 
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largest source of gunpowder for the North American revolutionaries.”73  
But Britain also benefited from St. Eustatius as a commercial entrepôt during 
the war. Many British colonial merchants emigrated there in 1776. They built 
new warehouses, received crops from British colonial planters, purchased 
provisions and American tobacco, and dealt with American rebel traders. 
Provisions from St. Eustatius were sent to feed slaves on Antigua.74 The 
Philadelphia merchant Stephen Girard summed up the commercial bustle of 
this small island in his remark in 1780 that “there is here [i.e. in St. Eustatius] a 
swarm of men from all parts of the world only occupied in settling their affairs 
quickly to get away as soon as possible.”75
Until about 1780 St. Eustatius justified its reputation as “the golden rock” 
because it was one of the richest trading centers in the Caribbean. Its demise as 
a commercial entrepôt came with a British military assault on the island.76 On 
3 February 1781 the British navy captured over 150 vessels at St. Eustatius together 
with goods and properties worth over £3 million – much of the seizure belong-
ing to British colonial merchants and planters.77 After the war ended in 1783, St. 
Eustatius experienced more competition from other colonies where ships of 
various nations exchanged goods, and, as a consequence, it never recovered its 
former position as a significant transit point for goods in the Caribbean.78
Bermuda’s intercolonial commerce also included a significant illicit trade 
with Curaçao and St. Eustatius. Bermudians gained international news, 
European manufactured goods, coffee, chocolate, rum, molasses and other 
tropical produce at these islands, which also served as markets for selling 
vessels. They benefited from the relatively cheap prices for goods offered by 
traders in Curaçao and Statia. Bermuda’s ship captains sold salt, dyewoods 
and turtles on these Dutch islands. These transactions were allowed under 
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British law; what was not permitted was smuggling goods that should have 
passed through British colonial customs houses. Bermudian-Dutch smuggling 
was already extensive by the 1710s. Bermudians acted mainly as buyers in 
these Dutch islands. They gained the cooperation of merchants there who 
were adept at using Bermudian vessels to ship their goods to British 
North American and Caribbean ports under the guise of using British registries 
of the Bermudian sloops. As Governor William Popple of Bermuda noted 
in 1749, Dutch captains “could go to each English settlement once, give in 
bond, and never return there again.” Bermudians also tapped the market for 
selling their vessels in Dutch Caribbean islands. By the 1720s, they regularly 
sold between 15 and 20 vessels per year at St. Eustatius, about half of the ships 
they constructed annually. In 1741 Governor Alured Popple of Bermuda stated 
that “our sloops are generally built for sale and the Dutch are the general pur-
chasers.” Customs house ledgers in 1770 state that Bermuda’s legal sugar 
imports amounted to 78 cwt. but Bermudians took three times that amount 
just from St. Eustatius. In the same year Bermudian ships cleared Statia with at 
least 11,000 gallons of rum, which was twice the amount legally landed.79
III
Anglo-Dutch economic connections were extensive in the Atlantic world 
between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution. During almost 
a century of peaceful relations between Britain and the Netherlands when war 
on the high seas was a frequent occurrence between Britain and her rivals 
(France, Spain, North America), the Dutch supported Britain’s public credit 
by significant amounts of investment in the British national debt while the 
fiscal-military strength of Britain protected Anglo-Dutch commercial endeav-
ors from enemy incursions. Neither Dutch public finances, which lacked a 
centralized fiscal system, nor the Dutch navy were able to offer such strong 
protection for Dutch transatlantic trade between 1689 and 1783.80 Cordial 
economic relations between Britain and the Netherlands therefore played a 
crucial role in supporting the overseas commerce of both nations. As British 
settlements in the Americas were extensive and Dutch colonies were relatively 
small, each nation could conduct her trade to take account of their special 
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advantages. British mercantilist restrictions helped to protect the wealth and 
profits of her transatlantic trade to Britain and the British American colonies, 
while the Dutch role as carriers of trades through transit points gave Holland a 
pivotal role in the international commercial emporium of trade between North 
America, the Caribbean and European markets.
The flexibility of the English navigation system allowed Anglo-Dutch 
commercial relations to flourish in the Atlantic trading world. Within the 
purview of the Navigation Acts, Britain re-exported colonial staple produce 
from London and Glasgow to Amsterdam and Rotterdam while British colonial 
merchants plied livestock and commodities between New York or New England 
and the Dutch colonies of Demerara-Essequibo, Berbice and Suriname. Goods 
were dispatched from Holland directly to New York and New England, with 
Dutch-speaking merchants in North America using their denization rights to 
claim legal importation. Probably more important, however, was the smug-
gling of tea, rum and molasses by the Dutch from the Caribbean to New York, 
New Jersey and New England in defiance of laws such as the Molasses Act 
(1733) and customs regulations. Within the Caribbean, the international 
exchange of goods via the nodal points of Curaçao and St. Eustatius enabled 
Britain to take advantage of the availability of French produce in neutral 
islands. This commerce suited the Dutch because it fitted their niche role as 
carriers of commodities and facilitators of commodity exchange beyond 
national imperial boundaries. It also served the British need to provide provi-
sions and other commodities to Bermuda and its Leeward and Windward 
Island settlements, especially during wartime.
Anglo-Dutch cooperation in the Atlantic trading world began to unravel 
towards the end of the American War of Independence. In early 1781 British 
naval forces sacked St. Eustatius, which never recovered its commercial posi-
tion in Caribbean trade thereafter. Spain opened Trinidad to international 
trade and France made St. Lucia a free port in 1787. These changes undermined 
Statia’s role as a transit point for commodity exchange in the Caribbean.81 
Britain and Holland engaged in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War between 1780 and 
1784 after the Dutch supported the rebellious North Americans against British 
sovereignty. This war brought the Dutch transatlantic slave trade temporarily 
to a halt.82 French occupation of the Netherlands in 1795 led Britain to treat 
Holland (now under the guise of the Batavian Republic) as a threat and in 
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subsequent years Demerara-Essequibo and Berbice fell under British control 
during the Napoleonic Wars. Substantial British investments in the plantations 
of those territories ensued.83 At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, 
however, Britain and the Netherlands never fully revived the inter- and intra-
Caribbean trade and the commercial connections between North America and 
the West Indies that had characterized the years of Anglo-Dutch cooperation 
between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution.
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A Network-Based Merchant Empire
Dutch Trade in the Hispanic Atlantic (1680–1740)
Ana Crespo Solana
Spanish colonial trade in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries was 
intended to be a state-controlled monopoly business. At the same time, this 
trade was financed privately and involved many non-Spanish actors. Since the 
early sixteenth century, when Spanish monopolies were instituted, there were 
two major restrictions in place regarding colonial trade. Firstly, commerce 
could only be carried out from a single port city (Seville, between 1503 until 
1717, Cádiz from 1717 onwards). These cities would be the centers for the orga-
nization, administration, and taxation of the colonial trade. Secondly, the right 
both to trade with, and to travel to, the Americas was exclusive to the citizens 
of the kingdoms in the Spanish monarchy. Thus, trade was a privilege granted 
by the king to his subjects.1
Yet, ironically, an ever-increasing participation of foreign merchants 
characterized Spanish trade with the Americas. The participation of foreign 
merchants highlights the discrepancies between legislation and trade to the 
Americas as it was actually practiced.2 Since the very beginning of the Atlantic 
expansion, the economic and financial structure of the Spanish-American 
empire was constructed from an intricate network of transnational interests. 
The Spanish empire was a truly multinational enterprise, and the Spanish 
element was but one among many.3
This chapter focuses on the contributions of Dutch and/or Flemish mer-
chants to this truly multinational enterprise. They were of vital importance 
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for the functioning of the Spanish Atlantic system, as I will show by focus-
ing on the “nodal point” of Cádiz. The Hispanic monarchy had to funda-
mentally alter its relationship with its former enemies in order to maximize 
the profits to be had from American trade. The Dutch went from enemies to 
allies and potential beneficiaries of this empire as they became intermedi-
aries for, and collaborators with, the Spanish. Their vital role also illustrates 
the contradiction in the Spanish monopoly laws whereby foreign persons 
who were not subjects of the King of Spain were supposedly not allowed 
to participate in the colonial trade, while at the same time the crown itself 
was the first to act in breach of these regulations. Foreigners, therefore, 
participated widely in the “Spanish” colonial trade to the Americas despite 
the laws prohibiting this.
Although the focus of this chapter is on the Dutch, it should be stressed that 
the Dutch were only one group in a long line of foreigners who participated 
actively in the Spanish trade to the Americas. For more than two centuries, 
the foreign presence in Seville and Cádiz, as well as in other Spanish port 
cities linked with the Atlantic economy, increased considerably and was 
highly lucrative to all parties involved.4 Many scholars assert the importance 
of the trade conducted by foreigners and believe that the colonial system 
could not have survived without them. According to Oliva Melgar, “The best 
part of Spanish trade was in foreign merchants’ hands […]. Foreign ships 
amounted to three quarters of the total number of ships that participated in 
the American trade, and foreign goods represented the bulk of the goods 
exported to the New World.”5 Nevertheless, the Dutch are a particularly inter-
esting example of this participation of foreigners in the Spanish trade with the 
Americas. The Dutch trade vividly illustrate the contradiction between the 
laws “on the books” and the reality of trade as it was practiced. But it also 
highlights the fact that although the Dutch and the Spanish monarchy had 
been at war for 80 years, a vibrant trade by Dutch merchants was permitted 
and even, in some cases, encouraged. This, in turn, demonstrates two things: 
the necessity of foreigners for the maintenance of the American trade – a 
necessity that sometimes outweighed political concerns – and the cultural 
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integration of many of the Flemish and Dutch traders into the mercantile sys-
tem of Cádiz.6
 The Legal and Political Background to Dutch Participation in the 
Spanish American Trade
The relationship between the formerly deadly enemies, Spain and the Dutch 
Republic, began to thaw after the Peace of Münster and Treaty of Westphalia 
(both in 1648), and continued to improve after the Treaty of the Quadruple 
Alliance signed in 1673 in The Hague. The signing of the Treaty of Münster 
marked the beginning of a new era of Dutch-Spanish commercial cooperation, 
which was continued and expanded by the treaty of 1673.7 These treaties 
helped the Dutch to build an institutional superstructure to protect their com-
mercial interests in several Spanish ports as the most favored foreign nation. 
This, in turn, enabled Dutch entrepreneurs to travel to, and settle in, Spain so 
they could run their businesses themselves. The Treaty of Münster’s eleventh 
article clearly stipulated that “the subjects and inhabitants of the territories 
ruled by Philip IV and by the States General will hold good correspondence 
and friendship, and are entitled to frequent, stay and reside in one another’s 
country and there trade by sea or land with no hindrance or limitation.”8 Direct 
Dutch trade with the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean increased, and Dutch 
commercial firms grasped the business opportunities to be had in the Spanish 
Atlantic. Meanwhile, certain Spanish ports became factories for the Dutch 
redistribution traffic in Europe, Spanish America and the Mediterranean.
The treaties of 1648 and 1673 were explicit in terms of commercial coopera-
tion and navigation. Signed in The Hague, these two treaties were designed to 
be advantageous to private mercantile interests while also ensuring that the 
Dutch had free access to the Andalusian regional market and to colonial 
exports. The stipulations were ambiguous because the Dutch were not allowed 
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to trade directly with Spanish America but were only allowed to become 
involved in the colonial re-export trade from Andalusian factories.9 With the 
Treaty of The Hague in 1673, the Dutch Republic succeeded in securing prefer-
ential treatment from Spain, a situation which would last until 1778, at 
which point internal politics and fierce competition from England and France 
jeopardized Hispano-Dutch relations.10  Three new clauses were created in the 
treaties of 1648 and 1673. Customs officials in charge of smuggling would not 
visit Dutch ships at Spanish ports, the list of banned goods was reduced, and 
more flexibility was sought when dealing with cases of “trade with the enemy.”11 
The latter offense allowed the Spanish authorities to seize ship and cargo when 
there was suspicion of trade with countries with which Spain was at war. 
Traders charged with this crime could only buy their way out of the difficulty 
by paying a fine or indulto (pardon), as Abraham de Sadeler, a Jewish merchant 
from the Republic and consignee for the Amsterdam Admiralty, had to do in 
May 1693.12
In the decades after the establishment of these Spanish-Dutch treaties, a 
shift in the Republic’s internal politics resulted in a closer relationship with 
England, especially after three consecutive Anglo-Dutch wars and the 
Nijmegen peace treaties in 1678. Nevertheless, a thriving trade between the 
United Provinces and Spain continued, partly due to war-related businesses 
such as shipbuilding and shipping supplies, as well as supplying salt.13 During 
the war between the Dutch Republic and Portugal (1657–1660), the former lost 
access to the salt from Setubal and were able to turn to the salt mines in 
Western Andalusia as an alternative. Moreover, Dutch merchants proved to be 
shrewd intermediaries who took advantage of the political situation after the 
aforementioned treaties were signed. For instance, the Amsterdam Admiralty 
became involved in the arrangements for the Messina War (1674–1675) under 
the command of Admiral De Ruyter.
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In 1672 the city of Messina, in Northeastern Sicily which was under Spanish 
rule, revolted against the Hispanic Monarchy. Messina was a key center for 
connections between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean as well as being 
a strategically important naval port. Spanish troops were sent to Palermo to 
crush the rebellion which was instigated in part by the French at the same time 
they had invaded the Netherlands. At that moment, the Hispanic monarchy 
was embroiled in a war against France, and the French were very interested 
in getting ahold of Messina. France made its claim legal on the basis of the 
short French presence in Sicily before the so-called “Sicilian Vespers” (1272). 
The Dutch were also keen to avoid the risk of French domination in the region. 
Therefore, the Dutch sent a fleet to Palermo to assist the Spanish against the 
French.14
In return for such services, the Spaniards would pay with salt as stipulated 
in a contract signed in Cádiz in 1679 – a contract that would be valid until 
1715.15 In the early autumn of 1678 the Amsterdam Admiralty extracted around 
10,000 shiploads of salt as ballast.16 The wool export business in the early eigh-
teenth century also benefited from this new period of collaboration between 
the Dutch and the Spaniards.17
Between the Treaties of Münster and the first decades of the eighteenth 
century, the relations between both countries were mutually beneficial, even if 
there were ups and downs, which is not surprising as these relations were built 
upon the trade with vast markets in the Spanish empire and were also heavily 
influenced by fierce English and French competition. Commercial relations 
would only start to deteriorate from the 1740s, as Spanish institutions attempted 
to increase profits by appointing officers in charge of spot-checking Dutch 
merchandise for volume, inventory and profitability in the ports belonging to 
the customs perimeter.18 Dutch merchants in Seville and Cádiz wanted to 
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avoid paying this tax, and this led them to clash with their own consulates and 
resulted in subterfuge on a number of occasions.19
There was a prelude to the reforms of the 1740s. After the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701–1714), the Spanish government attempted to strengthen the 
basic pillars of its monopoly, including implementing changes in port policies. 
Fiscal reforms were undertaken, most importantly centralizing the adminis-
tration of the system of fleets, galleons and the navy in Cádiz. Between 1717 and 
1726, the administrative institutions governing American commerce were 
moved to Cádiz, which became the headquarters of the monopoly. The reloca-
tion from Seville to Cádiz of the Casa de la Contratación (the Board of Trade 
that registered all ships, crews, equipment and merchandise bound for the 
Indies) and the Consulado de Cargadores (an association or guild of merchants) 
was an attempt by the Bourbon government to reinstate the monopoly as a 
business exclusive to the State. These attempts proved futile, also because 
these commercial institutions had already become obsolete due to bureau-
cratic incompetence and official corruption.20
As part of this over-arching reform effort, the monarchy tried to establish 
new laws designed to control the foreign share of the colonial trade. Laws 
against foreigners had a series of common objectives. Specifically, their main 
aim was to place under close scrutiny the commercial activities in the Americas 
of foreign merchants living in Spain. Although it was not the only reason for 
the reforms, the preponderance of foreigners trading out of Cádiz was one of 
the main arguments employed in order to encourage the government to step 
up the control of foreign merchants’ activities in the city. There were a number 
of attempts to bring the economic activities of the foreigners under control. 
For instance, the Junta de Dependencias de Extranjeros was created in 1714 with 
the objective of overseeing foreign businesses in Spanish ports. The main func-
tions of this agency were the appointment of consuls and other representa-
tives, the surveillance of foreigners either living in Spain or staying there 
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temporarily because of diplomatic privileges, and fiscal affairs related to taxes, 
as well as the provision of gifts granted by foreign merchants to the Spanish 
administration at some crucial junctures.21 The design of new laws had a prag-
matic character, as legislation served to both incorporate qualified immigrants 
into the Spanish administrative infrastructure, and to clarify the legal situation 
of foreigners, whose numbers had increased, particularly after the passage 
of pro-immigration legislation in 1716.22 The Junta de Depencias became a 
platform for the recovery of privileges that had been granted in the past to the 
various “nations” settled on Spanish soil.23
Even given the lack of any real institutional change, the reforms enacted 
which aimed to bring foreign trade under Spanish control did lead to conflicts 
and lawsuits against the so-called jenízaros (descendants of foreigners). 
Although many of the functions of the Casa de la Contratación became obso-
lete soon after the relocation of its headquarters to Cádiz, the newly created 
Intendencia de Marina (Navy Board) did function well in the preparation of 
the fleets in the first decades of the eighteenth century, and also managed to 
organize the register of ships in the 1740s.24 The policies of the officials of the 
Casa and the Intendencia and the fiscal authorities in the port of Cádiz 
remained contradictory, as they simultaneously tried to control foreign mer-
chants and to attract and support them in order to boost the Cádiz trade.
It is in this contradictory context that we should view the Dutch and Flemish 
merchants in Cádiz. But we also need to consider that much of the legislation 
designed to control foreigners did not affect the Flemish and Dutch in Cádiz at 
all, as a separate “Flemish nation” had long been recognized by the Spanish crown 
as citizens and subjects of the King of Spain, and, moreover, the privileges of 
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the treaties of 1648 and 1673 remained valid. The particular status of the Flemish 
and Dutch in Spanish cities can obviously be traced back to the structure of the 
Habsburg empire prior to the Dutch Revolt starting in 1568. The Flemish part of 
the Habsburg Low Countries, and particularly the cities of Bruges and Antwerp, 
entertained strong economic relations with the Iberian Peninsula.25 Flemish 
migration to Spain was tolerated as many of these immigrants were merchants. 
These merchants may have been viewed with some suspicion after the start of 
the Dutch Revolt, but their presence continued to be accepted as they were 
clearly contributing to the prosperity of the cities where they settled.
Immigrant “colonies” of merchants in Spanish cities had their own internal 
organization and identity, regarding themselves as a separate “nation,” with dis-
tinct legal, administrative, linguistic and religious characteristics. The “Flemish 
Nation,”26 and foreign nations in general, were characterized by such criteria 
rather than by nineteenth-century territorial and judicial conceptualizations.27 
This early modern concept of “nation” referred to a sort of corporation, as is 
seen in the documents sent by the Flemish nation to the Junta de Dependencias 
de Extranjeros.28 Strong blood ties and common interests further defined the 
nation. Trust-based relations were the norm and the shared conception of 
belonging to a common nation was the basis of a strong inner cohesion. Good 
relations between the earliest members and the rest of the group, including 
their often highly mobile representatives, were of vital importance.29
The Flemish community was well-integrated into Spanish society and was 
relatively large. They had their own charter of privileges and exemptions and 
were known as the “ancient and noble Flemish nation.”30 This body boasted its 
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own consulate and confraternity, the Brotherhood of Saint Andrew (Capilla de 
San Andrés de los Flamencos),31 while the Dutch Republic had only a small con-
sulate.32 Hence, most migrants from the Northern provinces, the new Dutch 
Republic, preferred to join the Flemish nation. Their affiliation with this body 
granted them Hispano-Flemish citizenship, assured that they were assumed to 
be Catholic and made them, therefore, subject to the Spanish king but also 
entitled to privileges and legal representation before the local authorities.33 
Affiliation with the Flemish nation also brought a respectable status and eco-
nomic benefits, as most of these Dutch citizens operated as consignees for 
merchandise shipped under the name of Flemish merchants.34
 Immigration of Dutch to Spain over Time
What was the scale of the migration of these communities? Historian 
J.G. Briels noted that by the end of the sixteenth century, around 80,000 
families in the war-torn Southern provinces of the Netherlands left for Spain 
and Portugal.35 Many of these immigrants settled in Spain’s port cities, often as 
merchants. The businesses set up by immigrant traders from Brabant and 
Flanders helped stimulate economic growth in areas within the Kingdom of 
Castile, but considerable numbers settled in Seville, the gateway to trade with 
the Spanish Americas.36
This well-organized community continued to attract new immigrants from 
the Low Countries. A sample taken from notarial sources shows that migration 
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to Cádiz rose in the 1660s, with a sharp increase between 1710 and 1740 and 
came to an almost a complete halt after that.37 The initial spurt is logical given 
that the peace treaties signed in 1648 allowed for this migration. According to 
their wills, migrants came from a variety of locations. Between 1650 and 1699, 
25 percent were from Flanders and 48 percent from Brabant. A minority had 
come from Holland (14.5 percent), Zeeland (0.5 percent) or other provinces 
such as Overijssel and North-Holland (12 percent). The Northern provinces of 
the Low Countries had been a preferred destination for thousands of mer-
chants fleeing the Southern Low Countries during to the Dutch Revolt, and 
ironically descendants of these refugees were now sent to Spain to apprentice 
in the merchant houses dedicated to the Atlantic trade. After 1700, the geo-
graphic distribution of people who left for Cádiz changed, with more migrants 
from Holland and Zeeland (24 percent) and fewer from Brabant (29 percent). 
Of the 41 percent of migrants claiming to be from Flanders, many were likely 
from other places in the Low Countries.
The “Flemish” community in Cádiz became very large and quite diverse. 
Around 1720, over 600 Dutch family names were to be found in Cádiz. Almost 
65 percent of these names relate to Flanders and Brabant, but there were 
also a large number of transient traders (“transeuntes”) born in Amsterdam, 
Haarlem, Oudewater or Middelburg. The rest were Flemish families with a lon-
ger pedigree in Andalusian port cities focused on the trade with America such 
as Seville and Malága who had then relocated to Cádiz in order to continue 
trading with the Americas. Diversity arising form regional background had to 
be muted. As other “nations,” the Flemish-Dutch community needed to main-
tain internal social cohesion even while striving for integration into the society 
of Cádiz.38
In the 1713 census taken in Cádiz, some of these Dutch merchants appeared 
as naturalized members of the Flemish nation.39 However, only 26 out of the 
152 merchants identified from the notarial protocols appear in the census. 
Many of them had settled in Cádiz only temporary. Moreover, we know of the 
arrival of quite a few new migrants after 1713 due to their appearance in the 
business contracts drafted in the 1720s. Many of the families appearing in 
contracts were long established in Cádiz – such as the Van Kessel, Coghen 
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and Montefrio, Conique, Snellincq, Hercq, and Vandentrille. Their members 
worked for firms with a presence in Cádiz dating back at least two generations. 
Amongst the best-known merchants were the Conique brothers, Juan Agustin 
and Andres Ignacio, who had commercial dealings with Santiago de Cuba, 
Cartagena de Indias and some ports in Nueva España.40
It was very common for these families to support Dutch and Flemish immi-
grants arriving in Cádiz to try their hand in the trading world. Some of these 
would begin their training working for well-established companies, some 
would also integrate into the nation through a fortunate marriage. Such was 
the case of Juan Baptista Coppenoll, who began his career as a servant in 
Nicolás Snellincq’s house and founded his own firm around 1715 when he mar-
ried Nicolas’ daughter, Isabel Maria. By 1717, Juan Baptista was already running 
a very profitable company independently from his father-in-law and hired 
another traveling agent from Amsterdam by the name of Jan van der Slotten.41 
All of which shows that immigration and family networks made it possible for 
individual traders and members of the Flemish nation to take part in colonial 
trade, despite the appearance of exclusion from this very trade.
 Trade with the Americas by the Dutch and Flemish Based  
in Cádiz
An interesting paradox arises in the functioning of Cádiz as the seat of 
the Casa de la Contratación after 1717. The city became the metropolitan hub in 
the global Spanish empire. Cádiz was the place where foreign merchants 
should be monitored, but, at the same time, these merchants could freely 
live and trade there. As a center of multilateral trade, Cádiz facilitated cross-
boundary exchanges transcending the immediate interests of the Spanish 
state.
Cádiz was both a port city and a derivatives market. According to historians 
such as Clé Lesger, this double functionality turns a region into a “Gateway 
System,” that is a node within an integrated economic spatial system where 
external trade is conducted through specialized middlemen. The Cádiz market 
developed oligopsonic characteristics, in which very few traders had a great 
deal of power in the market, and a small elite group of buyers exercised maxi-
mum control over prices and the amount of products to be made available on 
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the market. Under such conditions, profits tend to be concentrated with the 
buyers rather than with the producers.42
This situation may be observed in the functioning of Cádiz as the center 
of an illicit market in silver. This market was controlled by foreign merchant 
colonies holding a virtual oligopoly on the Spanish West Indies trade. Dutch 
merchants were strongly represented in the oligopolistic networks structuring 
this complex market. The richest and most powerful businessmen monopo-
lized the black market in metals, predominantly foreigners, non-resident 
agents involved in the purchase and sale of products in exchange for silver. 
Most of those middlemen were related to each other. Such traders would fix 
market prices, undercutting the official price of silver. In order to conduct 
this contraband trade, they had to employ legal strategies to feign legality. 
These strategies skirted what was allowed by the law and exploited the ambi-
guity in extant legislation. The Dutch and Flemish role was particularly visible 
because traders from this “nation” settled in Seville and Cádiz extended their 
networks all over the Spanish empire, thanks to their ability to create networks 
and adapt to the social, economic, and political environment.43
For this reason, foreign and particularly Flemish-Dutch merchants were not 
unhappy with the Spanish monopoly but, rather, its most eager supporters. 
They functioned as well-positioned intermediaries in a market with both 
oligopsonic and oligopolic features. A society such as Cádiz, with a substantial 
illicit trade component, needed discrete cooperation among the various 
parties. This was not incompatible with competition among the various net-
works focused on the different market areas and centered in diverse financial 
centers. To understand the role of Cádiz as a “nodal point” and the Dutch 
component in it, we need to consider the oligopsonic nature of the market in 
Cádiz with its high number of illegal silver traders, as well as the Dutch and 
Flemish merchants’ role as storekeepers and consignees.
Owing to their role as goods suppliers and their impressive merchant fleet, 
the Dutch were able to use many non-Dutch Atlantic ports as “nodal points.” 
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The presence of Dutch fleets was felt in a great number of port cities through-
out the Hispanic world, in the Iberian peninsula as well as in American ports. 
We cannot yet quantify the volume of business of Amsterdam firms through 
their networks of correspondents and branches established by the Dutch and 
Flemish community in Cádiz. But we know for certain that one of the most 
important incentives for these ships, merchants and cargoes to call in at Cádiz 
was American silver, a commodity that fuelled many European businesses. 
At the turn of the eighteenth century, Cádiz was one of the most attractive 
places for obtaining silver in a semi-legal way, and much of this trade ended up 
in the Dutch Republic, even if the French and British shares were higher.44 
Conversely, Cádiz was Amsterdam’s most important silver provider.45
The presence of Dutch businesses in the ports of Southern Spain, especially 
Cádiz, Seville and Málaga, should then be understood in the context of 
long-standing relationships facilitated by the Flemish nation in Cádiz. This 
long-standing network linked Andalusia with the East, and with the Hispanic 
Atlantic, a system geared towards accessing the flow of silver pouring in from 
the Americas.46 Dutch commercial firms based particularly in Amsterdam sent 
their agents to Cádiz, the de facto headquarters of American trade, and Dutch 
ships plying the Amsterdam-Cádiz route were diverted off to the American 
territories from as early as 1690. Thus Haarlem-born Martín Guillermo Van 
Hemert traveled to Cádiz as consignee for the Mediterranean fleet. He admit-
ted to having sent a Dutch vessel to Veracruz as a registered ship in the Indies 
fleet because he could not send it to the Levant ports due to warfare. In his will, 
Van Hemert listed among his business activities “consignations, trusts and 
commissions from various persons, my correspondents, all of them from my 
neighbouring northern provinces.”47
The Dutch and the Flemings played a significant role as the suppliers of 
shipbuilding materials and, on occasion, acted as asentistas and factores for 
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53 Guillermo Tomás de Roo was born in Cádiz but his family was from Amsterdam. 
His father, Juan Baptista de Roo, arrived in Cádiz from Amsterdam in 1715. In Cádiz, 
the Intendencia de Marina. Ships were built in Cantabrian shipyards with 
supplies from these agents.48 Even Spanish Prime Minister José Patiño 
benefited from their services. Once the naval boards and tribunals relocated to 
Cádiz, shipping and trade made Cádiz a depot for the re-export of goods. 
Its location and financial services gave Cádiz added value as a secondary 
market for derivatives, futures and options, albeit as a subsidiary of the major 
derivatives markets from Northern Europe, such as Amsterdam.49
The Flemish nation, then, could not be in a better position to exploit the 
position of its members as citizens of the Spanish monarchy and their per-
ceived creditworthiness as merchants, in order to benefit from the Spanish 
American trade in Cádiz. The strong hierarchical structure characterizing the 
organization of the nation, centered around a few of the longest-resident fami-
lies who formed a well-established élite, facilitated this perception of trustwor-
thiness. These same families would welcome “temporary” immigrant agents 
for periods as long as over ten years. These agents worked mainly as consignees 
and carried most of the weight of their firm’s operations in the city.50
The role of the Dutch and Flemings was not limited to their activities 
based in the ports. The Casa de la Contratación also granted passenger licenses 
for Flemish and Dutch traders to travel to the Indies.51 Such was the case 
of Colonel Juan Guillelmin from Zeeland, his Spanish wife, Maria de la 
Concepcion Valenzuela, and their two servants, Pedro Tosi from Barcelona 
and Guillermo Cornelio from Vic, who traveled to Santo Domingo.52 And they 
were not the only ones. In 1710, Guillermo Tomas de Roo, a Dutch member of 
the Flemish nation,53 sailed to Maracaibo with his family because he was 
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appointed governor and captain-general in Merida and La Grita.54 There are 
other examples that provide information about different families and the 
kinship ties and business relations existing among them. One such example is 
Adriana van Kessel, widow of Juan Van Haure, who had dealings with Thomas 
Antonio Coghen y Montefrio, a close relative of the consul Jacobo Vermolen. 
Vermolen had issued Coghen y Montefrio’s son, Juan Joseph, a carta de eman-
cipacion and 1000 doblones (around 4000 silver pesos escudos) on account of 
his inheritance, in 1723 when he was 24 years old. This enabled him to trade 
and do business on behalf of his family and using the family’s assets inside and 
outside of Spain. This is an interesting example showing the use of the “letter 
of adulthood” to ensure the continuity of the family’s businesses.55
Aside from these well-known, wealthy families there were many cases of 
Dutch enterprises linked to local Flemish and Dutch merchants in Cádiz, such 
as the firms of Eduardo Cornelis and Diego Van Haure, or that of the Van 
Hemert family from Amsterdam. The Van Hemerts were a family of textile 
manufacturers from Haarlem who had originally fled Antwerp, and they 
claimed to be Flemish in both their Spanish residences in Seville and Cádiz. 
Francisco Joseph and Gaspar Gregorio were born in Cádiz, and the latter sailed 
to New Spain on Fernando Chacón’s fleet as his brother’s agent or encomendero 
with the idea of becoming familiar with the American trade. At this time, the 
Van Hemerts had a family network that spread over a number of European and 
American port cities.56
This diversity of economic interests in both the Low Countries and in the 
Americas of these Cádiz-based Dutch families implied personal mobility. 
It was quite common for members of these families to travel for business 
purposes, at times to the Americas, more frequently to North Atlantic ports. 
An example is the case of the firm established in 1716 by Fernando Arroy, a 
member of the Flemish nation, and Ghent-born Juan Baptista Sholt. The latter 
arrived in Cádiz that same year and once his firm was fully established, he 
returned to Flanders in order to meet the commissions for his own firm in 
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Spain.57 In comparison to the merchants who joined the Flemish nation, there 
were very few who registered with the Dutch and, thereby, kept their “foreign 
charter.” In 1765, this registry comprised Octavio Barbour, Juan Lespinasse, 
Francisco Heegeman, Pedro Brack, Cornelio Van Linterlo, Juan Beumer, 
Constancio Albertini, Jose Pedro Heegeman and Miguel Woenigh.58
As was also previously mentioned, the number of transient traders was 
greater than that of the merchants permanently settled and operating under 
the umbrella of the Flemish nation, but their activities were very much alike. 
Perhaps the only difference between these two groups was the greater socio-
economic prestige and prominence enjoyed by the latter in Cádiz. This differ-
entiation becomes obvious when we study the wills and testaments collected 
throughout the years of the Cádiz-based trading families and their transient 
agents. Some of these families owned real estate in the city as well as in the 
countryside. Land ownership was generally associated with the privileged 
classes in Cádiz society. Such was the case of Ypres-born Francisco Henquel. 
He was the owner of estates in Rota and was related to the regidores perpetuos 
in Baeza (Jaen, Eastern Andalusia). At the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
he ran a firm with his nephew Juan Antonio Hendrix and was involved in the 
American trade. Guillermo de Graaf ran a salt supply business. He rented a salt 
mine and provided Esteban Van Uchelen with shiploads of salt as ballast for 
the return trips to Amsterdam.59
This importance of Cádiz was widely recognized at the time. Some political 
and economic thinkers and writers stressed the importance of Cádiz as a 
factory specifically for the Dutch. Jacques Le Moine de L’Espine stated that the 
Dutch had business in Bilbao, San Sebastián, Madrid, Seville and Cádiz, but 
most of the trade was run from Cádiz as this was a sea port open to the Atlantic 
Ocean, at the mouth of the Strait of Gibraltar, where all fleets and galleons 
for the Indies trade were arranged. This was the most profitable trade for all 
transient merchants and travelers in the area. For this reason, he wrote, a con-
sulate had been created and the merchant colonies paid their dues in order to 
meet the costs of trading in the city.60
The general structure of these commercial arrangements did not change 
much in the early decades of the eighteenth century in comparison to the 
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second half of the previous century, but there were some modifications. Dutch 
fleets would export agricultural produce such as wine, olive oil, raisins, almonds 
and citrus fruits, and import into Spain grain from the Baltic, naval supplies, 
paper, linen goods, lard from Flanders, cheese, salted fish and fabrics, as well as 
indigo, ebony, painted canvas, both raw and patterned cotton, sugar, coffee and 
tea, porcelain, rolled cinnamon bales, and other goods for domestic consump-
tion such as wheat and iron. Food-related goods were in high demand in 
Southern and Eastern Spain. There was also an increase in the number of fab-
rics and other commodities from Asia that were imported. Bernardo de Ulloa 
stated in 1740 that Asian spices brought by the Dutch were most sought after in 
Iberia and America. Spain’s commercial lassitude meant that the Dutch 
became the main providers for certain products.61
The Dutch even took the liberty of introducing products either sourced 
from their own colonies or from the Spanish colonial territories into Spanish 
America. A clear and paradoxical example of this is cacao. A treatise composed 
by Cádiz traders explained that the cacao bought by the Dutch in Venezuela, 
stored in Amsterdam, and then shipped to Cádiz was cheaper to buy than that 
supplied by the Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas.62 The Dutch also supplied 
Cádiz with tobacco from Barinas that had been purchased on the Venezuelan 
shores, despite the Estanco del Tabaco being in operation in Spain since 1636, 
which made it illegal to engage in any tobacco trade not under government 
license. And it was not only Cádiz from which the Dutch traded. They also 
arrived in a number of other Spanish ports, such as Málaga, Alicante, Barcelona 
or Bilbao. From these ports the Dutch would buy salt, indigo, wool, cochineal 
and, especially, precious metals.
The Dutch and Flemish trade in Cádiz was based on two fundamental 
pillars. The first was the trade of goods (gooderenhandel or warenhandel), 
which consisted of the consignment of goods, as well as the storage or distri-
bution of merchandise sourced from various markets. The second was the 
practice of depositing money to be used for financing the storage of produce, 
as well as for the payment of import goods from America destined for various 
ports in Northern Europe and vice-versa. Part of the cash stored would be used 
for investments such as private loans, and for selling and redistributing mer-
chandise to the hinterland – Andalusia (4.5 percent), America (62 percent) 
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and the Levantse Handel (31 percent).63 These two aspects were intrinsically 
related. They were essential for merchants involved in the American market, as 
they enabled them to store goods to be loaded in the fleets bound for New 
Spain as well as on the registered ships that set sail regularly to American ports 
around the Caribbean and the mainland. This broad functionality gave the 
Dutch and Flemish suppliers and merchants the opportunity to participate in 
various aspects of the American trade (storing merchandise from different 
sources and managing product purchases and sales) and the power to invest 
the cash necessary to fund business trips. This cash was funneled through 
instruments such as insurance policies.
The Dutch and the Flemings were also smugglers, but, to the naked eye, 
their trading activities appeared to be legal. The transient Dutch traders that 
operated as consignees for the Amsterdam and Middelburg Society of the 
Levant Trade (Levantse Handel)64 used their connections among the Flemish 
merchants to introduce ships belonging to this society, under a new name, into 
the fleets bound for New Spain and other areas, especially the ports of Veracruz, 
Portobelo, Caracas and Buenos Aires. There is ample evidence for this, espe-
cially in the import and export deals conducted by Cádiz-based Dutch and 
Flemish merchants between 1714 and 1753.65 This type of operation became the 
norm after 1740 on the registered ships. Between 1750 and 1760 a number of 
cases have been found demonstrating that smuggling depended on cross-
national cooperation, even to the point that these illegal practices were, by and 
large, socially acceptable. There were a number of ways of solving any legal 
issues arising between the parties involved. It was apparently quite common 
for the port authorities to be well aware of, and approve of, what was being 
done. And it was hardly smuggling when the merchants involved were already 
entitled to trade with the Indies.
The documents relating to this trade, found in archives in Cádiz and 
Amsterdam, provide information on how these operations were conducted. 
The Amsterdam firm would grant proxies and send cash to their Cádiz part-
ners, enabling them to introduce the ship in the fleet.66 In addition, permis-
sion would be granted for other Cádiz merchants to load their merchandise, 
and further powers were issued so the products could be sold, although this 
was always to be done in the name of the Amsterdam correspondent.67 On 
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several occasions these ships would sail under convoy by Spanish warships, 
especially when they traveled as single registered ships from various nationali-
ties consigned to Flemish merchants. Such was the case of a Genoese vessel 
purchased by Henrique de Roo and Sons.68 It is worth noting that these mer-
chants displayed exemplarily correct behavior as they paid all taxes due for 
these transactions (the alcabala or sales tax as well as 4 percent towards the 
general income tax for the city), which underlines that the Spanish authorities 
were not at all ignorant of them.69 In 1740, the increased use of loose register 
ships seemed to encourage merchants to create alliances to be able to load 
more merchandise – mainly manufactured goods – and thus profit from the 
increasing amounts of gold and silver arriving in Cádiz.
 Conclusion
To sum up, the share of locally-established foreign and particularly Flemish-
Dutch merchants in Spain’s commercial relations with the Americas not only 
continued in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but was strengthened. 
Though there were attempts to control the activities of foreigners, these served 
mainly as monopolistic window dressing and nothing more. There was little 
incentive to really exclude foreigners from the Atlantic trade, despite new 
monopoly legislation in the early eighteenth century. Everyone involved in the 
trade, from customs officials in the ports to the highest government ministers, 
knew that the trade conducted by foreigners was extremely beneficial to 
Spanish interest. This was nowhere clearer than in the nerve center for the 
conduct of trade with the Americas – Cádiz.
No matter what their origins were, the residents of Cádiz worked together to 
take advantage of the opportunities offered by the trade with the Americas. 
This cooperation included circumventing laws, committing fraud, and finding 
ways to smuggle contraband into and out of the port. The merchants involved 
were often acquainted with one another via ties of kinship, place of origin, and 
long-standing business partnerships. The “Carrera de Indias,” the Spanish colo-
nial trade with America, depended heavily on foreign merchant communities, 
as this case study of the Dutch/Flemish “Nation” in Cádiz strongly suggests. 
Through family ties and “nation”-based networks, Dutch and Flemish mer-
chants were vital to the functioning of the Spanish trade to the Americas.
158 Crespo Solana
<UN>
70 D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), vol. 1: Atlantic America, 62.
These conclusions support D.W. Meinig’s hypothesis that the Dutch created 
a geographically fragmented Atlantic “empire” formed by a network of strate-
gic nodal points along critical trade routes.70 The city of Cádiz was crucial in 
these merchant networks because it connected Atlantic routes and market 
areas. Cádiz was a factory-port used by Dutch convoys for storing and redistrib-
uting products as well as for obtaining cash to fuel their businesses along 
the routes linking Southern Europe, the Mediterranean and Spanish America. 
The Dutch presence in Cádiz therefore is indicative of the importance of cross-
imperial, cross-cultural trade in the early modern Atlantic.
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A Public and Private Dutch West India Interest
Henk den Heijer
 Introduction
In the historiography, the term West India interest stands for a group of 
British stakeholders in the plantation economy in the Caribbean. That group 
emerged in the eighteenth century, and its objective was to forcefully defend 
the West Indian interests of the members in the British parliament. In her 1921 
article “The London West India Interest in the Eighteenth Century,” Lilian 
Penson distinguished three London-based interest groups that decided to work 
together: agents from the West Indian colonies, merchants who traded with the 
colonies, and plantation owners who lived in the city. She describes how vari-
ous stakeholders formed an effective lobby group after a successful campaign 
for the introduction of the Molasses Act in 1733. This lobby group managed to 
keep foreign plantation products from the British market via the parliament.1 
The image of a powerful, homogenous interest group was recently adjusted by 
Andrew O’Shaugnessy.2 He demonstrated that the lobby was initially a fairly 
informally organized economic interest group, able to apply political pressure 
during the American Revolution, but that it also suffered from internal dissen-
sion. The interests of the group began to diverge more and more at the end of 
the eighteenth century. Nevertheless there was a lobby in Great Britain that 
managed to get the West Indian interest on the parliamentary agenda. Did the 
Dutch Republic have such an interest group, as well? Not according to J.P. van 
de Voort. In his dissertation on the West Indian plantation loans, he states that 
it was impossible for a Dutch West India interest to emerge, since the interests 
of such a pressure group were incom patible with the principles of an open 
staple market. A monopoly supply of plantation products from the colonies 
such as in Great Britain was unthinkable in the Republic, simply because the 
Dutch colonies could not meet the growing demand for sugar, coffee and other 
colonial products. Import from non-Dutch areas was necessary.3
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The key question in this chapter is whether or not the Republic had 
some sort of West India interest. Of course there have been individuals 
as well as organizations with West Indian interests, but around which 
subjects were they organized? Did these individuals and various groups 
collaborate and, if so, did that collaboration have similarities with that in 
Great Britain? A parallel seems hard to draw in advance; the significantly 
different state structure of the Republic will have affected the interests of 
various groups. The fragmented governance structure that was so charac-
teristic to the Republic did not exist in Great Britain.4 This chapter begins 
with the West Indian interests of the central government and then dis-
cusses the conflicts of interest between the provinces of Holland and 
Zeeland. Afterwards, we will shed light on how interest groups emerged at 
a local level in the Republic and how they defended their interests. Finally, 
we will discuss the alleged differences between the Republic and Great 
Britain and the role the States General played in balancing the different 
Atlantic interests in the Republic.
 Private Interest as State Interest
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the economic interests of 
Dutch merchants in the Atlantic were still modest. During the initial phase, the 
Republic had few to no planters overseas, nor sugar refiners at home. In 1609 a 
group of merchants submitted a petition to the States General for the first 
time, requesting protection of their trade interests in West Africa.5 The reason 
for this was that their ships were continuously being attacked by the Portuguese. 
Around 1600, however, it was not private interests but rather government 
interests of a military nature that rapidly sucked the Dutch into the Atlantic. 
The States General had been making efforts to relocate the battle against Spain 
from land to sea and from Europe to regions outside of Europe since the end of 
the sixteenth century. It was mainly the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in 
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the Atlantic that generated the capital with which the battle against the 
Republic was funded, and these territories, therefore, formed interesting tar-
gets for the Dutch. However, the government had no financial resources to 
fight this battle on its own, and resorted to private investors at a very early 
stage. The enormous war fleet of Pieter van der Does that carried out attacks 
on the Canary Islands and São Tomé in 1599 was such a public-private 
enterprise, whose main objective was military in nature. Eventually, this joint 
venture culminated in the establishment of the West India Company (wic) in 
1621, a private company with commercial and military goals. The charter of the 
Company stated that, in case of war overseas, it could count on financial and 
material support from the government.6 In the first half of the seventeenth 
century, during which the wic unsuccessfully attempted to build an Atlantic 
empire, the States General provided support by means of money, war ships 
and troops several times.
After the end of the Revolt against Spain in 1648, there was no reason to 
continue the battle in the Atlantic. Meanwhile, the economic interests of 
the Dutch in the Atlantic had increased significantly. Colonies had been 
established and the supply and processing of, and trade in, plantation 
products such as sugar and tobacco became increasingly important for the 
Dutch economy. This also significantly changed the nature of the Atlantic 
interest of the government. From the mid-seventeenth century until the 
end of the eighteenth century, the roles were reversed and the military 
actions in the Atlantic were primarily in the service of the economic inter-
ests of private organizations. For instance, the States General sent Michiel 
de Ruyter to West Africa in 1664 to recapture the wic forts, which had pre-
viously been captured by the English. The expedition of Abraham Crijnssen 
to the West Indies organized in 1667 by the Admiralty of Zeeland, and in 
which Crijnssen captured Suriname, fit in this policy as well. The trade in, 
and processing of, plantation products had become too important to the 
Republic not to defend. In addition to profit for merchants, sugar, tobacco 
and other products also provided employment. After all, almost all Atlantic 
products had to be processed, which created many jobs. Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam had dozens of sugar refineries and tobacco mills within their 
walls. For the survival of these companies, not to mention to ensure their 
continued success, the supply of raw materials from the Atlantic was 
essential. After the wic had been forced to give up its imperial ambitions 
with the loss of Brazil in 1654, the Company had the task of managing 
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the remaining infrastructure in the Atlantic, allowing production and 
trade to be continued. When the Company threatened to collapse under 
the burden of debt in 1674, the States General decided to reorganize the 
Company financially, allowing it to restart.7 It was simply unthinkable 
for the government, with its limited resources, to manage these overseas 
possessions itself.
In addition to the wic, there were other private organizations that 
managed Dutch possessions in the Atlantic. They were established with the 
permission of – and sometimes even initiated by – the government. That is 
how, in the 1620s, private colonies emerged under so-called patroonships.8 
Most of these organizations existed only briefly, but some of them had a 
longer lifespan, such as Tobago, which was a patroonship with alternating 
owners between 1628 until 1677.9 In 1683, the Society of Suriname had been 
established, in which the wic, the city of Amsterdam and the Van Sommelsdijk 
family each owned a third. Both societies had been granted a patent by the 
States General, which not only granted rights to these individual organiza-
tions, but also required them to protect the possessions of the societies in 
times of trouble. Eventually the wic, the patroonships and the societies were 
mandated by the government to rule overseas regions and to run the judicial 
system there on its behalf. On paper, however, the States General were ulti-
mately responsible for the governance, the application of the judicial system 
and the safety of the colonies.10 For these individual organizations, this was 
a reason to turn to the government for military support when needed. The 
wic even had a so-called “Haags Besogne,” a semi-permanent consultative 
body of directors and delegates of the States General, to exchange informa-
tion and represent their interests.11 The fact that the government had an 
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interest in the preservation of individual Atlantic organizations was evi-
denced by the fact that government support was frequently granted. For 
instance, in 1674, the wic received a guarantee from the States General that 
it would pay the costs for 200 soldiers every year, an amount that was allo-
cated to all provinces via the then current repartition system.12 The 
patroonships and societies could count on support as well. The Society of 
Suriname was given access to state army troops twice in the eighteenth 
century, for the purpose of disabling the maroons in the colony. And in 
Berbice, State troops were deployed in 1764 to put an end to the slave revolt 
that was threatening the existence of the colony.
It would be incorrect to assume that the fragmented government of the 
Republic granted support to Atlantic organizations without conditions. Even 
within the States General, there were significant conflicts of interest between 
the sea and land provinces. The latter had fewer economic ties with the Atlantic 
than the sea provinces of Holland and Zeeland and often had a negative atti-
tude towards supporting the wic or the West Indian colonies. Representatives 
of the States of Holland and Zeeland often had to exert pressure on the land 
provinces to get financial support for the West Indian colonies. In addition, the 
States General required the Atlantic organizations to make significant finan-
cial contributions to keep the defense and the administration of their colonies 
up-to-date. But these organizations passed on the costs to the colonists to a 
large degree, resulting in protests and resistance. In Suriname and all other 
Dutch colonies in the West, conflicts between the government and the colo-
nists about the payment for fortifications and troops led to a neglect of the 
defense of these territories. That neglect caused a fierce battle in the Patriot 
era about the governance and the defense of the Atlantic colonies.13 After the 
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Patriots, the States General sent two representatives, W.A.J. Grovestins and 
W.C. Boeij, to the West to put things in order.14 Despite the tension that existed 
between the provinces, the States General, the Atlantic organizations and the 
colonies, there were always forms of collaboration that assured continuity, 
however unstable it sometimes may have been. It was not until the end of the 
eighteenth century, when the fragmented governance system in the Republic 
started to become unworkable, that the state took over the colonies and the 
private Atlantic organizations were eliminated.
The wic and the societies were not the only ones who lobbied the States 
General for military protection. Groups of merchants did the same. A minority of 
the merchants was involved in the trade with Guiana but the majority had 
commercial ties with the Caribbean islands which were the sites of the most 
important trade of the entire Atlantic region. Via Curaçao and St. Eustatius, more 
tropical products of the English, French and Spanish colonies were shipped to 
the Republic than from the Dutch plantation colonies in Guiana. When the trade 
with the islands was threatened during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–
1748), groups of merchants from Amsterdam and Rotterdam launched actions to 
defend their interests. The Republic was officially neutral in the war, but treaties 
with Austria and Great Britain forced the States General to deploy state troops 
against the French in the Southern Netherlands in 1745. That development posed 
a serious threat to the Caribbean trade for several reasons.
For instance, the States General decided in 1747 that a third of the crew of 
merchant vessels had to serve on the war fleet that was to protect Dutch 
merchantmen from the attacks of the French navy in European waters.15 That 
measure would seriously hamper Dutch intercontinental shipping and trade. 
That is why the directors of the Society of Suriname and Berbice protested, after 
which the States General exempted navigation to and from Guiana from this 
measure.16 Merchants who traded with the Caribbean islands also joined forces 
and approached the States General via the directors of the wic with the request 
to revoke these harmful measures for Caribbean shipping. The joint protest of 
the merchants was successful; the States General also exempted ships engaged 
in Caribbean navigation from providing crewmembers to the war fleet.17
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More harmful than this obligation to provide crew members was the 
measure that prohibited trade with France and her colonies.18 Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam merchants who imported sugar and coffee via French ports 
were willing to accept this ban, but they refused to accept an import ban on 
French sugar via Curaçao and St. Eustatius. The latter would mean the end of 
their Atlantic trade. In a coordinated action, merchants and insurers from 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam submitted petitions to the States General to elimi-
nate the ban that would “ruin the overall Dutch trade with the West.” These 
petitions were signed by 185 merchants, including influential regents with 
Atlantic trade interests.19 This led to the decision of the States General to scale 
back the measure. Ships that were en route from the Caribbean with French 
products were given free admission to Dutch ports.20
Another issue for which the help of the government was asked was the pro-
tection of West Indiamen. Ships that sailed to the Caribbean were frequently 
the victims of privateers, despite the neutrality policy of the Republic during a 
large part of the eighteenth century. In the 1730s, the Spanish navy captured 
several Dutch merchantmen in the Caribbean on suspicion of smuggling to the 
Spanish colonies. At the instigation of the wic, the Admiralty of Amsterdam 
sent one or two convoys to the West Indies per year after 1737 to protect 
merchants from Spanish confiscations.21 But soon the convoy system was 
discarded by the Admiralty, despite protests from merchants who emphasized 
that – even without the threat of Spanish warships – the Caribbean Sea was a 
perfect area for privateers who did not stick to the rules and resorted to piracy. 
Ships carrying valuable loads of Atlantic products were appealing prey to 
them. In 1745, Amsterdam merchants submitted two petitions to the States 
General in which they requested protection against privateers. To the second 
petition, which was signed by 110 merchants, a list of 32 ships was added that 
had been confiscated by English and Spanish privateers. The merchants were 
supported by the Board of the wic, which was not able to offer sufficient pro-
tection.22 The States General took the petitions seriously, and commissioned 
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the Admiralty of Amsterdam to restart the convoying of the West Indiamen. 
When, after several new ships were captured by privateers, it turned out that 
the frequency and effectiveness of convoying left much to be desired, the 
stakeholders proposed to the States General that an armed convoy to the West 
Indies be organized twice a year.
The States General granted that request in December 1747 “to indemnify 
the subjects of the State for damage with all resources possible.”23 However, 
the convoy system fell apart once again due to the costs the Admiralty of 
Amsterdam had to incur to maintain it. During the Seven Years’ War (1756–
1763) large groups of merchants were continuously bombarding the States 
General with petitions for the improvement of the convoy system, with varying 
degrees of success. In June 1758, the representatives of the States General, in an 
action that was very likely coordinated, received six petitions signed by no 
fewer than 650 merchants from several cities in the Republic.24 All these 
petitions demonstrate that merchants were continuously working together to 
defend their West Indian trade interests via the States General. The States 
General, in turn, was usually willing to grant these requests; after all, they also 
had an interest in the continuity of Atlantic shipping and trade, even if the 
financial resources they could provide were limited.
 Conflicting Interests: Monopoly versus Free Trade
Based on enlightened self-interest, the States General supported various 
private organizations and merchants who were active in the Atlantic region. 
Only then could the economic interests of the country best be served. However, 
the problem was that the Atlantic interests of the provinces and cities in the 
States General could differ significantly. These diverging interests led to a fierce 
conflict of interest between Zeeland and Holland several times. The Zeeland 
merchants lost more and more ground to Holland, and, particularly, to 
Amsterdam, in European shipping and trade over the course of the seven-
teenth century and wanted to make sure that the same would not happen in 
the Atlantic. An important point of conflict, which both parties tried to settle 
in varying ways within and outside the States General, was the question of 
whether or not the trade monopoly of the wic should be preserved in certain 
parts of its mandate area.
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Initially, the Zeelanders were in favor of preservation of the Company 
monopoly, which guaranteed them that a portion of the Atlantic trade would 
remain in Zeeland’s hands.25 The first test case was the Dutch colony in Brazil. 
Almost immediately after the occupation of Recife in 1630, Amsterdam mer-
chants fought for free trade with Brazil, which was the most important sugar 
producing region in the world. Amsterdam had growing interests in sugar 
refining and the sugar trade and aimed to acquire the largest possible share of 
the available sugar. The battle that erupted within the wic between Amsterdam 
and Zeeland about the opening up of the sugar trade was temporarily won by 
Amsterdam in the fall of 1630. The States General allowed free trade, provided 
that all goods were shipped from and to Brazil using Company ships and the 
wic would receive a fee and shipping costs. In 1634, the rules on free trade 
were loosened which allowed the Amsterdam merchants to gain control over a 
large portion of the sugar trade.26 The timing was not coincidental, since 
at that moment the power of the Company in Northeast Brazil had increased 
significantly and the colony began to produce more sugar. In its wake, the bat-
tle about monopoly versus free trade flared as well. Supporters and opponents 
of the monopoly published dozens of pamphlets in which they tried to sway 
public opinion of the reasonableness of their views.27
In 1636, resistance against free trade grew, including within the Company, 
and the directors of the Chamber of Zeeland were able to stir up resistance 
against Amsterdam. Eventually, in late December 1636, the States General 
decided to restore the Company monopoly and free trade was banned imme-
diately.28 It seemed that Zeeland had won the battle, but this victory was only 
a mirage. A publicity offensive was launched against the reinstatement of the 
monopoly by Amsterdam. In addition, Amsterdam also applied political 
pressure within the States of Holland and the States General. From 
Dutch Brazil, the merchants of Amsterdam were supported by no less than 
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Governor-General Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, who was convinced that 
the colony would only be able to flourish with free trade.29 After a year-long 
battle between Zeeland and Amsterdam, the States General decided on 29 
April 1638 to partially dismantle the monopoly of the Company for the second 
time.30 Only the slave trade remained a privilege of the wic. With this deci-
sion, the ban on individual trade initiated by Zeeland in 1636 turned out to be 
a Pyrrhic victory. The West Indian interests of Holland, in particular of the eco-
nomically strong Amsterdam, carried more political weight and would eventu-
ally be the decisive factor in the free trade debate.31
After the loss of Brazil in 1654, conflicts between the provinces of Zeeland 
and Holland about shipping and trade in the Atlantic kept arising. In the late 
1720s, those conflicts would once again lead to a fierce battle between 
Amsterdam and Zeeland. However, this time the roles were reversed and the 
directors of the Chamber of Amsterdam defended the last monopoly of the 
Company: the trade and shipping to West Africa and the associated slave trade 
in the Dutch colonies in America. The reason for the conflict was the illegal 
commodity and slave trade of the Zeelanders in West Africa. In response to the 
structural loss of trade activities within Europe to merchants in Holland, the 
Zeelanders had focused on risky shipping branches such as privateering and 
smuggling, activities the merchants of Holland hardly engaged in. Privateering 
by Zeelanders was done in times of war and smuggling in times of peace.32 
Zeeland interlopers who dispatched ships to Africa always ran the risk of hav-
ing their ships captured and confiscated by the wic. That is why the Council of 
Middelburg was already urging the abolition of the Company’s trade monop-
oly with West Africa in 1692. The directors of the wic unanimously rejected 
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Middelburg’s proposal, and there were no changes in the monopoly.33 
Meanwhile, the organized illegal slave and commodity trade from Zeeland 
continued, in particular when, after the end of the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1702–1713), privateering disappeared as a major source of income.
In 1716 Zeeland once again submitted a request to open up trade to West 
Africa. They referred to England as an example, where the Parliament had 
opened up the trade to West Africa in 1698. That decision had significantly 
boosted English trade in West Africa, including the slave trade. However, the 
directors of the Company did not like the proposal and unanimously rejected 
it, so illegal trade continued. In the years after the War of the Spanish 
Succession, not only did smuggling activities increase, but due to stricter 
inspections in West Africa, many Zeeland smuggling ships were confiscated as 
well. Between 1714 and 1725, 27 Zeeland interlopers were captured by Company 
cruisers, and the commerce of the province suffered over 1.7 million guilders in 
damages.34 The West Indian interest of the Zeelanders was seriously threat-
ened by the actions of the Company. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was 
the merchants of Zeeland who developed initiatives to dismantle the last 
monopoly of the wic.
Several years before the States General had to decide on the renewal of 
the charter of the Company in 1730, the Zeelanders launched their attack 
on the monopoly. In the fall of 1727, a group of merchants from Vlissingen 
drafted a notice of objection, urging the full freeing up of the Atlantic trade. 
The merchants believed that the monopoly was seriously damaging the Dutch 
economy, since the wic was not able to adequately conduct the commodity 
trade in West Africa, nor could it manage the slave trade. They estimated that, 
after the dissolution of the last Company monopoly, 50 ships a year would be 
dispatched from Zeeland to West Africa, including ships deployed for the 
slave trade.35 The merchants of Vlissingen received support from a group of 
merchants from Middelburg, who established an almost identical proposal for 
liberalization of the trade. Both proposals were merged into one document by 
representatives of the City Councils of Middelburg and Vlissingen in 1728 and 
submitted to the States of Zeeland.36
After receipt of the document, the States of Zeeland appointed a committee 
that was to further develop the proposal to dismantle the Company monopoly 
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in the States General. The Zeeland plan to change the charter would soon also 
be known in Amsterdam. It immediately provoked a counter attack for the 
preservation of the monopoly. Directors of the Amsterdam Chamber believed 
that opening up trade in West Africa would mean the fall of the wic. The tax 
income would be insufficient to cover the costs of forts and factories.37 
Moreover, the Amsterdam directors did not trust the Zeeland stakeholders in 
the Atlantic trade. They had partaken in smuggling activities on a large scale 
and would not shy away from evading tax on the trade in Africa in the future as 
well. It was clear that Zeeland and Amsterdam could not disagree more regard-
ing a possible change of the Company charter. The battle between the two par-
ties would be fought in both the wic and the States General, which eventually 
had to renew the charter.
The Zeeland directors were now openly backing the proposals of the mer-
chants from their province. Together with the other Zeeland stakeholders in 
the Atlantic trade, they convinced the States of Zeeland to forcefully defend 
the dismantling of the monopoly in the States General. In an unexpected turn 
of events, the people of Zeeland received support from a group of plantation 
owners in Suriname who urged the States General to open up the slave trade in 
the colony. They said that the wic was not able to provide a sufficient number 
of Africans to the colony, so there was a chronic lack of slaves.38 Under pres-
sure from all those protests, Amsterdam agreed to change the mandate, but 
with a number of limitations on free trade. On 8 August 1730, the States General 
approved the changed charter for a period of 30 years. According to the charter, 
the Company would have a 60-mile strip on the Gold Coast as an exclu-
sive trade area, exactly the area that contained its forts. In addition, the wic 
retained the monopoly on the slave trade in the Dutch plantation colonies in 
Guiana.39 The renewed charter was a typical compromise product,  against 
which the Zeeland merchants would immediately object. Once again, they 
were able to get the States of Zeeland to undertake action in the States 
General, due to which the charter was modified in 1734. The exclusive 60-mile 
zone was now also opened up to individuals. Only the slave trade in Guiana 
remained exclusive to the wic, but it would eventually waive this right 
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voluntarily in 1738. Several unfortunate slave journeys that had led to signifi-
cant losses due to a high death rate, as well as decreasing slave prices, led 
the Board of the Company to decide to retreat from the slave trade.40  
The Zeelanders had won the battle with Amsterdam, and became the most 
important Dutch slave traders in the Atlantic from the 1730s onwards.
After the battle for the dissolution of the last trade monopoly had been 
settled, a new conflict arose. The third major conflict that the States General 
settled between both regions concerning Atlantic interests was about trade 
with, and shipping to, the plantation colonies Essequibo and Demerara. In this 
case, it was the Zeelanders who defended their privileges. Demerara was estab-
lished in 1745 as a part of Essequibo and had been ruled from there ever since. 
Both colonies fell under the charter of the wic but were managed by the 
Zeeland Chamber. The Zeelanders, who had founded Essequibo in 1616, 
claimed the exclusive right to trade in the region. As long as the plantation 
production was limited, nobody objected to the self-proclaimed monopoly of 
the Zeelanders. However, this changed when the colony grew and the demand 
for colonial products in the Republic increased. Around the mid-eighteenth 
century, opposition against the de facto Zeeland monopoly grew in Holland. 
Incidentally, the complaints did not emerge in Holland first. Rather they 
emerged in the colony itself, where Governor Laurens Storm van ‘s Gravensande 
repeatedly complained to the Zeeland directors about the limited supply of 
commodities and slaves.41 This complaint was taken very seriously by the 
“Gentlemen Ten,” the ruling Council of the wic, and was translated into an 
appeal to the directors of all the chambers to stimulate the trade to Essequibo 
and Demerara. The Zeeland directors considered this appeal to be a violation 
of the Zeeland monopoly and protested against it, thus giving birth to the con-
troversy around the shipping and trade on Essequibo and Demerara.42
The conflict about the Zeeland trade monopoly occurred in two phases. 
During the first phase, which lasted from 1750 until 1765, the Zeelanders fought 
against the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber. Two weeks after the disputed 
decision of the Gentlemen Ten, the main shareholders of the Zeeland Chamber 
gathered to agree on a strategy for the preservation of the monopoly. They 
chose four representatives who were to defend their interests in various politi-
cal forums. On behalf of the main shareholders, many of whom had interests 
in the trade with Guiana, a petition was submitted to the States General in late 
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August of 1750, who in turn forwarded the document to the Amsterdam 
Chamber for advice. The response of the Amsterdam directors was predict-
able. Through Willem Roëll and Thomas Hope, they stated that there had never 
been a Zeeland monopoly and therefore the claim of the main shareholders 
had to be rejected. Both directors told the States General that despite this 
rejection, Amsterdam was still willing to accommodate the Zeeland request if 
the Zeeland shareholders would compensate them for all costs incurred by the 
wic for Essequibo in the past.43 But by the time this Amsterdam proposal had 
reached The Hague, the main shareholders in Zeeland had already asked the 
States of Zeeland for help, who, in turn, had ordered Governor Storm van ‘s 
Gravensande in Essequibo to only allow ships with a Zeeland license to the 
colony.44 Simultaneously, the main shareholders called on the City Council of 
Middelburg to fight for the preservation of the Zeeland monopoly. The result 
of the lobbying of the main shareholders was that the States General was 
repeatedly asked to preserve the Zeeland monopoly. In opposition to this, the 
Amsterdam directors kept urging the States of Holland and the States General 
to eliminate the de facto monopoly, unless the Zeelanders were willing to pay 
for it.45 The Zeeland representatives in the States General consequently 
rejected the latter proposal, and with that prevented a possible settlement of 
the conflict concerning Essequibo.
1765 marked the start of a new phase, which also involved merchants from 
outside the wic. The Zeeland main shareholders, who had not been against 
a financial settlement during the first phase, reopened the Essequibo matter 
in May 1765 by starting negotiations with the Amsterdam directors of the 
Company about the purchase of the colony. These negotiations took place in 
The Hague under the supervision of the delegates of the States General.46 Just 
when a solution was within reach, a group of Dutch investors turned against 
the possible sale of Essequibo to Zeeland. In the 1760s, they had given signifi-
cant loans to planters in the colony, and demanded free navigation to Essequibo 
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and Demerara in return. In May 1768, they submitted a petition to the States 
General in which they insisted on the dismantling of the monopoly, which 
they believed to be illegal. Zeeland merchants, who feared that the colonial 
trade would eventually fall entirely into Amsterdam’s hands, also submitted a 
petition to the States General, insisting on the continuation of the monopoly.47 
As the Zeelanders and the Hollanders fought about their opposing colonial 
interests in the Republic via the States General, the supply issues in Essequibo 
and Demerara became worse. In September 1769, Storm van ‘s Gravesande 
drew up a petition with the Council of colonists, asking the States General to 
allow the slave trade with the English for the payment of a tax. That petition 
was signed by 71 planters and sent to the Republic with a letter of support by 
the governor. The merchants of Zeeland were furious about the petition and 
said that allowing the English would mean the fall of the Dutch slave trade, 
which was essential to the Zeelanders.48
The conflicting petitions of the merchants of Zeeland, Amsterdam and 
planters in the colony led to a stalemate in the States General. To force a break-
through in the long-running conflict, the Stadtholder was involved in the 
matter as a referee. William V was the supreme director of the wic, but was 
represented on the Board of the Company by Ferdinand van Collen. Van Collen 
very likely played an important role in the establishment of a new scheme for 
the trade with the colonies, issued on 25 October 1770 by the governor.49 It was 
a typical compromise in which neither party was proved right. In the new 
scheme, the Zeeland monopoly was rejected, but to placate them the mer-
chants of Zeeland were given the privilege of being the first to send 16 ships to 
Essequibo and Demerara each spring, after which the Hollanders were also 
allowed to participate in navigation to both colonies. Several months after the 
enforcement of the new scheme, a group of Middelburg merchants founded a 
shipping company for navigation to the colonies. It was the final attempt to 
keep dominating the trade with Essequibo and Demerara, but it wasn’t a very 
successful one. The company suffered heavy losses during the Fourth 
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Anglo-Dutch War which lead to the elimination of the shipping company in 
1788.50 From 1770 onwards, the shipping activities of Amsterdam to Essequibo 
and Demerara increased, and Zeeland lost more and more ground. Amsterdam’s 
preeminence did not last long, however, since in the Napoleonic Era both colo-
nies were conquered by the British, never to be given back.51
Zeeland and Holland fought about the configuration of parts of the Atlantic 
shipping and trade within and outside of the existing political bodies in the 
Dutch Republic for a century and a half. That battle says a great deal about 
the interest both regions had in the Atlantic trade. To achieve their goals, the 
parties used various means, such as lobbying in municipal and regional gov-
ernments and influencing public opinion through hundreds of pamphlets.52 
The mobilization of government entities and public opinion had one goal in 
the end: convincing the States General that a monopoly had to be preserved 
or dismantled. Eventually, decisions about Atlantic matters were made in 
The Hague. How the States General tried to steer a middle course between 
those conflicting interests is the subject of the last section of this chapter. First 
we will discuss how parties battled over, and lobbied for, the preservation and 
the reinforcement of their Atlantic interests at a local level in the Republic and 
in the colonial branches overseas.
 West India Interest on a Local Level
After the elimination of the wic as an active trade organization, the interests 
of local entrepreneurs in Atlantic shipping and trade increased greatly. In the 
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Republic, these interests were mainly centered in the cities of Middelburg, 
Vlissingen, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In addition, there were the interests of 
the planters and merchants in the West Indies which were not always parallel 
with those of the merchants, shipping companies and processors of Atlantic 
products in the Republic. Each city, each colony and, within these, each group, 
had specific interests they tried to defend – and, where and when possible, 
strengthen – via the various governmental entities, the wic and the societies. 
The actions taken by certain groups of stakeholders, depending on the loca-
tion and nature of the group, were aimed at reducing the cost of shipping and 
trade, to block or promote the importation of processed products, and to open 
up or block certain trade routes.
How important the trade with Suriname was for Amsterdam is amply 
illustrated by a statement made by stakeholders from the 1730s, in which the 
City Council was asked for support. The authors of the document did this by 
demonstrating which benefits Amsterdam reaped from the trade relationship 
with Suriname. Every year, about 35 ships sailed from Amsterdam to Suriname 
and back, supplying the city with 12.5 million pounds of sugar plus great 
amounts of coffee and cacao The trade with, and navigation to, the 
colony provided the city with many jobs and much income, thanks to the 
equipping of ships and the processing of Atlantic products.53 The Amsterdam 
City Council acknowledged the importance of the trade with Suriname and 
stimulated and facilitated it in various ways.
Amsterdam entrepreneurs were mainly interested in the import, processing 
and export of sugar and other plantation products, whereas the Zeelanders 
mainly focused on the slave trade. After the liberalization of the trade with 
West Africa, including the slave trade, Zeeland shipping companies fought for 
decades to reduce their costs by lowering their tax burden. One of the main 
expenses was the tax imposed by the wic on merchantmen which sailed back 
and forth between the Republic and West Africa and slave ships. The tax rate 
was determined by the size of the ship and the duration of the journey.54 From 
1730, the Zeeland shipping companies almost continuously resisted these 
taxes. Stakeholders in Middelburg and Vlissingen united and lobbied the city 
governments and the States of Zeeland for a reduction in the imposed taxes. 
In 1734, these actions led to an extension of the duration of journeys over 
which a certain sum in taxes was paid, a measure that reduced the costs for 
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Commercie Compagnie 1720–1755 (Middelburg: Koninklijk Zeeuws Genootschap der 
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shipping companies.55 However, that did not end the actions of the shipping 
companies. In 1750, the Zeeland shipping companies launched an initiative for 
the full abolition of the tax. In this, they were supported by a group of Rotterdam 
shipping companies with interests in the slave trade, including the trade 
houses of Hope, Coopstad & Rochussen and Hudig.56 Due to the taxes of the 
wic, the competitive relationship with other European merchants in the West 
African commodity trade, as well as the slave trade itself, had all deteriorated 
seriously, since non-Dutch merchants did not have to pay any taxes, meaning 
they could afford to pay more for African products and slaves.57 The Directors 
of the wic strongly opposed the plan, however. They argued that the Zeeland 
and Rotterdam trade was supported by the infrastructure of the wic in Africa. 
Therefore, it was only fair that those who traded with Africa paid taxes for the 
preservation of the necessary infrastructure. The States General agreed with 
the wic and denied the request.58
Not just shipping companies, but also suppliers of these companies had sig-
nificant interests in the Atlantic shipping industry. The aforementioned 
Amsterdam statement on trade with Suriname shows how the local middle 
class, from butchers to ships’ carpenters, benefited from that trade relation-
ship. For the ailing economy of Zeeland, the Atlantic trade was even more 
important than for Amsterdam and other cities in the province of Holland. 
The regulations of the Middelburgse Commercie Compagnie (mcc), for 
instance, stated that its merchantmen had to be equipped within the city of 
Middelburg – an act designed to strengthen the municipal economy.59 In 1720, 
the mcc had been established for that specific purpose by a group of leading 
merchants, because the city’s economy had suffered profoundly due to the 
competition of the cities in Holland since the mid-seventeenth century.60  
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If the Board of the mcc and other shipping companies deviated from this and 
ordered goods for their ships from outside the province, entrepreneurs in 
Vlissingen en Middelburg would protest. This led, for example, to conflicts 
about the purchase of alcohol and meat outside of Zeeland for the supply of 
slave ships.61 Zeeland entrepreneurs frequently acted as an organized group 
during protests. In Vlissingen, Middelburg and maybe in other Zeeland cities 
as well, they united in so-called Merchant Committees that defended the 
interests of the associated entrepreneurs. When the Zeeland trade monopoly 
to Essequibo and Demerara was about to be dismantled, the committees 
protested as well.62 These protests demonstrate that the lobby for the defense 
of the Atlantic interests of the region took place at various levels.
Stakeholders were not always as close a group as they were in Zeeland. 
Within a city or region, conflicting interests could arise that would be settled 
via political channels. A conflict of interests that became manifest in the mid-
eighteenth century involved the import of sugar. That conflict, which emerged 
between the merchants and the sugar refiners in the Republic and in the colo-
nies, pitted the wic against municipal governments in the States General. 
Initially, only coarse sugar was imported which was refined in the Republic. 
But the technique of sugar refining, which had been perfected in the Republic, 
had reached Europe and the Caribbean during the first half of the eighteenth 
century, which led to more and more refined sugar being imported and trans-
shipped by Amsterdam merchants.63 The sugar refiners of Amsterdam, who 
expected their industry to be significantly damaged by this new development, 
objected to the importation of refined sugar. Merchants on St. Eustatius and in 
Amsterdam, who benefited from the trade in refined sugar, fought the opposed 
import limitation.64 Initially, the request for import limitation from the 
sugar refiners was not granted by the States General. However, as a concession, 
the import of raw sugar and the export of refined sugar was made tax-free 
for a period of two years in 1751. It relieved the financial burdens of the sugar 
61 za, mcc 83, Request of Directors mcc, merchants and shipowners to burgomasters of 
Middelburg, 25 May 1754; mcc 108, Concept request Directors mcc to burgomasters of 
Middelburg, undated.
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and Culture in the Netherlands, 1350–1800, 2 vols. (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008), 2:343–344; 
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(’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1932), 255–257.
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refiners and the competitive position of sugar refined in the Republic 
improved.65 However, the sugar refiners were not pleased with these tempo-
rary measures. Their persistent protests eventually led to a limitation on the 
import of refined sugar from the Caribbean in 1756, despite the resistance of 
stakeholders on St. Eustatius.66 Not only Amsterdam sugar refiners but also 
the Rotterdam sugar refiners felt disadvantaged by the activities of the sugar 
traders. In the States General, they objected to the transit of lightly-taxed raw 
sugar to the Rhineland via Rotterdam, where a sugar processing industry had 
developed in a short period of time. As a result of this, Rotterdam sugar 
refiners were about to be pushed from the market by their colleagues from 
Cologne. The States General accommodated the Rotterdam sugar refiners by 
doubling the tax on the export of raw sugar.67
Sugar was not the only Atlantic product that caused conflicts between 
merchants and manufacturers. Tobacco had the same effect. In 1752, the States 
of Zeeland were handling a request by a group of tobacco processors from 
Middelburg, Vlissingen, Zierikzee and Veere. The united manufacturers asked 
the States for a tax increase on the import of processed tobacco, which would 
allow them to work in a more competitive manner.68 This request was 
honored. Merchants who imported processed tobacco, however, felt seriously 
disadvantaged and asked the States to reduce the imposed tax, but this request 
was denied.69 Why the requests of the merchants were denied can easily be 
explained. It was in the interest of the government that the employment rate 
in the cities remained at their current levels, and the processing of raw Atlantic 
products resulted in more jobs than the import of processed products.
Obviously, interests were not only represented in the Republic, but in the 
colonies as well. An interesting example of this is the conflict between the 
colonists and the Society of Suriname about the trade of the colony with North 
America. According to the charter of the Society, the colonists were only 
allowed to maintain a trade relationship with the Republic. They supplied the 
Republic with plantation products, whereas merchants from the Republic 
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would provide the colonists with the necessary European products. That sym-
biotic relationship between colony and homeland would soon appear to be 
unworkable. For the import of sufficient draught animals and food and the 
export of molasses (a residual product of sugar that was not shipped to the 
Republic) the colonists depended heavily on the regional trade. Initially, they 
had a trade relationship with Barbados, but at the end of the seventeenth 
century it shifted to trade with North American colonies.70 That trade was ille-
gal, but was often condoned. A long-term conflict arose about the legalization of 
the trade with North America between the colonial government, which repre-
sented the interests of the Society of Suriname and the planters. The main oppo-
nent of the imposed trade ban was the influential planter Samuel Nassy. 
Eventually, colonists succeeded in legalizing the trade with North America. As 
of 1704, it was permitted under certain conditions and on the payment of a tax.71
 Conclusion
In this final section, we will return to the question of whether or not the 
Republic had a West India Interest. Van der Voort thought that there was not 
one, and was supported in this view by Piet Emmer. Emmer states that the 
British plantation colonies in the Caribbean were considered “darlings of 
empire” in the metropole. All plantation products produced on the islands had 
to be shipped to Great Britain according to the Acts of Navigation introduced 
in the seventeenth century, where they were processed into end products and 
subsequently sold on the domestic and foreign markets. Processed and unpro-
cessed Atlantic products from non-British colonies were barred from Great 
Britain. That mercantilist policy was supposedly reinforced in the course of the 
eighteenth century by the lobby of stakeholders in the West Indian plantations 
and trade. The Republic did not have such protective constructions, due to 
which, as Emmer states, it was impossible to have a common West India 
Interest such as existed in Great Britain.72 His observation is correct insofar as 
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it concerns a homogenous group that rallied behind one common interest, 
which in fact did not happen in the Republic. But O’Shaughnessy demon-
strated that this communal cause only existed briefly in Great Britain. 
Moreover, “the size of the West India lobby (…) was not sufficient to explain 
their influence upon government.”73 The influence of such interest groups was 
often greatly exaggerated in the past.74 When, in the late eighteenth century, 
an abolitionist movement emerged within and outside of the parliament, the 
West Indian lobbyists did not succeed in providing sufficient counterweight to 
it, and eventually they had to accept that slavery would be abolished.
It is clear that there is much to criticize about the classic belief that Great 
Britain has known a politically influential, convergent West Indian interest 
group. The British government did take measures to protect its West Indian 
interests, but they were part of a much wider mercantilist policy that was 
supposed to promote their own trade and industry and to increase the 
income of the state. Since the seventeenth century, Great Britain had a Board 
of Trade and Plantations, managed by the Privy Counsel. The decentralized 
Republic did not have such a central organ, but the necessity to protect 
the Atlantic interest was widely acknowledged. A mercantilist policy was 
not viewed as the appropriate means for this protection, however. Unlike 
Great Britain, the Republic had neither extensive plantation colonies nor 
a large internal market to which tropical products could be sold. Moreover, 
the States General always had to take into account the West Indian interests 
of the various cities and provinces. This required the necessary persuasion 
and compromise politics that involved a lot of trial and error. These actions 
of the States General, in particular, demonstrate that there was a widely 
supported West India Interest that suited the decentralized nature of the 
Republic.
Initially, the States General greatly influenced the development of 
private trade and shipping in the Atlantic based on political-military motives. 
When those motives were no longer relevant and the economic interests 
of the Republic in the Atlantic became increasingly important, the States 
General supported those interests in various ways. Firstly, by offering military 
assistance. The wic was, unlike her sister organization, the Dutch East India 
Company (voc) in Asia, unable to defend Dutch interests in the Atlantic. As of 
the mid-seventeenth century, war fleets were dispatched to Africa and America, 
trade ships convoyed from and to the Caribbean, State troops deployed in 
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plantation colonies, and money made available for defense purposes. All this 
happened, of course, within the limited financial resources the States General 
had. More difficult to deal with were the often-opposed Atlantic interests of 
the cities and regions within the Republic. On paper, every voting city in a 
province and every province in the States General had an equal vote, but in 
practice the vote of the economically strongest party would always be worth 
much more. Even in the early modern era, the unwritten rule was “he who pays 
the piper calls the tune.” Thus, the political battle fought in the States General 
regarding the Atlantic interests was often settled to the advantage of the mer-
chants and entrepreneurs of Amsterdam. An example of this was the discus-
sion regarding free trade to Brazil. However, to make sure that the discrepancies 
would not get too extensive, the States General, which was dominated by 
the representatives of Holland, also had to satisfy the Zeelanders in certain 
situations. This was done, for instance, by abolishing the wic monopoly 
on the slave trade, which helped Middelburg and Vlissingen to obtain a leading 
position in this trade. The routes to the plantation colonies of Demerara 
and Essequibo, despite the formal abolition of the Zeeland monopoly in 
1770, also remained mainly in the hands of the Zeeland merchants. In contrast, 
Amsterdam, and, to a lesser extent, Rotterdam, almost fully controlled the 
import of plantation products. The processing of sugar and tobacco mainly 
took place in these two cities. The assumption of Van der Voort and 
Emmer that the Republic did not have a West India interest, is, in my 
opinion, a misconception. It existed, but its makeup differed from that of 
Great Britain in some respects. The Atlantic interests were significant at 
local and regional levels, especially in Holland and Zeeland, and were 
strongly defended by the various parties in the States General. Moreover, these 
interests grew more and more essential. While the economy of the Republic 
began to stagnate around the mid-eighteenth century, its share of the Atlantic 
trade nevertheless increased due to the growing demand in Europe for sugar, 
coffee, tobacco and other plantation products.75 Every year, dozens of ships 
sailed to African and American port cities to sell Dutch products, buy slaves 
and load plantation products. In addition, many plantation products were 
imported into the Republic indirectly via French and British ports. The sugar 
and tobacco industry provided jobs to thousands of people in Amsterdam and 
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Rotterdam.76 This development led more and more people in the Republic to 
invest capital in West Indian plantations. In the period of 1753–1794, Dutch 
investors poured an estimated 80 million guilders in plantations, a quarter of 
which was invested in non-Dutch colonies. Over 80 percent of that money 
originated from Amsterdam investors. The Amsterdam financial crisis of 1773 
that affected many investors in plantations did not end the growth of the 
Atlantic trade and the shipping of the Republic.77 Only after the French and 
the patriots had dissolved the old Republic in 1795 did the tide turn.
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Adultery Here and There
Crossing Sexual Boundaries in the Dutch Jewish Atlantic
Aviva Ben-Ur and  Jessica Vance Roitman
In 1777, the widow of Moses Pacheco of Paramaribo, Suriname was busy with 
preparations for her daughter’s upcoming marriage to Jacob Nunes Nabarro. 
As the wedding day approached, a proverbial ax swung down. The local 
religious teacher, Rabbi Aron Acohen, came forward to declare that her daugh-
ter could not legally wed because she was the product of a forbidden relation-
ship between widow Pacheco and her brother-in-law, Jacob Jona, initiated 
while both were still living in Amsterdam. In fact, according to Acohen, the 
Amsterdam Mahamad (the governing body of Portuguese Jews) had banished 
Jona from the land because of his crime. But when widow Pacheco was called 
before the Surinamese Jewish regents to discharge herself, she claimed that the 
child she had conceived after her husband’s death was the product of a fleeting 
relationship with an itinerant Jew from Bayonne. Moreover, she knew nothing 
about her brother-in-law Jona’s expulsion other than its cause: the Amsterdam 
Mahamad wished to rid itself of an impoverished family. The wedding was 
indefinitely postponed as the opposing parties, the Pachecos and the Jonas, 
gathered testimony in support of their version of the truth and the honor of 
their respective families.1
In the early modern Dutch Republic and in some of the overseas colonies 
adultery was – at least officially – among the most serious of crimes and rather 
common.2 Preoccupation with real and imagined cases of criminal 
1 National Archives of the Netherlands, The Hague (hereafter NL-HaNA), Portugees-
Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18, inv. nr. 1, May 8, June 17, and October 27, 1777.
2 This statement’s obvious applicability to early modern Europe and its overseas territories lies 
outside the scope of this chapter. For the Dutch Republic, see, among other works, Herman 
Roodenburg, Onder censuur: De kerkelijke tucht in de gereformeerde gemeente van Amsterdam, 
1578–1700 (Hilversum: Verloren, 1990); Else Margaretha Kloek, Wie hij zij, man of wijf: 
Vrouwengeschiedenis en de vroegmoderne tijd: Drie Leidse studies (Hilversum: Verloren, 1990); 
Veronique Verhaar and Frits van den Brink, “De bemoeienissen van stad en kerk met overspel 
in het achttiende-eeuwse Amsterdam,” in  Nieuw Licht op Oude Justitie: Misdaad en Straf ten 
Tijde van de Republiek ed. Sjoerd Faber (Muiderberg: Dick Coutinho, 1989), 64–93. For the 
Dutch colonies overseas, see Danny L. Noorlander, “Serving God and Mammon: The Reformed 
Church and the Dutch West India Company in the Atlantic World, 1621–1674,” (unpublished 
Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2011); J. Th. de Smidt and T. van der Lee, eds., Plakaten, 
Ordonnantiën, en Andere Wetten, Uitgevaardigd in Suriname, 1667–1816, 2 volumes 
(Amsterdam: S. Emmering, 1973) and J.Th. de Smidt, R. van der Lee, J.A. Schiltkamp, eds., 
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3 Carlos Herrera, “Infidelity and the Presidio Captain: Adultery and Honor in the Lives of María 
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History of Sexuality 15, no. 2 (May 2006): 204–227, 214.
conversation has produced a large and rich body of sources, affording scholars 
an unparalleled opportunity to explore the social status and experiences of 
individuals and groups often overlooked in the historiography of the Dutch 
Atlantic: women, Jews, and enslaved and free peoples of African ancestry. The 
adulterous act, the trials that ensued, and the offspring sometimes produced 
from these liaisons, touch on some key discussions about the Atlantic world 
now current in scholarly circles: the transmission of rumors, the roles enslaved 
and manumitted peoples played in shaping white-dominated societies, the 
development and inter-communal use of Caribbean Creole languages, racial-
ized sexual double standards, notions of public honor, the asymmetrical status 
change experienced by adulterous women (in comparison to men), and the 
roles of communal leaders and laymen in creating what one scholar calls “the 
language of silence.”3
In this chapter, we focus on laws regarding adultery in the Jewish religious 
and civil codes and how this crime was dealt with in practice. The cases of 
adultery in the Dutch Jewish Atlantic, we posit, are representative of a broader 
trend in Europe and the colonial Americas, whereby the status and reputation 
of the accused couple were more crucial in determining vulnerability to pros-
ecution than the sexual transgression itself, as discussed below. Wealth or lack 
thereof, race, and religious or political dissonance ultimately determined 
whether or not one was judged guilty. We also demonstrate that Jewish law in 
the Dutch Atlantic colonies most often worked alongside Dutch civil law. In 
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fact, three judicial systems with their corresponding legislation were at play: 
those of the metropole, the colonial authorities, and the Jewish community. 
Our research shows that these three legal systems functioned not just parallel 
to each other, but in fact in conversation, with Jewish law in most cases occu-
pying a subordinate position.
Detailed accounts of sexual misconduct are rarely found in the records. 
The four cases we consider here are centered primarily in Amsterdam and in 
the overseas Dutch colonies of Suriname and Curaçao during the 1770s. These 
cases are representative of adultery during the early modern period and how 
it was handled in the broader societies of Europe and the white population 
overseas. At the same time, the four scandals under study expose the distinc-
tive ways in which Portuguese Jewish communities – who comprised one- 
third to one-half of the white populations – understood and treated the trans-
gression on their own terms.
 The Sources
An important consideration for any comparative study involving Portuguese 
Jewish communities in the Dutch Atlantic is the unevenness of documenta-
tion. The two main Jewish communities of the Americas during the eighteenth 
century were those of Suriname and Curaçao, and there is extensive Dutch 
colonial administrative documentation for both. However, internal sources are 
a different matter. While the communal minutes of Suriname have been 
preserved almost uninterruptedly from the mid-eighteenth century, those 
of Curaçao’s Mahamad seem not to have survived. The municipal archive of 
Amsterdam, which houses the records of Curaçao’s Jewish community, does 
not contain any continuous documentation pertaining to this community, in 
contrast to the records of Suriname’s Portuguese Jewish community, held in 
the Dutch National Archives of The Hague.
This is both an opportunity for historians and a hindrance. The opportunity 
has enabled us to systematically scour the records of the Surinamese Jewish 
regents, and conclusively state that roughly a dozen adultery cases were dis-
cussed during the century beginning in 1751.4 However, we were encumbered 
in our comparative analysis because for Curaçao the sources for adultery are 
much spottier and thus nowhere nearly as representative as what has survived 
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for Suriname. The linguistic loss is especially overwhelming, for the no longer 
extant testimony documenting a leading adultery case in Curaçao was 
originally recorded in Portuguese, Spanish, and in a language referred to as 
Portuguese Negro speech (Portugeese neegers spraak), a possible indication 
of a Jewish version of the island’s Creole language Papiamentu. Additionally, at 
the time of this writing, several key inventories for Suriname, including 
governors’ journals and the records of the colonial court, were inaccessible due 
to a massive, ongoing restoration and digitizing project. We were therefore 
unable to consult records created by the Surinamese colonial authorities. 
Despite these lacunae, the total information is sufficiently abundant so that 
the main task at hand involves winnowing rather than speculating. The cases 
we have focused upon were the most prominent in terms of length of litigation 
and the attention of communal and colonial authorities.
 Adultery in the Dutch Atlantic: How Common,  
and How Serious a Crime?
Just how common unfaithfulness was in the early modern Dutch Atlantic 
is difficult to assess, given the extent of unquarried sources (and the 
corollary lack of statistical evidence), culturally variable definitions of the 
transgression, and the connivance of local authorities and highly-placed 
families to conceal scandal. In an article mainly concerned with bastardy 
in eighteenth-century Maryland, one historian posits that unfaithfulness 
within marriage was “uncommon enough to be gossip-worthy but certainly 
not unheard of.”5 But, as other early modern scholars of the Anglophone 
and Iberian Americas have shown, strong social networks, wealth, and politi-
cal power often protected straying husbands and wives from conviction and 
prosecution.6
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Let us begin with the United Provinces, whose early modern population 
hovered around a million and a half.7 The Hof van Holland inventory, 
preserved in the Dutch National Archives in The Hague, contains over 100 
cases of overspel, dating to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, almost 
all between illicit Christian couples living in the United Provinces.8 Herman 
Roodenburg’s study of the Protestant Dutch Reformed church of Amsterdam 
between 1578 and 1700 reveals a total of 726 cases of adultery that were 
brought before the consistory, in which 783 members of the church were 
involved.9 In Leiden alone, over 200 men and women were accused of either 
adultery or bigamy between 1678 and 1794.10 During roughly the same time 
period, dozens of adultery cases came to the attention of the Portuguese 
Jewish authorities of Amsterdam, where nearly 17,000 Jews lived by the mid-
eighteenth century, though only 3000 of them of Iberian origins.11 A brief 
glance at sexual behavior in Dutch overseas colonies shows that the Jewish 
communities of Curaçao and Suriname, whose populations peaked at just 
over 1000 in the late eighteenth century, laid claim to a few dozen known 
infidelity scandals. Among Christian settlers in seventeenth-century New 
Netherland, Curaçao, Brazil, São Tomé, and Elmina, adultery was one of the 
most dominant prosecuted crimes.12
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inv. nr. 5339.20, Mandament van purge voor Moses Castanghe beschuldigd vanoverspel, 
1684 and inv. nr. 5348.17, Mandament van purge over Abraham Cardoso, 1688. Both of 
these men were merchants, the former in Amsterdam, the latter in Rotterdam. Although 
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Adultery had always been punishable in Christian and Jewish communities, 
whether by religious or secular governing bodies.13 Adultery (along with 
bigamy and concubinage) was made punishable by law through the issuance 
in 1570 of the Criminele Ordonnantiën, the first codified body of criminal legis-
lation in Holland.14 In the Protestant Dutch Republic, and eventually overseas, 
several governing bodies could intervene in prosecuting the crime and deter-
mining its punishment, from criminal and civil lawyers to church councils.15  
In the Portuguese Jewish community, established in Amsterdam in the 1590s, 
suspected Jewish adulterers could be investigated by the Christian civil author-
ities, hakhamim (Jewish religious leaders), or the Mahamad.16
Penal sanctions for extramarital dalliances varied according to time and 
place, but by the early modern period, religious and secular authorities 
largely overlapped in their responses, which had steadily softened over time. 
The more lenient approach derives from medieval canon law, which by the 
mid-thirteenth century tended to mitigate the harshness with which ancient 
and many medieval secular codes had treated adultery. Probably under the 
Church’s influence, lighter sentences were increasingly applied in medieval 
secular law. The death penalty gave way to heavy fines and public humiliation, 
which often meant whipping or the shaving of the head.17
Dutch Reformed and secular law appear to have followed the lead of the 
medieval Catholic Church. In Amsterdam, which became Reformed in 1578, 
and elsewhere in the United Provinces, punishments for infidelity ranged 
191Adultery Here And There
<UN>
18 Dina Maria Helmers, ‘Gescheurde bedden;’ Oplossingen voor gestrande huwelijken, 
Amsterdam 1753–1810 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2002), 226–278; Verhaar and Van den Brink, 
“De bemoeienissen van stad en kerk,” 64–71; van der Heijden, Huwelijk in Holland, 143.
19 “Criminele en penaele wetten ende ordonnantien,” February 19, 1669, in J. Th. de Smidt 
and T. van der Lee, eds., Plakaten, Ordonnantiën, en Andere Wetten, Uitgevaardigd in 
Suriname, 1667–1816, I: 33–35; 34 (article 10). Interestingly, the ordinance applies only to 
double (not single) adulterers. Double adultery involved two married couples, while in 
single adultery only one party is married.
20 The West Indisch Plakaatboeken for Curaçao, Aruba, Bonaire, St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, 
and Saba do not mention adultery (boeleren, echtbreuk, overspel, fornicatie). J. Th. de 
Smidt, R. van der Lee, J.A. Schiltkamp, eds., Publikaties en andere wetten alsmede de oudste 
resoluties betrekking hebbende op Curaçao, Aruba, Bonaire); J. Th. de Smidt and T. van der 
Lee, eds., Publikaties en andere wetten betrekking hebbende op St. Maarten St. Eustatius, 
Saba, 1648/1681–1816. It is of course very possible that some plakaaten have yet to be recov-
ered from the archives.
21 Meetings of the Reformed Church Council, March 3, 1637, and January 5, 1638, in 
“Classicale Acta van Brazilië,” Archief voor de geschiedenis der oude Hollandsche zending, 
6 vols., (Utrecht: C. van Bentum, 1885), 2: 224–225, 236.
22 Amsterdam Municipal Archives (henceforth saa), Archief Classis Amsterdam (aca) 379, 
fol. 224, Minister Philippus Specht to the classis of Amsterdam, Curaçao, March 8, 1674. 
We thank Wim Klooster for this source.
from a warning from the church, to imprisonment, heavy fines, stripping of 
ecclesiastic honors, and banishment for a period of six to 50 years.18 During the 
early modern period, execution was almost never applied to convicted adulter-
ers. A law promulgated in 1669 in Suriname, which slated convicted married 
adulterers of either sex to the death penalty, seems to have been exceptional in 
its severity.19 With the exception of Suriname, adultery does not even appear 
as a named offense in the law codes of the Dutch Americas.20 Whatever the 
laws may have been, a sexual double standard can be detected in early cases 
overseas. In Dutch Brazil (1630–1654), one white Christian woman with a hus-
band left behind in the United Provinces pretended that her co-habitation 
with a local soldier was legal. When her testimony about the details of her sup-
posed marriage contradicted the information provided during her lover’s 
interrogation, Brazil’s High Council summarily shipped her back to the metro-
pole.21 Philippus Specht, a Dutch Reformed minister in Curaçao, complained 
in 1672 about rampant inebriation, whoredom (hoererij), and adultery. After 
the church council revealed to him that some individuals had openly philan-
dered, Specht appealed to the colony’s director, who ejected four “adulterous 
whores” from the island.22
Judging from references to infidelity in off-the-cuff remarks during 
heated arguments, it is clear that adultery bore an intense emotional charge. 
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In Suriname, adultery was a known offhand allegation, whether against women 
or men. Wives of Moravian missionaries were accused of whoredom in 
the eighteenth century,23 as were several married men and women living in 
the mixed white and Eurafrican Jewish communities of Paramaribo and 
Jodensavanne.24 Abraham Gabay Izidro, a rabbinical leader (hakham) who 
served the Jewish community of Suriname in the eighteenth century, under-
stood the severity of the slur when he attempted to excoriate his colleagues, 
the regents of the Mahamad, in a lengthy exposition recorded in 1737. His main 
dispute with them centered on internal communal governance, yet Izidro 
pointedly extracted from his arsenal of insults irrelevant references to sexual 
transgressions, including the regents’ “facility with women” (facilidad con 
mujeres) and “their evil passions” (negras pasiones), a thinly veiled allusion to 
intimate relations with enslaved women.25 Sixty years later, Ishak Ledesma 
Meatob was sentenced to imprisonment in the fort of Paramaribo for insulting 
the cadaver of a recently deceased regent and for failing to heed the commands 
of incumbent Jewish rulers. As Ledesma was carted away, a fellow Jew and 
sympathizer cried out in Dutch: “The armed guards are coming to take Ledesma 
away to the fort. Shitty Mahamad, bastards, hare eaters! They go on board a 
ship in order to eat pig! Riff raff, adulterers!” (italics ours).26
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These remarks made in the heat of the moment help to provide an 
emotional context for adultery among early modern peoples. At its most 
elemental level, adultery was a sexual transgression that violated universal 
norms forbidding intimate contact between particular members of a family or 
society. In the Dutch Atlantic world, as in many other early modern societies of 
Europe and their American colonies, adultery among established families 
upset the social lines carefully drawn between legally paired couples, on the 
one hand, and the lower classes, on the other. In overseas settlements, adultery 
could topple the status of reputable families and diminish their social distance 
from the majority enslaved and manumitted populations. Moreover, the child 
potentially created through overspel or echtbreuk (the two most common 
Dutch synonyms for adultery) burdened communal authorities with legisla-
tive and financial complications.27 The resulting children were typically mal-
treated by governing authorities, an indication that the human products of 
criminal conversation were considered a distortion of nature.28 In a legal 
sense, children born of forbidden relations between two white parties were to 
a certain extent parallel to slaves and even more so to free people of color. Both 
were attributed an ignoble social status as the publicly identified issue of their 
mothers, rather than their fathers, and both were deprived of certain privileges 
centered on inheritance and property rights.29 In slave societies, adultery 
was perhaps more disruptive as a social leveler than as a family destabilizer. 
In short, adultery was a serious transgression in the Dutch Atlantic. Just how 
serious can best be measured not through legislation and official punitive 
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measures, which varied according to place and time, but rather within the 
specific socio-political context in which each case unfolded.
 Adultery in Cross-Cultural Perspective
Social scientists have long warned against projecting ethnocentric definitions 
of adultery onto cultures under study during fieldwork,30 and this mandate 
is equally applicable to historians examining the multi-ethnic and multi- 
religious Dutch Atlantic. In canonical Christianity, adultery generally refers to 
extramarital intercourse between a spouse of either sex and someone of the 
opposite sex. Canon law eliminated the pagan Roman double standard by 
which married men did not transgress if they copulated with single women.31 
Even though rabbinical law incorporated the pagan double standard, Jews gen-
erally had a very different understanding of this type of sexual transgression, 
beginning with the term they used to describe it. Adultery, which appears in 
the Hebrew Bible as a verb rather than a noun, is a violation of the seventh 
commandment of the Decalogue: “Thou shall not commit adultery” (Exodus 
 ,(Under biblical and rabbinical law (based on Leviticus 18:6 32.(לא תנאף ;20:12
the act falls under the category of gilui arayot (גילוי עריות literally, the exposure 
of genitalia), sometimes translated as “sexual immorality.” This category 
includes a variety of forbidden male/female relations: not only intercourse 
between a married woman and a man other than her husband, but also 
between, for example, parent and child and sister and brother-in-law. Neither 
biblical law nor its rabbinical successor recognizes as transgressive sexual 
intercourse between a married male and an unmarried woman (unless she 
happens to be his sister-in-law).33 However, in the Dutch Atlantic world, gilui 
arayot was very seldom discussed in application to actual cases. Like many 
other rabbinical laws, the Jewish understanding of sexual transgression was 
largely displaced by Christian sexual morality prevailing in Western Europe. In 
most cases, either the Portuguese term adulterio is applied, or, more com-
monly, the minutes taker drew upon a variety of euphemisms, such as “an act 
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against religion” or “scandalous,” all clearly relating to marital infidelity given 
the discussion’s context.
This chapter does not attempt to tackle the question of sexual transgres-
sions affecting enslaved and manumitted communities, a potentially vast 
theme if one considers relations between married masters and slaves. But 
one overarching point should be made. The institutional recognition of slave 
marriages by ruling elites varied from place to place and from time to time in 
the early modern Americas, and even varied within the Dutch Atlantic colo-
nies themselves. In New Amsterdam, for example, some slaves were permit-
ted to marry in the church, which was not an option in the Dutch Caribbean. 
This absence of institutionally recognized marriage may explain why manu-
mitted slaves and their descendants, who came to form a majority of the free 
populations of Suriname and Curaçao by the turn of the nineteenth century, 
typically did not marry in a form legally-recognized by either the colonial or 
municipal governments. The sexual liaisons free black and Eurafrican women 
commonly cultivated with married white men on Curaçao and in Suriname 
were public secrets that could not be prosecuted as adultery in the eyes of 
civil authorities. These facts (much generalized) meant that enslaved and 
manumitted peoples had a complicated relationship with the legal and 
informal honor systems that made adultery a meaningful criminal category. 
In a way, this made individuals of African ancestry neutral parties and per-
haps ideal testimony-bearers in legal cases between white parties. More 
importantly, it placed them squarely within a sexual double standard that 
continually set them apart from whites and, as we shall see, made them 
extremely vulnerable witnesses.
Secondly, it bears note that adultery has been prohibited in the majority 
of human societies, even if sometimes (or often) honored in the breach.37  
In polygynous Central and Western African societies, likewise, adultery was a 
serious crime, although like the Jewish example above, was defined differently 
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than was infidelity in Christian law.38 Father Giovanni Anntônio Cavazzi 
seemed to understand both of these points in his ethnographic description of 
Central Africans in the late seventeenth century. He observed that a married 
woman with many partners was countenanced “as long as she recognized her 
husband as her principal lover.”39 In the vast majority of societies, sex is not 
exclusively confined to a single relationship whose purpose is reproductive. 
In short, sex regulation of any type usually does not hinge “on the fact of sex 
itself,” but rather on the “cooperative relationships upon which social life 
depends.”40 In global perspective, then, the single standard of adultery in 
Western Christendom was only one of the many ways of defining sexual 
transgression within officially sanctioned relationships.
 Adultery among Jews: The Temporal and Geographical Context
A major preoccupation of Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam in the eighteenth 
century was heterosexual wrongdoing, particularly adultery and clandestine 
marriages.41 Two historians have indicated that adultery was more common 
among Amsterdam’s Portuguese Jews in the eighteenth than in the previous 
century. Yosef Kaplan, in an article that discusses about a dozen cases of 
marital infidelity, calls adultery among Amsterdam’s Portuguese Jews in the 
eighteenth century an “extensive phenomenon” and traces its causality to 
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ever-growing “tolerance towards sexuality in Western European societies” 
beginning in the 1670s and “the satisfaction of erotic desires as a central goal in 
marriage.”42 Tirtsah Levie Bernfeld, drawing in part on Kaplan’s research, ges-
tures towards “a growing neglect of morality among Dutch Sephardim” in the 
eighteenth century.43 But it is imperative not to confuse preoccupations of the 
governing elite with the actual extent of extramarital dalliances. In the first 
place, both conclusions are impressionistic: neither is based on a statistical 
compilation of adulterous incidents in Amsterdam or in a comparative con-
text with other cities and colonies, whether for the Portuguese or Ashkenazi 
communities, or for Christians. That being said, the argument for an increase 
in anxiety over marital infidelity among Portuguese Jews in the mid-eighteenth 
century does find some archival support externally. A statistical profile of 
adultery as reflected in the aforementioned Hof van Holland inventory, for 
example, shows that 67 cases were recorded in the century and a half between 
1597 to 1749, while in less than 50 years (from 1753 to the close of the century) 
36 cases were tried.44
By contrast, a selective study of marital infidelity based on Amsterdam’s 
civil and church records indicates a precipitous decline in adultery cases 
over the course of the eighteenth century.45 This of course did not mean that 
overspel waned as a phenomenon, only that civil and ecclesiastical authorities 
developed more pressing priorities, such as the persecution of financial 
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crime.46 Until systematic research is undertaken comparing the two centuries 
beginning in the 1650s and 1750s, it is impossible to say whether either statisti-
cal increase or decline is mirrored within the Jewish community.
But what seems to be true for both (often overlapping) worlds is the small 
incidence of prosecuted adultery – according to one estimate from Amsterdam’s 
church council records, no more than five cases per year on average.47 As his-
torian Merry Wiesner-Hanks notes, there is “an enormous – and sometimes 
misleading – gap between rhetoric and reality in almost all aspects of sexual 
regulation” during the early modern period.48 In colonial British America, for 
example, there are almost no cases of adultery despite “harsh denunciations 
and stringent laws.”49 Instead, lay individuals and non-ecclesiastical, non- 
government groups such as guilds, confraternities, and neighborhood groups 
took part in “policing, denouncing, and investigating sexual conduct.”50 
Similarly, Carolyn Ramsey has found a clear pattern of selective enforcement 
of adultery laws in England and its North American colonies.51 Likewise, 
Herman Roodenburg cautions that his data does not say much about the actual 
behavior of the members of the church. Members from higher socio-economic 
positions, he surmises, had the wherewithal to keep their adultery from reach-
ing the consistory, a fact well known among pastors of the congregation.52  
We may then surmise that the cases that did go to trial, whether in Christian 
or Jewish communities, whether in religious or secular courts, were the tip of 
the iceberg.
Our own stance, taking into consideration the “imperious drive of sex,” 
is that marital infidelity was “common” in any age, as one historian of the 
eighteenth-century Cape also argues, and as a number of scholars writing 
in broader contexts have long posited.53 But what “common” is for early 
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modernity can only be quantified in comparison to other contemporaneous 
transgressions regarded (at least in theory) as equally serious. Yosef Kaplan is 
therefore right to refocus our attention on attitudes. The reaction of Portuguese 
Jewish authorities to marital infidelity differed over time qualitatively. 
Heightened scrutiny and verbosity characterizes trial proceedings from the 
mid-eighteenth century, and gone were the oblique euphemisms and lenient 
punishments of the previous century. Finally, we must bear in mind that what 
Kaplan terms a “moral panic” (the spike in adultery cases beginning in the sec-
ond half of the eighteen century) was refracted through the perspective of the 
community’s secular and religious leaders. The horror at marital infidelity was 
not always equally shared among the Jewish populace, as the following cases 
will demonstrate.
 Not Really Adultery: The Fernandes/Bueno de Mesquita Scandal 
(Suriname, 1775)
In November of 1775, Moses Bueno de Mesquita, a member of the Portuguese 
Jewish community living in Paramaribo, complained to the regents of the 
Mahamad that his wife, Deborah, had received frequent visits from her brother-
in-law, her sister’s husband, Moses Fernandes. Several times, Mesquita would 
come home at night to find Fernandes in his (Mesquita’s) bed, complaining of 
a headache, and Deborah sitting by his side, administering caresses and kisses 
to his head. After Mesquita forbad Fernandes from ever again entering his 
house, Deborah began to frequent Fernandes’ house, where her mother lived, 
returning home sometimes as late as eleven at night. When called to testify, 
Deborah affirmed the accuracy of her husband’s report, but claimed that the 
tender displays were innocent and that her husband would have done the 
same with his own sister-in-law. Moreover, she affirmed, she went to Fernandes’ 
house in order to visit her mother, and her husband had no right to forbid her 
from seeing her own brother-in-law. The regents were not convinced by these 
explanations. Deborah Bueno de Mesquita and Moses Fernandes were 
both warned, under threat of excommunication (herem), not to have further 
contact with each other, nor to visit each other’s homes.54
But the very next day, Deborah Bueno de Mesquita spent the entire day at 
her brother-in-law’s house. When called before the Mahamad, Moses Fernandes 
claimed he had tried to bar her entrance, but that she had insisted on visiting 
her mother. Fernandes was again warned, this time under threat of being 
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An important note: the assumption that First Parnas Joseph Bueno de Mesquita was the 
handed over the colonial prosecutor.55 From this point on, an ever-broader 
swathe of the Portuguese Jewish community became involved. In early 
December of 1775, Moses Bueno de Mesquita’s brother Joseph was informed 
that someone had spotted the illicit couple together in the home of Joseph 
Fonseca. The latter testified before the Mahamad that he had permitted the 
two in his house because he had not yet heard of the ban. When called before 
the court, the accused Moses Fernandes denied having been in Joseph Fonseca’s 
house with Deborah. But Fonseca’s two sons directly contradicted Fernandes’ 
story: they had definitely seen Moses and Deborah together in Joseph Fonseca’s 
house. Having caught Fernandes in his lie, the Mahamad ordered him to the 
synagogue for formal and public excommunication. No one in the Jewish 
community, they ruled, would be permitted to interact or deal with him in any 
way, save for those living in his house, his siblings, and his in-laws.
Later that day, Moses Fernandes’ brothers voluntarily presented themselves 
before the regents, asking that the case be reconsidered, since Moses had 
repented. Then, Moses Fernandes himself stepped inside the judicial chamber, 
promising under pain of three forms of rabbinical excommunication (herem, 
neduy and semata) to no longer speak or interact with Deborah Bueno de 
Mesquita.56 He was ordered to bring in a “request of submission” and to pres-
ent it before the regents during their scheduled meeting in Jodensavanne, a 
Jewish village in the colony’s interior that served as the community’s adminis-
trative and cultural center. He did so, but in an entirely unsatisfactory way, 
continuing in his denial of any wrongdoing, recanting his written “submis-
sion,” and persisting in his claim that the physical contact between him and his 
sister-in-law was purely of a medical nature. Remarkably, despite his disingen-
uous denial, the Mahamad refrained from excommunicating him, and merely 
condemned him to a public apology at the synagogue altar in Paramaribo, 
a mandate to grow out his beard for six months, obligatory attendance at 
synagogue during morning and afternoon prayers, a seating assignment in the 
bench behind the altar, and a fine of 200 guilders (in addition, of course, to the 
interdiction against communicating with his sister-in-law in any way).57
The balance of power seemed to tilt in Moses Bueno de Mesquita’s direc-
tion, for by 1777, his brother Joseph was serving as First Parnas, and made some 
attempts to protect Moses’ reputation.58 But as this case unfolded, the power 
201Adultery Here And There
<UN>
 same man as the Joseph Bueno de Mesquita cited is tentative, given the repetitive nature 
of first and family names among the colony’s Jews.
59 NL-HaNA, Portugees-Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18, inv. nr. 1, July 8, 1777. 
In the Portuguese Jewish communities of Brazil, Curaçao, and Suriname, a congregante 
was typically either a Jew of African ancestry or a white Jew demoted to second-tier status 
because of marriage to a Jew of African provenance. A jahid was a first-tier member of the 
Jewish community by virtue of white status.
60 NL-HaNA, Portugees-Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18, inv. nr. 1, July 21, 1777.
of the people alternately tipped the scale in and against the favor of the cuck-
olded husband. We hear nothing further of the Bueno de Mesquita/Fernandes 
case until a year and a half later, in July 1777. At this point, both the Eurafrican 
and Ashkenazi sectors of the Jewish community became involved. Reuben 
Mendez Meza, a congregante who would several years later be at the center of 
a Eurafrican struggle for first-tier status in the Portuguese Jewish community, 
was called forward as a witness, along with Semuel de Isaac Cohen Nassy, both 
of whom were rumored to have information about the recursive relationship 
between Moses and Deborah.59 It was revealed that the pair had harbored 
themselves in the homes of Ashkenazim, Jews of Central and European descent 
whose communal members had first trickled into the colony at the very end of 
the seventeenth century, and who comprised a substantial proportion of the 
Jewish community by the close of the following century.60 Perhaps the leaking 
of the situation into another Jewish community – and one that occupied a 
lower social status than Portuguese Jews – was the straw that broke the camel’s 
back. The regents put their collective foot down: Moses Fernandes was handed 
down the harshest form of excommunication: herem. In a near repetition of 
the drama that first unfolded two years previously, Fernandes disingenuously 
claimed that he did not realize the interdiction against meeting with his 
sister-in-law was still in effect. He declared himself repentant and begged the 
regents to rescind the decree against him, which they did. The same penalty 
was applied: Fernandes was made to ask for forgiveness at the synagogue 
altar, grow out his beard until the eve of the Jewish new year, pay a fine of 
200 guilders, and once again, have no form of communication with Deborah 
Bueno de Mesquita. But this time the regents were no fools: they also banished 
Fernandes from Paramaribo, where his sister-in-law resided, for the period of 
one year.
Banishment was a typical legal response to convicted adulterers in both the 
United Provinces and the overseas territories. This raises the question of why 
the regents were so slow in resolutely enacting territorial excommunication 
(herem ha-makom). The Mahamad’s extreme pains to cover up the case 
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(they quickly resolved to gather and seal up all relevant papers) and, moreover, 
the lengths they went to protect Deborah from any exposure is an interesting 
reversal of the usually heavier weight an adulterous relationship laid on 
the shoulders of women in rabbinical sources.61 We tentatively suggest that 
the deciding factor in targeting Moses Fernandes and not his consort was to 
protect the honor and economic position of the wealthy Bueno de Mesquita 
family, one of whose members was then heading the Mahamad.62 As the 
intense archival research on British North America has shown, defendants 
from affluent and respected families tended to escape infidelity allegations 
entirely or with only lightly applied punishment. But another unspoken inten-
tion may have been at play in protecting Deborah Bueno de Mesquita from a 
greater degree public censure: the desire to avoid the humiliating exposure of 
Moses Bueno de Mesquita as a cuckolded husband, a status that could suggest 
his inability to control or sexually satisfy his wife.63
If anything, the relatively quietist tactics to protect the reputation of a 
highly placed family backfired, for Moses Fernandes and Deborah Bueno de 
Mesquita continued to publicly flaunt both their relationship and the regents’ 
authority.64 To make matters worse for the regents, the forbidden couple 
rebuffed the Mahamad’s disciplining actions and brought the case before the 
municipal authorities. In August of 1777, about two weeks after the second 
excommunication, Moses Bueno de Mesquita’s brother Joseph Bueno de 
Mesquita proposed convening an extraordinary session (junta) of the 
Mahamad in order to reopen the sealed case. For the first time in the commu-
nal records, the regents called Moses Fernandes (but not Deborah Bueno de 
Mesquita) “incestuous and adulterous.”65 In an interesting tactical reversal, 
Joseph Bueno de Mesquita argued that adultery had never occurred. Joseph 
61 Ibid; Fram, “Two Cases of Adultery,” 280.
62 Although we do not yet have biographical details for this family, Parnassim were by defi-
nition wealthy; their positions were unpaid and their status came from wealth.
63 For a related discussion see Ramsey, “Sex and Social Order,” 205–207. This pattern – the 
brunt of adultery being borne by the male offender – seems to be a reverse of the 
seventeenth century anecdotes cited in Mary Beth Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers: 
345–346. Likewise, it is different from the conclusions of Merry Wiesner-Hanks, who has 
commented that in the early modern Christian world, undisciplined sexuality was most 
often punished in women. Wiesner-Hanks, Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern 
World, 260.
64 NL-HaNA, Portugees-Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18, inv. nr. 1, July 21, 1777.
65 NL-HaNA, Portugees-Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18, inv. nr. 1, August 7, 1777.
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presented an appeal before the governor, arguing against the resolutions of 
the Mahamad and describing the regents as partial judges (juezes parsiais) 
who transgressed both divine and political laws. The other regents were infuri-
ated.66 The Mahamad sentenced Joseph for flaunting its authority, but he 
refused to comply, and insulted the Jewish judges with “scandalous words.” 
The Mahamad resolved to excommunicate him and, if that did not work, to 
have him expelled from the colony as a disturber of public order. On further 
consideration, the Mahamad decided to avoid these measures in order to 
“indulge his family, who would suffer from the opprobrium of herem or great 
prejudice of banishment.” The regents resolved to forever strip Joseph of his 
honorific charge as former Parnas (adjunto) and, unless he complied with 
his sentence by the upcoming Passover holiday, to demote him to the status 
of congregante, a second-tier social position typically reserved for black and 
Eurafrican Jews.67
Meanwhile, Moses Fernandes and Deborah Bueno de Mesquita continued 
to see each other, on one occasion concealing themselves in the house of the 
Ashkenazi Josseph Jacobs Polak. In fact, Moses was spotted there sporting the 
beard he grew out as punishment, per order of the Mahamad.68 What followed 
was a wild goose chase for witnesses who refused to testify against Moses 
Fernandes and, in some cases, even to appear. Some – evidently aware of 
Joseph’s protective tactics on behalf of his cuckolded brother and straying 
sister-in-law – claimed they were obligated to testify only before the colonial 
authorities, while others feigned illness or family crisis. The Mahamad was left 
empty handed and looking foolish. Collectively, these passive-aggressive 
behaviors challenged the Mahamad’s authority, protected Fernandes and his 
paramour, preserved the official reputation of the Bueno de Mesquita family, 
and wore out the regents through prolonged delaying tactics. In the end, as 
with many other legal disputes in Suriname and Curaçao, when Jews resorted 
to the “gentile court,” the colonial authorities sided with the appealing Jewish 
defendants – in this case, Moses Fernandes and Deborah Bueno de Mesquita. 
But internally, the case was not really resolved – the communal minutes never 
mention a final decision. The last we hear of the affair is in August of 1779, 
when prosecutor Wichers informed the Mahamad that he wanted all the 
papers concerning the Fernandes/Mesquita case. The Mahamad, reluctantly, 
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eventually submitted all of the relevant papers.69 In this example of the lan-
guage of silence, two well-placed elite white families – in apparent collusion 
with their Jewish neighbors and colonial rulers – succeeded in preserving their 
economic standing and reputations, and two ardent lovers triumphed in 
indulging their affair.70
There are a few indications that what was at stake for the Mahamad was 
not an infringement of Jewish law in a rather sensitive area of family life 
and sexuality, nor the presence of a pair of adulterers in a nominally 
Protestant Reformed colony. The heart of the matter became for the 
Mahamad the threat to its judicial authority. The formula of confession 
and apology dictated to Fernandes was generic and identical to those pre-
scribed to infringers of non-sexual laws. Fernandes’ confession and apol-
ogy did not even force him to pronounce the word “adultery.” Rather, he 
was simply obliged to acknowledge he had incurred the punishment of 
herem for repeatedly transgressing the orders of the Mahamad. He was 
told to declare himself both God-fearing and an obedient jahid (first-tier 
member of the Jewish community).71 But it was clear that the latter mat-
tered more, for he was not required to ask forgiveness of God, even though 
the Mahamad acknowledged several times that his was a crime against 
both civil law (humanindade) and the Jewish religion (nostra ley). The 
principle concern of the colonial rulers, by contrast, seems to have been 
protecting a wealthy, leading white family in a colony whose majority pop-
ulation was both enslaved and of African origin.
Our conclusions here are very much in consonance with the findings of 
Carolyn Ramsey in her comparative study of early modern England and its 
overseas North American colonies. The Fernandes/Bueno de Mequita scandal 
provides a Caribbean example of a deeply rooted popular culture that delim-
ited the efficacy of legal codification. As Ramsey argues for colonial North 
America and early modern England: these popular values “did not always cor-
respond to those urged by formal legal institutions and – particularly in the 
area of sexuality – popular custom tolerated de facto unions that did not 
threaten the stability of the community.”72 As in the Suriname trial, Ramsey 
found that the English and colonial courts consistently failed “to impose severe 
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sentences on high-status sexual offenders.”73 In England, only three people 
were executed for the crime of adultery during the Interregnum, for juries sim-
ply refused to convict defendants unless one of them was “an unpopular indi-
vidual like a Catholic priest.”74 If the Fernandes/Bueno de Mesquita case is 
representative of a broader tendency in Europe and the colonial Americas, 
as we suspect it is, then status and reputation were more important “in deter-
mining the vulnerability of suspects to prosecution for sexual offenses.”75  
The official gravity of the crime of adultery played only a secondary role. 
Wealth or lack thereof, economic dependence, religious or political dissidence, 
and race – as we shall see more dramatically in the following cause célèbre – 
ultimately determined whether or not one was judged guilty in cases of marital 
infidelity.
 Imputed Adultery: The Vulnerability of Eurafrican Jews in 
Suriname (1775)
For Eurafrican Jews, bringing forth an adultery accusation was extremely risky. 
Eurafrican Jews formed a sub-community within the Portuguese Jewish nation 
of Suriname, and had grown to some 10 percent by the second half of the eigh-
teenth century.76 They typically traced their ancestry to a white Portuguese 
Jewish man and his (non-Jewish) African slave, but by the second half of the 
eighteenth century many were born to enslaved or manumitted Eurafrican 
Jewish women. Eurafrican Jews had to exert great caution in referencing the 
crime of adultery, as Moses Rodrigues del Prado discovered in the 1770s. It all 
began in 1775 when another Eurafrican Jew living on the savannah,77 Abraham 
Garsia, protested against rumored allegations that he had insulted the sexual 
virtue of Ribca de la Parra, described variably as “a noted lady…from a family so 
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esteemed” and a “white woman.” The Mahamad’s investigation uncovered a 
tortuous chain of rumors transmitted mostly from man to man. Garsia, backed 
up by a number of other Jewish witnesses, displaced the blame squarely onto 
the shoulders of Moses Rodrigues del Prado.78 Prado (d. October 3, 1797), the 
third son of the “mulatta” Maria or Mariana del Prado, was classified in the 
Portuguese Jewish community as a congregante.79
After calling witnesses and finding Prado to be the guilty party, the Mahamad 
swiftly resolved to banish him from the savannah forever, a measure never 
before or after meted out to a white Jew similarly convicted.80 In speaking of 
a white Jewish woman as an adulteress (if he was indeed culpable), Prado 
clearly hit a raw nerve. During his trial Prado was ordered to “behave humbly 
and recognize the prodigious difference between him and whites.” The regents 
decided that banishment from Jodensavanne was not harsh enough a penalty 
and resolved to ask the governor to apply corporal punishment, a deep insult, 
for its recipients in the Jewish community were almost always either parents 
ordered to discipline their children or, much more frequently, slaves. 
Banishment and physical correction were in this case intended to underscore 
the vast social gulf between whites and free Eurafricans in Suriname’s Jewish 
community. Class was also at issue. The alleged adultress, Ribca de la Parra, 
the widow of Selomoh de la Parra, was an elite white Jewish woman publicly 
active in the community in crucial ways. In 1770, a group of Portuguese Jewish 
volunteers including Ribca, collectively donated the massive sum of 10,000 
Dutch guilders to rebuild the Sedek VeSalom synagogue, a building in dire 
need of expansion following a huge population move from the savannah to 
Paramaribo.81 What is also key is that Prado seems not have had any effective 
network to rally to his side – at least not then.
Three years later, in December of 1778, Moses Rodrigues del Prado returned 
unlawfully to the savannah, brandishing a sword and accompanied by two body 
servants (moleques) armed with pistols.82 When the beadle (samas) ordered 
him to leave the savannah, Prado answered that he had come to carry out some 
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business affairs and that he would leave when finished. Then, reportedly without 
incitement, Prado began to shout through the streets that the judges who sat on 
his case years before had been biased, and that if any one of them had the guts, 
Prado would fight them. As the community’s treasurer, Samuel de la Parra, was 
passing by, Prado approached him with one of his body servants, who extended 
an unsheathed sword. De la Parra preempted an attack by grabbing the sword 
from the servant’s hand and called for a patrol to arrest Prado.
There are several indications that Prado’s visit to the savannah was not to 
carry out business, but rather to rectify injustice. Moreover, Prado was clearly 
taking his strategic cues from the white Jewish community. Note that Joseph, 
brother of the cuckolded Moses Bueno de Mesquita, had similarly accused the 
Mahamad’s regents of being partial when they resisted Joseph’s attempts to 
have the adultery trial dismissed. In addition, since his initial conviction, Prado 
had actively cultivated a powerful network of supporters. Just before launching 
his attack, he told a resident of the savannah (who asked him to leave) that he, 
Prado, was well known by the governor as a homem de bem, a Portuguese term 
that implies good behavior, wealth and philanthropy, and political power all at 
once. The regents evidently scoffed at Prado’s claim, for they sent a request to 
the governor to detain him in the Zeeland fort in Paramaribo.
The very next day, however, Prado’s bravado proved to be more than a bluff. 
His boss, Binjamin Robles de Medina, having received notice of Prado’s arrest, 
informed the regents that Prado was the director of his plantation and that this 
estate would suffer much damage should Prado be detained any longer in 
prison. Furthermore, Medina explained that Prado’s inebriated state was to 
blame for the “liberty” with which he acted in the Jewish village. The regents 
agreed to release Prado, on condition that his behavior in the future prove him 
deserving of liberty from prison.83 In February 1779, two months after Prado’s 
attack, the regents sent a report about Prado to the colony’s prosecutor.84 To 
the regents’ shock, the Court of Policy ruled in favor of Prado, declaring that 
the Mahamad did not have authority to banish any person from Jodensavanne, 
despite the Mahamad having shown a document dating to 1757 from the then 
governor (likely Jan Nepveu), that conferred upon the regents the power of 
expulsion. Moreover, the court decided not to punish Prado for insulting the 
Mahamad.85
Moses Rodrigues del Prado had clearly done his homework. He understood 
that protecting himself against libel meant networking, and that networking 
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meant identifying oneself with wealth and power. The governor’s favorable 
response to Prado’s plight may be an indication of Prado’s own growing eco-
nomic fortunes. Elsewhere in the communal minutes, in an unrelated context, 
a number of Jews in 1779 complained to the regents that Jews “of modest 
means” could not address their complaints to the colonial ruler,86 presumably 
for lack of clout or monetary inducement. Finally, it is probably not a coinci-
dence that Moses Rodrigues del Prado’s return to the savannah coincided in 
time with deliberations over the ongoing adulterous relationship between 
Moses Fernandes and Deborah Bueno de Mesquita. We suggest that Prado was 
stung by the patently exaggerated treatment he received for allegedly uttering 
an accusation of adultery (rather than perpetuating the crime itself). Prado’s 
successful campaign for justice not only foreshadowed, but possibly informed, 
the Eurafrican protest that emerged in Suriname beginning in the late 1780s, 
against their second-tier status in the Jewish community.87
 In Full View: A Cause Célèbre in Curaçao (1775)
Every once in a while, a well-documented case provides us with a framework 
through which to view issues shaping the dynamics of a community or even of 
a society as a whole. Such a case occurred in 1775, when the Portuguese Jewish 
community of Curaçao was rocked by a bitter dispute involving allegations of 
sexual misconduct. The witnesses included a broad swathe of colonial society: 
housewives, merchants, doctors, colonial officials, slaves, and free people of 
color. Witnesses were asked to reveal their personal knowledge of the situation 
and also to repeat hearsay. The case threatened the social cohesion of the 
community and reminds us that close-knit communities could be rife with 
suspicions and simmering conflicts. It is another example of how relatively 
clear-cut cases of adultery in the Dutch colonies could be manipulated in the 
defendants’ favor.
The charges were dramatic and highly salacious by any standard. Sarah de 
Isaac Pardo was pregnant, but the paternity of her unborn child was the sub-
ject of much speculation in the Portuguese Jewish community, among its 
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slaves and servants, and even among the white Protestants on the island. 
In more than ten years of marriage, Sarah had never before been known to be 
pregnant.88 Her much older husband, Selomoh Vaz Farro, was now gravely ill 
and had been for some time – so ill that the couple had twice been granted a 
conditional divorce in the preceding year by Haham da Fonseca in expectation 
of Vaz Farro’s imminent demise.89 How was it, then, that an elderly man on 
his deathbed – whom two doctors had declared impotent – could impregnate 
his wife?
Vaz Farro claimed in a sworn statement that, one evening several months 
earlier, he had “found the strength” to have relations with his wife.90 But this 
seemed unlikely to many within and outside the Portuguese Jewish commu-
nity. Instead, suspicion immediately fell on Abraham de David da Costa 
Andrade, Jr. After all, Sarah and Abraham had frequently been spotted in each 
other’s company. This in itself was not particularly shocking. As we have seen 
in the affair between Moses Fernandes and Deborah Bueno de Mesquita in 
Suriname, a certain degree of intimacy between married people of opposite 
genders was permitted in a closely-knit community in which nearly everyone 
was related by blood or marriage. But Sarah and Abraham seem to have pushed 
the limits of what was allowable by community standards. They were observed 
talking together on the porches of houses, exchanging small tokens such as 
flowers. Many witnesses had regularly spotted the pair strolling together out-
side the city gates. According to a few testimonies, Sarah and Abraham had 
even arranged rendezvous during the small hours of the morning. Gossip about 
their relationship was rife and there was plenty of material to work with.91
The frequency with which the two were sighted together, their obvious 
familiarity with one another, and Sarah’s suspicious pregnancy, flouted 
community norms and eventually incited censure. Sexual conduct was per-
haps the single most important piece of information about a third party, as one 
deponent testified. Gossip related to intimate behavior, he asserted, had always 
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circulated in Curaçao, whether among men or women, or between Jews, 
Protestants, slaves, or free people of color.92 In the Pardo/Andrade scandal, 
free people of color played a central role in information transmission. Even 
those unrelated to the families in question enjoyed a detailed familiarity with 
the case.93 In fact, Samuel d’Costa Andrade learned of his brother’s suspected 
adultery when he overheard two black women gossiping in a narrow Willemstad 
passageway.94 Other deponents admitted that they had listened in on conver-
sations about the scandal from blacks circulating in the marketplace and on 
the streets.95 All of this brings to the fore one of the main features of this case: 
the entanglement of enslaved and manumitted peoples in the daily life of 
whites, a contrast to the Surinamese cases earlier examined, where slaves are 
virtually non-existent in the surviving documentation. This contrast is perhaps 
unsurprising, given the geographical situation. Willemstad was a small walled 
city barely containing upwards of 11,500 inhabitants, who by the mid- 
eighteenth century had begun to spill beyond its gates and into neighborhoods 
such as Otrabanda.96 In the testimony, people of color emerge as major actors 
and information transmitters. Informally, they absorbed and spread gossip 
across communal boundaries, and white Portuguese Jews sometimes called on 
them to transmit messengers between the lovers. Sarah Pardo, for example, 
gave a letter to Antonia, a free black girl, to deliver to Abraham, who returned 
his own response via a slave girl. On other occasions, enslaved and free 
people of color played advisory roles to the parties involved, as we shall see. 
Clearly, these individuals occupied a central role in the Pardo and Andrade 
families, indicating not just intimacy and trust, but also influence.
After her second conditional divorce from her dying husband, Sarah Pinto 
moved back to her father’s house. However, Isaac Pardo’s ploy of putting an 
end to his daughter’s “shameless” conduct failed, for Sarah continued to visit 
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Portuguese Jewish fathers and non-Jewish women of color, but these sources highlight 
the sexual and financial utility of such relations and do not consider friendship or trust. 
See, for example, Eva Abraham-Van der Mark, “Marriage and Concubinage among the 
with Abraham Andrade sub rosa.97 This he learned during the humiliating visit 
of Mrs. Clements, a prominent Protestant widow, who told him of his daugh-
ter’s inappropriate conduct on the streets of Willemstad, a visit that illustrates 
how racial solidarity amongst whites overcame religious divides.98 Similar 
embarrassing social calls caused the situation at home to deteriorate; Sarah 
and her father were heard arguing loudly and frequently. Both friends and the 
family’s domestic slaves attempted to broker a peaceful solution to this unten-
able situation. At last, Isaac Pardo’s good friend Dr. Joseph Capriles, seconded 
by Pardo’s “house slaves,” persuaded Sarah to move into a residence outside 
the city gates which was owned by her father.99 The house slaves, although 
nameless, are listed alongside Capriles – Isaac Pardo’s long-time family friend, 
business partner, and prominent fellow Portuguese Jew – as key participants in 
persuading Sarah to change her domicile.100
Free people of color, referred to as mulatos, also appear in positions of inti-
macy or even friendship with Sarah Pardo and Abraham Andrade and other 
Portuguese Jews. Sarah was well enough acquainted with an unidentified 
mulatto woman whom she met on the streets to declare: “Everyone says I’m 
pregnant…I’m going to walk the streets now to show them that I’m not!”101 
Sarah also discussed with this woman her feelings for her ailing husband. She 
had “been hoping for two or three years for her husband to die…or for lighten-
ing to strike him.”102 That these statements were made to a mulato woman and 
that no one in the ensuing civil and religious litigation seemed surprised is 
again indicative of a level of familiarity between the free colored and Portuguese 
Jewish populations that has not heretofore been explored for Curaçao’s Jewish 
community.103
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It was a slave girl who transmitted to Isaac Pardo the love letters that would 
become centerpieces in the trial against Sara Pardo and Abraham Andrade. 
According to Pardo père, these letters “came into my hands…from a black girl I 
came across.”104 These incriminating love letters were written in the island’s 
Creole language, commonly known today as Papiamentu, but in the sources 
referred to as neger spraak (Negro speech). They were especially damning, for 
they provided actual evidence of an extra-marital affair and compelled the 
parnassim of the synagogue to act, in part because the contents of the letters 
had become so widely known to both Jews and non-Jews in the city. These 
letters – the oldest known documents written in Papiamentu  – formed the 
lynchpin of the various accusations against the couple. It was in these 
letters that both the pregnancy and the attempt to abort the fetus were 
acknowledged.105
After these compromising epistles were made public, one of Sarah’s 
brothers threw Andrade out of the synagogue.106 In fact, feelings against him 
were running so high that Andrade had to request an armed escort from the 
governor in order to arrive home safely.107 Sarah and Abraham claimed that 
they were innocent of the charges and that the adultery accusation was a 
conspiracy against them. They initially attempted to evade the parnassim 
when called to answer for their suspected crimes. Sarah Pardo disingenuously 
claimed several times that she did not realize she had been charged with 
a crime. Andrade’s family also avoided appearing before the Mahamad. 
His father feigned illness, while his brothers suddenly found pressing business 
to attend to off the island. When Sarah and Abraham eventually came before 
the Mahamad and were confronted with the letters they had sent to one 
another, they claimed them forgeries. Shortly thereafter, the haham and 
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parnassim formally accused Andrade of committing adultery with Sarah and 
excommunicated both parties. Andrade was ordered to ask for forgiveness at 
the synagogue altar, grow out his beard for six weeks, sit on a special bench in 
the synagogue, pay a fine of 200 guilders, and have no form of communication 
with Sarah Pardo. In an interesting departure from the Bueno de Mesquita/
Fernandes case in Suriname, Sarah, though not required to make the public 
penances in the synagogue like Andrade, did have to pay an equal amount to 
the charity fund, and it was Sarah that congregation president David Morales 
sought to have banished from the island, not Andrade.108
The reason for this harsher treatment could possibly be rooted in the family 
history.109 Isaac Pardo had been one of the first community members excom-
municated by Haham de Sola in the community-wide conflict that rocked the 
island two decades earlier. This dispute was, in many ways, a continuation of 
other, long-running, conflicts within the Curaçoan community. Like so many 
of the quarrels that plagued eighteenth-century Portuguese Jews in Curaçao, 
the case of 20 years before centered on delimiting the powers of the haham 
and parnassim. Disagreement arose when there was talk of building 
a new synagogue that would compete with the pioneering Mikvé Israel. 
Two “opposition” leaders, Moses Penso and David Aboab, and those who 
supported them, including Isaac Pardo, were excommunicated.110
Like Moses Fernandes and Deborah Bueno de Mesquita of Suriname, 
Abraham and Sarah resorted to civil authorities to find in their favor. Andrade 
hired the lawyer Petrus Bernardus van Starckenborgh, who would later become 
interim governor of Curaçao, to defend him against the charges. On July 3, 1776, 
the governor and Council acquitted Andrade and Sarah and ordered the 
parnassim to remove the excommunications, annul the fines, and have the son 
who was born to Sarah circumcised without discrimination (without the 
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omission of certain words pronounced for sons of fathers leading moral 
lives).111 As in the Suriname case, the parnassim were ordered to seal all papers 
referring to Sarah and Andrade.112
Centuries later, the guilt of Abraham de David da Costa Andrade, Jr. and 
Sarah Pardo hardly matters. What makes the case interesting today is the vivid 
light it throws on the social dynamics among the island’s various population 
groups and polities. The Dutch colonial authorities’ involvement in the case 
magnified long-standing tensions between Jewish communal autonomy and 
colonial hegemony. The intricate workings of the case as it darted to and from 
the judicial authorities confirm what legal historian Bastiaan van der Velden 
has noted about Jewish law on the Dutch island of Curaçao: that it often 
worked alongside the colonial system of secular justice.113 We may now refine 
that observation. The Andrade/Pardo controversy illustrates that in the Dutch 
colonies there were actually three layers of legislation and judicial systems: 
that of the metropole, that of the colonial authorities, and that of the Jewish 
community. Our research shows that these three legal systems were not just 
parallel to each other – they were in conversation, though Jewish law was in 
most cases clearly subordinate, and often subordinated by Jews themselves. 
We may also perceive how information was transmitted within the Portuguese 
Jewish community and contemplate the far-reaching and decisive role of 
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gossip. And we get a glimpse of the pivotal role of the colored population, 
whether enslaved or free, in one of the island’s major scandals.
Another remarkable feature of the adultery case of Abraham Andrade and 
Sarah Pardo is linguistic. As Portuguese Jews from families that had been on the 
island of Curaçao for generations, they might have been expected to communi-
cate with each other in Portuguese, the language of most of the synagogue’s 
records and of their ethno-religious community, or in Dutch, the language of 
colonial authority. Instead, they wrote and apparently spoke to each other in 
Papiamentu, a Caribbean Creole that emerged from Iberian and African lan-
guages. The love letters of Sarah and Abraham are generally agreed to be the 
first written evidence of Papiamentu, though the language was probably fairly 
well-established by the mid-eighteenth century and spoken much earlier.114
At least six of the witnesses in the scandal, including Jews, gave their testi-
mony in what was termed “neegers Spraake” (Negro speech). Sometimes, the 
testimony was transcribed in “creooles taal” (Creole language), presumably a 
synonym.115 The fact that Portuguese Jews, many or most of them well-to-do 
merchants, and their spouses, seemingly felt more comfortable in giving their 
testimony in Papiamentu than in either Portuguese or Dutch demonstrates 
how the language had begun to cross socio-economic, racial, religious and 
ethnic lines. Many witnesses who gave their testimony in Dutch revealed their 
knowledge of Papiamentu by repeating the conversations between blacks they 
had overheard on the streets.116 But, of course, it was not just the blacks on the 
streets conversing in Papiamentu. A rather large number of white witnesses 
reported hearing a discussion between Sarah, her husband, and parents which 
was conducted, these witnesses reported, entirely in Papiamentu.117 In marked 
216 Ben-Ur and Roitman 
<UN>
118 NL-HaNA, Ibid., 9 (testimony of Rabbi Jacob Lopes); 10 (testimony of Isaac Cardoso); 11 
(testimony of Ribca Lopes Fonseca); 12 (testimony of Esther Levy); 13 (testimony of David 
Lopes Dias).
119 Rupert, Contraband and Creolization, 214.
120 Ibid., 215.
121 Three births were registered to Selomah Gomes Soares and Simha Salom: Ester, in 1763, 
Rachel, in 1764, and Jeudit, in 1766. saa, 334, 345 (Geboorteregister – Birth registry), 108, 
112, 120. We must assume that Rachel died at some point before or during the events 
which transpired, though we have found no record of her death. Only two children are 
mentioned as going to Suriname, and there are records of both Ester and Jeudit in 
contrast to what transpired in adultery cases in Suriname, only a few of the 
witnesses gave their testimony in Portuguese.118 This does not mean that 
Portuguese was not used among Portuguese Jews on Curaçao. Most of the 
existing records of the case come from the Dutch colonial administration and 
not from the Portuguese community records, which almost certainly would 
have been in Portuguese. Therefore, it would be logical for the witnesses to 
give their testimony in Dutch instead of Portuguese if they were fluent in the 
language. But this still raises the question of the testimony given in Papiamentu. 
The Dutch authorities brought in an official interpreter to translate the 
documents to Dutch, a costly endeavor. Many or most of these officials must 
have known Papiamentu. There is ample evidence from the 1730s of occasional 
testimony given in “creoles taal” on the island, taken without a mandated 
Dutch translation.119 Official translations presumably served the purpose of 
validating them for the civil court case. The prominent role that Papiamentu 
played in the unfolding events of the adultery case between Sarah and Abraham 
is of great interest to linguists specializing in creole languages and vividly 
substantiates Linda Rupert’s assertion of a widespread creolization of the 
island by the latter part of the eighteenth century.120
 A Case from Amsterdam: Adultery and Its Trans-Atlantic 
Dimensions
Sometime in the mid-eighteenth century, Selomoh Gomes Soares relocated 
to Suriname, like so many other Portuguese Jews had before him, leaving 
his wife Simha and three daughters behind.121 He might have been one of the 
despachados, impoverished Jews dispatched from Amsterdam, usually to the 
Americas, by the local Portuguese Jewish regents in order to rid their commu-
nity of individuals and families who drained the ever-diminishing charity 
chests. Suriname was the primary destination for these Jews. Robert Cohen’s 
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calculations show that 135 destitute Jews were sent to Suriname between 
1759–1814, more than to any other single destination.122
In 1768, Simha Gomes Soares was publically accused of adultery by the 
parnassim of the Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam. Two anony-
mous witnesses came forward to identify David, the son of Daniel de León, as 
the father of the fetus. These same two witnesses further asserted that León 
had rented Simha a house in which she could remain concealed for the dura-
tion of her pregnancy. But his efforts were to no avail. Though the Portuguese 
Jewish community in Amsterdam was several times larger than that of 
Willemstad and the composition of the surrounding population was different, 
the social dynamics were similar. Gossip and the informal transfer of informa-
tion were vital mechanisms through which to reinforce community norms.
On July 5, 1768, Simha and David were called before the parnassim because 
it had “come to their knowledge” via an unnamed tale-bearer that the wayward 
couple had committed a “great crime according to our law.”123 Much like 
Abraham Andrade, Sarah Pardo, and Moses Fernandes in the Dutch colonies, 
David de León initially refused to appear in the synagogue to answer the 
charges against him. In fact, de León managed to avoid coming before the 
parnassim by absenting himself from the city. For over three weeks, no one 
knew where to find him. His father, when questioned, claimed ignorance of his 
whereabouts. The regents then initiated a search of the city to locate him. It is 
not clear if their search was successful, or whether de León finally decided to 
come forward of his own volition.
When he did come forward, the two lovers were both briefly excommuni-
cated with the usual punishments that accompanied such a sentence, includ-
ing not being allowed to communicate with anyone outside of their immediate 
families. However, de León, just like Abraham Andrade and Moses Fernandes 
after him, was expected to participate in a very public and highly ritualized act 
in order to be reconciled with the community. He was required to climb the 
stairs on the left side of the pulpit within the synagogue, declare his sins, and 
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ask for forgiveness for the scandal that he had caused. This mantra was to be 
repeated three times in total. During the month of Elul, he was ordered to 
refrain from shaving, sit in a proscribed space in the synagogue, and visit the 
synagogue twice a week. Public acts of penance put penitents such as David 
de León before the community as a warning to others, while also providing a 
process by which the offender might be restored fully to the community. 
In addition, the public staging of penance was a way to regulate social 
behavior. Simha, however, due to her “great contrition for her crimes and 
submission to authority,” had no penance to make whatsoever. Apparently, 
her confession to the parnassim and her evident remorse were enough to 
satisfy them.124
This case – alongside the affairs we have described from the colonies – could 
indicate that while it was important for the man to perform a ritual of penance 
publically, women were not expected to carry out such a public act in the 
sacred space of the synagogue. Whether this indicates a lower or higher 
social or religious status for women is unclear, but certainly contrasts to 
general practice in early modern Christian society, where women were part 
of the culture of public penitence. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Germany, for instance, women accused of adultery were often forced to wear 
distinctive clothing and undergo public penance in the church.125 Likewise, 
ecclesiastical authorities in early modern England and British America 
often sentenced women to public displays of contrition, which could involve 
standing at the local meetinghouse wearing white sheets and holding 
white wands, a traditional form of public penance for having sex outside 
marriage.126
219Adultery Here And There
<UN>
127 She was already living quite precariously on the edges of poverty. saa, 334, 27 (“Compendio 
de escamoth” – Regulations, 1767–1773), 127.
128 NL-HaNA, Portugees-Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18, inv. nr. 1, March 20, 1770. 
There is no record of any letter to Soares informing him of his wife’s excommunication in 
the relatively complete books of letters sent by the Amsterdam community (uitgaande 
brieven), so it seems likely that he was notified of the scandal solely via his cousin’s letter. 
saa, 334, 1028BB (Documents concerning the Jewish communities in Amsterdam, 
Curaçao, Suriname, and Constantinople, 1750–1793); 95 (“copiador de cartas” – copies of 
outgoing letters, 1773–1784).
129 saa, 334, 94 (“copiador de cartas” – copies of outgoing letters, 1764–1773), June 12, 1770, 332.
130 NL-HaNA, Portugees-Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18, inv. nr. 1, October 19, 1770.
131 NL-HaNA, Portugees-Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18 , inv. nr. 135, 67.
132 NL-HaNA, Portugees-Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18, inv. nr. 135, p. 68–69.
Simha had no money with which to pay a fine, which could have factored 
into the sentencing.127 However, de León was not fined either, an interesting 
contrast to the practice in Suriname and Curaçao, where fines seem to have 
been the norm. It may seem that Simha initially escaped the worst of the 
consequences for her “great crime against the law.” But in March of 1770, almost 
two years after the affair became a public matter, Selomoh Gomes Soares 
learned of his wife’s treacherous behavior via a letter from his cousin Joseph 
Gomes Silva of Amsterdam, who advised his cousin to divorce.128 A few months 
later, a Mr. de Vries arrived in Amsterdam on a ship from Suriname with a 
letter for the parnassim of the Portuguese Jewish community from Selomoh 
Gomes Soares. In this letter, Soares requested that they provide every possible 
assistance in speedily transporting his daughters to him in Suriname so 
that they could be under his “paternal protection,” a possible allusion to the 
moral unsuitability of his wife as a caretaker for their children.129 Soares was 
apparently in less of a hurry to legalize the end of his marriage, for in October 
of 1770, the Haham of Amsterdam wrote to his counterpart in Jodensavanne, 
asking Soares to provide a Jewish divorce decree (guet).130 There is no evidence 
that Soares did so; perhaps his intention was to keep his wife in a state of legal 
suspension as an agunah, an “anchored” wife who, according to rabbinical law, 
was forbidden to remarry.
Soares’ fortunes seem to have been on the rise by then, meaning that he 
could finally afford to have his children transported to him. In 1772, Soares 
received a piece of land valued at 200 Dutch guilders from Jacob de Abraham 
de Meza.131 In 1774, some three or four years after his daughters would have 
arrived in Suriname, Soares sold to Samuel Cohen Nassy a house and plot of 
land in the province of the savannah between the land of Samuel Henriquez 
Fereyra and the said Nassy, for 1500 Dutch guilders.132 If Soares’ luck was 
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looking up, the same could not be said for his wife. When the parnassim arrived 
on her doorstep with her husband’s letter in hand, she was living on communal 
assistance and could not afford to feed the children.133 Her poverty left her in 
an extremely vulnerable position. Although she initially refused to relinquish 
her daughters to their father in Suriname, the parnassim visited several times 
over the coming weeks using “persuasive and suave” arguments134 – actually, 
threats, one of which included cutting off all community charity should she 
refuse. Simha was completely dependent upon the charity chest, as was her 
mother, who was mentally ill, her two surviving daughters, and any child that 
may have been born of her adulterous affair with León.135 In the end, Simha 
acceded to the demands and her daughters were dispatched to their father in 
Suriname.136
The scandal of his wife’s adulterous behavior never seems to have affected 
Soares’ reputation or career in Suriname. In 1777, Selomoh Gomes Soares 
and David de Isaac Cohen Nassy formed a partnership and opened a phar-
maceutical store to serve the infirm in the savannah, whether white or black, 
under the name Soares & Company.137 While Gomes Soares’ career and repu-
tation did not seem to have suffered, his wife did. His financial abandon-
ment of her left her entirely at the mercy of the parnassim who controlled 
access to communal charitable funds. This, in turn, left her little recourse 
when these communal authorities demanded that her children be turned 
over to their father. This highlights the male-dominated system of the 
Portuguese Jewish communities on both sides of the Atlantic, which privi-
leged a father’s authority above a mother’s, and left women (especially those 
deemed morally unfit) with very little room in which to maneuver in assert-
ing their rights to their children. This same community routinely sent chil-
dren to live with their father or his family in case of divorce, and considered 
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illegitimate daughters of Portuguese fathers and Christian mothers eligible 
for the Dotar dowry.138
The Salom/Soares case also shows, in sharp contrast to the colonies, the 
power communal authorities exercised over members of the Portuguese Jewish 
community in Amsterdam, especially poor to middling ones. In another quite 
visible contrast to the cases in Suriname and Curaçao, both de León and Salom 
admitted their “enormous crimes.” They did not appeal to civil authorities for 
their sentences to be overturned, and despite León’s initial attempts to avoid 
coming before the parnassim, he ultimately submitted to his punishment with-
out further protest. This acceptance of the punishment as meted out by the 
parnassim raises interesting questions. We tentatively suggest that Salom and 
de León acquiesced in part because they did not have the financial wherewithal 
and connections to appeal beyond the Portuguese Jewish community. Another 
possibility is that the social distance between Jewish and Christian civil author-
ities in Amsterdam was much greater than in the colonies.
Finally, the affair of Simha Salom and David de León should be contextual-
ized within the trend towards increasing mobility which characterized the 
early modern period and led to growing numbers of women and children 
being left behind, either temporarily or permanently.139 Herman Roodenburg 
shows that 24 percent of all infidelity cases brought to the attention of the 
Amsterdam Dutch Reformed consistory between 1578 and 1700 involved a wife 
whose husband was away in the East or West Indies. Of the women accused of 
infidelity during the period under study, 83 of their husbands had gone to 
the East Indies and four to the West Indies or Brazil.140 As the Salom/de 
222 Ben-Ur and Roitman 
<UN>
141 See Florike Egmond, “Contours of Identity: Poor Ashkenazim in the Dutch Republic,” in 
Dutch Jewish History, Volume III: Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium on the History of the 
Jews in the Netherlands, ed. J. Michman, 205–225, 217–218.
142 Carlos Herrera, “Infidelity and the Presidio Captain: Adultery and Honor in the Lives of 
María Rosa Tato y Anza and José Antonio Vildósola, Sonora, New Spain, 1769–1783,” 214.
143 Nell Irvin Painter, Southern History Across the Color Line: Essays (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2002), 36.
León case shows, Jewish communities were not immune to this trend. In fact, 
some scholars speculate that it may have been more common within Jewish 
communities than in non-Jewish ones, due to the allegedly higher mobility of 
Jews during the early modern period.141
 Conclusion: The Dutch Atlantic through the Prism of Adultery
The foregoing cases of real or alleged marital infidelity in Suriname, Curaçao, 
and Amsterdam have raised a number of issues at the heart of contemporary 
Atlantic historiography. The interest in preserving the wealth and prestige of 
leading colonial families – and the ability to do so – may explain why so many 
Jewish family and community members, on the one hand, and government 
officials on the other, colluded in pretending the deed never happened. Perhaps 
the most interesting finding of this study has been the mechanisms that 
created the “language of silence.”142 Ultimately, no adultery was officially found 
in the Fernandes/Bueno de Mesquita and Andrade/Pardo cases. Clearly at play 
was an effort to uphold the economic and social standing of affluent white 
families in colonies whose majority populations were both enslaved and of 
African origin. The detailed documentation of these two litigations challenges 
the assumption of scholars like Nell Irvin Painter who has argued that only the 
impoverished lived “in full view of the world.”143 By contrast, Sarah Pardo and 
Abraham Andrade of Curaçao, and Moses Fernandes and Deborah Bueno de 
Mesquita in Suriname, unambiguously divulge the complex and drawn-out 
process by which public secrets were created within the privileged classes. 
Only on an official level did adultery among these wealthy men and women 
“never happen.” On the ground, it most surely did happen – and everyone 
knew it.
Also foregrounded in both Suriname and even more so in Curaçao is the key 
role enslaved and free people of color played in the transmission of rumors, 
and how entangled these populations were with elite white Jews, who some-
times treated their social inferiors as confidantes and family advisers. The 
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Curaçao case, too, illustrates the social backdrop against which Papiamentu 
was developed as a language of intra-communal use. Suriname’s infamous 
adultery accusation, blurted out by the hapless but resourceful Moses Rodrigues 
del Prado, highlights racialized double standards and the acumen of Eurafrican 
Jews in building up negotiating power in a white-dominant society.
The emergence of Eurafrican Jews in Suriname and the triple-layered legal 
system functioning both there and in Curaçao are particular to the inner 
dynamics of Portuguese Jewish communities and their interactions with 
local Dutch authorities. The racial features of Suriname’s Portuguese Jewish 
community and the legal systems both there and in Curaçao are informed by 
the distinctiveness of Portuguese Jewish culture and the special position of 
the population vis-à-vis the “host society.” Jews were the only non-Christian 
white group in the Dutch Atlantic and comprised from one-third to one-half 
of the white populations. At the same time, Portuguese Jews enjoyed a high 
degree of autonomy and an array of privileges that allowed them to maintain 
and develop their historic “culture” – a concept that encompasses everything 
from language, religion, and jurisprudence to collective historical conscious-
ness. Adultery as played out among these communities is therefore always 
heard in a Jewish key, with specific references to the laws and customs that 
governed sexual behavior and punishment, invariably adjusted to environ-
ments centrally informed by slavery.
That several of the parties involved in the Amsterdam adultery suit were 
dispatched, either voluntarily or otherwise, to and from the Caribbean and 
Amsterdam, bespeaks of an intense Atlantic mobility that – while it did not 
create the problem of marital infidelity – both exacerbated it and provided a 
long-distance escape hatch for those fleeing public disgrace. The asymmetrical 
status change experienced by adulterous parties seems to have been partly a 
function of gender, but perhaps more so a factor of the kind of wealth that is 
often paired with political power.
Most of what we have brought to light in this chapter is probably generaliz-
able to broader society. As such, our findings serve as a lens through which to 
explore the creation of public secrets, the entanglement of enslaved and free 
populations in the American colonies, and the genesis there of ethnic groups 
and languages. But let us conclude that the incidence of adultery was not only 
here and there – it was everywhere. The pervasiveness of marital infidelity – 
however culturally defined and treated – means that it can be used as a percep-
tive tool for examining issues of central concern in a variety of societies outside 
the Atlantic world.
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The Scholarly Atlantic
Circuits of Knowledge between Britain, the Dutch Republic  
and the Americas in the Eighteenth Century
Karel Davids
On 30 August 1735, Johan Frederik Gronovius in Leiden wrote to his friend and 
fellow-naturalist Richard Richardson in Bierley, England, “You will remember 
that at the time you arrived here in town, you met at Mr. Lawson’s a gentleman 
from Sweden, that went the same night to Amsterdam, where he is printing his 
Bibliothecam Botanicam. His name is Carolus Linnaeus.” Gronovius went on to 
praise Linnaeus’ singular learning “in all parts of natural history” and the 
 excellent qualities of his new taxonomy of minerals, plants and animals. 
Gronovius predicted that “all the world” would especially be “much pleased” 
with his “Botanic Table,” although he expected that it would take time “before 
one can know the right use,” and it might thus “be rejected” by those who 
would not be prepared to devote some time to study it.1 Gronovius himself was 
so impressed by the significance of Linnaeus’ achievement that he not only 
helped to see several of works of Linnaeus through the press in the Netherlands 
but also decided to reorder a survey of the “plants, fruits, and trees native to 
Virginia” sent to him in manuscript by John Clayton of Virginia shortly before, 
according to Linnaeus’ system of classification, and publish it as the Flora 
Virginica in 1739/1743. This was the first comprehensive overview of the flora in 
this British American colony to appear anywhere.2
The story of Gronovius, Linnaeus and the Flora Virginica illustrates the 
main theme of this essay, namely the increasing connectedness between 
circuits of knowledge in the North Atlantic in the eighteenth century and the 
prominent role of actors in the Dutch Republic in the emergence and evolu-
tion of these networks. I conceive of “knowledge” both in the meaning of 
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kennen, knowledge by acquaintance of objects, namely from the senses by 
taste and experience, and in the meaning of weten, knowledge of causal expla-
nation by reasoning.3 Scholarship can comprise both forms of knowledge.
Contrary to views in the Anglo-American literature,4 I will show that the 
evolution of knowledge networks in the North Atlantic in the eighteenth cen-
tury was a more complex affair than just the bilateral exchange between British 
and the American colonials. It was more than an interaction between confi-
dent, established scholars in the imperial metropolis and restless outsiders 
from New York, Philadelphia or Charleston trying to make a name for them-
selves in the wider world. European continentals, for a start, were deeply 
involved in networking. Moreover, players on both sides of the Atlantic not 
only entertained bilateral relations, but often corresponded with people in 
more than one region at the same time. Multilateral relationships, as in the 
case of Gronovius, were by no means uncommon. And these sorts of relation-
ships developed not just between actors based in Britain, the Continent and 
the British American colonies, but also between American colonials or 
European continentals and people living in South America, notably in Dutch 
Guiana. In the course of the eighteenth century, networks of knowledge cut 
across different imperial spaces. This essay concentrates on connections 
between Britain, the Dutch Republic and the Americas, with occasional glances 
at Sweden, France and Italy. It does not deal with the networks of knowledge 
in the North Atlantic as a whole, including the contributions of Spain or 
Denmark. Such a comparative, overarching analysis is the subject of other 
studies.5
Apart from increased connectedness between circuits of knowledge in a 
geographical sense, I will argue that the North Atlantic in the eighteenth cen-
tury also saw a growth in connections in other respects. Circuits of knowledge 
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became more multipurpose, and were increasingly used for transmission 
of knowledge on different subjects, e.g. on natural history as well as on elec-
tricity or the behavior of water, winds and ocean currents. Moreover, crossbor-
der exchange in a social sense occurred slightly more often than before.6 
Connections increased between two sorts of circuits. In the first of these cir-
cuits, knowledge was usually recorded in printed verbal statements or visual 
representations of regularities, principles or general patterns. In this circuit, 
carriers of knowledge often came from the ranks of academics or members of 
learned societies, who communicated through written correspondence and 
journals of a scholarly or general nature. In the second circuit, knowledge often 
had a localized, site-specific nature and normally was memorized and trans-
mitted orally rather than in written or printed form. Learning by watching, 
hearing and feeling was more common than learning by reading or writing. In 
this circuit, carriers of knowledge were often craftsmen, seamen, fishermen, 
peasants, hunters or common laborers, including slaves. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, scholars (from circuit one) were often not only more interested in com-
municating with peers, but also showed themselves willing to learn from 
people outside the scholarly world, such as seamen or Native Americans (from 
circuit two).
Dutch actors have played a central role in the emergence and evolution of 
scholarly networks of knowledge. Although the continued existence of a (mod-
est) colonial empire in the Atlantic was in this context not an entirely irrele-
vant factor, I will argue that colonial possessions were not a sine qua non for 
the role of Dutch actors in flows of knowledge. Cross-Atlantic networks of 
knowledge emerged and evolved in part independently from the existence of 
colonial empires.
How, then, did these scholarly networks of knowledge between Britain, 
the Dutch Republic and the Americas develop? What factors made their 
development possible and how can the key role of Dutch actors be explained? 
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These are the central questions of this essay. The first section will discuss the 
emergence of connected circuits of knowledge up to the 1740s, the second 
section looks at flows of knowledge in these circuits between the 1740s and 
the 1790s and the third examines the facilities and forces that made these 
developments possible. The conclusion summarizes and discusses the findings 
of this article.
 Emerging Transatlantic Networks up to circa 1740
The existing literature on transatlantic networks of knowledge in the early 
eighteenth century North Atlantic concentrates on the fledgling contacts 
between scattered groups of aspirant scientists in British colonies in America 
and established scholars in Britain, who were formally organized in the Royal 
Society of London. Raymond Phineas Stearns has described in detail how 
scientists in the American colonies gradually entered into regular contact with 
each other and with leading scientists in the metropolis and eventually man-
aged to make contributions that were acknowledged as original and important 
by their overseas “mentors.” While “colonial men of science” at first mainly 
served as “field workers” for scholars on the other side of the Atlantic, espe-
cially in the Royal Society of London, by 1770 they were able to “generate their 
own sources of inspiration, criticism and leadership,” Stearns has argued. The 
formation of the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia in the winter 
of 1768–1769, modeled after the society in London, marked in his view the 
“crowning point” of this emancipation.7
Other historians have studied this development from the perspective of 
individual scientists or through the lens of particular fields of inquiry. Joyce 
Chaplin and Nick Wrightson have analyzed the career and connections of “the 
first scientific American,” Benjamin Franklin. In a similar vein, Brooke Hindle 
has written a biography of the man who in the next generation succeeded 
Franklin as an icon of American scientific achievement, David Rittenhouse.8 
James Delbourgo and Susan Scott Parrish have examined why people in the 
British American colonies in the eighteenth century came to be curious about 
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subjects such as electricity or natural history and how they acquired their 
knowledge.9
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the standard argument runs, an 
“intercontinental network of scientific communication” had arisen, which was 
“both continental [meaning: American, kd) and intercontinental in scope.” 
“No longer were colonial scientists isolated from one another in a wilderness,” 
Stearns has written. The network of learned correspondents had become much 
more extended and integrated than a few decades before. The growth of this 
transatlantic “community” can, according to these historians, be explained on 
the one hand by factors on the British side such as “the stimulating promo-
tional activities of the Royal Society of London” and in particular the tireless 
coordinating efforts of Peter Collinson, and on the other hand, by factors on 
the American side such as the “widening public interest of the colonists them-
selves,” “the societal growth of colonial institutions” and more specifically, the 
patient, methodical network-building by Benjamin Franklin.10
This conventional picture is not inaccurate, I would argue, but it is incom-
plete. Learned men from Continental Europe and other regions outside the 
British Atlantic world make an occasional appearance in these studies, but 
they are essentially relegated to the margins. The “Atlantic” or “transnational” 
dimension barely seems to extend beyond the borders of the Anglo-American 
world and the networks of knowledge are centered on Britain. The reality in 
the eighteenth century was different. The scholarly Atlantic was much larger 
than the colonial empire of Britain and it was a polycentric rather than a 
monocentric entity.
A cursory glance at the numerous volumes of edited correspondence of 
scholars on both sides of the Atlantic in the eighteenth century shows that 
exchange of knowledge went beyond the restrictions of the British mercantil-
ist system. London was not in a privileged position as a destination for exports 
of knowledge from the American colonies. The genesis of the Flora Virginica  
is a telling case in point. John Clayton sent his items and descriptions not just 
to England, but also to a naturalist in the Dutch Republic, Johan Frederik 
Gronovius. It was Gronovius, not a British naturalist, who got Clayton’s 
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manuscript published. And even after Clayton had sent a complete manuscript 
for a new edition of the Flora to one of the leading botanists in Britain in 1757, 
Peter Collinson, it was not in London but in Leiden that the second edition of 
the book appeared. Collinson himself had for many years urged Gronovius Sr. 
to bring out a new edition of this “work so much wanted and so much desired.”11
Networks of knowledge between the British American colonies and the 
European Continent came into being well before the middle of the 1730s. 
Linnaeus’ arrival on the scene gave this development a powerful boost,12 but it 
did not create it. The emergence of these cross-Atlantic networks shows that 
colonial possessions were not a sine qua non for the role of Dutch actors in 
flows of knowledge. Cross-Atlantic networks of knowledge arose and evolved 
in part independently from the existence of colonial empires. The networking 
probably started soon after Herman Boerhaave in 1709 had succeeded Pieter 
Hotton as professor of botany and curator of the botanical garden at the 
University of Leiden. In 1722 Boerhaave got involved in a “crowd funding” 
scheme to support an expedition by botanist Thomas More to all colonies 
north of Virginia to collect “plants, seeds, fruits, barks, metalls…and all such 
other naturall bodies frequenting those countrys as ye unknown to us”. The 
participants of this fund, organized by William Sherard, paid an annual contri-
bution of one pound or one guinea. Apart from Boerhaave, all members came 
from Britain.13 Johan Frederik Gronovius entered into correspondence with 
another seasoned botanical traveler in the Americas, Mark Catesby, sometime 
before 1736. After collecting a vast amount of specimens in the Southern main-
land colonies and the Bahamas in the 1720s, Catesby had returned to London 
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in 1726. Gronovius kept corresponding with him until his death in 1749.14 
Another early American correspondent of Gronovius was Lewis Johnston in 
New York.15
Scholars in the Dutch Republic depended for the supply of items from the 
natural world in the Americas not solely on correspondents in the British 
American colonies or on mediators in Britain, such as Sherard, Collinson or 
Catesby. The period before the 1730s also saw the rise of a network between 
scholars in the Netherlands and “field workers” in Dutch colonies in the Americas, 
who supplied collectors in Britain as well as the Dutch Republic. In a letter from 
1706 to Sir Hans Sloane, physician and Secretary of the Royal Society in London, 
Frederik Ruysch, professor of anatomy at the Athenaeum Illustre in Amsterdam, 
promised to send a specimen of a particular kind of toad from America, which 
Sloane had asked for.16 Ruysch must have had a contact in America based outside 
the British empire. Suriname definitely was a source of natural curiosities in the 
early eighteenth century. Butterflies and other insects from Suriname were 
offered to Sloane and James Petiver in London via Dutch collectors based in 
Haarlem and Rotterdam.17 An anonymous collector “ex Surinama” – identified as 
Isaac Augar, doctor of the hospital in Paramaribo – sent specimens of the local 
flora to Gronovius in 1736.18 Augar’s successor at the hospital, Johann Bartsch, 
was hand-picked by Linnaeus himself to as an expert local correspondent for 
botanists in the metropolis. Despite Bartsch’s untimely death, correspondence 
about natural history between the Dutch Republic and Dutch Guiana did not 
completely cease, as we will see shortly.
By the late 1740s, networks of knowledge between correspondents in the 
Dutch Republic and in the British American colonies were, judging by the 
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frequency of contacts, almost as highly developed as those between American 
colonists and learned men in England. Some of the key American correspon-
dents of Peter Collinson entered into direct contact with his friend in Holland, 
Johan Frederik Gronovius. This relationship was evidently beneficial for both 
sides. James Clayton in Virginia, John Bartram in Pennsylvania and Cadwallader 
Colden in New York sent Gronovius samples of plants, animals or minerals, 
told him about interesting visitors to their locale and occasionally ventured 
some new ideas of their own. Gronovius sent his American correspondents 
copies of books published in the Netherlands, kept them informed about 
recent or upcoming publications on natural history, commented on their find-
ings and sometimes also asked for specific sorts of items.
Each of these correspondents could also serve as a link to other mem-
bers of the Republic of Letters. Gronovius served for the Americans as a 
contact with European scholars such as Carolus Linnaeus, Petrus van 
Musschenbroek and Johannes Lulofs.19 Bartram acted for Gronovius as a 
go-between in America with their mutual friends, naturalists Phineas Bond 
and James Logan.20 Alexander Garden from Charleston, Carolina, was able 
to read letters from Collinson and Gronovius to Cadwallader Colden when 
visiting Colden in Coldengham, New York, in 1754.21 Colden and Bartram 
acted as intermediaries between Gronovius and Benjamin Franklin.22 It 
was Colden who sent Gronovius a copy of Franklin’s description of his 
newly-invented fireplace, and it was Bartram who in 1746 received from 
Gronovius two copies of the Dutch translation of this tract, which, accord-
ing to the Leiden physician, “hath found a great applause in this part of the 
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world.”23 This translation, made on the initiative of Gronovius himself, was 
in fact “Franklin’s first overseas publication.”24
 Flowing Knowledge, 1740s–1790s
The story of the translation of Franklin’s tract is also interesting in other 
respects. It illustrates how transatlantic circuits of knowledge which origi-
nally centered around exchange of information on natural history could serve 
as conduits for information about other subjects and it demonstrates that the 
interimperial exchange of knowledge after 1740 became more, not less com-
mon than before. From the 1740s onwards, flows of knowledge running 
between Britain, the British American colonies, the Dutch Republic and 
Dutch Guiana became wider and more varied. The frequency of interchange 
of knowledge between actors in these different parts of the North Atlantic 
increased, even though the importance of Anglo-Dutch trade for British 
American colonists diminished after the 1730s.25 The relative decline of the 
Netherlands as a center for the production of maps in the second quarter of 
the eighteenth century was not paralleled by a decreasing significance as a 
hub in transatlantic scholarly networks.26 The increased scholarly interaction 
across the Atlantic after 1740 can be observed in the circulation of knowledge 
on electricity and fish and on the behavior of water, winds and ocean 
currents.
 Electricity and Fish
Although electrical phenomena had been known and observed for a long time, 
sustained research on electricity accelerated from the 1740s onwards. It is the 
first field of study where American colonials made a distinct, generally 
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acclaimed contribution to science. The meteoric rise of Benjamin Franklin as 
a celebrated natural philosopher was first and foremost due to his experiments 
and observations on electricity, which earned him the award of the Copley 
Medal of the Royal Society in 1753 (the first colonial to receive this honor) and 
election as Fellow of the Society three years later.27 But the event that sped up 
the process of inquiry into electrical phenomena was a discovery made inde-
pendently by a researcher in Germany, Ewald von Kleist, and a group of experi-
mental philosophers at the university of Leiden in the Dutch Republic. It has 
become known as the invention of the Kleistsche Flasche or, more commonly, 
the “Leyden jar.”
The “Leyden jar” consisted of a glass bottle coated with metal foil, which 
was partially filled with water and was provided with a metal wire passing 
through a stopper in its neck. The name “Leyden” derives from a description 
of experiments with this peculiar bottle in letters written by Petrus van 
Musschenbroek, professor of experimental physics in Leiden, to the secretary 
of the Académie des Sciences in Paris, René-Antoine de Réaumur, and to 
the leading French electrician Jean Nollet in January 1746, which soon 
circulated widely in the scholarly community in Europe. Shortly before, Van 
Musschenbroek, his colleague Jean Nicolas Sébastien Allamand and a visitor, 
Peter Cunaeus, had performed a series of trials with this device, which, unex-
pectedly, had generated a powerful, even terrifying, electrical discharge.28 
The “Leyden jar” for the first time made it possible to store static electricity. 
Thanks to the easy accessibility of stored electrical charge, electrical experi-
ments could from then on be conducted almost wherever and whenever one 
wished.
When news about the latest findings in Europe had reached colonial 
America, a group of Philadelphians, led by Franklin, from 1747 started to per-
form electrical experiments on their own, with the help of a glass tube sent by 
Peter Collinson and a generator supplied by the proprietor of Pennsylvania, 
Thomas Penn.29 The experiments conducted by Franklin and his fellow- 
Philadelphians in the late forties and early fifties led to many new insights 
in the study of electrical phenomena, such as the distinction between 
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conductive and nonconductive materials, the distinction between “negative” 
and “positive” charge, the notions of circulation and equilibrium of electrical 
flows and the significance of pointed objects in conducting electricity (which 
eventually led to the invention of the lightning rod). Franklin described these 
in Experiments and observations on electricity, composed in the form of a series 
of essays addressed to Peter Collinson, which was first published in London 
in 1751 and went through four more English editions until 1774. French editions 
in 1752 and 1756 followed, plus another nine in Italian, German and Latin until 
the 1770s.
The work on electricity established Franklin’s reputation as a first-rate 
“natural philosopher” in the Dutch Republic too. Petrus van Musschenbroek in 
1759 addressed a reverential letter to Franklin in which he (at Franklin’s 
request) supplied a list of authors who had written on electricity but added 
that “nobody had done more to unveil the mysteries of electricity than 
Franklin” himself.30 After 1760, Franklin traveled to the Low Countries twice 
and extended his network of Dutch contacts to include, among others, Jean 
Allamand and other professors in Leiden. He later corresponded with the 
founders of the Batavian society of experimental philosophy in Rotterdam, 
which appointed him a corresponding member of the society in 1771.31
Dutch researchers, meanwhile, made significant advances in the study of 
another sort of electrical phenomena: electricity in animals. It had long been 
known that some types of fish, such as sea torpedoes, Nile catfish or South 
American eels, were capable of exerting powerful numbing effects on other 
animals and even on humans. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the 
dominant explanation of this intriguing phenomenon was a mechanical one. 
According to this explanation, proposed by Réaumur in 1714, the contractions 
of the muscles of the fish could be related to elastic actions of tin “mechanical 
springs” in its body.32 However, a report by a British surgeon, Dale Ingram, 
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who had lived in Suriname and who had personally experienced the shocking 
effects of the eel, suggested that a kind of “electrical energy or spring” might be 
involved. Ingram’s account, which appeared in English and German journals in 
1750, prompted one of the scholars who had assisted at the original Leyden jar 
experiment, Jean Allamand, to make further inquiries.
Allamand addressed himself to an old acquaintance from the days when 
he worked as tutor in the household of the Leiden professor of experimental 
philosophy Willem Jacob ‘s Gravesande, his nephew Laurens Storm van ‘s 
Gravesande. Storm van ‘s Gravesande was thoroughly at home in Dutch Guiana. 
He was first secretary to the then commander of Essequibo in 1738, and had a 
decade later risen to be director-general of Essequibo and Demerara. During a 
brief stay in the Netherlands in 1750 he had, with Allamand, experienced first-
hand the powerful effects of the Leyden jar. Back in Essequibo, ‘s Gravesande 
penned a detailed reply to Allamand’s inquiries about the eel in the Guiana 
rivers. The most striking part of his account, which Allamand published in 1755 
in the transactions of the newly founded Hollandsche Maatschappij der 
Wetenschappen in Haarlem, concerned the resemblance between the effects of 
the eel and those of the Leyden jar. “If one touches the fish,” ‘s Gravesande 
wrote, “[the eel] produces the same effect as the electricity that I felt with you, 
while holding in a hand the bottle that was connected to an electrified tube 
by an iron wire.”33
While Allamand and ‘s Gravesande did not yet state explicitly that the 
numbing effects of the eel were in fact an electrical phenomenon, and not a 
mechanical one, as Réaumur had claimed, this was the conclusion which 
Dutch scholars drew as more and more reports about the eel came in from 
Guiana and a specimen of the fish was carefully studied in Leiden. What par-
ticularly stimulated Dutch scholars was the arrival of an extensive account by 
Frans van der Lott from Essequibo (who had collaborated with Storm van ‘s 
Gravesande and who knew the effects of the Leyden jar firsthand) and the pub-
lication of a detailed description of the fish by Johan Frederik Gronovius’ son, 
Laurens Theodoor. The prominence of Dutch scholars in research on this sub-
ject was no accident. The Netherlands was in the middle decades of the eigh-
teenth century at the forefront of what the French nineteenth-century biologist 
Georges Cuvier called the transformation of the natural history of fishes into 
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“a truly scientific form.”34 The leading ichthyologist of the 1730s, Peter Artedi, 
moved from Sweden via England to the Dutch Republic. His magnum opus 
Ichthyologia was posthumously published in Leiden by his compatriot 
Linnaeus, who had traveled to the Netherlands a few months before.35 
Extensive collections of fishes from various parts of the world were built by 
Albertus Seba in Amsterdam and by Johannes Frederik and Laurens Theodoor 
Gronovius in Leiden. These collections, and Artedi’s work, were the basis of a 
series of detailed case-studies and path-breaking general surveys on ichthyol-
ogy, such as the Museum ichtyologicum, the Zoophylacium Gronovianum and 
the Locupletissimi rerum naturalium Thesauri accurata descriptio, published in 
the 1750s and 1760s.36
The findings of the Dutch researchers soon became known in the schol-
arly world at large. Translations of the texts by Allamand, Van Musschenbroek, 
Gronovius and Van der Lott began to circulate in Latin and German in the 
late fifties, sixties and seventies.37 The first publication in English to affirm 
the electrical nature of the eel was a book on the natural history of Guiana by 
Edward Bancroft of Massachusetts, in 1769. Bancroft had worked as a physi-
cian in Essequibo between about 1763 and 1767 and he knew Van der Lott 
personally. According to James Delbourgo, his “experimental demonstra-
tions of the eel’s electricity closely followed those already conducted by the 
Dutch, from whom he had doubtless learned much.”38 Bancroft’s book trig-
gered a wave of experiments and observations on electrical fishes both in 
colonial America and in England. David Rittenhouse, Ebenezer Kinnersley, 
Isaac Bartram and other fellows of the American Philosophical Society 
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carried out experiments with an electrical eel in Philadelphia in 1773, which 
were promptly reported to England.39 The crowning achievement was a 
series of experiments conducted by John Walsh in London in the 1770s at the 
instigation of Benjamin Franklin. Walsh was able to actually observe a spark 
at the moment when the eel discharged. This clinched the argument about 
the fish’s electrical properties. In his eulogy for Walsh in 1775, the President 
of the Royal Society did not fail to make special mention of the contributions 
of the Dutch researchers.40
 Water, Winds and Currents
Benjamin Franklin, meanwhile, turned his attention to other curious phenom-
ena  in the natural world, which in his view were particularly relevant for the 
shipping industry. The issues which caught his interest concerned the effect of 
oil on water and the pattern of winds and currents in the Atlantic. In his quest 
to solve these aquatic riddles, Franklin helped to bring two circuits of knowl-
edge, which normally functioned in largely separate social spheres, together 
temporarily. These were the circuit of practitioners and the circuit of academ-
ics and members of learned societies, which were described in the introduc-
tion of this essay.
Contacts between these different circuits of knowledge in the Atlantic 
world as such were not unusual. Cadwallader Colden, for example, wrote in 
1744 to Gronovius that he had learned from “Mohawk Indians” that “when 
they were quite faint with travel and fasting” their spirits could be “wonder-
fully” restored with the roots of particular plants. In another letter, he remarked 
that his “negroes told [him] that they have kinds of maize in Africa very differ-
ent from any in this country.”41 Edward Bancroft described how he had called 
on Indians and slaves to assist in his inquiries about the natural history of 
Guiana.42 What was different in the case of the issues broached by Franklin, 
however, were the scale and the methods by which knowledge from various 
circuits were, at least temporarily, brought together. As with research on elec-
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Inquiries on the behavior of water were triggered by a contribution of 
Franklin to the Philosophical Transactions in 1774. In this brief essay, Franklin 
reported how during a voyage on a vessel in the British fleet headed for an 
assault on Louisbourg (Cape Breton) in 1757 he had observed that the wakes of 
two ships were smoother than the others and, when inquiring of the captain 
for the reason, he had been told that the phenomenon must have been caused 
by the greasy water emptied into the sea by the ships’ cooks. Remembering 
later that, long ago, he had come across a remark in Pliny’s Natural history that 
“everybody is aware that…all sea water is made smooth by oil,” Franklin 
resolved, during his stay in England in the sixties and seventies, to find out 
more about the effects of stilling of waves by means of oil by carrying out a 
number of experiments. In addition, Franklin received some first- or second-
hand accounts (including a letter by an official of the Dutch East-India 
Company) on the smoothing effects of oil observed by seamen or fishermen. 
Reflecting on these findings, Franklin suggested that oil could, under certain 
conditions, be usefully employed to diminish the wrinkling raising capacity of 
the wind, and thus smooth the waves and enhance the safety of ships and 
crews.43
Margaret Deacon, who summarized this account in her magisterial study on 
scientists and the sea, does not make mention of any follow-up to Franklin’s 
publication.44 Actually, however, the report did cause a stir, and nowhere more 
so than in the Dutch Republic. The following chain of events shows again that 
colonial possessions were not a sine qua non for the role of Dutch actors in 
flows of knowledge. Cross-Atlantic networks of knowledge could thrive inde-
pendently from the existence of colonial empires.
One of Franklin’s experiments in London, at Green Park in 1773, was 
witnessed by three acquaintances with a Dutch background: Count Willem 
Bentinck, one of the most powerful noblemen in Holland and member of the 
governing board of the University of Leiden, his son John Bentinck, captain in 
the Royal Navy, and Jean Allamand.45 After returning to the Netherlands, 
Allamand repeated Franklin’s experiments with the stilling effects of oil in a 
canal in Leiden in the presence of a number of friends: a retired naval captain, 
a natural philosopher and a merchant and cloth manufacturer, Frans van 
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Lelyveld.46 It was Van Lelyveld who brought the issue into the public square. 
He did so, first by making inquiries among friends, acquaintances and other 
interested persons scattered all over the maritime provinces of the Dutch 
Republic whether they knew anything about the practice of smoothing waves 
by pouring oil or a similar substance; secondly, by promising a reward for the 
best essay on the subject; and thirdly, by publishing, in 1775, a 200-page treatise 
containing all replies and reports, plus translations of selections from the 
writings on the topic by “the very famous English philosopher Benj. Franklin.” 
This lengthy treatise was later translated into French.47 While preparing his 
publication, Van Lelyveld had written to Franklin himself asking him for “any 
emendations or additions” to his original piece. Van Lelyveld was particularly 
interested to know whether the use of oil on water was known among “fisher-
men and navigators” in colonial America too (as Franklin had been silent on 
this point in his original tract).48
The most important finding of Van Lelyveld’s wide-ranging survey was that 
the practice of stilling waves by means of oil turned out to be not only known 
as far back as the time of Pliny, but was in fact still common knowledge among 
different groups of seamen and fishermen in Holland and in many other parts 
of the world, although this knowledge was spread unevenly among groups and 
groups in different localities were often not aware of its presence at other 
places.49 Knowledge did exist, but was localized. Van Lelyveld sent six copies of 
his treatise to Franklin, with kind regards from Allamand.50
Another issue that caught Franklin’s interest concerned the behavior of 
winds and currents in the Atlantic. What patterns could be observed? How 
could these patterns be explained? Members of learned societies, especially in 
the English-speaking Atlantic world, had more than once engaged with those 
questions, but not in a sustained fashion. In the early days of the Royal Society 
the issue was discussed by, among others, Isaac Vossius and Edmond Halley. 
During his stay in England after 1670, Vossius published an English version of 
his book on winds, tides and currents, A treatise concerning the motion of the 
seas and winds, which had first appeared as De motu marium et ventorum liber 
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Incognitae. The Annals of the Society for the History of Discoveries 3 (1971): 7–31.
52 Arthur H. Robinson, Early thematic mapping in the history of cartography (Chicago/
London: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 46–48.
53 Deacon, Scientists and the sea, 220–222; Waarnemingen over een stroom welke dikwyls 
stand grypt ten westen van Scilly…door James Rennell…uit het Engelsch vertaald, en met 
in Amsterdam in 1663. In this treatise Vossius refused to admit any motion of 
the seas and winds “which I could not if it were necessary confirm by infinite 
Testimonies and Experiments of sea men.”51 Edmond Halley in 1686 published 
a thematic map of the Northern and Southern Atlantic, which for the first time 
used showed rows of strokes (and sometimes arrowheads) as symbols to indi-
cate the direction and strength of winds. This wind pattern according to Halley 
was repeatedly reproduced on English and Dutch charts in the first decades of 
the eighteenth century.52
Thanks to Franklin, interest in this issue revived in scholarly circles about 
1770. Franklin suggested it might be useful for seafarers seeking fast passage 
across the Atlantic (such as captains of packet boats) to have a chart depicting 
“the Dimentions Course and Swiftness” of the current along the American 
coast commonly called by seamen “the Gulph Stream.” At Franklin’s request, a 
captain from Nantucket, Timothy Folger, marked the Gulf Stream on an exist-
ing chart, which was sent to the Post Office in London and printed by Mount & 
Page in 1768. Revised versions of the chart were published by Franklin himself 
in 1782 and 1786, the latter one in the second volume of Transactions of the 
American Philosophical Society. Another chart of the Atlantic currents was 
published by an English physician, Charles Blagden in the transactions of the 
Royal Society in 1781. Systematic research on patterns of winds and currents in 
the Atlantic Ocean really started with the work of a former seaman and sur-
veyor of the East-India Company, James Rennell, who collected a huge mass of 
data on every ocean of the world from ships’ logbooks and other sources. 
Although his magnum opus on currents in the Atlantic Ocean was not pub-
lished until 1832, some of his ideas and findings circulated in Britain (and 
beyond) long before that date. A Dutch translation of Rennell’s observations 
on a current to the Westward of the Scilly islands, first published in the 
Philosophical Transactions in 1793, appeared in Amsterdam a year later. Added 
to the translation of Rennell’s text were translations of selected parts from 
Blagden’s article of 1781 and summaries of observations on the Gulf Stream 
published in an American magazine, The American Museum.53
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 Facilities and Forces
The growth of shipping in the North Atlantic and its increased regularity 
since the late seventeenth century was no doubt an important underlying 
factor that facilitated the emergence of transatlantic networks of knowledge. 
“The growing maritime commerce [between 1675 and 1740], particularly in the 
Leeward Islands, Jamaica, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania, increased the 
flow of transatlantic news and narrowed the space and time between colo-
nies,” Ian Steele has written.54 Communication thus became faster and more 
regular as traffic increased. The consequences of this change were not restricted 
to the English Atlantic world. Communication between British American colo-
nies and regions outside the British empire became easier as well. Alexander 
Garden in Charleston remarked for example in a letter to Carolus Linnaeus in 
1755 that there were four or five ships every year sailing from South Carolina to 
Rotterdam which could take mail.55
Although packet boat services between England and the West Indies were 
in operation on a regular basis since 1744, and between England and North 
America since 1755,56 actors in transatlantic networks of knowledge commonly 
used other channels of communication to send each other parcels and letters. 
These circuits of exchange could only be maintained if it was easy to find peo-
ple who could be trusted to deliver packages safely and promptly to the right 
destination. The persons whom members of the scholarly Atlantic regarded – 
next to kinsmen, friends and fellow-scholars – as the most reliable carriers of 
messages, were merchants and, to a lesser extent, clergymen (or their rela-
tives). The growth and persistence of the scholarly Atlantic was in this way not 
only supported by the expansion of shipping but also by the development of 
commercial networks.57 Johan Frederik Gronovius and his correspondents 
made mention in their letters of merchants whom they considered a safe pair 
of hands for the transmission of letters and packages. Lewis Johnston in the 
1730s asked Gronovius to leave packages in the care of “mr. Bernard van der 
 eenige Aantekeningen vermeerderd door Jacob Florijn (Amsterdam: G. Hulst v. K., 1794), 
esp. Introduction, A3 (and footnote) and Appendix.
54 Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675–1740. An exploration of communication and 
community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 275.
55 Alexander Garden to Carolus Linnaeus, 15 March 1755, The Linnaean Correspondence, 
linnaeus.c18.net, letter L886 (consulted 17 July 2012).
56 Steele, The English Atlantic, 10. The first packet service to the West Indies, started in 1702, 
was discontinued after 1715. See Steele, chapter 9.
57 Cf. also Delbourgo, A most amazing scene of wonders, 18, 22.
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59 Gronovius to Richardson, 2 September 1738, in Extracts from the literary and scientific 
correspondence of Richard Richardson, 375–380, esp. 375; Gronovius to Richardson, 
7 December 1739, in idem, 381–382, esp. 381; Gronovius to Linnaeus, 11 November 1738, 
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Gronovius to Colden, 6 August 1743, in Selections from the scientific correspondence 
of Cadwallader Colden, ed. Gray, 4–7, 6; Gronovius to Colden, 3 April 1744, in idem, 7–8 
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60 Joyce D. Goodfriend, “The Dutch book trade in colonial New York City: The transatlantic 
connection,” in Books between Europe and the Americas. Connections and communities, 
1620–1860, ed. Leslie Howsam and James Raven (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 128–
156, esp. 134–146; Joseph H. Dubbs and William J. Hinke, The Reformed Church in 
Pennsylvania, part IX (Lancaster: The Society, 1902) chapter 7.
61 Gronovius to Colden, 6 August 1743, in Selections from the scientific correspondence of 
Cadwallader Colden, ed. Gray, 4–7, esp. 4; Gronovius to Bartram, 2 July 1750, in Darlington, 
ed., Memorials, 358; Gronovius to Bartram, 10 June 1754, in idem, 360–363, esp. 361–362.
62 Cf. Cook, Matters of exchange, passim; Daniel Margócsy, “Advertising cadavers in the 
republic of letters: anatomical publications in the early modern Netherlands,” British 
Journal for the History of Science, 42 (2009): 187–210; idem, “A museum of wonders or a 
cemetery of corpses? The commercial exchange of anatomical collections in Early 
Modern Netherlands,” in Silent messengers: The circulation of material objects of knowl-
edge in the Early Modern Low Countries, ed. Sven Dupré and Christoph Lüthy (Berlin-
Münster: lit Verlag, 2011), 185–215.
Grift,” merchant at the Keizersgracht in Amsterdam.58 Gronovius himself 
relied for his safe correspondence on Hudig and Papin in Rotterdam and on 
Messrs. Van der Velde and Messrs. Van Zadelhoff in Amsterdam.59 Religious 
networks sometimes fulfilled a similar function as networks of merchants. 
There existed in the eighteenth century regular contacts between the Reformed 
Church in the Netherlands and Dutch-speaking Protestant communities in 
New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.60 Thus, Gronovius also sent messages 
to British America with Protestant ministers and a son “of the Archbishop of 
Uppsala.”61
However, ocean shipping and commercial and religious networks should 
be seen as vehicles of communication rather than as the main driving forces 
of the development of circuits of knowledge. True, some members of the 
scholarly Atlantic, such as Colden, Logan, Franklin, Collinson or Van Lelyveld 
were entrepreneurs themselves. Others, such as Storm van ‘s Gravesande, 
were in the service of a chartered company. A few, such as Allamand, were 
trained as ministers of a Protestant church. A market for curiosities, instru-
ments and publications on science and scholarship definitely did exist.62  
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48; Marc J. Ratcliff, “Abraham Trembley’s strategy of generosity and the scope of celebrity 
in the mid-eighteenth century,” Isis, 95 (2004): 555–575.
65 See for this distinction Delbourgo, A most amazing scene of wonders, 18–20.
Yet there is no evidence that commercial or religious interests and values 
were the mainspring of the emergence and evolution of knowledge net-
works. Circulation of knowledge was facilitated by these factors, but was 
only partly caused by it.
To explain the structure and dynamics of the transatlantic circuits of knowl-
edge we should also take the values, attitudes and informal codes of the 
Republic of Letters into account. The scholarly Atlantic was the Republic of 
Letters writ large. The creation and maintenance of transoceanic networks of 
knowledge offered substantial benefits to their members on both sides of the 
Atlantic. These benefits did not (primarily) consist in material rewards, but 
were mainly paid out in the form of status. The rules of the game were similar 
to those described by Anne Goldgar in her anthropology of the European 
Republic of Letters between ca. 1680 and 1750. The essential principles of the 
Republic of Letters were an ethic of cooperation and reciprocity, an ideal of 
openness and the assignment of status on the basis of merit (in the eyes of 
colleagues) plus the idea of primacy of harmony over religious and political 
dissension.63 Generosity could be more rewarding than striving for commer-
cial gain.64
The principles of the Republic of Letters also underlay the development of 
the networks of knowledge in the North Atlantic in the eighteenth century. 
Although relations between, on the one hand, “colonial observers” in British 
American colonies and Dutch Guiana and, on the other hand, “metropolitans” 
in Britain and Continental Europe initially may have been unequal,65 such 
connections nevertheless could be beneficial for both sides, as we have seen. 
For colonials, being a valued supplier of specimens and information in regular 
correspondence with established scholars in Britain or Continental Europe 
served as a mark of distinction and provided them with admission to a larger 
scholarly world. For metropolitans, engaging in correspondence with colonials 
presented them not only with a useful source of “raw materials” for their own 
work but also enhanced their status among fellow-members of the scholarly 
world: the more clients and admirers, the higher the rank. Once admitted to 
the “club,” colonials could attain a higher status on the basis of merit, too, as 
the case of Franklin proves.
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(Maarssen: apa Holland, 1981) and Karel Davids, “Amsterdam as a centre of learning in 
the Dutch Golden Age, c. 1580–1700,” in Urban achievement in early modern Europe: 
Golden Ages in Antwerp, Amsterdam and London, ed. Patrick O’Brien, Derek Keene, 
Marjolein ‘t Hart and Herman van der Wee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2001), 305–323.
68 Frijhoff, La société néerlandaise et ses gradués, 98–99 and annexe 2.
The idea that harmony among scholars should overrule religious and 
political differences, was strongly in evidence in the scholarly Atlantic as 
well. Even during wartime, scholars from different countries were supposed 
to maintain friendly relations as usual. During the War of the Austrian 
Succession, for example, John Bartram complained to Gronovius that “it was 
very discouraging to think that all [his] labour and charges” might fall into 
the hands of French or Spanish privateers, who would take “no further care 
of them than to heave them overboard into the sea. If [he] could know that 
they fell into the hands of men of learning and curiosity [he] would be more 
easy about them.” Cadwallader Colden had found a practical solution: on the 
outside of his packet to Gronovius he had added a kind request in French, 
asking privateers to send the content “to the gentlemen of the Royal Garden 
in Paris.”66
This chapter has shown that Dutch actors, and especially scholars based 
in Leiden, played a significant role as creators and brokers of knowledge in 
the eighteenth-century Atlantic world. Remarkably, their role in the devel-
opment and maintenance of networks of knowledge in the Atlantic per-
sisted long after the Dutch Republic had entered its terminal phase as an 
economic and political power. How can this phenomenon be explained? 
Both generational and structural factors should be taken into account. The 
influence of Dutch scholars in Atlantic circuits of knowledge in the eigh-
teenth century was in part a consequence of the peak in the international 
appeal of Dutch universities reached between ca. 1680 and 1730.67 The 
number of foreign students flocking to Dutch universities in that period 
was higher than ever before or since. In the first quarter of the eighteenth 
century, almost a third of all graduates of Dutch graduates came from 
abroad.68 Among the Dutch institutions of higher learning, the University 
of Leiden proved to be especially attractive to English-speaking students. 
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Of all students from the British Isles and North America in the Netherlands 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, nearly three-quarters took a 
degree in Leiden. Between 1680 and 1730, more than 860 Scottish students 
alone matriculated there.69
The “British wave” to the Dutch universities, especially Leiden, between 
1680 and 1730 had long-term effects in two ways. First, it created a network of 
alumni in the English-speaking world on both sides of the Atlantic, who had a 
first-hand acquaintance with the Netherlands and could also act as carriers of 
Dutch cultural and intellectual influence. Esther Mijers has argued that the 
fact that Scotland became part of the European Republic of Letters was a result 
of its “cultural and institutional connections with the United Provinces.”70  
A number of correspondents in America and Britain in Gronovius’ network, 
such as Lewis Johnston, Isaac Lawson, Richard Richardson and Phineas Bond, 
were alumni of Leiden University as well.71 Secondly, the presence of so many 
English-speaking students in Leiden offered an opportunity for Dutch students 
to learn and practice the English language. This probably explains why Johan 
Frederik Gronovius possessed such a good command of English. One of the 
striking aspects of Gronovius’ correspondence is that he communicated with 
his British and American correspondents not in Latin or in French, but in 
English. Thus, the “old boys network” of the Leiden alumni formed significant 
social capital, which helped to underpin the role of Dutch actors in Atlantic 
circuits of knowledge.
In addition, there were factors that kept this role intact even after the 
attractiveness of the Dutch universities for English-speaking students had 
begun to decline after the 1730s. The Netherlands also boasted an abundance 
of cultural capital embedded in its infrastructure of knowledge: its libraries, 
botanical gardens, anatomical theaters, collections of instruments and cabi-
nets of curiosities and publishing houses constantly turning out books for 
both foreign and domestic markets. A large part of this infrastructure 
remained in place until at least the last decades of the eighteenth century. 
Jean Allamand was still busily networking between foreign authors and 
Leiden publishers in the 1760s and 1770s. The Gronovius collection of fish 
remained in Leiden till Laurens Theodoor’s death in 1777, when it became a 
prized object for foreign buyers. The natural history collection of Stadtholder 
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The growth and persistence of this extensive infrastructure of knowledge in the 
Dutch Republic was in no small measure due to the vast amount of private wealth 
amassed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some of its citizens could 
easily afford to pay for costly publications out of their own pocket. The Amsterdam 
banker George Clifford published in 1738 the Hortus Cliffortianus, a systematic 
description of the plants in his private botanical garden made by Carolus Linnaeus, 
at his own expense, and refused to sell any copies on the market. The 200-odd cop-
ies distributed by 1739 were all given as gifts. When the first copies finally did come 
on the market via auctions, they fetched 28 guilders apiece.73 Johan Frederik 
Gronovius, with an estate valued at more than 63,000 guilders, financed the publi-
cation of Linnaeus’ Systema naturae and his own Flora Virginica himself.74
Private wealth could be transformed into physical infrastructure for knowl-
edge production too. A prime example is the Teylers Stichting, a learned insti-
tution in Haarlem founded in 1778, which was funded from the immense 
fortune left by merchant-entrepreneur Pieter Teyler van der Hulst. The curator 
of the Stichting, Martinus van Marum, in 1783 managed to persuade the direc-
tors to order a huge electrical machine from the Amsterdam instrument maker 
John Cuthbertson, which for a long time was the most powerful one of its kind 
in Europe. Indeed, Teyler’s device enjoyed such as high reputation in the schol-
arly world that scientists abroad, such as Alessandro Volta in Italy, sometimes 
expressly asked Van Marum to run particular experiments with his unique 
“grande machine electrique.”75 In these ways, the past creation of wealth 
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allowed Dutch actors to continue to play a key role in the production and cir-
culation of knowledge independently of the status of the Netherlands as a 
colonial power in the Atlantic.
 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on actors and their connections, more specifically on 
the role of Dutch actors in scholarly circuits of knowledge between Britain, the 
Dutch Republic and colonies in the Americas. The perspective has shifted from 
institutional forces such as imperial governments, religious organizations, 
trading companies and scientific societies to network-building by individuals, 
or groups of people, from below. What this approach reveals is that even if 
some participants were more equal than others, the structure of the networks 
of knowledge in the eighteenth century was polycentric rather than monocen-
tric and did not show any kind of enduring hierarchy. Moreover, this different 
perspective has also allowed us to catch a glimpse of the networks’ dynamics: 
circuits of knowledge in the North Atlantic became over time more integrated 
in a spatial sense, existing circuits of knowledge on a specific subject, such as 
plants, also went on to serve as channels for knowledge on other topics, such as 
fish or electricity, and circuits of knowledge which usually functioned in sepa-
rate social spheres, e.g. those of scholars and seamen, could temporarily be 
brought together. In all these respects, Dutch actors played a much more sig-
nificant part in the development and maintenance of knowledge networks in 
the North Atlantic than a top-down, institutional perspective would suggest.
The emergence and evolution of these knowledge networks was aided by 
the growth of shipping as well as by the development of commercial and reli-
gious networks, but they were not driven by these forces. Likewise, they could 
be connected to colonial possessions, but they were not necessarily dependent 
on their presence. To explain the structure and dynamics of the networks of 
knowledge, the values, attitudes and informal codes developed in the European 
Republic of Letters should be taken into account as well. In the eighteenth 
century, the Republic of Letters expanded in the Atlantic world irrespective of 
existing borders between different colonial empires.
In this scholarly Atlantic, Dutch actors played a significant role as creators 
and brokers of knowledge thanks to a combination of generational and struc-
tural factors. They could build both on the social capital formed in the heyday 
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of English-speaking students to the University of Leiden between 1680 and 
1730 and on the pre-existing, highly-developed infrastructure of knowledge in 
the Dutch Republic, as well as on the substantial wealth accumulated by its 
citizens. These factors may explain why Dutch actors continued to play a 
prominent role in the development and maintenance of networks of knowl-
edge in the Atlantic long after the Dutch Republic had started to lose its status 
as a first-rate economic and political power.76
This essay has concentrated on connections between Britain, the Dutch 
Republic and British and Dutch colonies in the Americas, while showing along 
the way that the Netherlands in the eighteenth century in some respects served 
as a hub of knowledge for scholars from Sweden, France and Italy too. If we 
would expand the scope of the analysis to include all scholarly networks in the 
eighteenth-century Atlantic, the picture would doubtless be enriched, refined 
or modified at a number of points. On the one hand, we might expect to find 
many similarities to the patterns discussed above, given underlying constants 
such as the prevalence of values, attitudes and informal codes of the Republic 
of Letters or the persistence of the spatial location of cultural capital. On the 
other hand, we should not be surprised to discover that scholarly relations 
between France, French colonies and the Dutch Republic developed some-
what differently than the Anglo-Dutch connections discussed in this article. 
State agencies in France weighed more heavily in the accumulation and 
exchange of knowledge than in Britain, most Dutch scholars were more fluent 
in French than in English and French students did not flock to Dutch universi-
ties in the same numbers as students from England or Scotland. Spanish and 
Dutch networks of knowledge likewise showed interesting differences in struc-
ture and dynamics.77 The scholarly Atlantic, in short, will definitely benefit 
from further comparative research.
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1 The three paintings are View of Itamaracá (1637), Franciscan Convent (ca. 1675–80), and 
Riverside Village (ca. 1675–1680). The well known View of Olinda (1662), to this day a star 
attraction at the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, entered the collection (by purchase) in 1881. See
 Pedro Corrêa do Lago and Bia Corrêa do Lago, Frans Post, 1612–1680: Catalogue Raisonné 
(Milan: 5 Continents, 2007) [henceforth Corrêa do Lago, Post], cat. 1, 153–154; and cf. cat. 52 
(the View of Olinda). On the place of Post in the Rijksmuseum's collections, see Rebecca 
Parker Brienen, "Who Owns Frans Post? Collecting Frans Post’s Brazilian Landscapes," in The 
Legacy of Dutch Brazil: The Long-Term Impact of a Short-Lived Atlantic Colony, ed. Michiel van 
Groesen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 229–247. Note that a national 
("rijks") museum existed in the Netherlands in some form from the very late eighteenth cen-
tury, yet the permanent and grand shape of the current Rijksmuseum came to be when the 
building that presently houses it opened to much acclaim in 1885.
2 Kaiser to the Minister of Binnenlandse Zaken, quoted in Brienen, "Who Owns Frans Post?" 
The title of the late panel painting (Figure  10.2) has been updated in some recent 
The “Dutch” “Atlantic” and the Dubious Case  
of Frans Post
Benjamin Schmidt
I From Dutch Atlantic to European Exoticism
Did Frans Post paint Dutch Brazil? In 1879 – exactly 200 years after the death of 
Johan Maurits “the Brazilian” (1604–1679), the famously admired governor of 
the Dutch colony during its heyday who brought Post to Brazil as part of his 
princely entourage – the Rijksmuseum wagered its money brashly on the affir-
mative. In that year it acquired no fewer than three paintings by the artist, 
among the first to enter the permanent collections of the newly installed 
national museum, which arose in its current form a few years later in 1885 
(another Post painting would be purchased in 1881 and two more before the 
close of the century).1 In one of these early acquisitions, the View of Itamaracá 
(Figure 10.1), the director of the museum at that time, Johan Wilhelm Kaiser, 
perceived in the central figure on horseback none other than Governor Johan 
Maurits van Nassau-Siegen garbed in his “Brazilian costume.” Another paint-
ing represented “a house of a Dutch colonist in Brazil,” the proud owners stroll-
ing toward the portico-shaded entrance of their substantial New World home 
(Figure 10.2). And so it goes: the paintings told the story through pictures, like 
the Itamaracá canvas and the others, of the Dutch colonial presence in South 
America and the Netherlands’ prosperous empire in the Atlantic World.2
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Figure 10.2   Frans Post, Franciscan Convent, circa 1675–80, oil on panel (16.5 × 25 cm), 
Rijksmuseum (object no. SK-A-4273), Amsterdam.
Figure 10.1   Frans Post, View of Itamaracá, 1637, oil on canvas (63.5 × 89.5 cm), Rijksmuseum 
(object no. SK-A-4271), Amsterdam (on long-term loan to the Mauritshuis, The 
Hague).
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 catalogues (see, e.g., Corrêa do Lago, Post, 336), yet it entered the collections of the 
Rijksmuseum as "Landschap met het huis van een Hollandse kolonist in Brazilië [Landscape 
with the house of a Dutch colonist in Brazil]." While the Rijksmuseum has recently changed 
this labeling ("Kerkelijk gebouw in Brazilië [Ecclesiastical (lit. churchly) building in Brazil]"), 
the older title, with its presumption of colonial imagery, lingers in the online (thus relatively 
recently vetted) description of the painting: https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/explore-the-
collection/overview/frans-jansz-post/objects#/SK-A-4273,1 [accessed 15 June 2013]. Note also 
that, until the Rijksmuseum's reinstallation in 2013, the Post paintings in the collection were 
hung in the "History Section" of the museum, as they were understood to narrate the national 
history of the Netherlands.
Only they did not: neither painting, in fact, highlights a Dutch scene per se, 
while both – along with the Rijksmuseum’s impressive View of Olinda 
(Figure 10.3) and the vast majority of paintings done by Post in the intervening 
decades of production between these notably early and late compositions – 
present a tropical world that is hardly Dutch, perhaps Portuguese, and deter-
minately exotic. What Post did paint was a new world of nature – lush, green, 
resplendent, intriguing, and seemingly indomitable – and the various European 
attempts to fit themselves into it. In the View of Itamaracá, likely the first 
oil painting by the artist executed in Brazil (he sketched landscapes and sea-
scapes en route to South America and also produced several highly finished 
drawings, mostly undated, in ink and wash), a slender slice of Dutch life can be 
Figure 10.3   Frans Post, View of Olinda, 1662, oil on canvas (107.5 × 172.5 cm), Rijksmuseum 
(object no. SK-A-742), Amsterdam.
252 Schmidt
<UN>
3 Corrêa do Lago, Post, 88; and see ibid., 52, where the original label is reproduced.
4 Corrêa do Lago, Post, cat. 154.
detected in the background: beneath the meager town of Itamaracá, perched 
on the hill, rests a still smaller representation of Fort Orange, nestled on the 
coast. Yet the dominant subject of the painting, as Kaiser himself noted, is the 
tranquil scene of four figures, two African and two European, one of whom 
travels on horseback – in “the Portuguese mode of riding,” according to a con-
temporary label affixed to the painting around the time it entered the French 
royal collections in 1679.3 This modest, languid progression does not embrace 
the high-born Dutch governor – the central figure barely registers his atten-
dants’ attention – but offers instead a diverting device to animate the absorb-
ing layers of the landscape: land (verdant), water (calm), and sky (clouded, yet 
this would change in later compositions).
While these visual elements might fluctuate somewhat over the years – 
smatterings of people come and go, as do the not terribly impressive and often 
decrepit man-made structures – they served chiefly to anchor and align Post’s 
compositions and to guide the viewer’s vision toward the far richer materials 
of the surrounding landscape. The magnificent View of Olinda, completed a 
quarter of a century later, by which time the painter could claim a productive 
career as a specialist of such scenes, centers on a dilapidated (but functional) 
cathedral, in front of which congregate an assembly of Catholic and presum-
ably Portuguese parishioners. Cassocked (Franciscan) friars mill about the 
entrance, exchange greetings with broad-hatted (Portuguese) men and heavily 
veiled (Portuguese) women, while brightly dressed (African) slaves wait 
patiently below. Vying for the viewer’s attention, however, is the splendid 
repoussoir, left and right, which encompasses a sloth, monkey, anteater, arma-
dillo, iguana, and giant toad; not to mention a pineapple, several gourds, and 
various species of American flora on which alight vividly hued birds. There is 
more to this substantial canvas – among Post’s largest – but there is barely a 
sign of the Dutch in Brazil. By the time Post produces his “house of a Dutch 
colonist in Brazil” – this late-in-life painting is now more properly labeled 
Franciscan Convent – he distills his composition to its essentials.4 Palms fill the 
panel, both in the distant countryside (to the rear) and the dark repoussoir (to 
the right), where one imagines lurking the exotic fauna that the elderly painter 
can no longer quite delineate. There is, once again, a gathering of figures to 
train the eye to the heart of the composition; yet this modest muster is, 
once again, mostly dressed in the Portuguese style (the figure closest to the 
convent may be a nun; there is also a solitary slave). The structure in the center, 
furthermore – occupying a space laboriously cleared, one imagines, from the 
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thick vegetation of the tropics, which veritably threaten to subsume it anew – 
is surely no colonist’s house, as the cross balanced on the rooftop ridge con-
firms. It is a house of Catholic worship, and imagining otherwise speaks more 
to nineteenth-century collectors’ aspirations than seventeenth-century paint-
erly intentions.
Frans Post’s paintings of “Dutch” Brazil have been historically misread, not 
least since the Dutch moment in colonial Brazil (1630–1654), and the more 
extensive Dutch presence in the Atlantic that it is said to epitomize, have like-
wise been misconstrued. To recalibrate this essay’s opening question: was there 
a Dutch Atlantic? The Dutch thrived in the Atlantic world, to be sure, especially 
in the early to middle decades of the seventeenth century, a period that over-
laps with Post’s sojourn in Brazil (1636–1644) and with the expansion of the 
West India Company’s imperium: in North America (New Netherland), along 
the Coast of West Africa (including Loango-Angola), and encompassing the siz-
able swathe of South America conquered by Johan Maurits (seven captaincies 
of Brazil). There was not only a Dutch moment of expansion and empire in the 
Atlantic, but an exemplary constellation of colonies and forts, trade and settle-
ment, which brought together considerable portions of the Atlantic basin – 
North, South, East, and West. But this impressive, optimistic, land-based empire 
quickly receded over the middle and later decades of the century – Angola was 
lost to the Portuguese in 1648, Brazil fell shortly after that (1654), and New 
Netherland reverted to English forces in 1664 and was rechristened New York. 
The Dutch West India Company itself was considerably diminished: it declared 
bankruptcy in 1674, after which it was dissolved.5 But the Dutch do not so much 
disappear from the Atlantic in these years as shift discreetly to the background. 
Rather than maintaining a full-scale empire, they support smaller trading 
posts, modest plantations (in the Guianas), and industrious entrepôts working 
behind the scenes. They pursue inter-Atlantic shipping and other forms of 
exchange that capitalize on their well-honed skills as commercial intermediar-
ies. The Dutch reconfigure their Atlantic world such that, if the façade of the 
imperial structure was no longer especially prominent – gone were the ambi-
tious colonies in Brazil and North America; infrequent were any bona fide 
“houses of Dutch colonists” – there was much that remained nonetheless in 
the fine details of their Atlantic composition, apparent upon closer inspection 
(as the chapters in this volume amply demonstrate).
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These shifts are reflected, as well, in the Dutch cultural artifacts that engage 
with the Atlantic world, of which Post’s paintings are among the most visually 
remarkable and deservedly well known. Post’s oeuvre should be seen in the 
context of the changing fortunes of the Dutch both in the Atlantic and in 
Europe. Certainly, the perception of the Atlantic sphere altered over the seven-
teenth century from the perspective of the Netherlands: from a highly inter-
ested and patriotic conception of the Dutch place in America – the early 
decades of the century witnessed the development of topoi and depictions 
that closely linked the Netherlands with the New World and imagined a special 
kinship between the American indigenes and their Dutch allies, who would 
have shared (so it was proposed) a mutual antipathy toward an expansive 
Habsburg empire – to one that tended to dilute or even obscure the Dutch 
presence in the Atlantic.6 In the later decades of the seventeenth century, as 
the Dutch lost most of their American colonies and suffered setbacks, as well, 
in European wars against France and Britain, they also lost their interest in the 
sort of provincial geographies of America that had up until that point pre-
vailed. The number of sources addressing the Dutch in Brazil, for example, 
sharply decline (the colony of New Netherland had never featured particularly 
prominently in print or painting); and the popular refrain of “Spanish tyranny 
in America,” a rallying cry for so many of the colonial factions, all but disap-
pears.7 The Dutch do produce over these years a considerable number of 
books, prints, maps, atlases, and images otherwise dedicated to the Atlantic 
world; yet they do not place much emphasis in these sources on the Dutch 
presence in the region or on Dutch aspirations in the West, real or illusory. 
They address, rather, a more widely European audience, and they speak to 
generically European (as opposed to Dutch, British, French, Spanish, and so 
on) interests in the Atlantic sphere. They produce texts and images that illus-
trate the tropical nature of the New World, describe the wondrous inhabitants 
of America (and Africa), and incorporate the Atlantic into broader forms of 
global geography. But they do not linger especially on any Dutch achievement 
or any Dutch angle in the Atlantic. They move, in short, from a form of patri-
otic geography to a formulation of European exoticism. Indeed, in the later 
decades of the seventeenth century the Dutch become leading intermediar-
ies  of geographic imagery – primary purveyors of descriptions of the 
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non-European world, in word and image, pitched to an audience of 
European consumers – just as they were becoming leading intermediaries of 
Atlantic trade.8
If Post’s paintings do not fit these patterns perfectly – while cultural forms 
tend to track political and economic developments, they rarely trace them that 
precisely – they do correspond to the rough contours of Dutch activities in the 
Atlantic. Following an initial moment of direct engagement with the colonial 
project of Johan Maurits – the early paintings typically contain representa-
tions of Dutch forts and settlements, inconspicuous though these may be – 
Post’s compositions turn thereafter to less localized and more broadly “exotic” 
scenes. After recording the Dutch in Brazil, that is, during their brief period of 
hegemony, Post deploys his landscapes to convey a more pleasingly generic 
sense of the exotic world. This in itself is not surprising. There was not much 
left to paint of Dutch Brazil after 1654 beyond the vestiges of a colony quickly 
squandered; exotic naturalia were more compelling. What does cause pause, 
however, and invite correction is the stubborn consensus among critics that 
Post’s paintings somehow memorialized the Dutch imperial moment in Brazil, 
catalogued Dutch settlements and successes in the New World, and celebrated 
the Dutch presence in America – and, by extension, in the Atlantic. “Post’s 
images of Brazil,” runs a fairly typical assessment, “were expensive in his day 
and undoubtedly appealed to the Dutchman’s patriotic sense of his nation as a 
world power with a global reach.”9 This undoubtedly is wrong, and this notion 
of a patriotic and particularly Dutch Atlantic misses the point: of the quality 
and nature of Posts’ paintings, and of the shape and significance of the Dutch 
Atlantic. This fairly reflexive misreading of Post’s oeuvre derives from and 
feeds into a greater misunderstanding: an incorrect sense of the early modern 
Dutch conception of and attitude toward the Atlantic world. Post exemplified 
a certain engagement with Europe’s exotic world, yet not necessarily or 
straightforwardly with a “Dutch” “Atlantic” per se. By exploring Post’s paintings 
and trying to understand how they work, this essay also seeks to analyze the 
broader cultural engagement of the Dutch with the tropical world and to prob-
lematize the conceit of a particularly Dutch Atlantic.
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II Among the Saints and Serpents: Post’s “Brilliant” Brazil
Frans Post (1612–1680) ranks among the first European artists to paint 
America in America: he is by most measures the first on-site landscape 
painter of the New World tropics. In 1636 Post accompanied the incoming 
Dutch governor, Johan Maurits, to Brazil, where he served the count as court 
painter for eight years, producing images – paintings, sketches, preparatory 
drawings – principally of the lay of the land, its natural features, and its built 
environment. Of his life prior to that voyage nearly nothing is known.10 Born 
in Haarlem, he came from a family of artists. His father was a glass painter 
and may have worked in the miniaturist mode that Post would later assimi-
late into his own paintings; his older brother, Pieter Post, is considered 
among the leading architects of the Dutch Golden Age, a master of Baroque 
classicism, and Pieter may have recommended his younger brother to Nassau. 
Post’s early years in Haarlem also coincided with those of the landscape 
painters Samuel and Jacob van Ruysdael and of Frans Hals, who painted 
Post’s portrait sometime in the mid-seventeenth century (Figure  10.4); yet 
there is no indication that he trained with these well-known artists.11 Post, in 
all events, was a gifted draftsman who produced several superb sketches 
both en route to and during his Brazilian sojourn, and these later served as 
models for engraved prints that would appear in the quasi-official history of 
Nassau’s tenure in America, the Rerum per octennium in Brasilia, published 
in 1647.12 Post made further Brazilian sketches for his own use – none of 
these remain – and these along with his “official” drawings provided a font of 
imagery for the artist when he returned to the Netherlands in 1644 and 
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Figure 10.4   Frans Hals, Portrait of Frans Jansz. Post, circa 1655, oil on panel (27.5 × 23 cm), 
Worcester Art Museum.
turned to landscape painting, specializing in the sort of exotic landscape – 




 made from now lost sketches done in situ, a variant of the "clean copy" drawings Post did 
for printers: see Corrêa do Lago, Post, 371–392, especially 389–392. On "exotiscapes," com-
pare the discussion in Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global 
Cultural Economy," Public Culture 2, no. 2 (1990): 1–24, where Appadurai coins the term 
"ethnoscapes."
14 My discussion of the artist's phases of production borrows from the schema outlined in 
Corrêa do Lago, Post, yet with two mild distinctions: I would propose a slightly earlier 
transition to the so-called third phase (perhaps beginning in 1659 and the painting that 
appears as cat. 44 in ibid.). I would also suggest that the distinction between the so-called 
third and fourth phases is less thematic (as is argued by Corrêa do Lago) than a matter of 
age and declining painterly skill. What is useful, in all events, is to distinguish between the 
period in Brazil and just after, on the one hand, and the height of production and success 
from around 1660 to the mid-1670s, on the other hand, when Post produces his most char-
acteristic paintings.
The second act in Post’s career veered in a significantly new direction. 
Having painted and sketched for the prince, he now produced for the market; 
he shifted, that is, from making site-specific paintings and prints for a patron to 
painting for profit. Absent in this transformation was any sense that he needed 
to paint for patria – to create patriotic images for a Dutch clientele that may 
have harbored nostalgia for Brazil – and Post’s landscapes over this period 
(roughly the late 1640s through the late 1650s) pivot from not particularly, yet 
still vaguely, Dutch presentations of colonial Brazil to far more indeterminate 
and generic forms of exotic landscape. Indeed, as the years progressed, Post’s 
compositions showed less and less fidelity to any actual scenes he may have 
observed and recorded in Brazil, as they began to offer more and more by way 
of the vividly tropical imagery that would soon secure his reputation. 
And Post’s reputation – to judge from the evidence of his expanding output – 
blossomed in these years based on his ability to paint verdant images of 
tropical America, sometimes with scenes extracted from the towns and vil-
lages of Northern Brazil (where the Dutch had briefly colonized) but more 
often with the flourishing flora and fauna of the tropics, which typically spilled 
out of the paintings’ thick repoussoirs. If in the so-called second phase there 
remains some correlation, presumably, to earlier-made sketches, by the 1660s 
if not earlier (the so-called third phase) Post’s settings become altogether more 
freely composed – they decidedly do not accord with known perspectives and 
vedute in Brazil – as the paintings take on a richer, looser, more fantastic 
aspect.14 During this period, the most prolific and successful of his career, 
Post also develops the form – or better, the formula – that would distinguish 
his most characteristic paintings. Deep blue skies dusted with lazy white 
clouds occupy the upper half of the paintings and top thinly-painted distant 
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backgrounds; some manner of man-made structure, very often religious in 
form and animated by briskly painted staffage, fills the middle grounds of the 
compositions; and dense renditions of Brazilian plants and animals, creeping 
along the very edges of the lower panel, make up the carefully painted fore-
grounds. Post did some dozen or so landscapes in this mode that are gener-
ally  dated to the first half of the 1660s – the Rijksmuseum’s generously 
proportioned View of Olinda follows this schema (see Figure  10.3). And he 
painted another half dozen of such works in the most productive years of 
his career, spanning the mid-1660s, when Post would have established his 
distinctive market niche. The 1662 View of Olinda is justly ranked among the 
artist’s most “brilliant” canvases, and it derives from what is generally perceived 
to be the most outstanding chapter of his career, the “most brilliant period of 
Post’s output.”15
This recent assessment partly rehabilitates Post’s reputation – what meager 
attention the artist attracted from twentieth-century critics mostly pigeon-
holed him as a “curious” painter of Dutch Brazil – yet also provokes further 
questions and interventions.16 Frans Post has long been considered a unique 
and even an idiosyncratic painter – one of but two who journeyed to Brazil 
(the other being Albert Eckhout) or, for that matter, to any far-flung outpost of 
the exotic world. Yet there were in truth several other Dutch artists, also scat-
tered in distant pockets of the globe, who were able to imagine and to visually 
represent distant lands: Gillis and Bonaventura Peeters, who painted the West 
Indies (earlier than Post, yet without actually voyaging there); Dirk Valkenburg, 
commissioned by Jonas Witsen to reproduce the lay of the land in Suriname (in 
this case, after Post); Gerard van Edema, who painted that urban jungle pres-
ently known as New York (thus chiefly for British patrons); Reinier “Zeeman” 
Nooms, who executed North African land and seascapes; Andries Beeckman, 
who composed meticulous East Indian scenes; Ludolf Backhuyzen, also a 
painter of the East Indies; Willem Schellinks, who produced fantastic images of 
the Mughal court; Cornelis de Bruyn, who sketched and painted his way across 
the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires; and so on. (The complete list 
would include at least another dozen accomplished painters, including the 
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recently identified Pieter de Wit.)17 Post, however, gets singled out. He is distin-
guished by critics and historians not only for painting the non-European 
world – again, one of many contemporary artists to do so – but also for his “nos-
talgic” reminiscences of colonial Brazil; for his visual homages to the tenure of 
his patron Johan Maurits; and, above all, for his patriotic evocations of the 
Dutch Atlantic empire. “Post’s […] paintings,” remarked Peter Sutton, who has 
been largely responsible for placing the artist’s oeuvre in the canon of Dutch 
Golden Age painting (and serves as the go-to scholar for newly catalogued Post 
works) “can be seen in one sense as compensation for loss and a reassertion of 
the global reach of the Dutch trading empire.”18 His pictures offer “nostalgic 
reminders” of the Dutch settlements in Brazil and, by extension, of the colonial 
attainments of the Netherlands in the early modern Atlantic.19 Post’s images are 
understood to make allusions to Dutch empire – on this the critics are virtually 
unanimous – which they not only commemorate but also commend. They may 
be seen “as representations of the lost paradise of the Dutch in Brazil,” accord-
ing to a recent assessment. “Much of Frans Post’s work…represents an effort to 
celebrate Brazil,” opines another critic. His paintings are intended “as grand 
public statements about” Dutch Brazil, visual memorials that appealed to the 
Dutch “patriotic sense of [their] nation as a world power with a global reach.”20
Yet, again, the paintings do not, and they often do exactly the opposite: 
where earlier compositions by Post may have subtly introduced or perhaps art-
fully disguised the Dutch in their colonial world, later works fully abnegated 
the Dutch presence in Brazil and thereby underscore the remarkably quick 
retreat of the Dutch from their Atlantic “empire.” Sutton offered the first of 
these comments in an appraisal of a Brazilian pastiche now in the Museo 
Thyssen-Bornemisza in Madrid (Figure  10.5). The panel, “one of the most 
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attractive paintings [Post] produced throughout his third phase” (thus from 
the mid 1660s), resembles several done by Post during the height of his success, 
when the artist had hit his compositional stride – and by which time the 
Dutch, of course, had long departed Brazil.21 The paintings of these years 
depicted much of what made Post’s images ostensibly Dutch, including both 
the man-made structures of the modest settlements of Brazil and the men 
and women who would have built them: the odd European figure, along with 
African slaves and indigenous peoples. Yet these paintings also stocked the 
natural phenomena of South America, which surely was at the heart of their 
appeal. The Thyssen-Bornemisza panel, titled simply View of Igaraçu (namely, 
the village in Pernambuco), centers on a ramshackle, yet still serviceable, 
Figure 10.5   Frans Post, View of Igaraçu, Brazil, circa. 1665, oil on panel (42.8 x 58.8 cm), 
Museo Thyssen-Bornemisza, (inventory no CTB.1994.20), Madrid.




Christian church and on another building set further back and loosely-based 
on the local Franciscan cloister of Saint Anthony; there are a few figures in the 
foreground, also in front of the church. This duo of indubitably Catholic struc-
tures appear in several other compositions of these years, as does the image of 
the Olinda cathedral, which anchors the Rijksmuseum canvas (dated 1662) and 
dozens of others painted in a flurry of production that spilled into the early 
1670s. Another painting, titled Church with Portico and now in the Detroit 
Institute of Art (signed and dated 1665; Figure 10.6) bears a church fairly remi-
niscent of the Rijksmuseum’s cathedral – both paintings illustrate a distinctly 
religious structure with an incongruously classicized entrance – while yet 
another canvas, also signed and dated 1665 (and now in a private collection) 
has the form of the Detroit panel – a house of worship and worshippers center 
left, with intensive passages of naturalia otherwise creeping along the front of 
the canvas and its sides – with the structures of the Madrid painting, which 
grant the painting its title: Church of Saints Cosmas and Damian (see Figure 10.7 
and compare Figures 10.5 and 10.6).
Would these houses of unmistakably Catholic worship invoke Dutch nostal-
gia? The Detroit canvas (Figure 10.6), which closely replicates the form and 
style of the Madrid panel (Figure 10.5), offers a good point of comparison and 
an instructive case study. Both paintings furnish views of churches (a pair in 
Figure 10.6 Frans Post, Church with Portico, 1665, oil on canvas (56.2 x 83.5 cm), Detroit 
Institute of Art (Accession no. 34.188), Detroit.
Due to rights restrictions,
this illustration is not available
in the digital edition of the book.
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the Madrid painting, one in Detroit), in both cases framed by repoussoirs of 
tropical flora (note the matching date palms on the right) and curious fauna 
(nearly identical toads and nine-banded armadillos, also to the right). It was 
the latter, especially – the exotic naturalia, painstakingly painted and quixoti-
cally presented – that seemed to have excited viewers and driven the market 
for Post’s work. For while the paintings from this period of his career almost 
invariably incorporate a pale, typically crumbling church or chapel or cloister 
with some manner of local staffage, they invariably boast more concentrated 
passages of tropical nature, which fill the peripheries of the compositions and 
creep inevitably toward the center, lending the pictures a powerful undercur-
rent of the wondrous South American ecosystem. At the height of his powers, 
Post could render, in exquisite detail, a fascinating world of tropical wildlife: he 
excelled at conjuring exotic landscapes. In the Detroit canvas, the aforemen-
tioned toad (Bufo sp.) and armadillo (Dasypus novemcinctus) are shadowed, to 
the right, by a macabre boa constrictor who swallows a bloodied rabbit 
(Sylvilagus brasiliensis) – nature can be vicious in the tropics. Meanwhile, to 
the left, an ample iguana lingers in front of a slab of stone, a remnant of a 
Figure 10.7 Frans Post, Church of Saints Cosmas and Damian, 1665, oil on canvas 
(65 × 83.3 cm), private collection, São Paulo (sale Christie’s, London, 1992).
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forsaken classical column, which bears the artist’s signature and date of com-
position: “F. Post 1665.” The thick jungle flora, which occupies roughly a third of 
the canvas, is here and there enlivened by brightly painted timacambirés 
(Aechmea sp., Bromelioideae subfam.) and other tropical flowers (the Thyssen 
panel features a conspicuous pineapple: Ananas cosmosus); by various palms 
and spindly cacti; and by numerous other, gorgeously foliated exotic plants.
The dense greens that saturate the paintings’ foregrounds would seem to 
encroach on the whites and ochers of the middle sections and veritably 
entwine the sides of the stone and plaster buildings. Several of the latter are 
readily identifiable Catholic structures. The Madrid panel illustrates a variant 
of the Church of Saints Cosmas and Damian – the Igreja dos Santos Cosme e 
Damião, the oldest church in Brazil, is more plainly delineated in several other 
paintings; it was an apparent favorite of the artist – and it also portrays an 
adaptation of the Franciscan cloister of Saint Anthony of Lisbon and the con-
vent of Igaraçu, which, it should be noted, does not in fact neighbor the village 
church. The convent’s structure is transformed in the Detroit painting into the 
titular “Church with Portico,” a wholly imagined, classically proportioned, and 
more imposing church, into which parade several worshippers: a Portuguese 
woman, veiled in black; another Portuguese woman, this time draped in a 
heavy white head covering and offering alms to a Franciscan (or Capuchin) 
friar; and another, likely Portuguese couple, entering through an arched door-
way. A similar procession heads into the Saints Cosmas and Damian church in 
another 1665 canvas, now in a private collection, where one can just make out 
the altar painting housed within (Figure 10.7). The church in the Detroit paint-
ing also resembles, with its fanciful, overgrown, Renaissance-style portico – an 
image that suggests the epic struggle of classical architecture and tropical 
nature in an lushly exotic world – the relatively grander ecclesiastical structure 
of the Rijksmuseum’s View of Olinda (Figure  10.3), a “brilliant” composition 
that dates, like the Detroit and Madrid paintings, from the early-to-mid 1660s.22 
Toad, armadillo, and iguana are here joined by an anteater (Myrmecophaga 
tridactyla), just below a pineapple; by a slowly slinking two-toed sloth 
(Choloepus didactylus); and by a happily napping monkey – all of whom are 
shaded by palms, cacti, papaya trees, and so on. (The painting’s carved frame, 
of contemporary vintage, depicts more exotic naturalia, including a ubiqui-
tous serpent.) The church itself, set slightly back and extended horizontally to 
enhance its dramatic effect, plays a more pivotal role in this imposing canvas, 
attracting a train of figures that draws the eye up and down the sloping hill. 
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23 Which prompts the obvious point that the overwhelming majority of European women 
in Brazil over this period were Portuguese, as very few Dutch-born women migrated to the 
colony during its brief existence. For population figures circa 1645, see José Antônio 
Gonsalves de Mello, Tempo dos flamengos: influência da ocupação holandesa na vida e na 
cultura do norte do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1947), 73 (note 122).
Once again, a crowd of parishioners mill about the church’s entrance: veiled 
women, broad-hatted men, cassocked friars, and, a bit lower down, African 
slaves wearing loose-fitting trousers whose bright color provides a sharp con-
trast with their dark skin. Several more Africans slaves, further in the distance, 
perform their mundane duties by bearing a woman in a palanquin – Portuguese, 
one suspects, as was local habit.
All of which makes a basic point: The European figures in these paintings – 
and, for that matter, most of the Europeans that populate Post’s sizeable out-
put from these years – are overwhelmingly Portuguese. The religious buildings 
depicted are universally Catholic, and they are emphatically in active use. 
In the Rijksmuseum composition, one can just make out the altarpiece – 
a cleverly-done painting within a painting – and the veiled figure of a female 
saint (the Virgin Mary?) whose modesty no doubt served as a model for the 
female worshippers of the humid coastal villages of Brazil who – so the painter 
would have us imagine – kept their faith.23 And this suggests a corollary point: 
if these canvases do evince nostalgia, it would appear to be for the era of 
Portuguese control of the region; if they celebrate Brazil, they offer a narrative 
of Iberian Catholic persistence in a strangely exotic world, of the poetic strug-
gle of faith against flora and fauna in the tropics. To be sure, Post painted other 
types of buildings – sugar mills, for example, which allude to the economic 
foundations of the European settlements, Dutch and Portuguese alike, and 
also plantation houses and village scenes. And he painted other figures, too. 
Indigenous Brazilians and African slaves predominate his work, the odd 
European figure – if present at all – typically off to the side and sequestered in 
a palanquin or heavy veil. Yet during the most intensive period of his produc-
tion – from the early 1660s into the 1670s, when his output was slowed by 
age – Post painted churches, chapels, cloisters, and other obvious indicators of 
the Catholic faith; palanquins, manor houses, sugar mills, and other conspicu-
ous signifiers of Portuguese life; and, above all, the florid, exuberant, super-
abundant naturalia of the exotic world. His paintings convey a message 
pertaining to Europe’s experience and expansion in the exotic world and to the 
efforts by Europeans to sustain themselves in that world – but not, in the end, 
or in any easily discernible way, to the Dutch in the Atlantic.
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24 One exceptional early painting, however, may point to possible princely connections. The 
now destroyed canvas Sugar Mill (Corrêa do Lago, Post, cat. 29) may have been done for 
the Stadtholder Frederik Hendrik, according to Sousa-Leão, as early as 1644 – not an 
impossible scenario, but one for which there is no actual archival evidence. See Sousa 
Leão, Frans Post, 23–26, 96. Another painting, the 1653 View of Mauritsstad and Recife 
(Corrêa do Lago, Post, cat. 22), which focuses on the city founded by Nassau, may also sug-
gest a particular patron and purpose. As this composition is the only one of its kind done 
by Post – a proper cityscape of the Dutch colony painted the year before it was definitively 
lost to the Portuguese – it serves more logically as the exception that proves the rule: that 
Post otherwise did not paint Dutch Brazil.
25 Estimates come from Corrêa do Lago, Post, 21–49; on Dutch-made exotic geography, see 
Schmidt, Inventing Exoticism.
III Production and Consumption: Exoticism for Europeans
The highly questionable Dutchness of these images and their reluctance to 
broadcast any parochial lesson about the Dutch in the Atlantic is a matter 
plain from the perspective of production – the paintings and their messages – 
as well as from the perspective of consumption. Post designed his products 
not so much for a patron or patria – after 1645 there is no documented 
evidence that he painted for Johan Maurits24 – as for the public. He adroitly 
created his own market niche and, accordingly, met with considerable success. 
Post produced a lot: his oeuvre encompasses an estimated 300 painted works 
(about half of which have been identified and catalogued), done over a span 
of thirty-odd years. Post’s paintings sold at higher than average prices: typi-
cally, above the average for landscapes and often well above average. And 
Post’s paintings sold consistently throughout his career, the rate of produc-
tion  peaking in the 1660s, which is precisely the period when other forms 
of Dutch-made exotic geography also took off.25 His work and its success in 
the market mirrors in many ways the profitable manufacture of other products 
made in Dutch ateliers – books, prints, maps, exotic collectibles – for the 
European market.
To whom did the paintings sell? Tracing buyers of art sold on the open 
market is notoriously difficult; there is rarely a clear paper trail for this sort 
of mass-produced painting that extends beyond late nineteenth-century 
purchases (when national museums entered the art market and documenta-
tion improves). But there do exist some well-preserved provenances for 
Post’s corpus, and these offer useful clues. Of the slightly more than 25 percent 
of Post’s 155 catalogued paintings for which we can determine some level 
of ownership going back to the early modern period (at least to the eighteenth 
century or, in some cases, to the turn of the nineteenth century), just under 
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26 It is difficult to offer a wholly precise accounting, yet the provenances listed in the latest 
literature – above all, those meticulously detailed in Corrêa do Lago, Post – offer broadly 
convincing evidence. Of the circa 150 securely attributed paintings by Post, 28 percent can 
be traced with some confidence back to owners in the eighteenth century or, in some 
instances, the early nineteenth century (which in some cases is as far back as such lin-
eages may be tracked, although in other cases may point to uninterrupted aristocratic 
ownership). Of this securely documented group, above 85 percent belonged to non-Dutch 
owners for a measurable period of time (which is to say, the paintings may also have 
passed through other hands at some point). And while this sample offers nothing 
approaching definitive data, it does demonstrate fairly clearly that Post's paintings were 
possessed in large numbers by early modern owners who would have had a meager sense 
of nostalgia for Dutch Brazil.
90 percent – an overwhelmingly indicative number – sold to non-Dutch 
buyers.26 Post’s paintings scattered across collections throughout Europe, and 
they also moved among European buyers after their original sale. Moreover, 
the predominantly French, English, German, Scandinavian, and sometimes 
Italian owners of these paintings in the early modern period match the 
French, English, German, and sometimes Italian translations of early modern 
Dutch-produced volumes of exotic geography (the Scandinavian collectors 
commonly obtaining German editions of popular works). There is another 
group of paintings for which there is also a well-defined lineage: 27 works 
gifted in 1679 by Johan Maurits of Nassau-Siegen to Louis XIV of France. Two-
thirds of these paintings were executed by Post in Brazil (seven of this sub-
group remain, while the rest are considered lost), yet the final third were 
purchased on the open market by Nassau’s agent; these paintings span the 
artist’s post-Brazil career. All went to the French court, in all events, in the 
year immediately following the conclusion of the Franco-Dutch War of 1672–
1678, a conflict begun with the French invasion of the Netherlands and con-
cluded in a temper that would hardly have suggested a present of putatively 
“patriotic” paintings from the vanquished – the Dutch, whose military com-
mand included, until he retired in the mid-1670s, the former governor of Dutch 
Brazil himself – to the victors.
One more telling and highly concrete example: a late-career painting bearing 
the generic title Village and Chapel with Portico, a composition that effectively 
mirrors the church-and-landscape design so popular in the 1660s (Figure 10.8).
Done more than a decade after the Detroit Church with Portico – thus in the 
mid-to-late 1670s – Post’s later composition reverses the direction of his earlier 
painted church (it now faces the valley and background hills rather than the 
viewer) and, at this late stage in the artist’s career, lacks the fine detail in the 
repoussoir of his best work. The Village and Chapel with Portico sold, however, 
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27 Corrêa do Lago, Post, 326 (cat. 145).
28 This essay has not delved into Post's drawings, which were an integral part of his work; yet 
it should be briefly pointed out that these, too, sold largely to non-Dutch patrons. The 
largest known group of sketches – 30 or so, dating from the artist's formative years in 
as soon as it hit the market, and it offers as such an exceedingly rare instance 
of a documented atelier-to-market sale—namely a non-commissioned-paint-
ing transaction recorded within a year or so of the panel’s completion. Its con-
sumer, moreover, turns out to be a buyer who hailed from the other military 
and political rival of the Netherlands in these years, Great Britain. The painting 
has been inventoried in Ham House, Surrey – acquired by an English aristo-
crat, in other words – since “between 1677 and 1679.”27 The latter date was the 
year of Post’s death, by which time his reputation had successfully crossed the 
channel to England and spread to the court of the Sun King in France. In both 
Surrey and Versailles, Frans Post was collected and admired: less for his repre-
sentation of the Dutch in the Atlantic, one may assume, than for his excep-
tional ability to paint Europe’s exotic world.28
Figure 10.8 Frans Post, Village and Chapel with Portico, circa. 1675, oil on panel 
(18.2 × 24 cm), collection of Lord Dysart, Ham House, Surrey, England
© National Trust Images.
Due to rights restrictions,
this illustration is not available
in the digital edition of the book.
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Brazil – were obtained in the seventeenth century already by the English collector 
William Courten (alias Charleton) and subsequently purchased by Hans Sloane, the cel-
ebrated British imperialist and founder of the British Museum. Again, the case for these 
images' distinctly Dutch-patriotic resonances would seem rather weak.
29 Arnoldus Montanus, De nieuwe en onbekende weereld, of, Beschryving van America en ’t 
zuid-land (Amsterdam, 1671); Charles de Rochefort, Histoire naturelle et morale des Iles 
Antilles de l'Amerique (Rotterdam, 1658); Piso, Historia naturalis Brasiliae; and Willem Piso 
et al., De Indiae utriusque re naturali et medica libri quatuordecim (Amsterdam, 1658).
30 On Visscher's famous map and its equally famous iconography, see the discussion in 
Benjamin Schmidt, "On the Impulse of Mapping, or How a Flat Earth Theory of Dutch 
Maps Distorts the Thickness and Pictorial Proclivities of Early Modern Cartography (and 
Misses Its Picturing Impulse)," Art History 35 (2012): 1036–1050. For Dutch-made overseas 
maps more generally – including those in Joan Blaeu's Atlas Maior (Amsterdam, 1662–
1672) – see Kees Zandvliet, Mapping for money: Maps, plans and topographic paintings 
and their role in Dutch overseas expansion during the 16th and 17th centuries (Amsterdam: 
De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1998).
Also selling in London and Paris – and in the courts and more modest homes 
of consumers across Europe – were other Dutch products of exotic geography, 
and these lend an important context to Post’s success as a purveyor of exotic 
imagery and, specifically, of images of the tropical West. For books on America, 
Europeans could turn to the bulky and lavishly illustrated geography of 
Arnoldus Montanus, De nieuwe en onbekende wereld (1671), an Amsterdam-
made volume also translated into English and German. On the Caribbean they 
could read Charles de Rochefort’s Histoire naturelle et morale des Iles Antilles de 
l’Amerique (1658), published first in Rotterdam and then in numerous subse-
quent editions in Dutch, English, German, and French. And on tropical natural 
history they could consult the authoritative tome of Willem Piso and Georg 
Marcgraf, published soon after the return of Johan Maurits from Brazil in 
1648 – the volume included considerable graphic work based on drawings by 
Albert Eckhout – and then reissued in an expanded edition (1658) that also 
comprised a natural history of the tropical East.29 For maps they pored over 
Nicolaes Visscher’s highly influential – and relentlessly copied – Novissima et 
Accuratissima Totius Americae Descriptio, with its iconic allegory of America 
designed by Nicolaes Berchem. And Europeans also consulted the immense 
cartographic output of the firm of Blaeu and the many other mapmakers who 
made Amsterdam the capital of cartography in the seventeenth century.30 And 
then there were material arts: ceramic wares made in Delft, replicating both 
the exotic East and West (sometimes on the very same object); marine shells 
engraved and otherwise decorated with tropical flora and fauna; coconuts 
carved with images of Indians and palm trees (both Post’s and Eckhout’s 
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work was reproduced in this form); tapestries woven with pastiches of 
imagined American life (again, incorporating motifs of Post and Eckhout); 
and so on.31 Not all of this material came from the Netherlands, but a high 
proportion did, and objects that did not often borrowed motifs from Dutch 
sources – especially from the paintings, prints, and drawings of Post and 
Eckhout, which inspired a vast amount of American imagery for years to come. 
In the production of so many of these objects and sources – the books and 
artifacts that furnished Europeans with a view of the New World and of the 
exotic world, more generally – the Dutch played the role of middlemen, entre-
preneurs of exoticism and traders in imagery of the world. Post fits into this 
broader history of cultural commerce: he produced images of the tropics for an 
evidently enthusiastic audience of European consumers.
The Dutch role as mediators of the non-European world – and of the 
Atlantic world, in particular – has an extensive history, and it may only be in 
the last century or so that critics have so missed this point that they have erro-
neously attached the terms “Dutch” and “Atlantic” to these materials. This is 
almost certainly the case for the work of Frans Post. He reproduced, as early 
modern sources could frankly indicate, “the Indies,” sometimes “Brazil,” always 
Europe’s exotic world of circa 1670 – yet never the "Dutch" or the “Atlantic.” 
A painting dated right around that time makes this point both in its composi-
tion and its reception, the latter recorded in a rare contemporary comment 
affixed to the back of the painting. A large canvas purchased in 1678 or 1679 by 
Jacob Cohen, who served as Johan Maurits’ financial agent, the painting made 
a princely enough impression that Cohen acquired it for the collection of 
works that would eventually go to Louis XIV. Its exceptional size notwithstand-
ing – the canvas measures only slightly smaller than the Rijksmuseum’s grand 
View of Olinda – the painting follows the basic formula that Post had by this 
time perfected. Beneath a wide, pale blue, and gently clouded sky, in an open-
ing cleared from the jungle greens, a small group of Indians and Africans gather 
with baskets and tools; to the rear and barely visible are a few more figures, 
including a heavily veiled European woman. A thick repoussoir along the left 
side of the canvas and spilling into the foreground features a stately palm and 
an eye-catching pineapple; cacti and gourds of various shapes and sizes inhabit 
the dense brush. Perched on a hill in the distance is a single chapel; while in 
the center and on the right lies a more substantial cluster of buildings that 
31 For several excellent examples of such materials, see Ellinoor Bergvelt and Reneè 
Kistemaker, De wereld binnen handbereik: Nederlandse kunst- en rariteitenverzamelingen, 
1585–1735, 2 vols. (Zwolle and Amsterdam: Waanders and Amsterdam Historisch Museum, 
1992).
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32 Corrêa do Lago, Post, 287 (cat. 111), where the painting is assigned to the late 1660s (ca. 
1670) and titled House of a Portuguese Nobleman. The Louvre, which dates the painting ca. 
1650–1655, takes a broader perspective in their labeling: A Monastery of the Capuchin 
Fathers […] The House of a Portuguese Nobleman.
holds the composition together: a religious compound, toward which the 
European woman heads – perhaps a convent or cloister – and a decent-sized 
house, which gives the painting its title: House of a Portuguese Nobleman.32 
This title appears in an archival notation, which indicates, without much 
ambiguity, how the subject of the painting was understood in the late seven-
teenth century:
At the top of the Mountain stands a chapel of a village, which lies at its 
foot. A cloister of Capuchin monks of the Franciscan order. The house of 
a Portuguese nobleman. N.B. The yellow color one sees in the region are 
the Sugar Cane fields, from where sugar is extracted.
The inclusion of the word “nobleman” makes the painting worthy of its royal 
collector; the fact that the subject is Portuguese is beyond doubt. Likewise, the 
notation makes clear the Catholic bent of the composition; and there is notice, 
as well, of the economic relevance of the landscape (which may have increased 
the painting’s appeal to the king, as France expanded its own sugar planta-
tions, albeit in the Caribbean). In all events, the image conveys nary a sense of 
the Dutch in the Atlantic, even as it does convey a fairly good sense of the 
Atlantic in Europe, as the seventeenth century came to a close: of the Atlantic 
world as perceived and produced by a Dutch artist, to be sure, yet as bartered 
and collected by European princes. Indeed, in certain ways Post’s Atlantic 
became the Atlantic: a picture of the tropical world that would ultimately be 
exhibited in the most prestigious gallery of Europe – the Musée du Louvre – 
where the painting remains to this day.
This broad and necessarily cursory glance into the work of Frans Post sug-
gests several conclusions. First and most fundamentally, it proposes a new way 
to look at the much-admired landscape paintings of Post and hence a revision-
ist take on their meaning in the market of the late-seventeenth century. Post 
painted not so much nostalgia as exotica – hardly the same thing – and his 
works appealed to a generically European audience. A reassessment of Post’s 
painted oeuvre recommends, second, a reevaluation of the wider cultural pro-
duction related to Post, whose images spun off into prints, maps, tapestries, 
ceramics, and a full range of decorative arts. These Post-inflected products 
should be understood in the context of exotic geography circa 1700; they speak 
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33 This is a point made succinctly by Pedro and Bia Corrêa do Lago, as they write in their 
catalogue entry for View of Mauritsstad and Recife: "Why was Olinda portrayed so many 
times, and Maurisstad and Recife only this once?" (Corrêa do Lago, Post, 146).
not so much to the Dutch place in the Atlantic as to the Dutch role in purvey-
ing images of the Atlantic in various texts, pictures, and objects. More gener-
ally, the pattern of production and consumption sketched out for Post’s 
paintings relates to the pattern of production and consumption for a far wider 
range of goods: of paintings by other artists, of course, yet also of books, prints, 
maps, curiosities, and material arts that engaged with early modern Europe’s 
rapidly expanding world. And this brings up a third and final point pertaining 
to the putative Dutch Atlantic, of which Post’s work has long been claimed as 
an exemplary cultural expression. Post’s paintings are certainly Dutch in terms 
of their form and production – he indubitably borrowed techniques from the 
early modern landscape tradition of the Netherlands – yet hardly in terms of 
their content and consumption; they were broadly European in their market 
and meaning. And while they also reflect the space of the Atlantic world – the 
flora and fauna, the indigenous peoples and African slaves, the plantation 
economy and colonial rule – they flowed easily into a vaster European engage-
ment with and narrative about the exotic world. In truth, Post seemed to go out 
of his way to efface the Dutch presence in Brazil, to compose paintings that 
disguised Dutch history in the Atlantic: rare is the Post composition with iden-
tifiable Dutch figures or settlements, with allusions to the Dutch West India 
Company or the reign of Nassau.33 His work sold, accordingly, among a wide 
spectrum of European collectors and connoisseurs and those otherwise 
interested in the lush exotic world. In this sense, Post was a classic Dutch 
entrepreneur – a middleman who identified a market niche, a merchant of 
cultural goods who traded in images of the tropics. As often was the case in the 
early modern period – as was the case, as well, with other global products traf-
ficked in this period – the Dutch played the role of go-betweens: in terms of 
trade and in terms of culture. Post exemplifies these early modern Dutch 
instincts and patterns. His work allows us to see more clearly, in dazzling com-
positions and luxuriantly verdant detail, how Europe engaged with the exotic 
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Swedish Free Ports in the Northeastern Caribbean
Continuity and Change
Han Jordaan and Victor Wilson
 Introduction
The focus of this article are the Dutch colony of St. Eustatius (Statia), the 
Danish colony of St. Thomas and the Swedish colony of St. Barthélemy, during 
the close of the so-called “long eighteenth century.” These colonies shared the 
distinction of being free ports. The last two decades of the eighteenth century 
were a tumultuous time on both sides of the Atlantic, and, in the case of free 
ports, a time of both economic success as well as misfortune and ruin. Free 
ports thrived – albeit under great risk – on the fringes of empires in conflict, 
offering neutral, intercolonial transit stations during times when regular ports 
on critical trade routes were obstructed or blockaded.
The Dutch Republic managed to remain neutral during most of the eigh-
teenth century, but this neutrality ended abruptly with the Fourth Anglo-
Dutch War (1780–1784). One of the causes of the war was the Dutch stance in 
the War of American Independence (1775–1783). St. Eustatius, which fulfilled a 
crucial role in providing the Americans with goods, arms, and ammunition 
was a first target for British military action. After a devastating British occupa-
tion in 1781, which ended when allied French forces retook the island that same 
year, the Statian merchants and planters rebuilt their position and returned to 
business as usual. But in 1793, the Dutch again became involved in armed con-
flict when revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain and the Dutch 
Republic. Two years later, French troops invaded the Dutch Republic. The 
Stadtholder fled to England and the Batavian Republic was proclaimed, which 
became a vassal state of France. That very same year, St. Eustatius was occu-
pied by “friendly” French forces sent from Guadeloupe – an occupation which 
would spell the definitive end to its role as a free port in the region. By the 
beginning of 1795, Statia had lost its unique position as a free port in the region. 
Its role was taken over by St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy. Danish St. Thomas 
had had a long history of free trade beginning in the early decades of the eigh-
teenth century, while the new Swedish colony of St. Barthélemy had declared 
its port open to all nations in 1784. The economic development of these two 
colonies, which managed to remain neutral during the last decade of the 
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eighteenth century, benefited greatly from the downfall of Statia and the other 
assorted international conflicts around the turn of the century.
These colonies have, for a number of reasons, not been researched exten-
sively from either a regional or Atlantic perspective. Little or no attention has 
been made to connections across imperial borders in the colonies themselves, 
either in the form of migration flows, the transfer of ideas and information, or 
the complex networks created through trade and commerce. It follows that the 
relationship between the different free ports of the Caribbean and the sur-
rounding colonies in the region is not very clearly understood.
This chapter will elaborate on David Armitage’s concept of “cis-Atlantic” 
history, in the sense of being a regional history within an Atlantic context. 
More specifically, it will study three places within the Caribbean region with a 
similar institution – the free port city – and their inhabitants. The focus will be 
mainly on the transfer of ideas, commercial networks and migration. Firstly, it 
is argued that the experience of Dutch transit trade informed and influenced 
Danish and Swedish colonial policy to a considerable extent. Secondly, it is 
argued that the commercial networks were operated similarly and had con-
tacts in all three free ports, due to their proximity to each other as well as to the 
existing regional systems of trade. Also, it is argued that their similar roles dur-
ing the end of the eighteenth century gave rise to competition and affected 
contemporary discussions on trade policies in both colony and metropole. 
Lastly, it is argued that the occupation of the Dutch colonies gave rise to migra-
tion flows that deeply affected the development of St. Thomas and St. 
Barthélemy well into the nineteenth century, and that migration from colonies 
such as Statia ensured a continuity of trade in the region.
 The Historical Background of St. Eustatius, St. Thomas and  
St. Barthélemy
The island of St. Eustatius was occupied by the Dutch in 1636. This was not 
done by the Dutch West India Company (wic), but by an expedition financed 
by a number of Zeeland merchants who had obtained official permission for 
this enterprise from both the Zeeland chamber and the Board of Directors of 
the Company. Statia became a so-called patroonschap, a privately adminis-
tered colony within the jurisdiction of the wic. The island was uninhabited at 
the time of the Dutch arrival and was initially baptized New Zeeland. It was 
intended to become an plantation colony and the first settlers cultivated 
tobacco. But in 1683 the last heir of the original patroons sold his share to the 
wic and St. Eustatius came under the direct government of the Company, 
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which recognized the island’s potential to become a regional center for illicit 
trade.1 During the wars of the second half of the seventeenth and early eigh-
teenth century in which the Dutch Republic was involved, Statia was recur-
rently seized and plundered by the French and the English.2
After the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War Statia was returned to the Dutch. The 
wic resumed control but in 1791 this organization went bankrupt and was dis-
solved. The administration of the colonies then returned to the States General. 
In 1795, after the Batavian Republic was proclaimed, all three Dutch Windward 
islands3 were placed under French “protection” by Commissioner Victor 
Hugues at Guadeloupe. Between 1801 and 1802 and again from 1810 until 1816 
the British were in control again.4
The Scandinavian kingdoms were comparatively late entrants in the scramble 
for colonies in the Caribbean. The first Danish occupation of St. Thomas occurred 
in 1671, followed decades later by the colonization of neighboring St. John in 1717. 
With the purchase of St. Croix from the French in 1733, the Danish Caribbean 
empire was completed. The same year as the Danes gained a foothold on 
St. Thomas, the Danish West India Company was established both as a commer-
cial and an administrative entity for the island. Reorganized as the Danish West 
India and Guinea Company in 1680, the Company assumed administration of all 
the colonies in the Caribbean as well as the Danish enclaves on the Gold Coast 
until it was dissolved in 1754. While early Danish dominion over their islands was 
questioned and challenged from the first day of their colonization by other 
European powers, the islands remained in Danish hands, except for two British 
occupations in the early nineteenth century, one in 1801–1802 and the other 1807–
1815. The islands were finally sold a century later to the United States, in 1917.5
The first successful Swedish claim for a colonial territory in the region came 
at a much later date than did the Danish acquisitions in the Caribbean. While 
the ambition to establish colonies certainly was not lacking among members 
of the Swedish government, the practical outcomes of such projects during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were limited. The seventeenth century 
1 G.J. van Grol, De grondpolitiek in het West-Indisch domein, I, Algemeen historische inleiding, 
3 vols., (Amsterdam: S. Emmering, 1934), 1:46–48, 56.
2 Wim Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), 89.
3 The islands in the Northeastern Caribbean which are called “Leeward” in English are termed 
“Bovenwinds” or “Windward” in Dutch.
4 Van Grol, Grondpolitiek, 1:65–68.
5 Neville A.T. Hall, Slave Society in the Danish West Indies: St. Thomas, St. John & St. Croix 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 6–7; Svend-Erik Green-Pedersen and 
P.C. Willemoes Jørgensen, “Dansk kolonihistorie – det globale perspektiv,” in Dansk kolonihis-
torie: Indføring og studier, ed. Peter Hoxcer Jensen et al (Aarhus: Forlaget Historia, 1983), 9–15.
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New Sweden settlement in Delaware rapidly fell into the hands of Dutch colo-
nists. Sweden also made attempts to trade on the African Coast but could not 
keep a foothold there either, as they were unable to compete with larger pow-
ers. The eighteenth century was marked by Swedish territorial losses around 
the Baltic Sea, effectively ending the preceding period of imperial expansion. 
The same century also saw some more or less serious attempts at colonial 
acquisition. The culmination of diplomatic negotiations with France during 
and after the American War of Independence would yield the only tangible 
result of these ambitions. In addition to a treaty that stipulated French subsi-
dies to the Swedish crown, the French ceded the small Caribbean island of 
St. Barthélemy in exchange for staple rights in Gothenburg. The Swedish rule 
of St. Barthélemy was interrupted by a British occupation in 1801–1802, during 
the same period as the Danish islands.6
The islands of St. Eustatius, St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy had, at the close 
of the eighteenth century, developed into small polyglot communities which 
were centered on trade in shoreline urban settlements. These maritime societ-
ies were composed of a variety of different ethnic groups, religions and lan-
guages. At the time of the British capture of Statia in 1781, the majority of the 
white population was male: adult males outnumbered adult females three to 
one, with 668 men (75 percent) versus 215 women (25 percent). Of 163 persons, 
20 percent of the adult white male population, it is known that they settled in 
the colony only within half a year prior to the arrival of the British. Over 60 
percent of these newly arrived burghers came from Europe, mainly from 
England, Ireland and Scotland, but also from France, and Italian and German 
territories. The remaining 40 percent came from other, mainly British, colo-
nies, especially from Bermuda and North America. There was only a small core 
of long-term residents; the majority of the white population consisted of 
recent migrants, predominantly unmarried white males of British descent, 
who had come to the island to participate in trade and probably hoping to 
make a fortune on the “Golden Rock,” as Statia was known.7
On St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy, foreigners were of central importance as 
well. The local administrative elite, the colonial officials, civil servants, clergy 
6 Sture M. Waller, “Det svenska förvärvet av S:t Barthélemy. Huvuddragen av de svensk-franska 
förhandlingarna,” Historisk tidskrift, 3 (1953): 231–255; Sten Carlsson, Svensk historia 2: tiden 
efter 1718 (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1980), 177; Elisabeth Mansén, Sveriges historia 1721–1830 
(Stockholm: Norstedts, 2011), 79–84.
7 Norman Barka, “Citizens of St. Eustatius, 1781,” in The Lesser Antilles in the Age of Expansion, 
ed. Robert L. Paquette and Stanley L. Engerman (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
1996), 223–238, 230, 232, 234–236.
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10 For the correspondence of the authorities of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Dutch 
Republic with the local churches in the three Danish islands, see Amsterdam Municipal 
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(København: Fremad, 1966), 55–62.
and soldiers consisted of Danes and Swedes. The cadres of planters, merchants, 
artisans and workers were, as a rule, mainly foreigners. During the initial phase 
of Danish settlement in St. Thomas, attempts at colonization using indentured 
farmers and peasants failed. Instead, the only recourse was a more permissive 
policy to ensure colonization and development. Between the years 1685–1693, 
the island was leased to the Prussian Brandenburger Company in order to revi-
talize the colony.8 A large share of the Company actors were of Dutch origin, 
and when the Company ceased its operations, the Dutch were the most promi-
nent group and would remain so for the rest of the eighteenth century. By the 
time of the first documented censuses in St. Thomas in 1686 and 1688, the 
Dutch comprised a significant portion of the population. In 1686, they num-
bered 37 out of a total of 135 white adults, and in 1688 they totalled 66 out of a 
total of 148.9 The Dutch cultural and commercial dominance on St. Thomas 
and St. John is illustrated by other indicators as well. The Dutch Reformed 
Church became firmly established in the Danish colonies and a majority of the 
slaves spoke a Dutch Creole.10 The system of open admission continued after 
the purchase of St. Croix in 1733. The island’s topography was suitable for plan-
tation agriculture in a way that neither St. Thomas or St. John were. To attract 
planter knowledge and expertise, Danish officials offered cheap lots of land, 
generous loans and a tax-free status to planters from nearby islands from 1735 
and onwards. Migrants came from Antigua, St. Kitts, and Virgin Gorda, and 
even from islands as far away as Barbados. The English comprised the most 
numerous and influential cohort of colonists at the beginning of Danish devel-
opment of St. Croix. A number of Dutch settlers also arrived from St. Eustatius, 
who under the leadership of Governor Pieter Heyliger, sought refuge in St. 
Croix during the War of Jenkins’ Ear in 1739. In this way, the English language 
and culture became dominant on St. Croix whereas the Dutch dominated St. 
Thomas and St. John.11
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In the case of St. Barthélemy after Swedish acquisition, colonization by 
Swedes was not even seriously considered. At the time of the transition from 
French to Swedish governance, a local population of 700 French farmer settlers 
and their slaves were already using most of the land on the island for subsis-
tence farming. Small quantities of cotton were a locally-produced staple, but 
there was nothing that generated incomes on par with regional slave plantation 
economies. In 1786, Swedish ownership of the new colony had become com-
mon knowledge on both sides of the Baltic Sea. Facing famine as a result of crop 
failures that had stricken the Baltic countries during the preceding years, farm-
ers and tenants within the Finnish provinces petitioned to move to the king’s 
new colony in the Americas, where it was said one could make a fortune easily. 
Faced with this plea, King Gustav III thought it best to dispel any false rumors 
that the colony was a bountiful land of opportunity. Instead, measures were 
adopted that were aimed to attract merchants and capital from the surrounding 
islands, to make the most out of an acquisition of questionable value.12
 Ideology of the Free Ports
The economic history of the six islands of the Dutch Antilles – from their colo-
nization during the seventeenth century until 1795 – constitutes a conspicuous 
counterpoint to that of the British and French Caribbean. Because of their lim-
ited size, and unsuitability for large-scale agriculture, different strategies had 
to be employed in order to create profitable colonies out of the Dutch islands.13 
Very much the same case can be made for the Scandinavian islands in the 
region, with the only exception being St. Croix, which became a full-fledged 
plantation colony. Also, as will be argued in this section, the administration of 
St. Barthélemy and St. Thomas were influenced to a significant extent by Dutch 
practice in the region.
The colonial system was, in a strict sense, built on mercantilist principles 
which held that colonial markets were only within the exclusive trading rights 
of the home country. Shipping to and from the colonies was barred to foreign 
12 Birger Wedberg, “S. Barthélemy-febern,” in Tärningskast om liv och död. Rättshistoriska 
skisser (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1935), 51–62; Pekka Masonen, “Kustavilainen 
siirtomaapolitiikka ja Saint-Barthélemyn kuume,” Historiallinen aikakauskirja 3 (2007): 
330–345.
13 P.C. Emmer, “‘Jesus Christ was Good, but Trade Was Better’ An Overview of the Transit 
Trade of the Dutch Antilles, 1634–1795,” in The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European 
Expansion, ed. Robert L. Paquette and Stanley L. Engerman, 450–475.
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vessels. These regulations became the object of discussion and criticism, both 
in the metropoles and in the colonies, especially after the publication in 1776 
of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which led to serious questioning of mer-
cantilist policies. During times of crisis and conflict, regular supplies from the 
metropole to the colonies simply could not be sustained, and the recurrent 
wars between Great Britain and France closed regular traffic which was the 
lifeline of plantation colonies. The colonies needed continual provisions, vict-
uals and slaves, without which they would be sure to suffer losses and possibly 
face food crises and famine. The establishment of free ports was one solution 
that facilitated shipping between traders of all nationalities. The system had its 
beginnings in the fourteenth-century Mediterranean port cities and was later 
implemented in various localities on the other side of the Atlantic. The Dutch 
were one of the progenitors of the system in the Caribbean. They conducted 
this trade with the Spanish colonies through Willemstad on Curaçao, and with 
the French, the English and the Americans through St. Eustatius.14
On St. Eustatius tobacco was soon replaced by sugar cane. However, it already 
became clear in the 1660s that the island was far more valuable as a market for 
illicit trade with the surrounding English and French colonies. Until the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, however, economic success was severely hampered by 
the recurrent wars and foreign occupations. In the 1720s, the economic situation 
improved and, thanks to the fact that the Dutch Republic managed to remain 
neutral during most European conflicts, the economic situation improved up 
until the 1780s. While nearly all the other European nations were at war – between 
1739 when the War of Jenkins’ Ear broke out and 1763, when the Seven Years’ War 
came to an end, a whole series of armed conflicts was fought by the major colonial 
powers both in Europe and the Americas – the Statian position as a neutral 
entrepôt gained importance. The colonies of the belligerents, when cut off from 
regular connections with the home country, obtained supplies from neutral Statia, 
which were paid for with tropical produce. By the 1750s, the island had become a 
principal regional market, where European goods, African slaves, and American 
colonial produce were exchanged.15 Ships of all nations were allowed to trade on 
the island. But although ships from foreign European ports were admitted, the 
traffic with the Dutch Republic was exclusively reserved for Dutch Ships. After the 
outbreak of the American War of Independence, Statia’s role as an Atlantic trad-
ing hub reached its zenith and the island became a major supplier for the rebel-
lious North Americans. The Statian heyday ended abruptly with the British 
occupation of 1781. After the de facto French occupation between 1795 and 1801 
282 Jordaan and Wilson
<UN>
and the two British occupations that followed during the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the role of St. Eustatius as an Atlantic entrepôt definitely came to an end. The 
loss of Dutch neutrality in European conflicts and the waning mercantilist doc-
trine were, as will be explained later, the principal reasons why.
The Danish plan for a free port was an idea born out of necessity. Up until 
the year 1754 the Danish colonies had been controlled by the Danish West 
India Company, which, by the end of its administration, struggled against 
local planter interests and uneven profits. Indeed, difficulties arising from 
supplying the colonies and the planters’ needs resulted in limited free trade 
concessions as early as 1707. Shipping rights in the colonies were liberally 
extended, insofar as colonial shipowners were permitted to export locally 
produced staples to any foreign port. Danish home ports, including Hamburg 
and Bremen, were forbidden destinations. In principle, this entailed that 
the Danish colonies became a Caribbean free trade zone from 1724 to 1745. 
Company attempts at reasserting its monopoly after that period failed, and 
the colonies were declared the property of the crown after the dissolution of 
the Company. Under crown rule, free trade was reinstated for both St. Thomas 
and St. John, which was finalized by a royal decree in 1764, which held that St. 
Thomas and St. John were open to ships bearing flags of all nations. Danish 
colonial goods would, however, be reserved exclusively for Danish keels. 
Meanwhile, St. Croix remained closed to foreign traffic, the important excep-
tions being slave vessels and the victuals and necessities that were regularly 
supplied from North America. The 1764 decree was, in essence, a concession 
to St. Thomas and St. John, both of which had been marginalized by the bur-
geoning plantation economy of St. Croix. The fact that the commerce of St. 
Thomas floundered during peacetime was also acknowledged by this deci-
sion. It was thought that by establishing this economic dualism between the 
islands, the exception made to St. Thomas and St. John would compensate 
for their relative disadvantages.16
In Sweden, it was Gustav III’s finance minister, Johan Liljencrantz, who was 
the leading proponent of free port and transit trade ideas. Liljencrantz is 
16 Poul Erik Olsen, Toldvaesendet i Dansk Vestindien 1672–1917 (København: Toldhistorisk 
Selskab, 1988), 33, 61, 147; Erik Gøbel, “Management of the Port of Saint Thomas, Danish 
West Indies, during the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” The Northern 
Mariner/Le Marin du Nord 7, no. 4 (1997): 45–63; Erik Gøbel, “Volume and Structure of 
Danish Shipping to the Caribbean and Guinea, 1671–1838,” International Journal of 
Maritime History 2, no. 2 (1990): 109–114; Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien 1755–1848, 64, 81–83. The 
majority of free port traffic in the Danish colonies would gravitate towards St. Thomas 
instead of St. John, as Charlotte Amalie was preferable to Coral Bay in St. John as an 
anchorage.
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usually accredited with the decision for the establishment of a free port on St. 
Barthélemy. A pragmatic mercantilist, Liljencrantz favored the idea of estab-
lishing Sweden as the middleman between Northern Europe and the markets 
outside of the Baltic. While the earlier Baltic experiments in free trade certainly 
played their role in the Swedish considerations regarding St. Barthélemy, local 
examples in the Caribbean were clearly studied. The first expedition and survey 
ship to the island carried with it two merchants, Jacob E. Röhl and A.F. Hansen. 
The former, upon return to Sweden in late 1785, penned a sobering report on the 
limited future use of the colony. The only prospect, according to Röhl, was 
through freedom of trade with neighboring colonies, especially the sugar- 
producing French colonies of Guadeloupe and Martinique. This would have to 
be accomplished either by formal trade rights or by smuggling. It is clear that 
he had conversed with Statians on the latter subject, as he related their meth-
ods of clandestine trade, and that the Dutch “understood to procure so-called 
indulgence for their swindles in the French Islands, although they must pay for 
it without exception.” Röhl referenced the Dutch system on St. Eustatius as a 
way of ensuring a “popular government.”17 The important fact about Röhl’s doc-
ument is that it is striking in its similarity to the decrees issued on 31 October 
1786, the same decrees that established the Swedish West India Company (SWIC) 
and created the first regulations for the colony’s administration. The Company 
was created as a joint stock venture with a limited charter, and awarded the 
right to trade with St. Barthélemy and other West Indian islands and North 
America for an initial period of fifteen years. Its privileged position in the form 
of lower duties and shares in the income of the colony did not, however, give 
the company exclusive trading rights. Any Swede or foreigner was allowed to 
carry on trade with St. Barthélemy, although with certain limitations.18
By this time, the decision to establish St. Barthélemy as a free port had already 
been made, and was officially proclaimed in 1785. The free port model practiced 
by the Dutch and Danish was seen as the only realistic alternative when the future 
of the colony was debated by the government. The process of applying a Swedish 
governing structure at the island was also influenced by actors already engaged in 
the transit trade of the Caribbean. In 1784 Henrich Wilmans,19 a Bremen merchant 
with 16 years of experience trading in both St. Eustatius and St. Thomas, 
17 J.E. Röhl, Wördsamt Memorial, 14 January 1786, F16, Vitterhetsakademiens handskriftsam-
ling, Antikvarisk-topografiska arkivet (ata).
18 These decrees and others are published in J.B. Hattendorf, Saint Barthélemy and the 
Swedish West India Company. A selection of printed documents, 1784–1814 (Delmar: Scholars’ 
facsimiles & reprints, 1994).
19 In all likelihood, identical with the merchant established in Statia by 1788, see below.
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petitioned the Swedish king with suggestions about the possible utility of a new 
free port at St. Barthélemy. Wilmans detailed the legal and administrative institu-
tions in existence on Statia, and was of the opinion that the Swedes would be wise 
to implement them in their new colony. He was also adamant that customs duties 
would have to be fixed at a consistently lower rate than on St. Thomas and St. 
Eustatius in order to succeed economically. This might seem a peculiar suggestion 
from Wilmans, who at the time was co-owner of a merchant house on St. Thomas. 
But he himself explained that another competitor in the region would “be 
attended with great benefit to us in St. Thomas, as the Danes must do the same to 
retain merchants among them.” The information and suggestions that Wilmans 
provided were subjects of great interest, and resulted in some visible adaptations 
in the 1786 decrees, among which was the institution of a mixed council of Swedish 
officials and local inhabitants.20
With the acquisition of St. Barthélemy, Sweden also acquired the status of a 
slaving power, though on a limited scale. In principle the colony was a Swedish 
territory and in all respects under the rule of the Swedish law of 1734. At the 
same time, the emerging legal structure of the fledgling colony came to adopt 
a mixed legal system incorporating previous French laws and West Indian cus-
toms, much in the same way as they were in Dutch and Danish colonies. In 
other words, Swedish administration of the newly acquired colony was quite 
firmly anchored in local and regional conditions, and the Dutch example of St. 
Eustatius was a clear reference point.21
 The Islands’ Merchant and Mariner Communities: Composition, 
Networks, Operations
The Statian community of merchants and mariners consisted of a minority of 
members of local families, some of whom had already lived on the island for 
several generations, and an international group of Dutch and numerous 
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foreign expatriates. A special group among these expatriate merchants and 
mariners was formed by Bermudians. One of its most prominent representa-
tives, as we will see, was Richard Downing Jennings. Due to overcrowding, 
Bermudians quickly departed for other American destinations. Migrants from 
this British Atlantic colony settled in the mainland North American colonies, 
the Bahamas, St. Thomas, and St. Eustatius, operating trading networks of their 
own along kinship ties. There were also strong Bermudian-Dutch connections. 
The Statian family of Huguenot descent, Godet, with contacts in Guadeloupe, 
St. Barthélemy, Boston, and Amsterdam, was related to the Bermudian Gilbert 
family, which was part of an extensive Anglo-American network, and also to 
former governor and prominent Statian merchant Johannes de Graaff. In 1780, 
Bermudians made up the largest group of British colonial settlers in Statia, out-
numbering all those from the Caribbean and North America combined.22
In 1789 the population structure of the white inhabitants seems to have been 
more balanced than before the war, which might indicate that the number of 
“fortune seekers” relative to more stable settlers had diminished. There were 787 
men aged 16 years or older versus 771 women. Boys and girls younger than 16 years 
numbered 374 and 409 respectively.23 Governor Godin estimated in 1790 that 
about 1000 men, women and children depended directly on commerce for their 
livelihood, while some 300 earned a living as mariners or fishermen.24 The inter-
national composition of the Statian community can be seen in two petitions dat-
ing from March 1787, which bore, respectively, the names of 68 and 116 inhabitants 
of various backgrounds, who had an interest in trade and shipping.25 In a state-
ment regarding Statian trade, issued in July of that same year by the aforemen-
tioned Bermudian Richard Downing Jennings and two other foreign merchants, 
it is mentioned that he represented 52 non-Dutch residents on the island.26
The foreign community in 1790 consisted mainly of British, North American, 
and French merchants. According to Godin, there were two large British 
companies. These had many ships in service, and were mainly interested in the 
286 Jordaan and Wilson
<UN>
27 De Hullu, “St. Eustatius,” 389–390.
28 Ibid., 390.
29 Ibid.
30 Fabry probably later returned to Switzerland where he continued his business. In the 
archive of the kanton of Vaud a fragment of his bookkeeping is kept over the period 1792–
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.vd.ch/detail.aspx?ID=34109 (2013). For Samuel and Louis Chollet, see: NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, 
Oud archief van St. Eustatius tot 1828 (oase), inv. no. 123, procuration 15 January 1782, 
38r–39r; petition by Samuel Chollet regarding a French prize ship which he bought in 
1782, 29 January 1782, 89r–89v, 90r–90v; inv. no. 130, Procuration from Fredrick Sugin, on 
behalf of Samuel Chollet, dated 6 February 1789, for Juan Baptista Oijarzabal in Santo 
Domingo, to claim a ship, 114r–118v. Chollet was born in Moudon, in the kanton of Bern.
31 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 123, deed of transport for the schooner Elizabeth, sold by 
Joseph Frankina to Henry Duncan and Vincent Deubeda, 12 June 1782, 469r; deed of trans-
port for the schooner Polly (renamed Elizabeth), sold by Ebenezer Barker to Joseph 
Frankina, 5 December 1782, 701v–702r; inv. no. 130, last will and testament of Joseph 
Frankina, 14 March 1789, 193r–198v.
32 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 128, procuration dated 27 March 1787 from Philip David for 
Abraham Hartog, Jewish merchant established in Amsterdam, to act as his attorney regard-
ing the inheritance from his uncle, Joost Hartog, who died in Altona near Hamburg, 164r–165r.
33 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 129, procuration, dated 7 April 1788, from Fredrich 
Nicolas Sander, merchant on St. Eustatius, for Barthold Möller, to act on his behalf regard-
ing the settlement of the left estate of his parents, 253r–254v.
slave trade, and the trade in dyewood, mahogany, cotton, and rum – products 
that were more in demand on the British market. They maintained contact with 
all the British islands.27 The seven to eight North American merchants mainly 
traded in wood, flour, and provisions – a trade that was subject to large fluctua-
tions in volume and prices. According to Godin, these North American prod-
ucts were immensely important to the island, since it made Statia the cheapest 
supplier of provisions to the neighboring colonies.28 There were two major 
French merchant houses which illegally imported tropical produce, especially 
sugar, from the French colonies, mainly from Guadeloupe. The French were the 
major suppliers of return shipments to the Dutch Republic, either directly by 
shipments to Dutch correspondents, or indirectly by selling tropical produce to 
Dutch merchants in Statia who then shipped it to the home country.29
Some foreign merchants also originated from European countries that did 
not have direct colonial connections with the Americas. Jean Henri Fabry for 
example, partner of the merchant house and shipowners of Fabry & Sugnin, 
and Samuel Chollet and his cousin Louis Chollet, all originated from 
Switzerland.30 The merchant and ship-owner Joseph Frankina was a Sicilian.31 
Philip David was a merchant from Prague.32 The trader Friedrich Nicolas 
Sander originated from Eppendorp, a town near Hamburg.33 Fredrich Wilhelm 
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Cruwell, partner of the merchant house of Wildrik & Cruwell, came from the 
German town of Bielefeld.34 Jan Ernst Kobert, partner of the merchant house 
of Kobert & Co, had direct trading connections with Hamburg and was prob-
ably also of German descent.35
Creole whites, stemming from families that had lived in the colony for gen-
erations, like the Doncker, Godet, Groebe, Heijliger, Roda, and Runnels fami-
lies, formed a minority among the white population. They usually also owned 
plantations and other real estate, trade not being their only economic activity. 
Statia counted several sugar plantations. Some of these families also owned 
plantations on St. Martin and on the Danish islands.
Company officials, in some cases locally-born, were also privately involved 
in commerce. Johannes de Graaff, who was born on St. Eustatius and was gov-
ernor at the time of the surrender to the British in February 1781, remained 
active in trade during the 1780s and 1790s.36 Members of the Beaujon family 
held high posts in the colonial administrations of St. Eustatius, Curaçao, and 
Demerara. They established a merchant house on St. Eustatius in 1780, which 
was later moved to Curaçao.37 Other Company employees active in trade 
privately were Alexander le Jeune, Hendrik Pandt and Pieter Ouckama, 
although they were not amongst the most prominent merchants.38 In 1790, 
34 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 129, procuration, dated 29 April 1788, from Fredrich 
Wilhelm Cruwell for the merchant house of Jacob Henrich Weber & Son in Bielefeld, to 
act as his attorney regarding any inheritances from people in or near Bielefeld to which he 
was entitled, 297r–298r.
35 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 128, Procuration from Jan Ernst Kobert for Erdwein 
Henrich Bartels, to make an arrangement with his creditors in Hamburg, both privately 
and on behalf of Kobert & Co, 30 July 1787, 557r–558r.; inv. no. 129, Procuration of Jan Ernst 
Kobert for Fredrich Wilhelm Cruwell, merchant on St. Eustatius, to establish current 
affairs with Dethlefsen & Limprecht on St. Thomas, attorneys of Kobert’s creditors, the 
merchant house of Scramm & Kerstens in Hamburg.
36 De Graaff is mentioned as an exporter of tropical produce in several cargo lists. See for 
instance: NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 125, cargo list of the ship Hildegonda Jacoba, 
18 May 1784, fol. 425r–426r; inv. no. 126, cargo list of the ship Hildegonda Jacoba, 17 May 
1785, fol. 423r–424r; cargo lists of the ships Vriendschap, Jongvrouw Anna Catharina, and 
Meijsje Cornelia, 7, 19, and 31 July 1786 respectively, fols. 466r–467r, 502r–503r, and 
544r–545r; inv. no. 138, cargolist of the ship Noord Holland, 24 June 1789, fol. 282r–282r; inv. 
no. 139, cargo list of the ship Eensgezindheid, 31 July 1790, fols. 436r–437r.
37 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 550, financial administration and correspondence of 
the merchant house of Anthonij Beaujon and Sons, established on St. Eustatius and 
Curaçao, 1780–1787.
38 Alexander le Jeune exported mainly tobacco and some coffee. He acted as correspondent 
for the merchant houses of Hanedoes & Van Hanswijk, Zadok & Salomons, and F.W. 
Holthuijsen, see NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. nos. 126 and 135, cargo lists dated 17 May 
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 1785, 16 and 22 May 1786, and 31 July 1786; Only on one occasion did Ouckema export a 
quantity of coffee to J.A. Johanson & Joh. Joosten, see oase inv. no. 125, cargo list dated 18 
May 1784; Hendrik Pandt was active as a merchant between 1785 and 1788, exporting 
tobacco, coffee, sugar, cotton, hides and a quantity of elephant tusks. He acted as corre-
spondent for prominent merchants like Louis Charles Boswell, Crommelin & Sons, and 
Hodshon & Son. See oase inv. nos. 126, 135–138, cargo lists dated 23 April and 13 September 
1785; 22 February, 16 May, and 4 September 1786; 16 and 26 May 1788; 24 June 1789.
39 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 131, a loan of ƒ20,000 against an interest of 4 percent per 
annum, augustus 1790, 507r–508r. He borrowed this sum from Wendelina Eleonora ten 
Hooven, de widow of Jan Carel Godin.
40 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. nos. 139, cargo lists of the ships Columbia and Eensgezindheid, 
30 March, 31 July, and 9 November 1790, fols. 113r–114r, 436r–437r, and 598r–599r.
41 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 139, cargo lists of the schooner Governor Godin, dated 25 
May, 10 November, and 22 December 1790, fols. 250r–v, 600r–v, and 692r–v.
42 See for instance: NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 125, cargo lists of the ships Jonge 
Juffrouw Margaretha and Nooijtgedagt, fols. 195v and 254r–v; inv. no. 135, cargo list of the 
ship Amsterdam, 21 June 1786, no. 187, fols. 422r–423r; inv. no. 138, cargo list of the ship 
Thomas, 21 August 1789, fol. 489r–v; cargo list of the ship De Hoop, 13 February 1790, fols. 
57r–58r; inv. no. 141, cargo list of the ship Catharina & Elizabeth, 31 July 1792, fols. 478r–479r. 
Matthijs Kerkhoff exported to the merchant house of Jan & Pieter Kerkhoff; Jan Schimmel 
Hendriksz exported to Rittenberg & Schimmel and to Hendrik Schimmel sr.; Jacob van 
Putten exported to Joannes van Putten; David Mendes exported to the Mendes Brothers.
43 Victor Enthoven, “That abominable nest of pirates: St. Eustatius and the North Americans, 
1680–1780,” in Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 10, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 
239–301, 296–297, appendix I. Merchants and shipowners, 1750s.
Governor Godin borrowed a large sum of money to invest in his private trade.39 
He sent several shipments of sugar, tobacco and coffee to Amsterdam in 1790.40 
He possibly also had an interest in the regional slave trade. A schooner named 
after him, which was owned by James & Lambert Blair, undertook three voy-
ages to Berbice in 1790, carrying over 200 slaves to this colony.41
A last group to be mentioned was formed by expatriate correspondents of 
merchant houses established in the Dutch Republic. These might be individual 
merchants that had come to St. Eustatius on their own initiative and usually 
traded with a number of firms in the Dutch Republic. Or they might be sent to 
the island to represent a Dutch company overseas. This could be the case with 
family firms or family networks of merchants. The merchants Matthijs 
Kerkhoff, Jacob van Putten, David Mendes, and Jan Schimmel Hendriksz, all of 
whom acted as correspondents for what appear to be relatives in the Dutch 
Republic, although these contacts were never exclusive.42 Many of these mer-
chants had also been active before 1781.43
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44 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 131, sworn statement regarding a current account 
between Fabry & Sugnin and the Danish Royal West India Company, 12 May 1790, 
234r–236r; copy of the current account, 12 May 1790, 238v–240r.
45 The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom (tna), High Court of Admiralty (hca), 
Prize court papers inv. no. 32/342, claims regarding the cargo of the Dutch ship Gesina 
Maria, master Cornelis Jansze Hofker, seized by British warships Monarch and Panther, 
document nos. 5–7, invoice and claim dated 14 March 1782, by the London merchant 
Richard Puller, acting as an agent and correspondent of Danish Merchants Matthi Pieter 
Ernst and L.H. Haasum, regarding a shipment of coffee, sugar and tobacco, confiscated 
property of last mentioned merchants, established in the island of St. Eustatius (thanks to 
Karwan Fatah-Black); NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 134, no. 213, contract of associa-
tion, 29 December 1785, 467r–468r; procuration dated 8 November 1785, from L.H. Haasum 
for Pieter Lavalette to cash debts with debtors of Haasum & Ernst in Saint-Domingue, 
346r–347v; inv. no. 139, deeds dated 4 and 15 May 1790, 215r–217v.
46 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 129, procuration, dated 7 April 1788, from Laurens and 
Christiaan Jurgensen Holm for their brother Jurgen Jurgensen Holm, to act on their behalf 
to settle the estate of their late father Jurgen Lorentzen in Danmark, 256r–257v; inv. nos. 
137–139, cargo lists of the ship Zeeven Provintiën, 5 April 1788, 10 February and 30 July 1789, 
and 5 June 1790.
47 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 137, power of attorney, 12 January 1788, fols. 12r–13v; cargo 
lists of the ships Veronica Catharina, Johanna, Nooijt Gedagt, and Noord Holland, 20 February, 
20 and 29 March, and 26 May 1788, fols. 142r–143r, 181r–v, 213r–214r, and 341r–342r respectively.
From the Statian governmental archives, especially the secretarial and 
notarial deeds, a good impression can be obtained of regional activities and 
relations. Some of the merchant houses were active on the neighboring islands. 
Fabry & Sugnin were for some time established in St. Thomas, before they 
came to St. Eustatius.44 The Dane Lauretz Harleff Haasum had already been 
active on St. Eustatius before the British occupation of 1781. Together with his 
business partner Matthi Pieter Ernst, a merchant in Copenhagen, he operated 
under the name Haasum & Ernst. The Frenchman Pieter Renardel de Lavalette, 
who traded with Guadeloupe and Saint-Domingue, later became a third part-
ner. The firm was continued under the name of Haasum, Ernst & Lavalette, and 
some time later as Haasum & Lavalette, under which name it would move to 
St. Barthélemy.45 The merchants Laurens & Christiaan Jurgensen Holm also 
originated from Denmark. Their brother, Jurgen Jurgensen Holm, was first 
mate on the Dutch brigantine Zeven Provintiën, which sailed several times 
between St. Eustatius and Amsterdam during the late 1780s and early 1790s.46
The German Henrich Wilmans, already mentioned above with regard to his 
petition to the Swedish king, was active as a merchant in St. Eustatius in 1788, 
where he acted as an agent for the King of Denmark. During that year he sent 
various shipments of coffee, tobacco and sugar to Amsterdam.47 A year earlier 
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48 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 137, ship’s manifests, 20 February, 29–30 March, and 26 
May 1788, 142r–143v, 181r–v, 213r–214r, 181r–v, 341r–342r; Procuration, dated 12 January 1788, 
from Jacob Christian Sonntag, on behalf of Claus Henrich Sonntag in Hamburg, to settle 
financial affairs with a man called Jürgen Rohde in St. Thomas, who had mortgaged his 
plantation to Sonntag for 41,997 mark, 12r–13v; inv. no. 129, contract of commerce and 
companyship, 11 January 1788, 43r–45v.
49 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 130, contract 23 January 1789, 59r–64r.
50 NL-HaNA, 1.05.213.01, oase inv. nos. 124–126, 131, 134–141, and 143–144, cargo lists. https://
easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:54485 (2013).
51 Wim Klooster, “Subordinate but proud: Curaçao’s free blacks and mulattoes in the eigh-
teenth century,” Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 68, nos. 3–4 (1994): 283–300, 289, Table  2. 
he had founded a partnership with Henrich Muller on St. Thomas under the 
name of Henrich Muller & Co. In January 1788 Wilmans agreed to include 
Jacob Christian Sonntag in the merchant house, who was probably from 
Hamburg, and who was to participate for one third in this partnership, which 
was renamed Muller, Sonntag & Comp.48
In 1789, Jacob Furtado Ainé, a merchant established in Saint-Domingue, 
came to St. Eustatius as the representative of the merchant houses of both 
Isaac Rebeijro Furtado & Moijze Ribeijro Furtado in Cap Français and of David 
Ribeijro Furtado & fils in Amsterdam. He concluded a contract with Levy 
Furtado & Abraham Ribeijro Furtado on St. Eustatius. They agreed to a merger 
under the joint name of Furtado, Frêres, Cousin et Comp. This newly estab-
lished company would be active both in Saint-Domingue and St. Eustatius.49
These examples demonstrate that the merchant community of St. Eustatius 
formed part of a complicated network that extended to neighboring colonies 
as well as to various countries in Europe directly. Nearly all merchants men-
tioned above were also major exporters to the Dutch Republic and acted as 
correspondents for merchant houses in the Dutch Republic. Based on the 
information extracted from 150 cargo lists out of a total of 180 shipments for 
the period 1781–1795, about 340 merchant houses that shipped tropical pro-
duce to the Dutch Republic could be identified on Statia. In the Dutch Republic, 
more than twice as many firms were active in trade with Statia, although many 
are only mentioned occasionally and the quantities of their imports were often 
relatively small. The actual number of individuals involved in trade on both 
sides might have been smaller, because both in the home country and in the 
colony, merchants operated in changing alliances.50
Free blacks and coloreds were also active in Statian commerce and shipping 
but on a very modest scale. Unlike Curaçao, where around 1790 more than half 
of the free population was non-white, free blacks and coloreds on Statia only 
formed a small minority.51 In that same year Statia counted 7830 inhabitants: 
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 In 1789, Curaçao counted 20,988 inhabitants: 12,864 slaves (61 percent), 3564 whites 
(17 percent), 3714 free non-whites (18 percent), and a group of 864 “free servants” (4 per-
cent), who were probably colored but could also have been white. In total, 11,543 people 
(55 percent) lived in the urban area around the harbor. Of the free non-whites 70 percent 
lived in town, mainly in Otrobanda.
52 NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.02, nwic, inv. no. 1196, return of the population in 1789, 706–707.
53 Han Jordaan, Slavernij en vrijheid op Curaçao. De dynamiek van een achttiende-eeuws 
Atlantisch handelsknooppunt (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2013).
54 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 123, ff. 381r–v and 606r–v, two testaments of the free 
black woman Cathy, dated 4 July and 27 September 1782 respectively; ibid., fols. 373r–v, 
testament of the free black woman Cloe, 2 July 1782; inv. no. 124, fol. 66r, last will and testa-
ment of the free black John Quacu, dated 17 January 1783; ibidem, fols. 486r, 487r–488r, 
deed of opening of the last will and testament of Thomas Crooke, dated 5 July 1783, and 
the original testament dated 9 March 1780; inv. no. 131, fols. 323r–325r, last will and testa-
ment of the free black woman Mary Harris, alias Creagh, dated 28 June 1790.
55 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 123, fols. 553r–v, 612r–v, transport deeds of 17 August 
(house) and 3 October 1782 (slave) respectively; inv. no. 124, fols. 103r–v, 125r, 135r–v, 442r, 
transport deeds of 4 March (slave; later cancelled), 11 March (slave), 18 March (house), and 
23 June 1783 (slave; the buyer is the mother; for the manumission of the same slave, see 
letter of manumission of 24 June 1783, ff. 444v–445r) respectively; inv. no. 128, fols. 611r–v, 
transport deed of 23 August 1787 (slave); inv. no. 135, f. 555r and 556r, transport deeds of 24 
March and 2 June 1786 (slaves); inv. no. 137, fols. 640r–v, 712r–v, transport deed of 18 
October 1788 (house) and 3 December 1788 (slave; sold by a free mulatto woman from 
St. Kitts); inv. no. 138, fols. 512r–513r, transport deed of 1 September 1789 (house).
4944 slaves (63 percent), 2375 whites (30 percent), and only 511 free blacks and 
coloreds (7 percent).52 The Statian slaves were employed on the island’s sugar 
plantations, but also in the town of Oranjestad as house slaves and craftsmen, 
as dockhands in the Lower Town, and as sailors on board the Statian ships. It is 
not clear why Statia had only a relatively small free non-white population com-
pared to Curaçao. Statia’s much later economic rise might have been of influ-
ence here. Curaçao, by the end of the seventeenth century, already had a busy 
port and a rapidly growing urban area offering possibilities for slaves to earn an 
income of their own, save money and buy their freedom.53
In contrast to Curaçao, in Statian judicial and notarial documents, free 
blacks and coloreds are only occasionally mentioned. In the notarial archives 
only a few wills of free non-whites have been found.54 And over a ten year 
period from December 1781 until December 1790, no more than four transport 
deeds could be retrieved regarding the sale of real estate and nine regarding 
the sale of slaves, in which free blacks or coloreds were involved.55 Statian 
free black and colored men also would have been employed as sailors. From a 
sample of 203 muster rolls of local merchant ships, issued between 1781 and 
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1795, in which 2208 crew members were registered, 856 were listed as 
non-white, both slave and free.56 Since there was only a relatively small 
group of free male non-white Statians – in 1789 there were only 39 free 
black and 67 free colored men between 16 and 60 years of age57 – many of 
these sailors probably originated from neighboring colonies, and partly also 
from Curaçao.58 On a total of 163 listed shipowners in the muster rolls, only 
six (one of which was a woman) were designated as free non-whites. Most of 
these non-white shipowners only became active in the 1790s.59 Only a hand-
ful of free non-white Statians were active in trade, probably mostly by run-
ning a small shop like the free mestizo woman Jenny Fletcher who sold 
textiles.60
Because of their small numbers, the free non-whites were not considered as 
a potential threat by the Statian whites. But during the revolutionary period of 
the 1790s, Statian whites were suspicious of blacks and coloreds coming to 
their island from other places, especially the French colonies. In 1793, foreign 
free blacks and coloreds were ordered to leave the island, and those newly 
arrived were not admitted to the colony unless they had obtained special per-
mission because they had been on Statia before and were known to be of good 
56 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. nos. 123–131, 134–139.
57 NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.02, nwic, inv. no. 1196, return of the population in 1789, 706.
58 It can be deduced from the sources that a Curaçaon community was living on St. Eustatius 
from the fact that there was a location called “Curaçao Dorp” (Curaçao Village). See: 
NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 137, fols. 358r–359r, deed of transport of a house in the 
so-called “Curaçaose Dorp,” situated on a plot of land belonging to Laurence Salomons, 
and inhabited by the free black Cyrus, dated 31 May 1788.
59 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 137, fol. 373r, muster roll of the sloop Twee Vrienden, 
5 June 1788, owned by the free mulattoes George Lacombe and Domingo Serido; inv. 
no. 141, 604r, muster roll of the barque Catherine, 10 November 1792, owned by the free 
mulattoes George Lacombe and Domingo Serido; inv. no. 143, fols. 466r and 651r, muster 
rolls of the barque Defiance, 16 May and 24 July 1793, owned by the free black Peter 
Doncker; ibid., fol. 563r, muster roll of the barque Dolphin, 25 June 1793, free mulattoes 
George Lacombe and Domingo Serido; ibid., fol. 633r, muster roll of the schooner Fly & 
Delight, 17 July 1793, owned by the free mestizo Labbe Walrand; inv. no. 144, muster roll of 
the schooner Jenny & Venus, 26 July 1794, owned by the free black Peter Doncker; ibid., 
fols. 405r and 505r, muster rolls of the sloop Fly and the barque Success, 20 May and 2 July 
1794, owned by the free mestizo Labbe Walrand together with the free mulatto Benjamin 
Solomon; ibid., fols. 478r and 521r, muster rolls of the schooner Twee Broeders, 28 June and 
15 July 1794, owned by the free mulatto woman Leonora Lagan.
60 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 139, fol. 489r–v, report of an inspection regarding the 
damage caused by a burglary in the shop of the free mestizo Jenny Fletcher situated on 
the bay, 29 August 1790.
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61 J.A. Schiltkamp and J.Th. de Smidt, eds., West Indisch Plakaatboek, 3, Nederlandse Antillen, 
Bovenwinden, Publikaties en andere wetten betrekking hebbende op St. Maarten, St. 
Eustatius en Saba, 1648/1681–1816 (Amsterdam: Emmering, 1979), St. Eustatius, no. 91, pub-
lication April 1793, 353–355.
62 John P. Knox, A historical account of St. Thomas (New York: Charles Scribner, 1852), 89–91; 
117–119; P.P. Sveistrup, “Det Kongelige octroyerde Vestindiske Handelsselskab 1778–1785. 
En drifstøkonomisk undersøgelse,” Historisk tidskrift 10, no. 6 (1942): 385–427.
conduct. It was prohibited for Statian free blacks and coloreds to house or hide 
any foreign free non-whites.61
After the Danish decree of 1764 proclaiming St. Thomas and St. John free 
ports, there was no instant explosion of merchant interest in the colonies. 
There are very few records detailing the urban population and its activities 
during this time. St. Thomas was still very much a plantation economy, over-
shadowed as it was by the extensive cultivation of St. Croix. In 1773, there were 
39 sugar and 43 cotton estates, owned mostly by Dutch families present on the 
island since its early colonization. The plantations were worked by 2523 slaves, 
and overseen by 42 white persons. It was not until the American War of 
Independence that there was some added impetus for trade through Charlotte 
Amalie. The free port now found some utility among neutrals and belligerents 
alike. The Danish government itself would not pass on the opportunity to 
profit from the wartime economy of St. Thomas. The Vestindisk Handelsselskab 
(vhs) was created as a limited-charter company in 1778, amassed by the capital 
of Danish government officials and wealthy Copenhagen merchants. The 
directors of the Company had their sights set on the importation of Spanish 
and French colonial goods, primarily coffee, so as not to interfere with the 
sugar economy on St. Croix. During its short existence, the vhs contributed to 
making Copenhagen a major center for the re-exportation of coffee in the 
Baltic, but was also riddled with administrative problems and financial vaga-
ries. It was finally bought in its entirety by the Danish crown in 1786, as the 
return of peaceful conditions could not sustain its already floundering 
business.62
Regarding private commercial networks, there is little more to be found in 
the written sources than some glimpses into the polyglot community that was 
composed by Charlotte Amalie merchants. A Danish-German traveler, J.P. 
Nissen, sailing to St. Thomas in 1792, wrote that the number of white inhabit-
ants on the island “may have been between four and five hundred: the greater 
part of them were Creoles, – the remainder consisted then already of persons 
of all nations, and almost every language was spoken among them.” Nissen, 
then a wine merchant’s apprentice, observed the harbor and the movements 
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through it. There were large ships arriving from Hamburg, Altona, Flensburg 
and Copenhagen, trading their textiles and manufactures and loading colo-
nial goods such as Puerto Rico tobacco and coffee for a return voyage. The 
greatest part of the intra-Caribbean trade that came into the harbor “were 
American vessels, small Spanish sloops and boats, and large English mer-
chant-men.” The Americans brought in provisions, lumber and shingles, and 
they sailed out with rum and sugar in return. The Spaniards exchanged 
German linens and English manufactured goods, bringing along much-needed 
silver coin from the Spanish main and Puerto Rico. The Charlotte Amalie of 
1792 that Nissen wrote about was a cosmopolitan Caribbean port with regional 
connections, especially with Spanish dominions, whose trade was of the 
utmost importance. The ties with European shipping were also there, with 
Danish ships importing all varieties of colonial goods with the conspicuous 
exception of sugar, a result of the exclusive sugar trading rights for St. Croix 
inhabitants.63
Whereas many merchants in Statia and St. Thomas had been living in the 
islands for decades, the early history of Swedish St. Barthélemy presents a dif-
ferent population structure. Contemporary Swedish observers in 1788 saw an 
island inhabited by a “great many adventurers.” These persons were maritime 
transients, who, for the most part, had come there running from creditors else-
where and would have no qualms leaving the island again if the opportunity 
arose. Settled merchants with sizeable capital and property were few, and the 
trade circulating through the harbor of Gustavia was by all accounts modest in 
scope and nature. There were, for example, the Americans Arthurton and 
Basden, who traded North American merchandise for rum and sugar coming 
from surrounding islands. There was a group of petty French traders, among 
them Bernié, Le May, Renaldy, Junius and Martins, who dealt in a small-scale 
retailing of French goods, such as textiles, wines, haberdashery, glass- and tin-
wares. There were also a few traders acting as commissioners or agents for 
merchants on other islands such as St. Martin and St. Kitts. The firm of Haasum 
and Lavalette which, as mentioned earlier, was also established in St. Eustatius, 
was the only business which retailed goods from the Dutch islands, and they 
were also involved in the American trade. The majority of the urban popula-
tion were not actively involved in intra-Caribbean trade, but were employed as 
artisans, hawkers, and shop- and innkeepers.64
63 J.P. Nissen, Reminiscences of a 46 Years Residence in the Islands of St. Thomas in the West 
Indies (Nazareth, pa: Senseman & Co., 1838), 7–9.
64 Christopher Carlander, Resan till St Barthélemy. Dr. Christopher Carlanders resejournal 
1787–1788 (Stockholm: Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien, 1969), 74–80.
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The trade passing through St. Barthélemy in its early phase of Swedish colo-
nization was, at times, lively, but was as a rule dominated by often illicit, small-
scale regional cabotage journeys, which lacked the European-bound character 
of the commerce present in Statia and St. Thomas at the same time. In 1787 for 
instance, for which there are some rare surviving custom house records, the 
port of Gustavia was visited by 1033 ships. A general impression of the trade 
emerges from the figures of the busiest month of June. There were 159 arrivals, 
of which a large majority of 78 vessels came from British colonies in the 
Caribbean. Twenty-six ships came from North American ports, from Guadeloupe 
and Martinique there were nine arrivals and from Statia there were 21. There 
was only a single vessel coming from the Danish colonies. Departures for the 
same period display essentially the same pattern, with 84 departures for British 
colonial destinations, 14 departures for North America, 29 for Statia, six for 
Guadeloupe and Martinique and, finally, two vessels for the Danish colonies. 
During the ten extant months found in the custom house records of 1787, only 
three Swedish ships entered the harbor from European ports of departure. 
Not a single non-Swedish ship arrived from Europe during the same year. The 
establishment of the swic would not change the picture considerably regard-
ing traffic from Sweden. The majority of the vessels clearing through Gustavia 
were small packboats, schooners and sloops, of around 20 Swedish lasts or 
roughly 40 tons. The only exception was the American-flagged ships, generally 
of a larger build. The ships traveling back and forth from North American ports 
carried lumber, victuals and tobacco, while ships coming from neighboring 
colonies freighted local produce such as sugar, coffee, rum and molasses.65
After news of the Dutch Patriot coup had reached St. Barthélemy in January 
1788, there passed a brief moment of high anticipation among the Swedish 
officials on the island. A few wealthy merchants from surrounding islands, 
including St. Eustatius, had recently bought lots of land and rented property in 
Gustavia, and the governor, Von Rosenstein, also counted on a rumored Anglo-
French war as an opportunity for the small island to advance its role as a 
regional marketplace.66 The hopes were in vain, however, as no regime change 
came about in the Dutch Republic, and there was no international conflict yet 
between Great Britain and France. Instead, Sweden itself was entangled in a 
war with Russia, which led to considerable delays for the Swedish colonial 
project. The commercial networks of St. Barthélemy would remain of a cir-
cumscribed and local character at least up until the outbreak of war in 1793. 
65 Custom house records 1787, SBS 28, sna; Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin S:t Barthélemy, 
163–164.
66 Von Rosenstein’s report 21 January 1788, SBS 1B:1, sna.
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That year would bring the beginning of a transformation of the transit trade in 
the region, which would have consequences for Gustavia as well as Charlotte 
Amalie.
 Changing Conditions on St. Eustatius and Migration to the 
Scandinavian Colonies After 1795
The picture that emerges after 1781 shows that the Statian economy, in the first 
place, suffered from the lack of a clear trade policy as a result of the particular-
ism of various parties in the Dutch Republic vis-à-vis demands from possibly 
equally self-interested merchants in St. Eustatius. During the economic heyday 
preceding the British occupation, the many hundreds of American, British, 
and French merchant ships that called at the island provided the Company 
with a handsome income from the duties paid on imports and exports, moor-
age etc. At the same time, a steady and voluminous stream of tropical produce 
reached the home country; exporters in the Dutch Republic found a ready 
market for their products and many industries and suppliers directly or indi-
rectly associated with the Statian trade also benefited. During the years follow-
ing the British occupation in 1781, the volume of shipping and trade dropped 
considerably, reducing not only the income of the Company but also reducing 
the turnover and profits of many Dutch merchants and other entrepreneurs 
who had previously benefited from the Statian trade. The wic intended to 
repair its loss of proceeds and decided in 1786 to raise the tariffs on trade in 
St. Eustatius. This caused a vehement reaction from the Statian merchant com-
munity. In a number of petitions, proposals, and memorials, coauthored by 
some prominent foreign merchants like the Frenchman Vaucrosson and the 
Bermudian R.D. Jennings, the Company plans were protested while fears were 
uttered regarding the growing competition from the Danish and Swedish free 
ports as well as French, Spanish, and British free trade experiments. It was 
feared that the intended increase of duties would be the deathblow for the 
Statian trade.67
67 Schiltkamp and De Smidt, West Indisch Plakaatboek, 3, St. Maarten no. 149, “Resolutie van 
de bewindhebbers van de wic van 9 oktober 1786 het overgezonden tarief van in- en 
 uitvoerrechten van kracht te doen zijn,” 17/19 Februariy 1787, 122; NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.02, 
nwic inv. no. 1195, copy of a petition by David Mendez, F. Sugnin, W. Stevenson, Daniel 
Hopker, R.D. Jennings, M. Dubrois Godet, Jan Schimmel Hendriksz, Vaucrosson, received 
21 March 1787, 351–357; copy of a petition by 68 merchants to acting governor and council-
lors, received 14 March 1787, 423–425; copy of a petition by David Mendes, Frederik 
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The growth and decline of economic activity on St. Eustatius is usually 
gauged by the numbers of ships entering and clearing Orange Bay. In 1792, an 
average of nearly 300 ships a month called at the island, a number comparable 
to pre-1781 conditions and an indication that supposed regional competition 
was at that time hardly felt. Exports to the Dutch Republic, however, although 
clearly recovering after peace was concluded in 1784, did not reach the same 
levels as during the 1770s. In 1792, the highest post-war volume of trade was 
reached when 28 ships laden with tropical produce sailed to the home country. 
After the first half of 1793 – in February France had declared war on the Dutch 
Republic – the monthly number of ships dropping anchor in the Statian 
roadstead was suddenly halved.68 Registers of incoming and outgoing 
ships for the years thereafter have not been found, but in the archive of 
St. Eustatius a register of import duties was preserved. The figures regarding 
the money collected monthly from arriving ships make the demise of the col-
ony as an Atlantic trading hub visible. Until August 1793, an average monthly 
amount of 433 pesos or Spanish dollars69 (ƒ1049) was received. This fell to 
Sugnin, William Stevenson, Daniel Hopker, R.D. Jennings, Martin Dubrois Godet, Jan 
Schimmel Hendrisz, Vaucrosson and Hendrik Pandt to acting governor and councillors, 
21 maart 1787, 427–432; copy of a petition signed by 116 merchants and ship captains, 
dated 15 March 1787, 435–438; “Memorie en Representatien tot Herstel van den 
handel & vaart des Eijlands St. Eustatius,” by Jan Schimmel Hendiksz, Hendrik Pandt 
and D. Mendez, 17 juli 1787, 599–625; copy of a statement by Martin Dubrois Godet, 
received 20 July 1787, 627–636; NL-HaNA, 2.21.006.49, cvh inv. no. 154g, copy of a 
document dated 20 July 1787, signed by R.D. Jennings, Vaucrosson, and W. Stevenson, 
nos. 37–66v.
68 NL-HaNA, 1.05.01.02, nwic inv. no. 633, list of incoming and outgoing ships 1778, 111–286; 
inv. no. 635, register of incoming and outgoing ships 1784, 131–283; 1.05.02, Raad van 
Coloniën (RvC) inv. no. 90, monthly registers of incoming and outgoing ships, January 
1792–December 1793.
69 The peso, Spanish dollar, or piastre gourde was the regular currency and financial unit of 
account in both the Dutch Leeward and Windward Islands, as well as in the Danish and 
Swedish colonies. The commercial exchange rate between the peso and Swedish and 
Danish rixdollars are not precisely known, but Swedish descriptions from around 1786 
give one piastre gourde as equal 42–44 shillings specie. That is, not quite one Swedish 
rixdollar specie (48 shillings specie). Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin S:t Barthélemy 
67–69; I have yet to find any estimate for the Danish colonies, as there was an established 
difference between West Indies current money (vestindisk courant) and Danish current 
money (dansk courant), which was universally given in account books and the like. 
Commercial exchange rates, of course, depended on many other factors apart from face 
value and the weight in silver. See the discussion in John J. McCusker, Money and Exchange 
in Europe and America (London: MacMillan, 1978), 116–120, 291–299.
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185 pesos (ƒ444) a month during the remaining part of that year. In 1794, the 
monthly average rose a little to 228 pesos (ƒ547), but in 1795 it fell to 64 pesos 
(ƒ153). In 1796 and 1797, the last years for which information is available, 
this figure plummeted to a mere 29 pesos (ƒ69) and 20 pesos (ƒ48) a month, 
respectively.70
This coincides with the decrease in exports from Statia to the Dutch 
Republic. After 1792, the number of shipments declined with only one ship 
sailing to the home country in 1795. The explanation for this development is 
clear: war. During the turbulent two decades that followed after the outbreak 
of the French Revolution, the Dutch were almost continually involved as one 
of the belligerents. Between 1793 and 1795, the Dutch were at war with revolu-
tionary France. After French troops invaded the Republic and the Batavian 
Republic was proclaimed in January 1795, the Dutch sided with France in the 
war against Great Britain. In that same year, St. Eustatius was put under the 
“protection” of the French, which came down to a de facto occupation that 
lasted until 1801, when the British conquered the three Dutch Leeward Islands. 
During this period, the French colonies – the most important suppliers of trop-
ical produce to Statia – were largely in a state of chaos as far as they had not 
been occupied by the British. The United States, another very important trad-
ing partner, was entangled in the so-called Quasi War with France between 
1798 and 1800. During these years, French privateers were actively hunting 
down American vessels in Caribbean waters, so these were not likely to call at 
an island that was controlled by the French. Statia, St. Martin, and Saba were 
returned to the Dutch after the Peace of Amiens in 1802. But by that time, the 
Dutch Leeward colonies had economically become totally insignificant. A year 
later, the war was continued. In 1810 the islands were again occupied by the 
British. When Statia came under Dutch rule again in 1816, its population had 
declined to 2591: 507 whites, 336 free coloreds and 1748 slaves.71
The Scandinavian free port colonies could be neutral havens where refugees 
would find accommodation whether they ran from debt, conflict, persecution or 
other calamities, or, in the case of the Statians discussed below, where they sought 
greater economic opportunity. The nature of turmoil in the region from the 1790s 
70 NL-HaNA, 1.05.13.01, oase inv. no. 240, register of collected import duties, September 
1792–October 1797.
71 Cornelis C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and in the Guinanas, 1680–1791 (Assen: 
Van Gorcum & Co, 1985), 146–154; For the repercussions of the Quasi War for the Dutch in 
the Caribbean see also: Han Jordaan, “Patriots, privateers and international politics: the 
myth of the conspiracy of Jean Baptiste Tierce Cadet,” in Curaçao in the Age of Revolutions, 
1795–1800, ed. Wim Klooster and Gert Oostindie (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011), 141–169.
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onwards resulted in extensive and complex migration flows, as Caribbean colonies 
were engulfed in internal conflicts and were subject to external aggression. After 
the news of the French Revolution reached the Caribbean in 1789, Frenchmen 
of various political convictions took refuge on neutral islands. St. Barthélemy 
received many refugees from Martinique and Guadeloupe, whereas St. Thomas 
was a destination for refugees from Saint-Domingue. Successive migration waves 
occurred after the Revolution, during the British occupations of neighboring 
islands, and after Guadeloupe was retaken by Victor Hugues in 1794.
A first great wave of migration took place in 1793–1794 by a heterogeneous 
group of inhabitants from Martinique and Guadeloupe, consisting both of 
revolutionary sympathizers and royalists. In May of 1793, the Swedish  Governor 
Bagge commented with mixed sentiments on the arrival of French families. On 
the one hand, he lamented granting protection to foreign “adventurers” and 
bankrupt persons, which he saw as a potential threat to public tranquillity. On 
the other hand, he welcomed those “familiar traders” from the French islands 
who brought with them “considerable property, consisting of slaves, house-
holds, cash etc.”72
Other immigrants were also influencing the turn of events in the neutral 
free ports. The French capture of Statia, St. Martin and Saba in 1795 prompted 
an exodus of their former inhabitants. St. Eustatius was a source of consider-
able migration. A cohort of displaced St. Eustatius merchants became natural-
ized Swedish and Danish subjects towards the close of the eighteenth century, 
and some would be of great consequence for their newly-adopted home colo-
nies. Already in 1781 there had been a slight surge in Dutch-language migrants 
to St. Thomas, a likely effect of the smaller relocations or resettlements from 
Statia after the British occupation in 1781. The remainder of the settlers bore 
English, Spanish and French names, few of which could be definitively linked 
to Dutch colonies.73 The emigration of some Sephardic Jews from St. Eustatius 
to St. Thomas after 1781 is an exception, but it is difficult to trace other non-
Dutch former residents of Statia from the available evidence. The records do 
not show any significant migration of former Dutch colonial residents prior to 
the mid-1790s in either of the Scandinavian colonies. Judging by the available 
statistics, there is a markedly higher increase in the population of St. Barthélemy 
around 1795 than figures for corresponding years in St. Thomas. Evidence of 
72 C.F. Bagge’s report 28 May 1793, SBS 1B:2, sna.
73 St. Thomas og St. Jan guvernement mm.; Gruppeordnede sager – Sociale og kulturelle 
forhold; Borgerbrevsprotokoll 1755–1788, 693/11.53.171, Vestindiske lokalarkiver, dna; 
Anne Lebel, “Saint Barthélemy et ses archives: une connaissance historique éclatée,” 
Bulletin de la societé d’historie de la Guadeloupe 59 (2011): 91–102, 96.
300 Jordaan and Wilson
<UN>
Dutch colonists immigrating to the Swedish colony is found in other documen-
tary evidence. The Swedish judge Johan Norderling wrote to the Board of 
Directors of the swic in July of 1795 detailing the recent growth of Gustavia. 
He wrote, “The amount of houses are now nearly doubled, some of them quite 
beautiful,” and went on to comment that, “All trade in St. Eustache is ruined, all 
warehouses at the present closed, and the wealthier houses gone away, some 
here, some to other islands.”74
Indeed, supporting Norderling’s assertion of the transformation of Gustavia, 
it is clearly evident from town maps drawn out in 1791, 1796, 1799 and 1800 
respectively, that the expansion of Gustavia was considerable during this time. 
In 1791, the town was composed of 133 buildings, while in 1796 this figure had 
nearly trebled, and in 1800 the town could boast over 800 separate buildings 
ranging from the largest warehouse to the smallest cooking shed.75 Norderling 
attributed this growth to the Statian merchants, and he also hinted at the 
wealth that some apparently brought with them. Others made similar conclu-
sions, such as the Company agent Gustav Wernberg, who thought the island 
could “reap great profits” from the recent immigration from the Dutch colo-
nies, “if only a perfect neutrality would be observed, and that no Nation should 
be favored par preference.”76 The available statistics offer an overview of the 
migration to the islands of St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy between 1789–1838, 
as shown in Tables 11.1 and 11.2.
While many migrants arrived solely because they needed a sanctuary, there 
were many who stayed and became naturalized inhabitants of their new colo-
nies. In order for foreigners to become a naturalized Swedish or Danish subject 
by settling in Gustavia or Charlotte Amalie, they had to make a cash payment 
and sign an oath of fidelity and allegiance. St. Barthélemy had a differen-
tial  scale for payment for naturalization and burgher rights. For merchants 
who wanted to be able to sail their vessels under Swedish colors, a one-time 
74 J. Norderling to swic, 13.7.1795, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 169, sna. “All handel i St. Eustache 
är förstörd, alla magaziner tilsvidare igenslagne, och de rikare husen bortflyttade, en del 
hit, en del til andra öar – Den som lämnat St. Barthelemy för tre år sedan, skulle nu knap-
past igenkänna staden Gustavia: Antalet af husen äro nära fördublade och några af dem 
tämeligen vackra.”
75 Samuel Fahlberg, Charta öfver Gustavia på S:t Barthelemi Som det förhölt sig den 30 april 
1796; Samuel Fahlberg, Charta öfver Staden Gustavia, dated Gustavia 18 October 1799; 
Samuel Fahlberg, Charta öfver Staden Gustavia, dated Gustavia 12 April 1800, The Military 
Archives of Sweden; see also Holger Weiss, “Det svenska kolonialprojektets komplexa 
rum: om slaveriet under svensk flagg i slutet av 1700-talets karibiska och atlantiska värld,” 
Sjuttonhundratal. Nordic Yearbook for Eighteenth-Century Studies (2012), 59–92.
76 G. Wernberg to swic, 14.9.1795, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 169, sna.
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1788 279 83 294 656 1663 39.4 42.5
1794 554 590* – 1144 2212 51.7 25
1796 981 388 682 2051 3190 64.3 47.8
1806 1424 802 835 3061 –** ** 46.5
1812 1818 1025 1038 3881 5482 70.7 33.2
1819 –** –** –** 2910 4587 63.4 –**
1834 –** –** –** 2080 3720 55.9 –**
1838 338 1074* – 1412 2965 47.6 11.4
Sources: St. Barthélemysamlingen (sbs) 28, sna; Yolande Lavoie, Carolyn Fick 
and Francine-M. Mayer, “A Particular Study of Slavery in the Caribbean Island  
of Saint Barthélemy: 1648–1846,” Caribbean Studies 28, no. 2 (1995): 369–403; Yolande Lavoie, 
“Histoire sociale et démographique d’une communauté isolée: Saint Barthélemy (Antilles 
francaises),” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique francaise 42, no. 3 (1989): 411–427.
*    This figure includes the total for whites as well.
** Figures for these groups are not available.



















1789 1527 260 398 2185 5266 39.5 73.2
1794 1715 243 578 2536 4627 54.8 67.6
1796 2021 239 619 2879 5720 50.3 70.2
1797 1943 239 726 2908 5734 50.7 66.8
1800 2561 714 1185 4460 7699 57.9 57.4
1831 2894 3408 4769 11,071 13,492 82.0 26.1
1838 2093 5024 1770 8887 11,433 77.7 23.5
Source: Reviderede vestindiske regnskaber; Matrikel for St. Thomas og St. Jan 1755–1915, dna; 
Neville Hall, Slave Society in the Danish West Indies  
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 90, 189.
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77 See, for example, “HIS MAJESTY´S Gracious Taxation Act, whereafter the below specified 
Public duties on the Island of St. Bartholomew are provisionally to be paid, Given at the 
Palace of Carlsruhe March 26, 1804,” Report of Saint Bartholomew, 26 September 1804. 
Similar taxations were in effect in earlier years, but this is the first documented taxation 
act found in print. http://www.memoirestbarth.com/st-barts/traite-negriere/premier 
-journal-local.
payment of 100 pesos was necessary. For settlers who wanted to support them-
selves by crafts or other business ventures within the town limits, 16 Spanish 
dollars was required. For the right of simply being a Swedish subject and the 
right of residence in Gustavia, only one dollar was to be paid. These scales were 
a clear reflection of both the ambition to attract merchants who carried sub-
stantial capital and the desire to make it easy to provide settlement for the 
much-needed mariners and craftsmen who were the bulk of the workforce.77
The next years would see some notable Statian émigrés becoming Swedish 
or Danish subjects. The most prominent merchants to move from St. Eustatius 
to St. Barthélemy, for example, were not Dutch by birth. A notable migrant 
from St. Eustatius was the Italian John Joseph Cremony, a native of Gaeta, near 
Naples. Born in 1756, he had established himself as a Statian merchant in 1781, 
as he was enumerated in the list of burghers that the British had made up dur-
ing the occupation. He seems to have settled in St. Barthélemy by 1796, as had 
the Vaucrosson family. Both Cremony and the Vaucrossons came to have lead-
ing positions in the mixed community that was Gustavia after the migrations 
of the 1790s. The migrants’ transition to a new colony was not one character-
ized by complete accord with the new administration and smooth accommo-
dation into a new society. The freedom of trade in both St. Thomas and St. 
Barthélemy was hampered by restrictions that had been non-existent in Statia. 
Locally registered ships were, as a rule, not allowed to freight ships to Europe 
under Swedish or Danish flags. Local merchants who wished to remit cargoes 
to European ports were forced to find circuitous and costly means to do this, 
usually chartering ships under a different flag. This was a great source of dis-
content among the merchant elite, and was the most serious question sur-
rounding trade in the colonies during the early nineteenth century. Abraham 
Runnels, a Statian residing in St. Barthélemy, summed up the pleas of the mer-
chant class in a letter to the Swedish Trade and Finance Department in 1814, in 
which he stated that:
[…] three essential links in the chain is wanting. Namely the confidence 
of the Merchants in Sweden, the facilities of Markets for colonial produce 
within her Territories and the faculty of navigating with the vessels of this 
colony in the European Seas & Ports. If the comparison could be rendered 
303The Eighteenth-Century Danish, Dutch, and Swedish
<UN>
78 Abraham Runnels to Carl David Skogman, 9 June 1814, St Barthélemy-samlingen (sbs), 
vol. 3 A, sna.
79 Image 281–282, vol. 260, Correspondence (C), Fonds Suédois de Saint-Barthélemy (fsb), 
Archives nationales d’outre-mer (anom), Aix-en-Provence, Uppsala University fsb digi-
tization project; For further examples of Statians and Bermudians in St. Thomas, see 
Jarvis, In the Eye Of All Trade, 163–167, 170, 353, 432.
complete by supplying the chain with these three links, we might be 
unconcerned about the rivalry of any new free ports (which could grow 
out of a new order of things) possessing no greater physical means than 
we do; but possibly not so favored in the matter of jurisprudence.78
According to Runnels, the restrictions exacerbated the fact that commerce on 
the island was too dependent on North American shipping, which, in reality, 
was the only source of outside supplies and provisions to the nearby colonies. 
Runnels was writing this when the War of 1812 still raged between the United 
States and Great Britain. The war was, by all available accounts, the zenith of 
profitability for the Swedish colony in terms of harborside traffic, but the North 
American merchants enjoyed the most advantages, according to Runnels. The 
“new order of things” was a reference to the resumption of peacetime com-
merce, which would inevitably entail the return of occupied colonies to their 
former owners.
It is slightly more problematic to detail the instances of Statian merchants 
moving to St. Thomas, as burgher brief protocols are missing for key years from 
the 1790s onwards. However, in an undated and unsigned report found in the 
local administrative archive of St. Barthélemy, there is some unequivocal evi-
dence of relocated Statians residing in St. Thomas. The report was in all likeli-
hood penned by the Swedish harbormaster at St. Barthélemy, Anders Furuträd, 
because he had been assigned in 1802 to investigate the rival Danish colony 
from a large number of perspectives, and the report is the likely end result of 
these investigations. The report is a systematic overview of conditions and 
regulations in the Danish colony, and it is attached with a list of the island’s 
“most distinguished” merchants. At the top of this list, the Bermudian and for-
mer Statian resident Richard Downing Jennings is found, perhaps not so sur-
prisingly, as the dominantly Anglophone Danish island of St. Thomas had for 
some time become a node in Bermudian trade networks.79
If focus is shifted onto other groups than the white merchant elite, there are 
other migration patterns to observe. In the free ports, seafaring and artisan 
trades constituted the major areas of occupation. The growth of the free colored 
population of Charlotte Amalie had been dramatic during the first three 
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decades of the nineteenth century. The enumerated population of Charlotte 
Amalie’s able-bodied free colored male adult population on 28 May 1802 shows 
a total of 221 individuals. The enumeration indicates the origin of these inhabit-
ants, one originating from St. John, ten from St. Croix and 122 from St. Thomas. 
Out of the remaining 89 – 40 percent of the total – all were of foreign origin. 
Among those émigrés, a majority of 39 were former residents of Curaçao, 
whereas 30 others hailed from neighboring St. Eustatius. The remainder came 
from French and British colonies, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Barbados and 
Jamaica. These inhabitants display a pattern of continuing intra-Caribbean 
migration reinforced by political vicissitudes reverberating in the region. 
Immigration was also likely to be influenced by existing ties of ethnicity, family 
and commerce. The existence of this list is due to some very specific motiva-
tions. The rapid increase in the size of the free colored population, coupled 
with its high foreign component, led to some fears among the governing white 
population. It influenced the Danish governor-general von Walterstorff to 
establish the first “St. Thomas Commission for the Registering of the Free 
Coloured” in February of 1803. It raised questions about whether the presence 
of foreign free coloreds was desirable and advantageous or if it was a dangerous 
burden to the colony. Von Walterstorff specifically targeted colored migrants 
from the French colonies because of their perceived subversive ideas and activ-
ities inspired by the French and Haitian Revolutions. It also highlighted the 
large number of women from Curaçao and elsewhere who roamed the streets 
of Charlotte Amalie, engaging in petty trade and bartering. It was observed that 
their knowledge of Spanish and Spanish customs placed the local creoles at a 
disadvantage, because these women could acquire and sell merchandise from 
nearby Puerto Rico with ease and usually with high profit margins. The com-
mission outlined some possible measures, ranging from targeted taxation to 
outright deportations, but none of these proposals seems to have materialized, 
save for the expulsion of a select number of free colored persons with origins in 
French West Indian colonies. The commission and its records are indicative of 
the ambiguous attitudes of colonial administrators in the Danish West Indies 
towards different types of migrants. While the overall view of migration and 
settlement in the free ports was benign, administrators differentiated between 
what they perceived to be valuable as opposed to potentially disruptive exter-
nal elements in their colonies. Comparing Walterstorff ’s concerns about free 
colored migrations with the gleeful accounts of wealthy Statian settlement on 
St. Barthélemy by local officials, this becomes quite clear.80
80 Hall, Slave Society, 178–189.
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The period after the British occupation of both St. Thomas and 
St. Barthélemy showed signs of consolidation, growth and material advance by 
their respective free colored populations. In St. Thomas after 1802, the registers 
for sea passes included information of shipowner and shipmaster burgher 
licenses and the so-called free-briefs, which stated the date of manumission or 
birth. In the years 1803–1807, the share of free colored shipowners stood at 
8.6 percent, and the share of shipmasters at 14.6 percent, which indicates 
that this group also participated directly in the colony’s growing merchant 
community.81 Civic rights for free colored were discussed from time to time. 
At the request of the council of St. Barthélemy, the question of civic rights for 
the free colored, specifically their electability for public service, was debated 
in Stockholm in 1812. The notion was rejected with explicit reference to the 
Revolution in Saint-Domingue, arguing that extended civic rights was danger-
ous, that “such a change would with time result in that all property end up in 
the hands of the free coloured.” In the Danish West Indies, the free colored 
tried to advance their own rights in the form of the so-called freedman petition 
of 1816, aspiring for the same civic rights and privileges as the white popula-
tion. It would take several more years to gain these formal rights, as they were 
granted in St. Barthélemy in 1822 and 1830 in the Danish West Indies.82
When the war had broken out in April 1793, the British government was 
determined that the trade of the French Caribbean colonies should not be car-
ried in neutral vessels. This led, in turn, to the stopping, searching and sending 
for adjudication of all suspicious neutral vessels. Much to the dismay of mer-
chants and officials in the neutral free ports, locally registered vessels were 
affected by a great number of confiscations. Amid the protests, any preten-
sions of innocence were hard to prove. Swedish officials, for instance, knew too 
well that “3/4 of our commerce consists of smuggling,” and that the majority of 
smuggling was conducted with the French colonies, “from whence we get our 
sugar, coffee, cotton, rum, cocoa &c.”83 While the British Orders-in-Council in 
1793 were aimed at the economic deprivation of France and its colonies, they 
were a gross diplomatic miscalculation insofar as they drew heavy protest from 
the United States, which led to a partial reversal of the Orders-in-Council in 
the latter part of the 1790s. During much of the French Revolutionary War it 
was in the interest of the British government to follow a policy more solicitous 
81 Udskrift af St. Jan og St. Thomas søpasprotokol, 1788–1807, 365/384, Vestindisk-guinesisk 
renteskriverkontor, Generaltoldkammeret – Ældre del, dna.
82 E.O.E. Högström, S. Barthélemy under svenskt välde (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1888), 
Hall, Slave Society, 175; Thomasson, 6–7.
83 J. Norderling to swic, 30 June 1796, Handel och sjöfart, vol. 169, sna.
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to the neutrals than had been customary in previous wars. The Americans, in 
particular, whose trade with Britain itself was more important than had it had 
ever been and whose wartime cooperation in the Caribbean was also sought, 
received differential treatment throughout the war. The Americans had 
emerged as independent neutral carriers, supplying Caribbean colonies with 
essential food supplies and other provisions, and remained as key actors and 
middlemen in the regional trade throughout the French Revolutionary Wars 
and the Napoleonic Wars. The free ports themselves also drew direct scrutiny 
from the British. When news reached London about the formation of the 
League of Armed Neutrality in 1801, the British War Secretary, Henry Dundas, 
sent secret orders to the military and naval commanders in the Leewards to 
seize the islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, St. John and St. Barthélemy, and all 
Danish, Swedish and Russian goods discovered there. The islands were occu-
pied and were only returned after the Treaty of Amiens was signed in 1802.84 
Despite the toll taken on St. Barthélemy and St. Thomas merchants during 
the war up until 1802, both by British seizures at sea and the eventual occupa-
tion of the colony, the last decade of the eighteenth century was a period of 
increasing profitability for the island. St. Barthélemy shows the most dramatic 
transformation during this time. Consisting of negligible sums in 1791, the 
incomes from port duties and tariffs shot up and hit a high point of over 40,000 
Spanish dollars in 1799.85 The Scandinavian colonies had come to be domi-
nated by resident local merchants, all with nominal Swedish and Danish citi-
zenship, although, in reality, consisting of Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Spaniards, 
Americans, Englishmen and other nationalities. These merchants bought up 
incoming cargoes from North America or Europe, bought or chartered the nec-
essary ships, and traded to and from ports in the Caribbean officially closed to 
foreign traffic.86 This was the essential arrangement that existed in the free port 
of St. Barthélemy until the Congress of Vienna in 1814, and in St. Thomas until 
the British occupation of 1807. The sweeping British conquests of French colo-
nies after 1807 affected the neutral trade considerably, but American shipping 
84 Lydia Wahlström, Sverige och England under revolutionskrigens början: Bidrag till den 
Reuterholmska regeringens historia (Stockholm: Norstedt & Söner, 1917), 217–243; 
Governor Ankarheims reports 21 March 1801, 17 June 1801, 18 July 1801 and 22 July 1802, SBS 
1C, sna.
85 A sum, which roughly would represent about 1 percent of the value of cargoes passing 
through the island. St Barthélemy account books, 1793–1814, St Barthélemysamlingen 
(sbs), vol. 25A–D.
86 Michael Craton, “The Caribbean Vice Admiralty Courts, 1763–1815; Indispensable Agents 
of an Imperial System” (unpublished PhD diss., McMaster University, 1968), 137–141, 289.
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still was vital in holding the illicit trade channels open. St. Barthélemy was one 
convenient port through which American shipping found an outlet.87
The rationale and the need for these free marketplaces, operating on the 
fringes of a mercantilist framework, had been removed after the return to 
peace. St. Thomas, on the other hand, continued to develop despite of these 
events, and maintained its population, although it was occupied by the British 
in 1807–1815. After the occupation it went through a significant development 
by becoming a regional coal depot for transatlantic steamers and a station for 
the Royal Mail packet boats. These facts explain the subsequent demographic 
development beyond the 1820s.
 Conclusion
Although the damage caused by the British occupation of 1781 was substantial 
for St. Eustatius, resident merchants nonetheless rebuilt their businesses. 
Worries about nascent competition from neighboring colonies such as St. 
Thomas and St. Barthélemy were clearly present, but this only became acute 
when the wic decided to introduce a new tariff on imports and exports which 
suddenly threatened to put the island in a very disadvantaged position. During 
the early 1790s, exports to the Dutch Republic grew, reaching a post-war peak 
in 1792. Commercial activity did not move to neighboring competitors, as was 
initially feared. Many of the merchants that had been active before 1781 
remained on the island or returned after a brief absence. Many of the “adven-
turers” who dominated the Statian community shortly before the arrival of the 
British left the island and a more stable population was formed, which could 
effectively use its trading networks that had sometimes been built over genera-
tions. One critical component had nevertheless been lost in the previous war: 
neutrality in international conflicts. Beginning in 1793, the Dutch were involved 
in two decades of almost continuous warfare. This was the deathblow to 
Statia’s role as regional market, and, hence, the impetus for emigration from 
the island.
For St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy, the decline of the Dutch colonies after 
1795 had a lasting impact. At the same time as the former competition became 
phased out, it also contributed to colonial development through immigration. 
The colonies attracted high numbers of new settlers, among them many for-
mer prominent Statians and other former Dutch colonial residents. The same 
Statian merchants who were active in the post-1781 debate were among the 
87 Ibid., 289, 326–328.
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first to move to the Scandinavian colonies and establish themselves as the new 
elite in their newly adopted societies. However, the majority of migrants were 
artisans, craftsmen, mariners, workers and slaves, who also followed in the 
migration waves of the 1790s into St. Thomas and St. Barthélemy, apart from 
the larger merchant houses whose establishments and property took root in 
the islands during the same period. The administrations in the receiving colo-
nies saw this phenomenon as having a positive effect, visibly gauged by urban 
growth and increasing trade activities. Without this influx of capital and peo-
ple from neighboring colonies, the future of the Scandinavian free ports would 
undoubtedly have been much different. The prime mover of migration and the 
subsequent growth of commerce in St. Barthélemy and St. Thomas was inextri-
cably linked to war and conflict, coupled with the benefits of Swedish and 
Danish neutrality. Circumvention of mercantilist regulation and the evasion of 
belligerent maritime forces was made possible with Swedish and Danish citi-
zenship in the Caribbean. Moreover, Swedish and Danish citizenship was 
desirable for newcomers aspiring to support themselves and to prosper, as it 
conferred advantages in the form of civic rights, favorably low taxes and other 
costs. Conflict made the free ports convenient marketplaces and attracted 
merchant capital, but conflict also entailed a high degree of involuntary migra-
tion due to the hazards of war. Thus, a large number of migrants came to the 
island only by accident.
Regional economic and social networks persisted to a large extent, despite 
changing political realities. The evidence in our contribution suggests a conti-
nuity in the transit trade centered around free ports in the Caribbean, as actors 
from Dutch colonies, St. Eustatius in particular, shifted their commercial oper-
ations and family businesses to neutral colonies when circumstances 
demanded it. The phenomenon of the migration waves of the 1790s were not in 
any way atypical. The largely heterogeneous and cosmopolitan community of 
St. Eustatius included a high number of migrants and transients before 1781, 
and free port colonies were open places where the mobility of people, goods, 
capital and ideas were defining features of society. The migrations after 1795 
and their consequences also testify to the complicated interconnectedness of 
the region in general, and for the free ports in particular. Distinctive and mutu-
ally important connections existed between the Dutch, Danish and Swedish 
free ports and their inhabitants. These connections became particularly visible 
during the period 1780–1820, when ports and plantation colonies of the minor 
Caribbean colonial powers adjusted to the changing realities on both sides of 
the Atlantic. It also underscores the usefulness of a regional and transnational 
perspective, which, left unexplored, leaves all of the contacts and interactions 
as a mere background in a “national Atlantic” perspective.
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Dutch Atlantic Decline during “The Age  
of Revolutions”
Gert Oostindie
The Age of Revolutions heralded fundamental changes in the Atlantic. The 
American, Haitian and Latin American revolutions did away with colonialism 
in most of the Americas, though the Caribbean remained a European strong-
hold. The British abolition of the slave trade potentially severed the ties 
between Africa and the Americas and initiated the ending of slavery itself, 
even if illegal slave trading would continue into the 1860s. The economic ascent 
of the United States laid the basis for the later political supremacy of the u.s. 
in the Americas. By 1825, of all the European colonial powers only Great Britain 
continued to be a serious competitor to the us in the Americas – while simul-
taneously, this entire period served to broaden the divide between “the West 
and the rest.”1
Like all other European states, the Dutch suffered heavy losses in the pro-
cess. At the threshold of the Age of Revolutions, the Dutch Atlantic had been 
far more successful for the Republic than is often assumed, even after the pio-
neering seventeenth-century “Dutch moment in Atlantic history” – a felicitous 
phrase coined by Wim Klooster – had passed. Throughout most of the eigh-
teenth century, growth rates of Dutch Atlantic shipping had been superior to 
domestic economic growth and to most international trades, the Dutch East 
India Company (voc, 1602–1795) trade to Asia included. Jan de Vries calculated 
that whereas Asian imports had been consistently higher ever since the mid-
seventeenth century, by 1780 the annual value of Atlantic imports into the 
Republic surpassed the Asian share.2 This Atlantic success started to crumble 
with the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in the early 1780s. As this chapter will argue, 
310 Oostindie
<UN>
the Age of Revolutions, which brought about such radical changes in the rest 
of the Atlantic, was, in the Dutch domains, a period of slow, yet inexorable, 
contraction – a contraction that would eventually be the death knell for the 
Dutch Atlantic as an area of any real significance for either the metropole or 
for other nations. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the confirmation of the 
late-eighteenth century British takeover of Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo 
meant that the Dutch lost a plantation frontier. The British returned the rest of 
the Atlantic colonies, and Suriname became the only remaining Dutch asset 
economically. Curaçao and St. Eustatius lost their function as free trade zones 
in a post-mercantilist world. So did Elmina, as the slave trade came to a halt. 
Dutch Atlantic trade figures would never recover.
The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War of 1780–1784 was the first spectacular episode 
in the Dutch Atlantic decline, but there was a prelude to that. Previous eco-
nomic growth in the Dutch Atlantic had been based only partially on produc-
tion growth in the Dutch Guianas, mainly Suriname. Of growing importance 
was the transshipment of other nations’ plantation produce through Curaçao 
and St. Eustatius. Dutch Atlantic commerce thrived because merchants from 
these two islands acted as middlemen in the wider Atlantic. But since the early 
eighteenth century, British and British North American merchants had started 
to emulate the Dutch in this role of Atlantic brokers. By the 1780s, they had 
already quietly displaced the Dutch as prime shippers to and from the Dutch 
Guianas, and in the next decades, they would displace them in the Caribbean 
Sea as well.
It seems that few either in the Dutch Republic or in the Dutch Atlantic colo-
nies had anticipated such a decline, but as a result of the devastating maritime 
blows suffered in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, an awareness of the extreme 
vulnerability of the Dutch state, both at home and overseas, did settle in. In 
fact, this chapter will show that it was the Dutch state’s neutrality – a neutrality 
that was safeguarded or “permitted” by the other Atlantic powers – that had 
allowed the Dutch to build their niche as intermediaries within the mercantil-
ist system. In the aftermath of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, the Dutch learned 
the painful lesson that their neutrality only lasted as long as it was condoned 
by more powerful states. But even before this, the vulnerability of the Dutch 
Atlantic colonies was foreshadowed. This translated in the 1780s into the rise of 
the so-called Patriot movement, aiming at reform of the stagnant, semi-monar-
chal Republic. Over the next decades, “Enlightened” Patriots and conservative 
“Orangists” – after the Stadtholder’s family color – would vie for dominance at 
home and overseas. As this chapter will go on to argue, it was, time and 
again, foreign powers who would be decisive for the outcome of these strug-
gles. With every change of regime, there were new hopes in the metropolis of 
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reinvigorating the Dutch Atlantic, inspired by the conviction that the Caribbean 
colonies were still vital to the metropolis. It would take until the second half of 
the nineteenth century before the Dutch economy embarked on a new round 
of steady growth, and indeed there was a strong colonial dimension to that. 
But this time unequivocally only the Dutch East Indies mattered.
This chapter charts the development of the Dutch Atlantic in the Age of 
Revolutions. It will show how the changes that actually mattered in the long-
term in the Dutch Atlantic – changes such as abolition, loss of territory, and the 
diminished brokerage function – did not emerge from either movements 
within the metropole or from inside the colonies themselves, and especially 
not from the Creole elite (in stark contrast to so many other colonies in the 
Americas). Rather, they were externally imposed. The first section focuses on 
demographic and economic change, and argues that this period was a down-
ward turning point in Dutch Atlantic history. The period was marked by geo-
graphical contraction as well as a definitive loss of the islands’ broker function 
in the wider Atlantic, leaving only Suriname as an asset – though this colony 
too would soon lose its value to the metropolis. The second part of the chapter 
discusses political and social developments. Whereas outside interventions 
were crucial, internal political strife or challenges to the slave society as such 
had little impact except for on Curaçao. But even there, in the end, the only 
relevant political change was that the colonies came to belong to a Kingdom 
rather than a Republic, following regime change in the metropolis. Nowhere 
was there an urge for independence, or even for political reform. Clearly 
the elites of the Dutch Atlantic thought and acted differently from their peers 
in the Continental Americas, and similar to the white elites in the rest of 
the Caribbean. The closing section offers some thoughts on the rise and fall 
of the Dutch Atlantic as a set of interconnected and externally oriented 
regional hubs.
 Economic and Demographic Decline, 1780–1825
Among the Dutch colonies in the Atlantic, three would demonstrate spectacu-
lar growth in the decades after 1780. These were Berbice, Demerara and 
Essequibo. Their success was mainly the result of massive British and North 
American involvement, included several British occupations, and climaxed 
with their formal transition to the British empire. With Trinidad, ceded by the 
Spanish, British Guiana became the new plantation frontier in the British 
Atlantic. The performance of Suriname paled in comparison to its neighbor, 
with population decrease and the value of exports initially growing at a slower 
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pace and even declining in absolute value from the 1820s onwards. The decay 
of Curaçao and Statia was even more graphic, with strong population decline 
because of migration to non-Dutch territories. With only a few dozen 
Europeans, Elmina had already become an imperial backwater at the eve of 
the abolition of the slave trade, and would not recover (Figure 12.1).
The demographic development of the Caribbean colonies had been linked 
primarily to the African slave trade, as net demographic growth continued to 
be negative throughout the eighteenth century, particularly so in the Guianas. 
















Figure 12.1   Population Figures in the Dutch Atlantic, 1780–1863.
Excluding Amerindians and maroons.
Sources: Hanneke Lommerse, “Population Figures,” in Dutch 
Colonialism, Migration and Cultural Heritage, ed. Gert Oostindie 
(Leiden: KITLV, 2008), 315–342, 323–334 and Gert Oostindie, “‘British 
Capital, Industry and Perseverance’ versus Dutch ‘Old School’?: The 
Dutch Atlantic and the Takeover of Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo, 
1750–1815,” BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review 127, no. 4 (2012): 28–55, 
35. NB: figures for Elmina and the nearby Dutch forts not included. 
Inhabitants were primarily military personnel. In 1788, the population 
was just over 300, of which some 70 were Europeans. In 1816, the total 
number was down to 220, of which only 20 were Europeans. Estimates 
kindly provided by historian Henk den Heijer, who is preparing a 
monograph on Elmina.
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primarily to the collapse of the Dutch slave trade in the last quarter of the eigh-
teenth century. This, in turn, was due to the 1773 financial crisis in Suriname 
and the consequent withdrawal of credit facilities, as well as the decline of 
Dutch shipping during and after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Berbice and 
above all Demerara and Essequibo in contrast benefited from British capital as 
well as the British illicit slave trade decades before the formal takeover, as 
British investors rightly perceived that this new plantation frontier promised 
much higher yields than “depleted” colonies such as Barbados or Antigua.3
The contraction of Curaçao and Statia was not primarily due to negative 
natural demographic growth and a lack of slave imports, but rather to large-
scale emigration. For Curaçao, this included all segments of the population, 
but in uneven proportions. The island’s total population shrunk by one-third 
from some 21,000 in 1791 to 14,000 in 1816. The number of slaves decreased from 
nearly 13,000 to just over 6700, which is almost half. In contrast, the number of 
free citizens of color increased by over 20 percent. One may assume that 
some slaves had moved into that category in this period and others had died, 
but considerable numbers must have been taken by their owners to other 
destinations in the Northern Caribbean, particularly St. Thomas, a Danish 
colony that was able to develop into a flourishing free trade port thanks to not 
only the slave trade, but to metropolitan neutrality.4
Something of the same sort must have happened in St. Eustatius. Its devel-
opment as a free trade zone for the Northern Atlantic had involved the immi-
gration of merchants from Curaçao, who would have taken their slaves with 
them. The 1781 ransacking of Statia involved the forced exile of many Europeans, 
including Jews who were particularly targeted by Admiral George Rodney. 
There was a short recovery, surely inspired by hopes of restoring the island as a 
free trade port, with total population reaching an all-time peak of nearly 8000 
in 1790. The collapse thereafter was definitive, with the population decreasing 
with two-thirds between 1790 and 1816 and the white segment by almost 
80 percent.5 A prime migration destination again was St. Thomas.
Ironically then, the two waning Dutch free trade zones lost a considerable 
part of their population to a competing, equally small free trade port owned by 
Denmark, an even smaller player in the Caribbean. The key to St. Thomas’ 
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short-term success lay in Danish neutrality during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch 
War and in the first years of the revolutionary wars (until 1800), but in the long 
run, as mercantilism waned and was eventually abolished in the decades after 
1815, St. Thomas too would decline.6 But that was still to come. In the late eigh-
teenth century, St. Thomas – since its earliest days a settlement with a strong 
Dutch presence – hosted not only whites and their slaves from Curaçao, but 
also free blacks born on that island now working as sailors out of St. Thomas. 
In 1803, 156 out of 1000 free coloreds in the capital of Charlotte Amalie were 
born in Curaçao; another 62 hailed from Statia. As late as 1830, a Dutch visitor 
to the island remarked that, among the non-white population, Papiamentu 
was widely spoken.7
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Demographic decline and economic contraction fed one another. The decade 
after the conclusion of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1785 to 1795) Suriname 
produced an unprecedented peak in the combined value of sugar, coffee and 
cotton, totaling some 10 million Dutch guilders per year. It is impossible to 
reconstruct the development of plantation exports between 1795 and the early 
1800s. The overall value of the exports of these three staples reached a last peak 
of 10 million guilders in 1815–1819, which possibly explains the optimism about 
the colony prevailing in Holland at the time. But export value declined steeply 
afterwards, to a low of 4 million in the 1840s followed by a slight recovery to 
4.8 million guilders in the 1850s, followed by further contraction.8
Not all products fared the same. From 1815 onwards to Emancipation in 1863 
we see a steep growth in sugar exports, compared to a more erratic pattern for 
cotton and the virtual disappearance of coffee. But even then, the share of 
Suriname sugar in the Dutch and world markets dwindled. In a globalizing mar-
ket, of all Caribbean producers only Trinidad, British Guiana and particularly 
Cuba would continue to matter as the century progressed – but the once domi-
nant Caribbean share in world sugar production was rapidly decreasing anyway, 
to below a third by 1900.9 On the Dutch market in 1831, Dutch sugar imports from 
Suriname were roughly at the same level as its new colonial competitor Java. In 
1850, Java exported five times as much sugar to the Netherlands, in 1860 14 times 
as much.10 The post-Emancipation introduction of indentured labor would not 
bring a halt to that relative decline, and alternatives were hard to come by until 
the twentieth-century development of bauxite mining. Before that, as a desper-
ate Minister of Colonial Affairs, Hendrik Colijn, sighed in Parliament in 1935: 
“Everything that has been tried in Suriname, it has all simply failed.”11
Prior to their turn-of-the-century demographic decline, the Antillean 
islands had never exported much, Curaçao and Statia making fortunes 
only through re-exports. As North American merchants came to control 
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intra-Caribbean trade, and as mercantilism was effectively abolished in the 
nineteenth century, it is only logical that the islands lost their economic func-
tion as regional hubs. Once they were applauded by Adam Smith in Wealth 
of Nations, for amassing fortunes in their function of “free ports, open to the 
ships of all nations,” in an otherwise mercantilist environment. Now, these 
“barren islands” took the full brunt of the poverty of their natural resources.12 
Throughout the nineteenth century and up to the establishment of oil refiner-
ies in Aruba and Curaçao in the 1930s, successive Dutch governors would 
report on deep poverty, economic stagnation and would consider one plan for 
economic development after another, all of which would come to naught. In 
1901, Member of Parliament H. van Kol, who had made his fortune in the Dutch 
East Indies, qualified Curaçao and the other Antilles as “a colony in dire straits,” 
worse off even than in the early nineteenth century.13
Of Elmina, finally, not much may be said. Even prior to the abolition of the 
slave trade, its function as seat of the Dutch West India Company (wic) had 
lost its former importance. Some experiments were made after abolition with 
cotton and indigo plantations as well as with trade, but to little avail. Between 
1831 and 1872, the Dutch recruited local soldiers in Elmina to serve in the colo-
nial army. Partly because this scheme was criticized as an ill-concealed form of 
semi-bondage, and partly because cheaper alternatives were found in the 
Indonesian archipelago, this practice was discontinued. By 1872, the Dutch 
eagerly ceded Elmina to the British in a swap which included confirmation of 
Dutch control of Northern Sumatra and permission for the Dutch to acquire 
indentured labor for Suriname in British India.
We should not assume that contemporaries were already anticipating this 
overall decline of the Dutch Atlantic. During the Age of Revolutions as well as 
at its conclusion, policy makers voiced optimism in spite of their painful 
awareness of Dutch decline, or at least the conviction that the Caribbean colo-
nies could play a vital role in the Netherlands regaining the status of a serious 
world player. Thus in 1795 parliamentarians of the “revolutionary” Batavian 
Republic were of the opinion that their new state could only survive with the 
support of its colonies, “in particular those in America.”14 After the Peace of 
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Amiens, the Dutch quickly dispatched a large fleet to the Caribbean to restore 
their sovereignty, investing serious money in the expectation of future rewards. 
Even as during the Napoleonic Wars almost all Dutch colonies had again been 
“temporarily” taken over by the British, there was the expectation of their 
recovery. In an 1806 report written at the request of the recently-appointed 
King Louis Napoleon, the Dutch Department of Colonies argued that the 
Atlantic properties, including Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo, were “among 
the most prominent colonies world-wide.” A second memorandum expressed 
the conviction that these colonies, and the African slave trade, were “indis-
pensable” for Dutch recovery as “a merchant state.”15
Upon the restart of the country as the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1813, 
King Willem I hoped to make the colonies work to the benefit of the metropolis, 
but it would take until the mid-1820s before he could make real progress with 
his ambitions for state reform including colonial rule. In 1820 the King still nur-
tured high hopes for his American possessions, in spite of the loss of much of 
the Guianas, for which, incidentally, Amsterdam merchants blamed him.16 By 
1825, government reports qualified Suriname as “a highly important colony,” 
and “almost the only still flowering branch of trade and shipping for 
Amsterdam.”17 This was the last optimism to be voiced regarding the Caribbean. 
In the next decades, it would dawn upon government circles and entrepreneurs 
alike that the Dutch East Indies were becoming the only part of empire that 
really mattered. Prompted by Willem I, the state assumed control, with evident 
success, for the national treasury. Income from the East Indies, mainly derived 
from the semi-feudal Javanese “Cultivation System,” accounted for 32 percent of 
state income in the 1830s, 53 percent in the 1840s and 45 percent in the 1850s.18
 Dutch Colonial Policies in Revolutionary Times
The Dutch Revolt against Habsburg Spain had resulted – somewhat surpris-
ingly even to its protagonists – in the establishment of a Republic, albeit a 
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republic of a strongly federal character and with a semi-monarchal structure. 
The “Republic of the Seven United Netherlands” had its center in the province of 
Holland, but included six more provinces of which Zeeland was most important 
to overseas trade, particularly in the Atlantic. Sovereignty lay with the States-
General, a parliament in which the several provinces were represented in con-
formity with their demographic and economic clout. Each province had its own 
council or “Staten.” Amsterdam was the most important player in the “Staten van 
Holland.” Nevertheless, the seat of government was The Hague, an administra-
tive center in Holland of much lesser economic importance. The most impor-
tant metropolitan cities in the Dutch Atlantic were Amsterdam, followed by a 
large margin by Middelburg/Vlissingen in Zeeland and Rotterdam in Holland.
Despite this ostensibly Republican structure, ever since its 1581 proclama-
tion of war against Spain, the Republic had also retained an institutional rela-
tionship with the noble family of Oranje-Nassau who intermittently served as 
a pseudo-monarchy, even if the so-called Stadtholders never had the royal pre-
rogatives usual in ancien régime Europe. There was a constant competition 
between the House of Oranje-Nassau and the Staten van Holland, particularly 
the dominant city of Amsterdam. Between 1581 and the 1790s, there had been 
two periods in which the Dutch burgher elite ruled the country without the 
interference of Stadtholders at all, from 1650 to 1672 and again from 1702 to 
1747. For the rest of the period, the States General shared their powers with the 
Stadtholders in an uneasy compromise. As for colonial affairs, the Stadtholders 
were nominally presiding over the two companies, but in practice their involve-
ment in colonial affairs was limited.
Colonial affairs in the Asia and Southern Africa were relegated to the semi-
state voc.19 Financed by private means as a chartered company, the voc  
was beneficial to the Republic both by the employment and riches it brought 
to cities and individuals in the Republic and because the company paid 
various kinds of taxes to the States General. The wic failed to perform as 
satis factorily.20 The first wic (1621–1674) faltered after the loss of Brazil and its 
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successor, the second wic (1674–1792), was not financially successful either. 
The wic lost its trade monopoly in the 1730s and only wielded direct gover-
nance in Elmina and the Antillean islands. Suriname and the lesser Guianas 
were ruled by corporate associations in which the wic had a share, at best, as 
was the case with the “Sociëteit van Suriname.” But of course, even if it did not 
yield the nice dividends to its shareholders that the voc did, as an institution 
of governance the wic was indispensable to the functioning of the Dutch 
Atlantic and as such had an economic function for the Republic no matter the 
poor returns paid to its share holders.
Even prior to the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, the Republic had become fragile 
economically and militarily, and this instability affected colonial affairs as well. 
But the war acted as a catalyst, with the British sacking of St. Eustatius in 1781 
serving as a painful reminder of the vulnerability of Dutch maritime strength. 
Since the 1713 Peace of Utrecht, the Dutch had performed their role as middle-
men in the Atlantic on a basis of neutrality between the larger European rival 
states. The war demonstrated that this rewarding role could only be performed 
as long as competitors tolerated this. When the British decided that the 
Republic’s neutrality was no longer convenient, the Dutch found out that they 
lacked the military means to defend their interests. Unable to protect their 
own merchant fleet and colonies, their future laid in the hands of the British, 
and to a lesser extent the other Atlantic states.21
This humiliation stimulated the existing misgivings among part of the 
educated classes against the status quo. Inspired by Enlightenment ideas, 
a “Patriot” movement had started to organize against the governing aristocratic 
elite and its leader Stadtholder Willem V in 1781, one year into the war. Not 
surprisingly, the Patriots sympathized with the American Revolution. In the 
mid-1780s the Patriots started organizing themselves in militias, and by 1787 
there was a genuine Patriot coup. Pro-Orange Prussian intervention, however, 
prevented regime change and the Patriot leadership had to seek exile in France. 
Some of the leading Patriots would return in 1794 as members of an armed 
force supporting revolutionary France’s invasion army. In this way, they contrib-
uted to the fall of the Dutch Republic and the exile of Stadtholder Willem V to 
England.
The proclamation of the Batavian Republic in January 1795 signaled both a 
victory for the Patriots and their absolute dependence on revolutionary France. 
Internal dissent characterized the Patriot movement, particularly on the issue 
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of the continuation of a federal state, or rather the shift to a unitary state. 
Moderate factions differed from radical ones in their plans for reform and the 
implantation of revolutionary projects, but all Patriots were anti-British and pro-
French. Their now defeated Orangist opponents were obviously pro-British. The 
Batavian Republic lasted until 1806, at which point Napoleon Bonaparte decided 
to turn the country into a dependent “Kingdom of Holland” with his brother 
Louis Napoleon serving as its first king. In 1810, against his brother’s wish, 
Napoleon annexed the Netherlands altogether. Three years later, the Anglo-
Prussian defeat of France resulted in the establishment of a Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, with the last Stadtholder’s son appointed as King Willem I.
This long – and at times revolutionary – intermezzo would have crucial con-
sequences for the Netherlands itself, but also for the management of Dutch 
colonial affairs. First, the semi-state-owned voc and wic were dissolved and 
the direction of the colonies was entrusted to genuine state institutions.22 
With the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, colonial affairs 
became a prerogative of King Willem I. Only with the liberal democratic reform 
of 1848 would the States-General reclaim this authority.
Next, British military interventions narrowed the surface of the Dutch colo-
nial empire. Upon taking up exile in England, Stadtholder Willem V, in the so-
called “Kew Letters,” had instructed the overseas officers to admit the troops 
and ships that would be sent by the British King, “and to consider these as 
Troops and Ships of a nation that is in friendship and Alliance [with the pur-
pose to] prevent that this Colony will be invaded by the French.”23 One assumes 
he did not anticipate that his protectors would not return all possessions after 
the wars. During the wars, the British indeed took “protective possession” of all 
Dutch colonies, albeit at different intervals. At the 1814–1815 Peace of Vienna, 
the United Kingdom returned most Dutch colonies, but retained the Cape 
Colony, Sri Lanka as well as Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo.
Finally, the Patriot intermezzo yielded a modest harvest of pamphlets 
addressing colonial affairs and sparked some debate in the new National 
Assembly about colonial policy, but all this was of limited importance. By the 
321Dutch Atlantic Decline during “The Age of Revolutions”
<UN>
24 Benjamin Schmidt, “The ‘Dutch’ ‘Atlantic’ and the Dubious Case of Frans Post,” in this 
volume; Margaret C. Jacob and Wijnand W. Mijnhardt, eds., The Dutch Republic in the 
Eighteenth Century: Decline, Enlightenment and Revolution (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1992), 212–213; Jeremy D. Popkin, “Print Culture in the Netherlands on 
the Eve of the Revolution,” in The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth Century, 273–291, 282.
25 Quoted in Lubbertus Les, Van Indië onder de Compagnie tot Indië onder de Staat: de kolo-
niale titel in de staatsregeling van 1798 (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1948), 2, 51.
26 Gerrit Jan Schutte, De Nederlandse Patriotten en de kolonien: een onderzoek naar hun den-
kbeelden en optreden, 1770–1800 (Groningen: Wolters, 1974), 15–16, 58–59, 144–149, Klooster, 
Revolutions, 98.
27 Schutte, Nederlandse Patriotten, 3, 55–56, 90–105, 115, 141.
late eighteenth century, the Dutch Republic had ceased to be the intellectual 
powerhouse, or at least printing house and repository, it had once been, the 
Dutch printing business having even ceased to be export-oriented, so there was 
little Dutch contribution to international political or philosophical debates.24 
In the Netherlands as elsewhere – except for a brief period of radicalism in 
France, including the 1794 abolition of slavery, a law revoked in 1802 – 
“Enlightened” politicians struggled with the contradiction between high ideals 
about the equality of men and the economic benefits of colonialism, and even-
tually concluded that the time was not yet right for ending either colonialism or 
slavery. As for colonialism as such, a Dutch state commission concluded in 1796 
that colonies served “exclusively” for the benefit of the metropolitan economy, 
and should therefore be “subservient to the Batavian people.”25
The issue of slavery was discussed in the National Assembly, with Pieter Vreede, 
the leader of the radical Patriots, strongly opposing slavery as being incompatible 
with the Rights of Man. In the ensuing debates considerations of national interest 
prevailed, and occasional allusions to the Haitian Revolution were used to illus-
trate that the enslaved Caribbean populations were not quite ready for freedom. 
The Assembly concluded that the idea of inalienable rights to freedom could not 
yet be extended to non-European colonial subjects, much less to slaves. The lack 
of radicalism is further illustrated by the fact that the 1798 Constitution even with-
held full citizenship rights from Europeans in the colonies. Surely the earliest revo-
lutionary debates in metropolitan France had reflected more radical thought.26
The only real change was in the field of governance and economics. 
Enlightened thinkers had long criticized mercantilism, with its supposedly sti-
fling monopolies. It was therefore quite logical that the Dutch Patriots were 
highly critical of the voc and wic, as they had been consistently since the 
1780s. In the debates leading to the Constitution, the Patriot representatives 
agreed that neither of the by then ailing companies should be revived. 
Henceforward, all colonies were simply possessions of the state.27
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 Patriots and Orangists in the Caribbean Colonies
The metropolitan conflicts between Patriots and Orangists had repercussions 
in the Caribbean colonies as they had elsewhere in the Dutch empire. It seems 
though that such conflicts did not arise before 1795, hence not before the estab-
lishment of the Batavian Republic, the Stadtholder’s Kew Letters and the inter-
mittent British occupations of Dutch territory. There is no indication that 
colonial Patriots were interested in undermining colonialism as such, or slav-
ery, the pivotal institution of their colonial societies. Thus, while Jan Bom, a 
Patriot official to Demerara and Essequibo, characterized the Batavian Republic 
as a “free” state no longer “in the chains of the Aristocratic and Orange slavery,” 
this did not imply that he disagreed about the fundamentals of slavery in the 
West Indies. Instead he insisted that he and his fellow Patriots in the colony 
had demonstrated remarkable zeal in successfully suppressing a “devastating 
Revolt of the Negro slaves” in 1795.28
More plausible then is the assumption that political strife within the Dutch 
Atlantic colonies was driven at best partly by ideological divides, and more by 
local idiosyncrasies and interests in which many protagonists demonstrated 
considerable opportunism. Thus a Dutch-born member of the Curaçao elite, 
Albert Kikkert, actively participated in the repression of the 1795 slave revolt, 
next became a vociferous member of the Patriot and, hence, anti-Stadtholder 
and anti-British faction in local politics. He was consequently expelled after 
the 1800 British takeover but somehow managed to return to the island in 1816 
as the first governor appointed by King Willem I. In his installation speech, he 
spoke of “the iron yoke of the French invaders,” qualified Napoleon as “the 
worst of tyrants,” and his monarch as “a caring father.” This type of “weather-
vane” conduct was quite characteristic in the context of the successive regime 
changes in the Netherlands itself too, and ensured a high degree of continuity 
between the “French” period and the monarchy.29
A summary of events in the various colonies during these revolutionary 
times may illustrate the limited lasting impact of internal political bickering in 
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all colonies except for Curaçao. With the symbolic support of the Kew Letters 
as a convenient justification, the British invaded all but one of the Dutch colo-
nies, but not exactly at the same time. Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo were 
the first to be taken over by the British, from 1796 to 1802 and then again in 1803, 
this time indefinitely. Suriname was British from 1799 to 1802 and again from 
1804 to 1816, Curaçao from 1800 to 1803 and again from 1807 to 1816, Statia from 
1801 to 1802 and from 1810 to 1816. Only Elmina remained nominally Dutch 
throughout this period – an indication of the colony’s insignificance, but none-
theless remarkable in view of its potential role in the Atlantic slave trade, made 
clandestine for the Dutch too after the British abolition in 1807.
There is an interesting pattern here. In the Atlantic, the colonies that even-
tually would not be returned – Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo – were the 
first to be occupied. Exactly the same transpired in the domain of the voc. 
Thus the British took over governance of the Indonesian archipelago late and 
only for a short period (1811 to 1816), while they intervened earlier in the colo-
nies that they would eventually retain – the Cape Colony (1795 to 1803 and 
again from 1806), Sri Lanka (ever since 1796) and Malacca (1795 to 1818 
and again since 1825). In a sense, then, the entire period of regime changes and 
warfare in Europe provided Great Britain with convenient arguments to 
expand its empire. It is not surprising that the British West Indian interest in 
the metropolis – as well as local British planters and merchants in Berbice, 
Demerara and Essequibo – had applauded the earlier but short-lived takeover 
of the colonies in 1780 and, after 1796, thought of the Peace of Amiens (1802) as 
an annoying obstacle in their design to retain these promising plantation fron-
tiers permanently.30
At the eve of the establishment of the Patriot Batavian Republic, the white 
elite of Suriname arguably identified more with the metropolis than did either 
the lesser Guianas, with their robust British and American community and 
connections, or Curaçao and Statia with their traditionally stronger regional 
rather than transatlantic orientations. We may also assume that after the 
French and particularly the Haitian Revolutions, there was deep concern about 
the establishment of a possibly revolutionary Batavian Republic. News that the 
French National Convention had abolished slavery was received in December 
1793 with deep concern, as the slaves in Suriname might be inspired to rebel. 
Slave unrest remained limited though.
In March 1795 Governor Friderici organized the usual celebrations for the 
Stadtholder’s birthday. But shortly after, the Kew Letters arrived and the 
governor and his Colonial Council had to make up their minds about what 
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course of action to follow. Surprisingly, Friderici and his predominantly 
Orangist council decided to ward off a “protective” British takeover in spite of 
the Stadtholder’s instructions. The British reacted by establishing a maritime 
blockade until they attacked in August 1799. The conditions of capitulation 
included a clause regarding a possible permanent transition to British sover-
eignty.31 With a short intermezzo following the Peace of Amiens, Suriname 
would remain British until 1816. The British intervention would have one unex-
pected and, among the planter class, most unwelcome outcome, which was the 
abolition of the slave trade, a seminal measure that was confirmed in the 
1814 treaties.
How do we account for the initial resistance among the Suriname elite 
to  surrender to the British? Surely there was no interest in revolutionary 
ideas,  hence no sympathy for France – even if the Batavian Republic was 
recognized, the Colonial Council forbade public debates on “French” issues 
such as the Rights of Man. This ban must have been inspired by fears of a 
spilling over of revolutionary ideas from Saint-Domingue or, more close by, 
the colony of Cayenne.32 And no one anticipated that the British interven-
tion would end with the imposition of the ending of the slave trade. Perhaps, 
therefore, the initial refusal to follow the Stadtholder’s instructions to wel-
come  the British may be understood as a reflection of the emergence over 
the preceding century of a white, originally quite diverse, Creole commu-
nity  defining itself both as part of the Dutch empire and as a legitimate 
defender of local economic and political rights and therefore wary of any 
permanent change of imperial affiliation that might adversely affect their 
local interests.
This confident attitude may be illustrated by referring to the Essai historique 
published in 1788 in Paramaribo by “a group of learned Jewish men” headed by 
David Nassy. Throughout the book the authors emphasized both their grati-
tude for having been allowed to live as Sephardim in the colony since its earli-
est days, and the crucial Jewish contributions to the development of Suriname. 
A deep loyalty pervades the book, starting with the opening dedication thank-
ing the directors of the Sociëteit van Suriname “for living under the laws of the 
Republic of the United Dutch Provinces, and under your protection.” But this 
did not keep Nassy from requesting a lowering of taxes and allowance of free 
trade. This is a refrain uttered throughout the colony’s history by gentile set-
tlers as well, no matter how divided among themselves they may have been on 
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scores of issues, including religious divides and bigotry in spite of toleration, as 
contemporary judge Adriaan Lammens wrote.33
The British took over Suriname anyway. For the local business community 
this would have the adverse long-term consequence of the ending of the slave 
trade, but some positive short-term effects. The British intermezzo meant that 
no ships could be sent to French-controlled Holland, no debts paid off, and 
hence an accumulation of local wealth. In addition, there was unrestricted 
trade to North America and within the British Atlantic and, therefore, Suriname 
partook in the advantages of the British market and the West Indies lobby in 
the metropolis. But even then, this did not translate to a widespread longing to 
remain within the British fold. Only the planters of Nickerie, the most Western 
part of the colony and hence adjacent to Berbice, urged, in vain, for inclusion 
in what was to become the new colony of British Guiana. But then again, these 
planters were mainly British nationals to begin with.34
The contrast with Berbice and particularly Demerara and Essequibo is evi-
dent. In the second half of the eighteenth century, British interest and pres-
ence in these colonies had been rapidly growing, and with Statia, these colonies 
had already been briefly occupied in 1780 during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. 
This episode lasted only a few months, but a letter from 76 British resident 
planters may have alerted the Crown to this new frontier. The supplicants 
advised their King not to return these “little known” colonies to the Dutch, as 
they provided great opportunities. “[As] part of your Majesty’s dominions,” 
they argued, these colonies “would be equal to or rather exceed your Majesty’s 
most flourishing settlements in the West Indies.”35 The colony was returned 
nonetheless, but the informal British takeover continued and was even 
applauded, naively so in retrospect. Thus a 1790 report commissioned by the 
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States-General argued that further immigration of “planters from Barbados, 
Grenada and other isles, leaving their depleted lands” would make the colony 
flourish to the benefit of the Dutch metropolis. At the same time, the report 
complained of massive illegal slave imports by and for British nationals.36
Shortly after the establishment of the Batavian Republic, and in accordance 
with the Kew Letters, a British fleet sailed to the Guianas to assume protective 
custody against France. This offer was initially refused, against the judgement 
of the Orangist Governor Willem August van Sirtema Van Grovestins, who 
secretly left the colony on a British ship. His successor, Antony Beaujon, would 
turn over the colony a year later to the British anyway.37 British Atlantic inves-
tors must have applauded this. A delegation of local residents had already 
requested the government in Barbados to intervene, and with the British fleet 
came, as a contemporary wrote, “a great number of speculators” ready to 
invest their capital in this new frontier, hence is was “more like a country 
resumed, than ceded, to England.” Indeed, around 1800, two-thirds of the white 
population of Demerara was estimated to be British, while the rest were a cos-
mopolitan mix including, in addition to the Dutch, many other European 
nationalities.38
The position of the British settlers need not surprise us, but what of the 
loyalties of the local Dutch population in Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo? It 
appears that there was more internal friction than in Suriname, and we may 
assume that this reflected a concern among at least some of the Dutch settlers 
that this was not primarily a struggle over political ideas but rather a hard-
nosed competition over the possession of valuable territory. Thus the above-
quoted former local official and fierce Patriot Jan Bom blamed not only the vile 
British for the 1796 takeover, but equally the “egoism” of “corrupt” local Dutch, 
including the “perfidious” Governors Van Grovestins and Beaujon. In vain had 
the Patriots attempted to protect the colony from the “vile and cowardly means 
of [British] treachery and bribery.” Bom bitterly concluded that the Orangists 
had joined in “the triumph of the English settlers.” He was convinced that the 
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British would not return the colony at all, which they had hoped to add to their 
empire ever since the early 1780s.39
Calculating Dutch settlers may have shifted their allegiances out of pure 
opportunism. There was always the concern that local conflicts could spark 
slave rebellions following “the terrible example of the French islands.”40  
A transfer of sovereignty may also have rescued indebted planters from paying 
their debts, as a cynical commentator had already remarked in the Patriot 
newsletter De Post van den Neder-Rhijn, in reference to the quick surrender of 
Demerara to the British in 1781.41
Upon their return in 1803, the British initially dealt cautiously with Dutch 
sensitivities, allowing the pro-British Dutch Governors Antony Beaujon and 
Abraham van Imbyze van Batenburg to serve as lieutenant-governors under 
the new British governor.42 Born in St. Eustatius, Beaujon came from a family 
of merchants settled in both Curaçao and Statia and was a rare example of 
family interconnectedness within the Dutch West Indies. A Patriot settler 
accused him of having no loyalty, “no heart for Patria,” of being “a Foreigner, 
intruding in the Colony without the least interest in the public cause.”43 
Perhaps we may indeed qualify Beaujon’s maneuvering as sheer opportunism, 
but then again, by 1800 “national” loyalties were less defined and stable than 
they would be a century later. Meanwhile the British resolve was clear. A Dutch 
visitor observed that by 1810 the Dutch settlers had only second-class status, 
while in 1840, the colony’s European population was mainly English, “very few 
of the former Dutch settlers having remained in the colony.”44
There is little indication of Patriot versus Orangist strife in St. Eustatius. 
Both Statia and the adjacent Dutch colonies of St. Maarten and Saba were at 
the mercy of the British and French. This had first become clear in 1781 with 
Rodney’s sacking of Statia and the subsequent three years of French occupa-
tion. In 1793, at the outbreak of the war between the French and the British, 
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Dutch settlers had claimed the French part of St. Maarten, but two years 
later, the French took over all of the three Dutch Windward Antilles. The 
British, in turn, ousted the French in 1801, returned the islands to the Dutch 
after the Peace of Amiens, and resumed control in 1810 for another three 
years. In 1816, the three islands’ combined populations had been reduced to 
half that of 1790, and over the next century and a half this figure would remain 
that low.45 We may assume that rather than worrying about political positions, 
the more enterprising settlers simply left during the Age of Revolutions, taking 
their slaves with them.
While Curaçao had a similar drastic reduction of its population, this island 
did experience significant political turmoil in the first five years of the revolu-
tionary period. Patriot versus Orangist strife, combined with successive out-
side interventions, led to a potentially revolutionary regime change in the 
period from 1795 to 1800, after which a combined British-American interven-
tion secured the isolation of Curaçao from the Batavian Republic and revolu-
tionary France. Thereafter internal factionalism ceased to matter, as 
French-leaning Patriotism was no longer tolerated.
The history of the six revolutionary years is quite complicated.46 As in all 
Dutch colonies, the proclamation of the Batavian Republic and the conflicting 
instructions of the exiled Stadtholder forced the governing elite to profess loy-
alty one way or another. The news of the Batavian Republic reached Curaçao in 
May, 1795. The next year, the hesitant Governor Johannes de Veer was replaced 
in a local coup by Jan Jacob Beaujon, a member of the same Dutch Antillean 
merchant family that produced the pro-English governor who took over gover-
nance in Essequibo that same year. Beaujon in turn was replaced in 1796 by a 
local merchant of Swiss origins, Johann Rudolf Lauffer, again a man officially 
serving the pro-French Batavian Republic but nurturing no revolutionary feel-
ings whatsoever. Small wonder then that Lauffer would be allowed to continue 
as governor after the British takeover in 1800. The remaining period up to the 
establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands saw two more changes in 
sovereignty (from British to Batavian in 1803, back to British in 1807), but none 
of these responded to a local political dynamic. French and British moves were 
decisive.
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This had been quite different before.47 Clearly there was some local sympa-
thy on the island for the French Revolution, to the point that the government 
banned the singing of French revolutionary songs in 1789. By 1793 the governor 
also issued a ban on public criticism of the House of Orange. News of the 
establishment of the Batavian Republic intensified local strife in 1795, pitting 
Patriots and Orangists against one another. In August, the island experienced 
its biggest slave revolt ever, clearly inspired by the French and Haitians 
Revolutions. The ranks were immediately closed and the revolt was violently 
suppressed by a coalition including not only the white population, but equally 
the (separate) militias made up of black and “colored” freemen.
In the summer of 1796, the Batavian Republic sent an envoy to ensure the 
island’s loyalty. Pressed to choose, the Orangist Governor de Veer refused to 
take the oath of loyalty to the republic and was consequently replaced by 
Beaujon. To Patriot dismay, the latter turned out to be Orange-leaning as well. 
This caused renewed factional strife between local Patriots and Orangists and 
ended in a coup d’état in which Lauffer took Beaujon’s position, in December 
1796. His appointment was made public in a declaration opening with the 
French revolutionary slogan “Freedom, Equality, Fraternity.”48 Yet Lauffer was 
no radical either. He had been one of the leading figures in a moderate Patriot 
movement demanding economic reform benefitting the local merchant class, 
but he nurtured no radical ideas. Once in power as a “Batavian,” and hence 
officially a pro-French governor, his policy was to repress more radical Patriots 
and to keep the revolutionary French troops out of the island as much as 
possible. In the next years, he attempted to steer a middle course in the 
long-standing Anglo-French belligerence as well as in the “Quasi-War” fought 
between his assertive French allies and the United States. His only real interest 
in this was the defense of Curaçao’s commercial interests – more radical ideas, 
particularly about slavery, were not relevant either to the local elites or to the 
three competing nations.
All of this climaxed when in 1800 predominantly black French troops from 
Guadeloupe landed on the island to preempt a possible British attack. 
Conspiracies involving local French revolutionary agents had preluded 
this dramatic episode – though it seems likely that their “revolutionary” fervor 
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had more to do with French geopolitical interest than with ideals about slave 
liberation and links to revolutionary Haiti.49 In this decisive conjuncture 
Lauffer, in spite of his self-portrayal as a man inspired by the French 
Enlightenment philosophes, had no qualms about seeking American and 
British protection against France. This explains why the British allowed him to 
continue as civilian governor after they had ousted the French and annexed 
the island.
 Creole Triumphalism?
If we are to understand “Creole Triumphalism,” a concept applied by Bernard 
Bailyn to Latin as well as British America, as the pulsating circulation of revo-
lutionary, anticolonial ideas leading to regime change, there is nothing in 
Dutch Atlantic history that comes close.50 Nowhere did local white elites strive 
towards independence, and choices made in the Patriot versus Orange, pro-
French versus pro-British dilemma were dictated by personal, or, at best, by 
local merchant and planter interests. Pragmatism or sheer opportunism pre-
vailed. Within the margins dictated by the metropolis, everyday politics were 
made by Dutch and other European settlers in the colonies, and they embod-
ied no revolutionary fervor at all in this Age of Revolutions. There was no striv-
ing for independence, no lasting urge for political reform, let alone social 
change. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, local elites in the restored colonies – 
if they had not left for better shores outside of the Dutch realm – simply 
accepted the new realities, welcomed the governors now appointed by a real 
king, had to accept the abolition of the slave trade imposed by the British, and 
had no qualms about slavery and socio-racial hierarchies. In some of this they 
diverted from the European elites in British North America and Latin America, 
but not at all from their peers in the rest of the Caribbean.
Of course, the majority in the Dutch Atlantic were not Europeans but 
enslaved Africans and their offspring, whether slave or free. Even if we are fully 
aware of Alison Games’ dictum that “the most urgent and immediate challenge 
[in Atlantic history] is to restore Africa to the Atlantic,” it remains hard to 
highlight African agency as a decisive factor on either side of the ocean during 
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this entire period, for the Dutch Atlantic that is.51 Elmina hardly figured any-
more because of European wars and abolitionist legislation. As for the Dutch 
Caribbean, surely enslaved Africans and their offspring did not emerge trium-
phantly from the Age of Revolutions.
But then again, there were some attempts. As elsewhere in the wider 
Caribbean, news of the Haitian Revolution did reach the enslaved populations 
of the Dutch colonies. The massive 1795 slave revolt of Curaçao – involving 2000 
of the island’s 12,000 slaves – was among the largest of contemporary revolts in 
the wider Atlantic and was evidently inspired by the French and Haitian 
Revolutions. Thus, the revolt’s leader, Tula, emphasized the equality of all men 
as they all originated from Adam and Eve, and reportedly declared: “we seek our 
freedom, the French [Caribbean] blacks have been given their freedom, Holland 
has been taken over by the French, hence we must be free.”52 The 1800 French 
invasion of the island found support among the local enslaved population, but 
the invasion foundered and again there were no rewards for the slaves.53 Slavery 
in Curaçao and the other Dutch Antilles would not be abolished until 1863.
It is likely that the news of the Haitian Revolution reached the enslaved 
populations of the Guianas as well. A merchant in Rotterdam, writing about 
this “terrifying news,” shared with his agent in Paramaribo his hopes that the 
necessary vigilance would quell any “spirit of rebellion among the negroes” in 
Suriname. It is not clear whether more than the routine type of repression was 
needed during these years. The Dutch Guianas had a long tradition of slave 
revolts and particularly marronage, and the last “Boni” Maroon War (1789–
1793) had just been concluded. In the next period, only a few minor slave 
revolts were recorded, and these came to naught even if there was some quite 
unusual participation of free black troops or maroons.54 In Suriname too, slav-
ery would persist until 1863, with an extension of another ten tears under the 
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In contrast, this period did have repercussions for the free non-white popu-
lation. First, this is a matter of figures. The proportion of the “free coloreds” in 
the total population of Curaçao doubled between 1789 and 1816. There are no 
similar figures available for Suriname, but as the share of the total free popula-
tion tripled between 1774 and 1813, we may well assume that the proportion of 
non-white free segment increased considerably as well. Thus in both cases, the 
absolute number of free non-whites increased while the overall population 
contracted.55 We might assume that the growth of this group opened avenues 
for upward social mobility for at least some of its members, particularly in the 
economic sphere, even if the color line would remain divisive well into the 
nineteenth century and indeed beyond.
Curaçao stands apart from the other Dutch colonies as to the importance of 
its free non-white population. Long before French revolutionary ideas about 
equality landed in the Caribbean, whites on the island had worried about what 
they perceived as the unacceptable arrogance of the free non-white popula-
tion, a concern no doubt fed by the growing numbers of this segment. 
Manumission rates were high, resulting in a large non-white, predominantly 
Catholic, free population mainly living in Willemstad. By 1740 two-thirds of all 
mariners in town were non-whites. Most were poor, but Governor Rodier 
reported in 1769 that some 100 out of this group owned one or two slaves. In the 
later eighteenth century, while their numbers kept growing, white complaints 
were voiced about the group’s supposed arrogance, more taxes were levied, 
and discriminatory legislation enforced.56 A 1789 report on the Dutch West 
Indian colonies argued that the non-white population of Curaçao had a repu-
tation for being recalcitrant. Three decades later, another visitor observed that 
in comparison to Suriname, whites treated the free colored population with 
considerable more “denigration” – one is tempted to assume that this reflected 
a longing to create distance from a group that was constantly growing in size 
and clout.57
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So on Curaçao there was indeed considerable non-white population agency 
and consequently serious white concern. There is no doubt that revolutionary 
news spread fast to the entire population precisely because of the mobility of 
the free blacks and “coloreds” in the wider region. But this did not imply that 
there was a concerted effort by the entire non-white population, whether free 
or enslaved, for regime change and the ending of slavery. On the contrary, non-
white militias were instrumental in suppressing both the 1750 and 1795 slave 
revolts and in the turbulent 1796–1800 years; again, there was no consistent 
solidarity among the non-white population.58
This brings us to the conclusion that for the Dutch Atlantic colonies, apart 
from the loss of the “lesser” Guianas, the only crucial and lasting change was 
the abolition of the slave trade, imposed by the British who emerged 
dominant from this entire period. There has been much discussion about the 
role the Haitian Revolution and slave resistance more generally played in 
the trajectory leading up to the abolition of the trade, and next, of slavery 
itself. Whatever the conclusions one would want to draw from this general 
debate, there is no indication that events in the Dutch Atlantic speeded up this 
process. Nowhere within the Dutch Atlantic did local elites vie for an end to 
the slave trade or slavery itself. The one major revolt (Curaçao, 1795) had no 
impact on debates on colonialism or slavery in the Netherlands, where aboli-
tionism was – perhaps surprisingly59 – absent or at best weak. In the end, and 
much to the chagrin of the Dutch West Indian interest on both sides of the 
Atlantic, Britain simply extended the abolition to the occupied Dutch colonies 
after debates on the ending of the British trade in which Dutch concerns had 
not figured.
Indirectly, abolition did have a bearing on the social and cultural develop-
ment of the Dutch colonies and their majorities of African descent. The ending 
of the slave trade implied not only that the process of demographic and hence 
cultural creolization sped up, but equally that the bargaining power of the 
enslaved population increased. In Suriname, this involved state-controlled 
amelioration policies as well the admission of Christian missionaries to the 
plantations, where slave owners, unlike their counterparts in the Antilles, 
had long thought of Christianization as pearls before swine and potentially 
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disruptive for the slavery regime.60 As the link to Africa was definitely sev-
ered, oral traditions maintained spiritual links across the Atlantic, but culture-
building became even more a locally and regionally rooted process than it had 
been before.61
 Contraction in Revolutionary Times
For the Dutch Atlantic, the period roughly spanning from the outbreak of the 
Fourth Anglo-Dutch War to the end of the Napoleonic Wars came down to over 
three decades of economic and political contraction, without regime change 
and with only subtle, long-range cultural change sparked by the externally 
imposed abolition of the slave trade. The revisionist argument of this book is 
that the significance of the Dutch Atlantic to the early modern wider Atlantic 
has been systematically underestimated in the historiography of the past 
decades. But we can only conclude that the Age of Revolutions did ring the 
death knell for the Dutch Atlantic, both as an imperial entity with economic 
significance for the metropolis and as a web of serious entanglement with the 
wider tricontinental Atlantic.
The explanation of this decline is simple. If, economically, the Dutch 
Atlantic had been an asset to the metropolis, this was to a large extent because 
the Republic, by scale and military and naval power no match for the major 
Atlantic players, had used its neutrality to build a niche as a broker greasing the 
prevalent system of mercantilism. The years from 1780 to 1815 taught the Dutch 
that a weak state’s neutrality lasts only as long as larger states condone it. Post-
1815, in the emerging post-mercantile Atlantic, there was no longer a need for 
trade zones such as Curaçao or Statia at all, and no need for illicit connections 
at the margins of mercantilism, so the very issue of neutrality became insignifi-
cant. After the loss of the lesser Guianas, this left the Dutch with only Suriname 
as a potential asset, but this colony had declining comparative advantages in a 
quickly globalizing market for plantation produce.
On closer inspection, the Dutch role as an Atlantic broker operating from a 
range of regional hubs was already undermined in the previous period. 
335Dutch Atlantic Decline during “The Age of Revolutions”
<UN>
62 Quoted in Christian Koot, “Anglo-Dutch Trade,” in this volume.
Merchant ships outfitted in the North American colonies were increasingly 
active in the trade with the Caribbean, to the extent that as early as 1713 a mer-
chant commenting on American trade to the French islands had remarked 
that the Americans were taking over a role hitherto played by the Dutch.62 
That observation may have been premature, but indeed North American ship-
ping was on the rise and had even become crucial to the Guianas in the same 
period. After the American Revolution the nation’s mercantile expansion in 
the Caribbean accelerated. Throughout the eighteenth century, British and 
British West Indian investments, shipping and migrations had an increas-
ing  impact as well, culminating in the takeover of what was to become 
British Guiana.
In this context of decreasing significance in the Atlantic, what changes did 
the major Dutch actors aspire to, whether in the metropolis or in the colonies? 
The imperfect monopolies of the West Indian companies were challenged and 
broken, eventually giving way to direct state control of colonial affairs. The 
colonial elites had no interest in anything more radical, surely not in indepen-
dence and not even in a concerted effort to ensure political representation. 
Much less was there an abolitionist drive, on either side of the Atlantic. 
Colonials in the Dutch orbit were hardly inspired by the American, French or 
Latin American Revolutions and positively abhorred the far more radical 
Haitian Revolution.
So the changes that really mattered – abolition, geographical contraction, 
loss of broker function – were all externally imposed and grudgingly taken for 
granted in the Netherlands and among the local elites in the colonies. Slavery 
remained the key institution in the Dutch Atlantic and all considerations of 
those in charge departed from their concern about a social order constantly 
tested by the enslaved. The enslaved population had not been a direct party in 
the changes taking place between 1780 and 1815, but was at least entering the 
final, post-abolition phase of slavery, a period of intense creolization. The 
intermediate group of free men and women of (partly) African origins gained 
considerably in numbers in the period since 1780, and at least in Curaçao 
developed a political presence to be reckoned with. But ultimately the gradual 
and unfinished emancipation of the non-white majorities under the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands would be accomplished in the context of progressive mar-
ginalization of the Dutch Atlantic colonies.
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The Dutch Republic has sometimes been coined “a miracle.” It stood out among 
the nations of the world because of its large trading empire in Europe, Asia 
and the Atlantic. Around 1650, the Dutch share in world trade might well have 
been larger than that of any other nation in Europe and, indeed, in the world. 
Over time, however, the Dutch were surpassed by their rivals, notably Britain 
and France, countries with more people and money in addition to their supe-
rior military and naval might. In retrospect, it seems a miracle indeed that the 
Dutch were able to build such a large trade network considering the relatively 
small size of the Dutch population and its limited resources.
In the past decades, however, the duration of the primacy of Dutch trade 
in the Atlantic has been questioned. It now seems that the trade between 
the Atlantic powers in Europe with their respective colonies was mainly in 
the hands of the national merchant communities, that the Dutch were able 
to break through these national barriers, but were driven out earlier than 
previously has been assumed, even in those areas of the Atlantic where protec-
tive legislation did not exist or could be evaded. Usually, the relative decline 
of Dutch commerce in the Atlantic has been explained by the fact that rival 
nations excluded Dutch traders from their colonies by applying protective 
legislation. This contribution explores the possibility that the declining 
competitiveness of Dutch trade and shipping constituted an additional cause 
for the slow erosion of the Dutch share in the early modern Atlantic economy. 
Over time, it became the most important barrier to the Dutch maritime activi-
ties. During the first half of the nineteenth century, only the relative ineffi-
ciency of the Dutch merchant marine can explain why it was in need of 
protective legislation governing the maritime trade routes to and from the 
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 The Dutch in the Early Atlantic
The beginnings of the Dutch expansion in the Atlantic were impressive. During 
the initial phase between 1580 and 1650, Dutch merchants started to send their 
ships to all corners of the world. The Dutch were able to make important 
inroads into the Iberian trading networks in Asia and the Atlantic, and they 
conquered one of the most promising parts of the New World, Pernambuco, 
with its rapidly expanding sugar production. In addition, they took possession 
of a sizeable part of North America as well as of several small enclaves on the 
Coast of West Africa and a number of small islands in the Caribbean, some of 
which were developed into important commercial hubs. In spite of this flurry 
of activity, after 1650 the two largest Dutch colonies were lost in rapid succes-
sion, in addition to which Dutch ships encountered an increasing number of 
trade barriers due to the protectionist legislation of its commercial rivals. 
These developments reduced the Dutch share in Atlantic trade and shipping to 
less than 10 percent, much lower than their share in the intra-European trade 
and in the trade between Europe and Asia.1
There are two possible explanations for this decline. Most frequently, histo-
rians of the early Dutch overseas expansion point to the fact that the 
Netherlands was only a small country, that military and naval superiority might 
not have been of decisive importance when trading in Europe and Asia, but 
that it did make a difference in the Atlantic, where the Dutch were unable to 
match the resources of the larger powers. Also, in contrast to Asia, colonists 
were an important component of the expansion of Europe in the Atlantic, and 
the larger countries were in a much better position than the relatively small 
population of the Dutch republic to send migrants overseas.
During the past decades, however, some of the traditional explanations of 
the modest Dutch performance in the Atlantic have been challenged. Rather 
than blaming the rival powers for cutting the Dutch down to size, it might 
well have been possible that the Dutch share in the Atlantic commerce did 
not increase at the same pace as that of the other Atlantic powers because of 
internal factors such as the decline in the competitiveness of Dutch shipping, 
the low return on Dutch investments in the Atlantic or the lackluster attempts 
at sending European – not necessarily Dutch – colonists to the settlement 
colonies, thus foregoing the opportunity to create a transatlantic market for 
Dutch goods and services.
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In spite of these new arguments stressing the internal causes of the rela-
tively modest Dutch participation in Atlantic trade and migration, there are 
still many reasons to support the contention that external forces such as the 
military, naval and demographic superiority of the larger nations in the Atlantic 
forced the Dutch to play a marginal role. The Spanish exclusion policies, the 
English Navigation Acts and the protectionist legislation in France, all backed 
up by an impressive naval presence, seem to confirm that the declining role of 
the Dutch in the Atlantic was indeed the result of external forces. This is not to 
say, of course, that the Dutch did not play a role in these empires, as the works 
of Silvia Marzagalli and Ana Crespo Solano for the French and Spanish, respec-
tively, show in this volume. Had the Spanish, Portuguese, English, and French 
colonists been allowed to choose, they would have preferred to trade with the 
Dutch rather than with their own merchants. This is a point made in Christian 
Koot’s contribution to this book for the English in the Chesapeake during the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. During the first phase of Dutch 
expansion into the Atlantic, Dutch traders were known all over to offer lower 
freight rates and a better array of trade goods at lower prices than any of their 
competitors. That seems to suggest that external forces limited the Dutch 
expansion in the Atlantic.2
A case in point in the traditional historiography is the conquest and loss of 
Dutch Brazil. The Dutch could not defend this colony as they were attacked 
from within as well as from outside for the simple reason that there were too 
few Dutch colonists, with the result that the Portuguese remained a disloyal 
majority and a permanent safety hazard for the Dutch colonial administra-
tors.3 Only in West Africa were the Dutch able to hold their ground for the 
simple reason that military or naval superiority had little effect on the pres-
ence of the various European nations there due to the extremely high mortal-
ity rate among European crews and troops. The relatively important Dutch 
presence on the African Coast, where no outside power could dominate the 
others, seems to confirm the view that the Dutch could have achieved much 
more in the Atlantic had it been a more level playing field.
Over the past decades, however, new research seems to suggest that the 
various foreign protectionist policies were not the sole cause of the modest 
performance of the Dutch in the Atlantic, but that the decreasing competitive-
ness of Dutch shipping also played a part. Even in those areas and during those 
periods, where and when free competition in the Atlantic was possible, the 
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Dutch commercial performance seemed far less competitive than has been 
assumed previously.
A case in point is the volte-face in the explanation of the rapid rise in the 
number of enslaved Africans on the island of Barbados during the period 
between 1640 and 1660, when the planters there changed from cultivating 
tobacco to sugar cane. Until recently, the only explanation for the rapid rise in 
the number of slaves on Barbados took the dominant position of the Dutch 
slave traders on the island for granted. After the loss of their slave market in 
Brazil, the Dutch had a fully developed slave trading system in place, but no 
customers. Keen to create “a second Brazil,” the Dutch slavers lowered their 
prices, making slavery more affordable for the Barbadian planters relative to 
the costs of importing indentured laborers from England and Ireland. Similarly, 
the ubiquitous Dutch traders were credited with being almost the sole suppli-
ers of slaves to the French islands, where the transition from tobacco to sugar 
cane took place a few decades later than in the English Caribbean. It was 
assumed that until the third quarter of the seventeenth century the English 
and French slave traders could not compete with their Dutch rivals.
Recently, however, the explanation for the rapid rise in the number of slaves 
on Barbados in the decade between 1650 and 1660 has been turned upside 
down. It now seems that there were a sufficient number of English slave trad-
ers to provision Barbados with enslaved Africans right from the beginning of 
sugar cultivation on the island. True, in 1651 Cromwell proclaimed the first set 
of Navigation Acts that prohibited the colonists on Barbados from buying 
slaves from foreign ships. Yet, these laws would not have been enacted had the 
English slave trade been ineffective and almost non-existent as has been previ-
ously assumed.4 This seems to suggest that the Dutch competitiveness in the 
early slave trade to the Caribbean had been far less impressive than had been 
previously assumed and that the English slave traders had been able to com-
pete with the Dutch even before English colonial trade became protected.
For a later period in the seventeenth century Atlantic, similar doubts can be 
raised about the competitiveness of the Dutch merchant marine. After the 
reconquest of Dutch Brazil by the Portuguese in 1654, the shipping capacity of 
the Portuguese and Brazilian merchant fleets remained inadequate and it 
seemed that not Dutch, but English ships filled that gap.5 The same applied to 
Spanish America, where the Dutch had to surrender part of their – illegal – 
trade to British interlopers. During the second half of the eighteenth century, 
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The Portuguese case would seem to have offered a more obvious counterpoint to the Dutch 
example, considering that both powers had a small geographical territory on the European 
continent and a relatively small population inhabiting this territory. Unfortunately, however, 
the state of the historiography regarding Portuguese economic history makes it impossible to 
identify the exact differences with Dutch trade history. Moreover, the Portuguese did not 
have a large mercantile shipping network in Europe like the British, the French and the 
Dutch competitiveness in trade and shipping in the Atlantic seemed to have 
declined even more as the British, French, American and even Danish slave 
traders became heavily involved in the slave trade to Cuba, but not the Dutch.
As far as migration goes, the same situation applies. The Dutch could have 
put more effort into recruiting colonists for their settlement colonies in North 
and South America. No rival power could have prevented this as demonstrated 
by the very successful recruitment policies of the Dutch East India Company, 
each year luring thousands of young men from all over Europe to risk their 
lives in the tropical parts of Asia with less than an even chance of returning 
home. Rather than using their recruitment system to send migrants to the 
Dutch settlement colonies, the Dutch merchants only became involved in 
the transport of mainly German migrants to the British settlement colonies. 
The Dutch merchant community was not interested in investing in “planting 
ventures.”6 It could be argued that Dutch merchants and capital owners rather 
invested in ventures that yielded higher profits than sending migrants to the 
colonies and that English merchants were more inclined to invest in migration 
as they might have had fewer alternatives for investment. In reality, however, 
the investment opportunities of the two nations hardly differed and that 
seems to suggest that the English mercantile community had a better eye for 
long-term economic growth in the Atlantic than their Dutch counterparts.
 The British and Dutch Compared7
The unwillingness of the Dutch merchant community to invest more in naval 
power and migration made the Dutch into the Atlantic losers of the eighteenth 
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century. In fact, “a big divide” showed up when comparing the Atlantic achieve-
ments of Britain and the Netherlands. Britain became the only European coun-
try to which the Atlantic made a difference during both the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. After 1750, Britain’s quantum leap forward in the volume 
of exports to the Caribbean and North America was unique.
In the eighteenth century, Britain’s Atlantic trade surpassed its European 
commercial activities. In 1700, 67 percent of British imports came from 
Europe and 23 percent from North America, the Caribbean, Africa and the East 
Indies. By 1750, these percentages were 55 percent and 45 percent respectively, 
and in the years just before 1800, 42 percent and 58 percent. In absolute 
numbers, the value of all overseas trade had quadrupled: from nearly 6 million 
pounds in 1700, surpassing nearly 8 million pounds in 1750, to nearly 24 million 
pounds during the last years of the eighteenth century. The story of British 
exports looked very similar: in 1700, 85 percent of these exports went to 
Europe, in 1750, 77 percent and in 1800, 30 percent. The value of British exports 
increased from 4.5 million pounds in 1700 to 18 million pounds around 1800. 
These figures indicate that the shift towards the Atlantic took place between 
1750 and 1800, and that Britain’s most dynamic Atlantic trading partners were 
the West Indies and North America, whose share in the export of British 
domestically-made products, rose from 11 percent in 1700 to an impressive 
56 percent just before 1800.8
The Dutch, on the other hand, remained more oriented toward trade within 
Europe, in spite of a modest shift towards the Atlantic during the second 
half of the eighteenth century. Of the 100 ships leaving Dutch ports between 
1600 and 1800 on average about 80 had destinations in Europe and the 
Mediterranean, five sailed to Asia, and 15 ships had Atlantic destinations, a 
conclusion mirrored in Silvia Marzagalli’s sample for 1780 which is presented 
in this volume. In the second half of the eighteenth century the Atlantic offered 
more opportunities for economic growth than Europe and Asia as reflected in 
the sharp increase in British and French trade in the Atlantic.9 The modest 
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increase of the Dutch commercial activities in the Atlantic during that period 
is testimony to the growing relative inefficiency of Dutch shipping and trade.
The divergence of the Dutch and British experience in the Atlantic began at 
home. Economic growth in the Netherlands peaked between 1580 and 1620. 
After 1670, a period of stagnation set in, lasting for about two centuries. When 
economic growth in the Atlantic increased during the eighteenth century, the 
Netherlands had a stagnating economy at home. No wonder Adam Smith, writ-
ing in 1776, was of the opinion that the Netherlands had “acquired the full com-
plement of riches which the nature of its soils and climate and its situation 
with respect to other countries, allowed it to acquire.” The Netherlands had 
accumulated so much capital that profits were driven close to zero, and the 
Dutch economy could advance no further.10 This led to the phenomenon men-
tioned in Kenneth Morgan’s contribution to the volume. The Dutch began to 
invest heavily in British state bonds, in part because there were limited invest-
ment opportunities to be had at home.
Let there be no misunderstanding: the results of the early and short-lived 
period of growth in the Netherlands between 1575 and 1675 were impressive, 
even by modern standards. The Netherlands was the first country to break 
the trend of declining real wages caused by rising populations and rising 
prices. After 1580, a widening difference between the real wages in the 
Netherlands and England developed that lasted into the middle of the eigh-
teenth century. During the first half century after 1575, when the growth spurt 
set in, the nominal wage for unskilled labor increased from 0.28 guilders to 0.73 
guilders. As prices rose much more slowly, the increase in buying power was at 
least 50 percent. That explains why the Netherlands was flooded with migrant 
laborers from abroad. There was little danger that these migrant laborers 
would bring down wages since they were easily absorbed into the labor force 
as the demand for labor was rising rapidly, in spite of the opinion of Karl Marx 
that the Dutch Republic was the “model capitalist nation of the seventeenth 
century” and, thus, that “by 1648 the people of Holland [were] more over-
worked, poorer, and more brutally oppressed than those of all the rest of 
Europe put together.”11
The economic miracle at home took place well before economic opportuni-
ties in the wider Atlantic became attractive to the Dutch. The Dutch share in 
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the Atlantic plantation production was modest at best and never sufficient to 
provide more than half the sugar processed in the Netherlands. After the failed 
attempt at conquering part of Portuguese Brazil, the Dutch acquired a major 
plantation colony in the New World by taking Suriname from the English 
in 1667. In addition, the Dutch took possession of some smaller neighboring 
plantation colonies in the same region on the coast of South America between 
the Amazon and Orinoco rivers. During the first 150 years the Dutch plantation 
colonies did increase their output, but none saw the dramatic upswing in the 
production of sugar and cotton that occurred in some of the other Caribbean 
colonies.
After the beginning of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784), the differ-
ences between the Dutch and the British economies in the Atlantic became 
even more pronounced. During the last two decades of the eighteenth century, 
Britain saw its trade in the Atlantic, both in slaves and goods, grow more 
rapidly than its trade to other destinations, while the Dutch experienced a 
decline in their Atlantic trade, with the Dutch slave trade coming to a virtual 
standstill. The gdp per capita in the Netherlands peaked around 1650 and 
declined somewhat during the following 200 years, while between 1500 and 
1700 the gdp per capita in England was much lower than that of the 
Netherlands, but almost doubled during the period 1700–1820. The same devel-
opment occurred in European shipping. The Dutch share is estimated to have 
been 40 percent in 1650 and 12 percent in 1780; the British share grew from 
12 percent to 26 percent.12 Both countries saw the percentage of trade outside 
of Europe increase, but the reasons for this shift were very different.
In the case of the uk, the reorientation was caused by the Industrial 
Revolution that encouraged the exportation of manufactured goods in 
exchange for the importation of foodstuffs and raw materials. The “Agricultural 
Revolution” in the uk allowed the country to double its population during the 
eighteenth century. The Netherlands, on the other hand, experienced a very 
slow increase in its population and did not industrialize until late in the nine-
teenth century. The increasing share of colonial products in Dutch trade was 
not a reflection of a new and innovative home economy but, rather, of the 
opposite. It indicated that the Dutch had become less competitive in Europe 
and that they had to retreat to an area where part of their trade was protected 
by mercantilist legislation. Even so, the Dutch share in the total volume of the 
trade in plantation crops declined. The value added in this trade was limited, 
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Britain, on the other hand, saw its export to North America triple between 
1750 and 1800, and the export of British domestic products to the West Indies 
increased five times during these 50 years. This seems to suggest that the early 
mechanization of British industry did help to increase Britain’s Atlantic trade 
as only merchants from that country could offer an array of goods that catered 
to the increasing purchasing power of the consumers in the wider Atlantic. 
Textiles are a case in point because only Britain could provide a mix of textiles 
that were imported both from India as well as from the European continent, in 
addition to those made at home both in the traditional way and by mecha-
nized mills.
Again, the Dutch could point to unfair competition as the trade with British 
North America was restricted by the British Navigation Acts. However, that 
seems a feeble excuse as British trade with North America survived the end of 
mercantilism in North America. “Given the superiority and cheapness of 
British articles over those manufactured by the Dutch and the French, it is not 
surprising that some American merchants maintained contacts with British 
firms during the War of Independence and that British manufactured products 
were so much in demand in the usa.”13
The two Atlantic products par excellence suffice to demonstrate this point: 
sugar and cotton. During the course of the eighteenth century, the consump-
tion of sugar in Britain per head of the population increased far more rapidly 
than anywhere else in Europe, indicating a link with the process of industrial-
ization.14 Compared to Britain, the consumption of sugar per head of the pop-
ulation in the Netherlands remained relatively low. Most sugar refined in the 
Netherlands was exported abroad. The production of, and the trade in, cotton 
is another indicator of economic modernization. To a disproportionate extent, 
the cultivation of cotton in the Dutch West Indies was in the hands of 
British planters. Cotton boomed during the British occupation of the colony 
(1798–1816), suggesting that this increase was a response to innovation in the 
British rather than in the Dutch economy because the traditional cotton mills 
in the Netherlands had moved away from the cities and were not expanding.15
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 The Atlantic Influence on the Dutch Economy
There have been a few attempts at calculating the volume of the Dutch share 
in the trade between Europe and the non-European world. Niels Steensgaard 
has suggested that the total value of all foreign imports into the Netherlands 
around the middle of the eighteenth century amounted to 150 million guilders, 
of which 20 to 25 percent came from non-European trade. No allowance had 
been made for the sale, re-export and distribution from, to and via the 
Netherlands of colonial imports and exports from and to the neighboring 
countries. Steensgaard calculated that around 1750 the share of the non- 
European trade as a percentage of all trade in Britain was about 50 percent – 
twice as much as for the Netherlands.16
A second difference between the Dutch and British trade patterns that the 
statistics of Steensgaard bring to light is the fact that within British colonial trade 
the importance of America versus Asia can be set at 3:1, while that ratio is roughly 
equal in the Dutch case.17 Only during the decade 1770–1779 did the value 
of Dutch commodity imports from the West Indies exceed those from Asia.18 
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How important were those Asian and West Indian imports to the Dutch econ-
omy as a whole? The most recent calculations put the national income 
of the Netherlands around 1800 at about 300 million guilders, while the trade 
outside Europe earned the Dutch about 20 to 30 million guilders or about 
10 percent of the total.19
These figures indicate that the Dutch economy of the ancien régime was 
more dependent on income from trade with other continents than virtually 
any other economy in Europe, perhaps with the exception of Portugal. 
Trade was certainly less important to the British economy as a whole than 
to the Netherlands. Yet, within the mercantile sector of the two countries, 
non-European trade, and especially trade in the Atlantic, was twice as impor-
tant for Britain as for the Netherlands. That seems to confirm the assumption 
that shipping and trade in the Atlantic were less profitable for the Netherlands 
than for Britain.20
The economic histories of the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and France are 
killing fields for anyone trying to link industrialization to foreign trade, let 
alone to Atlantic trade. England is the exception, but even for the economy 
of that country the contribution of income earned on trade outside Europe 
was modest at best, something in the order of the income derived from the 
economy of an average duchy in England. That seems to suggest that even 
for Britain, the most likely candidate country to have profited from the slave 
trade and slavery, the Industrial Revolution could not be directly linked to the 
increasing economic benefits derived from New World slavery.21 In all other 
countries with a stake in the Atlantic, industrialization took place when the 
Atlantic slave trade and slavery had been abolished.
Anyone looking for a link between the contribution of the colonies to the 
Dutch economy and industrialization will not point at the Atlantic, but at Java. 
Between 1840 and 1870, the transfer payments generated by the forced crop-
ping system (“cultivation system”) on Java flowed into the public purse, and 
were used to increase government expenditure on the construction of water-
ways and of a new railroad system in the Netherlands. These transfer payments 
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reached their peak in the late 1850s when they made up as much as 23 percent 
of the yearly income of the Dutch state.22
 Why the British in the Atlantic Moved Ahead and the Dutch 
Remained Behind
In addition to the comparative decline in the productivity of Dutch shipping in 
the Atlantic and the Dutch preference to recruit migrants for Asia rather than 
for the Atlantic, there are three other features that made the Dutch Atlantic 
different from its British counterpart, and that impacted negatively on the 
profitability of the Dutch Atlantic.
The first deviation from the pattern of British activities in the Atlantic was 
the relatively large volume of the Dutch transit trade. Recent research has 
shown that the illegal trade to and from Spanish America, in addition to the 
transit trade to and from the French Caribbean, was worth more than the value 
produced in the Dutch plantation colonies. The Dutch preference for the trade 
rather than for production can be explained by the fact that it required much 
less investment. The drawback was, however, that the Dutch had no control 
over the volume, which differed widely from year to year, while the British 
colonies produced a steadily increasing volume of sugar, coffee and cotton.23
A second difference between the British and the Dutch experience pertains 
to the way in which both countries financed their West Indian activities. In the 
British case, there was a constant flow of investment money going to the plan-
tations. Part of that money was the capital that a new planter took with him 
to the West Indies and another part was provided by merchant houses that 
specialized in the importation and sale of plantation produce, as they were 
used to advance loans and mortgages to their customers. Until 1750, the same 
pattern existed in the Dutch Caribbean, but, after that year, groups of 
Amsterdam investors suddenly started to offer large mortgages to West Indian 
planters in Suriname as well as in the British “Ceded Islands.” As was the case 
elsewhere in Europe, Dutch investors moved away from buying government 
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bonds and other low-risk instruments of investment and started to put some 
of their money into high-risk “bubbles.” In this case, the result was disastrous. 
The amount of mortgages provided to the Suriname planters far exceeded 
their ability to pay the interest on these mortgages, let alone to pay back the 
principal. After 1773, this situation resulted in a wave of bankruptcies, and soon 
the majority of the plantations were owned by the investment funds that had 
provided the loans and mortgages in the past. No wonder, then, that after the 
crash of the Amsterdam stock exchange the flow of new investment capital for 
the plantation colonies dropped dramatically, and this process of over- and 
under-investment severely hampered the expansion and modernization of the 
plantations. As a result, some areas of Dutch Guiana could only continue to 
grow due to the immigration of British planters with their slaves and capital. 
In addition to slowing down the development of new plantation areas in 
Suriname, the lack of credit also affected the established plantations.24
A third difference constituted the rapid decline of the Dutch slave trade and 
the dramatic growth of the British slave trade. In part, that difference can be 
explained by the way in which the slave traders were paid. In the British case, 
the bills came from the agents of the metropolitan merchant houses residing 
in the West Indies. This provided the British slave traders with much more 
security than their Dutch colleagues. “By comparison with their French and 
Dutch counterparts, the Liverpool slave traders appear to have been much 
more independent of colonial credit and relatively unencumbered with the 
heavy indebtedness of the plantation economy.”25 In contrast, the Dutch slave 
trade suffered badly from the lack of new money for the Dutch plantations. 
Before the crash of the Amsterdam stock exchange, planters used bills of 
exchange drawn on the merchant houses cum mortgage providers in the 
Netherlands in order to pay for the slaves. That meant that slaving firms could 
obtain full payment for their slaves upon the return of the slave ship to its 
homeport. After the crash this method of payment came to a grinding halt, as 
most bills of exchange were no longer honored and, as a consequence, the 
shipping firms themselves were forced to collect the price of their slaves in 
cash or in kind from the planters. It sometimes took years and years before a 
slave cargo had been paid in full. That explains why, after the crash, and again 
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after the end of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 1784, the Dutch slave trade 
declined rapidly, while the British slave trade (and that of most slave trading 
nations in the Atlantic) experienced a dramatic increase in volume. In order to 
survive at all, the Dutch slave trade had to be freed from all taxes and levies.26
In all fairness, however, the superior buying power of the planters in the 
British Caribbean must have also contributed to the remarkably high profits in 
the British slave trade. British planters had more buying power because they 
enjoyed incomes that were, in part, based on the protective tariffs for their 
sugar in the British home market.27 The British consumer not only bought 
much more sugar than any consumer on the Continent, but he or she also had 
to pay more for it than elsewhere. The figures are telling. In the 1720s, Britain 
re-exported about 20 percent of its sugar to foreign markets and, during the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century, this percentage had fallen to less than 
5 percent. The planters in the Dutch West Indies, on the other hand, did not 
receive protection and had to compete with the most cost-effective producers 
anywhere, resulting in relatively low profits in the Dutch slave trade as well as 
in Dutch West Indian plantation agriculture.28
 Conclusion
By comparing the Dutch expansion in Asia and the Atlantic, it seems self- 
evident that the constituent components of the successful Dutch policy in 
Asia produced a different, if not an opposite, effect in the Atlantic. A large 
monopoly company for all Dutch trade to and within Asia worked wonders, 
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but its sister company in the Atlantic was a failure. Similarly, the Dutch recruit-
ing system for staffing its trading posts and ships in Asia was extremely 
successful, but not for peopling its Atlantic colonies. As far as trade between 
Europe and Asia is concerned, the Dutch might well have carried about half 
the total volume, in addition to which they had a sizeable trading network 
within Asia. In the Atlantic, on the other hand, the Dutch share in the transat-
lantic slave trade was about 5 percent and their share in other branches of 
trade in the Atlantic was perhaps somewhat higher.
In contrast to Asia, it was impossible to monopolize trade routes or the 
production of goods in the Atlantic. That is why legislation was needed to 
create protection. The trade between the European countries and their 
New World colonies was subject to protective legislation and even the champi-
ons of free trade, the Dutch, legislated that all goods and slaves imported or 
exported to and from the Dutch plantation colonies should be shipped on 
Dutch ships only. In actual practice, however, a part of the Atlantic trade was 
open to competition as the Portuguese, Spanish, and French merchants and 
shipping companies were not always able to provide shipping capacity, slaves, 
and trade goods in sufficient numbers and quantities at competitive prices. 
During the seventeenth century, the Dutch played an important part in provid-
ing the illegal tonnage, goods and slaves to third parties, but over time their 
competitive edge diminished dramatically as is shown by the declining 
volume of the Dutch slave trade to non-Dutch colonies. In the second half of 
the eighteenth century, when British, American and even Danish slave traders 
were successful in supplying Cuban planters with slaves when the island 
started to produce sugar in a large way, the Dutch were absent.
The same applies to migration. In Asia, the Dutch were extremely successful 
in attracting young men from all over Europe to serve in the Dutch East India 
Company. In the Atlantic, however, the Dutch hardly made an effort to find 
settlers for their colonies in the New World. Unlike the English, the number of 
indentured laborers migrating to the New World was very small; while the 
Dutch mercantile community did not seemed interested in financing “plant-
ing” ventures as was the case in England. After the loss of Dutch Brazil and 
Dutch North America, the Dutch no longer possessed suitable settlement 
colonies and the number of Dutch migrants settling in foreign colonies was 
negligible in the Atlantic.
The opposite seems to apply to Dutch investments in the Atlantic. 
The money available in the Netherlands for Atlantic ventures was larger than 
the demand in the Dutch Atlantic. That is why investment funds were orga-
nized that provided anonymous mortgages to planters both in the Dutch and 
non-Dutch Caribbean. In the case of the British, the investment in foreign 
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colonies was not anonymous, but linked to British planters and merchants 
moving into French, Spanish or Dutch colonies.
And last but not least, the home economy should be considered. The size of 
the consumer market at home did not govern the volume of Asian imports as 
luxury goods could command a European-wide market. On average imports 
from Asia had a high value and a small volume, almost no value was added 
in Europe and the clientele was international. Most Asian goods might be 
auctioned in London or Amsterdam, but they traveled on to other parts of 
Europe and indeed to Africa and the New World.
The production, sale, and consumption of Atlantic goods, on the other 
hand, was, to a large extent, dominated by the boundaries of the various 
national compartments in the Atlantic in spite of smuggling and illegal trade 
documented in a growing number of studies.29 The fact that empire mattered, 
despite the permeability of imperial systems evidenced in the incorporation of 
“outsiders” like the Dutch within the French or Spanish systems as detailed in 
this volume by Silvia Marzagalli and Ana Crespo Solano, respectively, is a point 
brought home in the chapter by Christian Koot in this volume. Some parts of 
Spanish America seemed to have conducted more illegal than legal trade and 
all of the plantation colonies in the Caribbean were dependent upon the 
“Yankee traders” for the importation of certain victuals and the exportation 
of dram and molasses regardless of the confining laws of mercantilism. 
This dependency on North American traders is vividly highlighted in Karwan 
Fatah-Black’s contribution to this book. He shows how necessary to Suriname 
the provisions provided by the North Americans were. Yet the majority of 
the imports and exports remained within the various national sections of the 
Atlantic, and the British section was the most successful one.
The British had the only Atlantic empire with a truly integrated economy, 
especially when we include Ireland. During the course of the seventeenth cen-
tury England had developed its own manufacturing industry protected against 
foreign competition by the Navigation Acts and the same protection was 
granted to the sugar produced in the English Caribbean. Yet, towards the end 
of the eighteenth century, no country in the world consumed so much sugar 
per head of the population as Britain. Protection makes for high prices, but in 
the British Atlantic this was not an obstacle to growth. The inhabitants of 
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Great Britain could afford high sugar prices as their country was the first to 
industrialize, providing higher per capita incomes. Industrialization also 
explains why higher wages do not necessarily result in higher prices for British 
exports as it increased the labor productivity dramatically. During the first 
decade of the nineteenth century, 54 percent of all manufactured goods in 
Britain were exported to the Americas, a figure that no other European country 
with an Atlantic empire could match even if we allow for the compensation 
effect as British exports to the Continent had declined because of the war with 
France.30
The Dutch Atlantic could never rival the British achievement for the simple 
reason that the market for Dutch exports in Africa and the New World was 
extremely small. That is why the Atlantic only had a very modest impact on the 
Dutch economy, while the buying power of the British settlement colonies was 
substantial. The first-ever population count in Great Britain held in 1801 
revealed that the country had about 10 million inhabitants, while Ireland and 
the New World colonies (including the recently independent us) counted 
more than 8 million inhabitants.31 The population of the Dutch Atlantic 
counted 2 million inhabitants in Europe and not even 100,000 in their Atlantic 
colonies, most of whom were slaves.
These figures seem to suggest that the Dutch responded to the Atlantic chal-
lenge by creating a trading empire, while the British not only created a trading 
empire but also an important market for their home industry. In addition to 
the usual imports of sugar, coffee and cotton, their Atlantic empire became a 
substantial outlet for British goods and services and in the nineteenth century 
came to include the newly independent parts of South America.
These facts indicate that over time the Dutch experience in the Atlantic 
deviated drastically from that of Britain, and, in order to explain this differ-
ence, this chapter has discussed several external and internal factors influenc-
ing the Dutch performance, showing that both external and internal factors 
were at play. That the Dutch were unable to hold on to one or more large-scale 
settlement colonies was due to an external factor: the lack of naval power. Even 
France, a much larger, a more powerful and more populous country than the 
Netherlands, lost its settlement colony in North America, albeit a century later 
than the Dutch. However, the declining Dutch share in the Atlantic trade was 
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caused by an internal factor: the relative decline in the productivity of Dutch 
trade and shipping. That is why the Dutch share in the trade in goods and 
slaves to non-Dutch colonies diminished relative to that of its competitors in 
areas where protective legislation hardly made the difference. It also explains 
as to why the Dutch were unable to profit commercially from the opening up 
of Latin America and relied heavily on protectionist legislation in order to pre-
vent being outcompeted by British and us firms in the trade and shipping to 
their own colonies. Trade barriers, the much-hated stumbling block for Dutch 
expansion in the seventeenth century, had become a protective wall. Dutch 
commerce in the Atlantic had come full circle.
<UN>
© alison games, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004271319_016
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons  
Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported (CC-BY-NC 3.0) License.
1 Han Jordaan and Victor Wilson, in this volume; Henk den Heijer, in this volume.
Conclusion
A Dutch Moment in Atlantic Historiography
Alison Games
One of the foremost contributions of this collection is to bring together recent 
scholarship on the Dutch in the Atlantic world in an English-language volume 
for an international audience. The collection showcases varied approaches to 
the Dutch Atlantic. The essays investigate an impressive breadth of topics, with 
an emphasis on trade and commerce but also attentive to such themes as reli-
gious practices, domestic relations, slavery, circuits of knowledge, culture, and 
politics. The authors explore a wide range of connections, including transat-
lantic religious ties, migration, administrative appointments and patronage 
networks, commercial links of all sorts, and ties between Dutch settlements 
and other European colonies and ports. Some of those connections linked 
trading posts and colonies to the Netherlands, while others fostered ties within 
regions, to neighbors, or to important trading partners in more remote locales. 
These essays identify important similarities to other European outposts, as in 
the case of the free ports of Statia, St. Barthélemy, and St. Vincent, and also 
intriguing differences: there was, for example, a Dutch West India interest, as 
there was an English one, although the Dutch coalition looked different in 
ways that suited “the particularistic nature of the Dutch Republic.”1
For those unable to read Dutch-language sources, this volume is a boon. It 
makes it possible for nonspecialists to deepen their understanding of different 
aspects of Atlantic history in general and the Dutch Atlantic in particular. 
Aside from assertions that the Dutch were important in the seventeenth cen-
tury, many Atlantic historians really do not know with certainty how or why. 
Moreover, some of the assumptions historians have had about their role in 
sugar production or the slave trade, for example, turn out to be erroneous. Take 
the case of the Dutch role in the English sugar boom on Barbados. The old 
wisdom held that the Dutch instructed the English in sugar cultivation in 
Barbados and fostered its development with capital and slaves. The historian 
Russell R. Menard’s assiduous investigation into Barbados sources, however, 
has yielded no evidence that the Dutch provided instruction or significant 
capital for sugar production, although they do appear to have offered both a 
market for sugar in Amsterdam and vessels to carry the product. They may well 
have played some modest role in providing capital for the sugar boom. Menard 
suspects that the story of Dutch assistance was invented by English colonists 
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who were eager to protest the stringent Navigation Acts of 1660, which limited 
them to shipping goods on English ships, and they sought to justify their objec-
tions by pointing to the centrality of the Dutch to sugar production. English 
sugar planters blamed this law for their financial difficulties during a period of 
depression, and the “myth of the Dutch” was born.2 This example points to the 
many potential myths that have evolved around the history of the Dutch 
Atlantic, and of the Dutch in the Atlantic, and which have endured thanks to 
linguistic impediments and source limitations. Thanks to this edited volume, 
nonspecialists will gain a deeper understanding of how the Dutch shaped the 
Atlantic world, how the Atlantic world shaped the Dutch, and what a Dutch 
Atlantic world looked like.
Several aspects of this volume echo the goals and accomplishments of 
The British Atlantic World, a major coedited work that contributed to the matu-
ration of the field of Atlantic history at the time of its publication in 2002.3 At 
that stage in the development of the field, there was a lot of interest in looking 
at the imperial Atlantics, those European states that projected their power 
beyond Europe. This approach was fully displayed in a 1999 Itinerario forum, 
which contained essays on the Spanish, French, and British Atlantics, and an 
essay arguing that there was no Dutch Atlantic.4 This way of conceptualizing 
the Atlantic in national and imperial terms has had important staying power; 
two important edited volumes on Atlantic history published in 2008 and 2011 
contained several essays taking this approach.5
When The British Atlantic World appeared, many historians imagined that 
volumes devoted to other national Atlantics might follow.6 Instead, in the 
years since that work’s publication, and with the development and maturation 
of the field of Atlantic history, two lines of criticism emerged that 
have pushed the field away from national approaches. One critique pertains to 
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geography: what processes were unique to the Atlantic, as opposed to shared 
features of a period of global interaction and expansion.7 A second critique 
derives from concerns about examining a single ethnic or linguistic group in 
isolation. The most cogent critiques along these lines have called for an “entan-
gled” history, one which scrutinizes interactions across imperial, national, lin-
guistic, and ethnic lines.8 Although the Dutch Atlantic Connections volume 
appears at a historiographic moment when historians are, for the most part, 
shifting away from imperial Atlantics, the capacious intellectual perspective 
undergirding the book enables the collection to speak directly to current con-
cerns among Atlantic historians. As these essays demonstrate, any study of the 
Dutch is one of entanglement.
The book’s focus on interactions and connections is a marked departure 
from earlier approaches to the Dutch Atlantic, including important ones by 
contributors to this volume who in the past evinced some skepticism about the 
existence of a Dutch Atlantic.9 As Oostindie and Roitman observe, previously 
the historiography of the Dutch in the Atlantic largely examined the Dutch in 
isolation.10 Such an approach is hardly true only of the Dutch, of course, and it 
is perhaps even more true of other imperial historiographies with more lin-
guistically constrained historians. In response to this older historiographic 
practice, then, the ambition of the Dutch Atlantic Connections volume has 
been to pioneer an approach to the Dutch Atlantic that privileges connections, 
insisting that any study of a small place be conceptualized solely in terms of its 
linkages with other locales. This kind of transnational or entangled history is 
easily called for, but very hard to do. For all its challenges, however, it is vitally 
important to try to do this kind of research – transnational, multilingual, look-
ing at the Atlantic in terms of intersections, entanglements, and interactions. 
The contents of this volume therefore start to model how a history organized 
around examining connections might work, and it is this aspect that produces 
the second important contribution of this book. 2014 is, historiographically 
speaking, a Dutch moment in Atlantic history.
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This close study of the Dutch Atlantic prods Atlantic historians to rethink 
some of the basic frameworks they have deployed in their approaches to 
Atlantic history. Because historians of the British and Iberian (mainly Spanish) 
worlds have been especially active in writing Atlantic history, and, indeed, 
played an important role as pioneers of the field, patterns for these European 
kingdoms as they projected themselves into the Atlantic have come to stand in 
for the Atlantic world as a whole. As a result, themes pertaining to territorial 
occupation and the growth of colonial societies have generated important 
typologies for the Atlantic writ large.11
The first Europeans to secure permanent footholds in the Western Atlantic 
were the Spanish, and, drawing on models of occupation tested in the Iberian 
peninsula during the “Reconquest,” they established a style of colonization 
based on the exploitation and conversion of indigenous people, the resettle-
ment of Spanish migrants, and the transfer of fundamental Iberian institutions 
to the Americas. Even though the Portuguese had already established impor-
tant trading posts on the West and Central African Coasts, and with these com-
mercial enterprises indicated the multifaceted endeavors Europeans pursued 
in the Atlantic, it was the Spanish model of American colonization that shaped 
historiographies, making this style of occupation and exchange appear to be a 
dominant European strategy in the Atlantic. The British likewise ended up dis-
placing many indigenous people (through war and disease) from their home 
territories, and claimed this territory for themselves, echoing Spanish strate-
gies in important and occasionally deliberate ways.
These are obviously gross caricatures of widely varied and complex 
processes, but the historiographic dominance of these patterns of territorial 
dominion and control over people has made major trading enterprises 
(in Canada, Brazil, and West and Central Africa) look too much like anomalies 
within the larger Atlantic, even though that list of regions alone might indicate 
that trade was a pervasive pattern, not to mention the economic value of 
the commodities (dye goods, pelts, gold, ivory, salt, textiles, and slaves, to name 
some of the key items), or of other extractive industries, including the lucrative 
fisheries. Putting the Dutch in the equation should continue to put pressure on 
the historiographic emphasis in Atlantic history on European control (or aspi-
rations for control) of land and indigenous subjects, as these tended not to be 
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major preoccupations of Dutch colonists, with some notable exceptions. These 
exceptions include the Dutch settlements on the so-called “Wild Coast” of 
South America (Suriname, Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, and Guiana), which 
are included in this volume, and New Netherland and the colony at the Cape of 
Good Hope, which the editors decided to exclude.
Commonplace periodizations of the Atlantic also have a reduced salience 
when we look closely at the Dutch experience over the long eighteenth cen-
tury. For the Atlantic as a whole, the eighteenth century was an era of tighten-
ing imperial ties, of the maturation of political, cultural, social, economic, and 
religious institutions. The late eighteenth century and early nineteenth centu-
ries witnessed independence movements in mainland colonies, accompanied 
by loyalism for most island colonies. This characterization of the Atlantic in 
this era as in the midst of an Age of Revolution endures, a depiction that 
applies to most, but not all, places in the Western Atlantic, and which increases 
the omission of Africa from the larger field of Atlantic history. For the Dutch, 
this period was certainly one of warfare and disruption throughout the 
Atlantic. But this era was not a time of revolution or independence in the 
Western Dutch Atlantic, despite considerable political upheaval in the Republic 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Integrating the Dutch 
experience in the Atlantic challenges these generalizations, already problem-
atic because of their limitation to the American mainland, and thus better 
suited to a history of the Americas than to a history of the Atlantic.12 Finding 
new periodizations and typologies that encompass multiple historical actors 
and approaches, however, remains challenging. Jan de Vries proposes a four-
part periodization for the Dutch Atlantic, but this interpretation derives from 
his study of the Dutch Atlantic economy and reflects the economic patterns of 
the Dutch Atlantic world.13 As Karel Davids’ essay reminds us, different sub-
jects require their own periodizations. Even when the Dutch Atlantic waned in 
the eighteenth century, Davids argues, the intellectual engagement of Dutch 
scholars continued unabated.
Beyond important questions about typologies and periodizations, a focus 
on Dutch Atlantic connections brings important issues to the fore and helps us 
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envision what Atlantic history might look like if historians take connections 
more seriously. First, a Dutch-informed Atlantic history privileges an interna-
tional orientation. This perspective emerges in many different ways in these 
essays, starting with the composition of the population in Dutch-claimed 
territory. A highly diverse European population inhabited wic settlements, 
which might be a distinctive characteristic of the Dutch Atlantic.14 While many 
other colonial regions contained diverse European inhabitants, the territories 
under the Dutch West India Company (wic) seem unique in the percentage  
of the European population that was not Dutch. (African-born and African-
descended populations often outnumbered European populations in the 
Atlantic world.) In Demerara, for example, the white population was two-
thirds British in 1800.15 Many of these non-Dutch Europeans acquired consid-
erable political and economic power, such as the Bermudian Richard Downing 
Jennings who lived on Statia. These essays demonstrate the ability, willingness, 
and, often, eagerness of the Dutch to assimilate other people, not necessarily 
into a single Dutch culture, whatever that might be, but into a Dutch political 
dominion and commercial operation.
As Jennings’ Bermuda background intimates, this diverse population in 
Dutch colonies enhanced regional ties between Dutch settlements and other 
locales, within the Caribbean, on adjacent islands, or on the mainland, whether 
as close as Venezuela or as far as Boston. This heterogeneity turns out, we learn 
from Victor Wilson and Han Jordaan’s essay, also to have been characteristic of 
the Danish and Swedish islands, which contained English, Dutch, Spanish, 
Italian, and French inhabitants, not to mention Danes and Swedes. Many of 
these colonists had immigrated from within the region, so this heterogeneity 
suggests both a European cosmopolitanism and a thickening regional network. 
Gert Oostindie’s examination of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo indicates 
that these three colonies were precociously British, before any official take-
over, because of the deliberate recruitment of British colonists from the West 
Indies to settle there. Thus when we focus on European populations, we can 
discern how connections enhanced regional ties, not necessarily transatlantic 
connections. It would be interesting to compare these patterns of regional and 
oceanic connectedness with those of African and African-descended popula-
tions in the Dutch Atlantic world.
Looking at the “Dutch” Atlantic world, then, has the intriguing benefit 
of bringing into focus a wide range of minority populations – some of whom, 
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as was true for the British in Demerara, were in fact the majority. Religious 
minorities – most notably Jews – were also important in the Dutch Atlantic, as 
Roitman and Ben-Ur demonstrate in their contribution, and in the case of 
Suriname, they comprised a significant portion of the free population. Even 
the Dutch inhabitants of Dutch colonies did not necessarily feel bound to the 
Netherlands or to the interests of the wic. Oostindie shows these conflicted 
loyalties in the case of the Dutch planters in Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, 
who seemed ready to accept British takeover if it liberated them from their 
debt obligations.
Another indicator of the international nature of Dutch Atlantic societies 
was language. The Dutch proved poor exporters of many elements of Dutch 
culture. Language provides the foremost example. Dutch seems to have rarely 
become the lingua franca of Dutch settlements. In Suriname and Curaçao, cre-
ole languages became the lingua franca – Sranan Tongo (an English-based Cre-
ole) in Suriname and Papiamentu (a Portuguese-based Creole) in Curaçao. 
These languages originated in enslaved populations. As Roitman and Ben-Ur 
demonstrate, however, Papiamentu was adopted by Jews and other people of 
European and mixed descent in Curaçao. Their analysis lets us see how lan-
guage, as they put it, “had begun to cross socio-economic, racial, religious, and 
ethnic lines.” This linguistic heterogeneity was true of free ports and other 
islands as well: in St. Croix, inhabitants spoke English, while on St. Thomas and 
St. John, they spoke Dutch.
Language patterns had many implications in the Dutch Atlantic world, as 
Davids demonstrates. They shaped academic training in Europe and both cir-
cumscribed and expanded circuits of knowledge. The Dutch, for example, 
were connected to the English intellectual world because so many English-
speaking students from England and Scotland studied in Leiden between 1680 
and 1730. At the same time, more Dutch scholars were fluent in French than in 
English, thus opening another important intellectual sphere. The French, how-
ever, were unlikely to know Dutch and thus unlikely to enroll at Dutch univer-
sities. These linguistic patterns and the educational ambitions they fostered 
undergirded the circulation of knowledge in the Dutch Atlantic in the eigh-
teenth century, shaping not only what information came to Dutch scholars 
and intellectuals but also what Dutch knowledge crossed linguistic lines. 
Davids’ essay points to an important difference between the Eastern and 
Western Dutch Atlantics, because inhabitants of different backgrounds in vari-
ous West Indian locales may have found it easier to converse with each other 
than some of these scholars in Europe, where institutional traditions occasion-
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If the “Dutch” inhabitants of wic colonies turn out not to have spoken the 
language of the wic Directors in the United Provinces, cultural artifacts once 
regarded as important representations of Dutch culture overseas turn out to 
have an equally complex history, one that makes it difficult to discern when the 
Dutch themselves were expressing or conveying national or patriotic senti-
ments. Benjamin Schmidt’s analysis in this volume of paintings by Frans Post 
and their market makes this point effectively, illustrating as it does the diverse, 
non-Dutch market – and in the case of the Brazil paintings, the Catholic, 
Portuguese subjects they depicted. Schmidt challenges previous interpreta-
tions that regarded these works as expressions of a Dutch patriotic sentiment. 
Instead, he suggests that Post painted for a diverse and dispersed European 
market, one more interested in exoticism in general than in Dutch Brazil in 
particular.16
The Dutch Atlantic world was an international one – but so, too, were 
the territories claimed by the French, Portuguese, Spanish, and British, and 
inhabited by Europeans, Amerindians, and Africans, even if some of those 
cosmopolitan elements have been obscured by the ability of European rulers 
to impose more robust institutional and cultural structures on their subjects. 
Perhaps it would be a salutary exercise for historians to approach all the popu-
lations they study in the Atlantic as if they were “Dutch”: outward-oriented, 
connected to an assortment of national, religious, and ethnic actors in a vari-
ety of polities and locales, and quite probably not “Dutch” at all.
A second characteristic of the Dutch Atlantic is the important economic 
ties the Dutch forged (as middlemen, as traders, as brokers, as inhabitants of 
trade entrepôts) with other polities and people. The historical emphasis on the 
Dutch as traders, with a commensurate focus on connections, puts networks at 
the center of the Dutch Atlantic. The Dutch were entangled in multiple states 
and empires. One consequence of the economic ties Dutch people forged was 
new lines of political, cultural, and commercial exchange that linked Dutch 
settlements with non-Dutch locales. Karwan Fatah-Black shows us an impor-
tant gap between the policy of the Suriname Company, which sought to sever 
local ties in favor of transatlantic ties, and the preferences of the colonists, 
whose commercial networks reached across imperial borders and embedded 
Suriname in the region. He argues forcefully that these connections were not 
incidental to the colony’s formation, but rather “constitutive” of the colony and 
of Dutch efforts in the region. He traces these linkages in a variety of ways – 
looking, for example, at efforts to recruit colonists from within the region, 
at the networks Jews established, and at the importance of Barbados to the 
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colony.17 Kenneth Morgan likewise shows that in 1720, most of the mill horses, 
fish, and other stores in Suriname came from New England.18
Other essays point to the importance of Dutch traders outside areas of 
Dutch control. Silvia Marzagalli argues that the French colonial system relied 
on non-French actors, and Ana Crespo Solano demonstrates the significance 
of Dutch and other foreign merchants in Spain’s American trade. Morgan 
makes a similar point, observing that the British system’s flexibility was essen-
tial in permitting English and Dutch commercial relations to thrive.19 The 
Dutch could only be successful middlemen in economic systems that provided 
them with breathing space, as the French, Spanish, and British did, to the 
benefit, it seems, of all parties. Dutch-descended traders outside the wic- 
controlled Dutch Atlantic were also important, as Morgan shows for North 
American trade, with the continued significance of Dutch merchants in New 
York until the era of the American Revolution.
Linkages were not limited to trade, although trade routes often circum-
scribed the flows of ideas or people. Wim Klooster sketches the many ways in 
which Curaçao was tied to different places in the Atlantic.20 Runaway slaves 
provide an important and unusual vantage point on these connections. 
Klooster draws on their experiences to demonstrate how the colony’s varied 
connections and networks shaped the patterns of runaway slaves, especially 
on the main route to freedom which took runaways to Venezuela. Klooster’s 
inclusion of free blacks and slaves shows the tenacity of connections in the 
Dutch Atlantic that we might not otherwise have appreciated, and casts 
Curaçao in a new light, as a place shaped by multiple, parallel, intersecting 
connections. Klooster’s essay is also a salutary reminder of the importance of 
further study into the experiences of slaves and free people of color in the 
Dutch Atlantic world.
The terminology of “connections” might suggest a benign interaction that 
was far from the case. There was, of course, profound asymmetry in many of 
these relationships. The flight of slaves from Curaçao brings this asymmetry 
into bold relief. Jews emerge as sinews of the Atlantic, forging connections 
both across the Atlantic and from one entrepôt to another and playing key 
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roles in commercial exchange. But Jews did so in conditions of legal vulnerabil-
ity, in which they were forced to assert their rights against those who denied 
them in order to secure their property. Jessica Roitman’s study of Jews in the 
Dutch and British Atlantic world reveals gaps in legal regimes and political 
sentiment between centers and peripheries, where metropolitan courts upheld 
Jewish rights while colonists often tried to undermine them.21
A third feature of the Dutch Atlantic world was its decentralization. 
Ostensibly under Company control, with a clear administrative structure 
based in the Netherlands, the territories of the Dutch Atlantic also had 
important local power structures. This gap between preferences expressed by 
European investors and rulers and what inhabitants of settlements thousands 
of miles away actually elected to do was hardly unique to the Dutch, of course, 
nor atypical for the thwarted projection of centralized power in this era. In J.R. 
McNeill’s memorable articulation of this gap between aspiration and reality, 
“imperial history is the product of metropolitan logic and decisions imper-
fectly inflicted on people and places poorly understood by the metropoli-
tans.”22 In this volume, for example, Gert Oostindie’s work on the Dutch on the 
“Wild Coast” illustrates that individual officers were able to exert a lot of power. 
Distance and decentralization and patterns of territorial acquisition likewise 
contributed to state weakness. In Suriname, Dutch takeover of the English 
colony in 1667 did not sever the colony’s connections to British trading part-
ners, as Karwan Fatah-Black demonstrates. The States of Zeeland, which con-
trolled the colony in those early years, simply did not have the capacity to sever 
these officially unsanctioned ties in the face of colonists’ objections and needs.
For all the Dutch Atlantic’s decentralization, of course, states and polities 
continued to be important in shaping sinews of commerce, international alli-
ances and rivalries, and a range of local attributes. The major states of Western 
Europe emerge as important to the Dutch Atlantic in different ways and at dif-
ferent times. Consider the simultaneous promulgation of protectionist poli-
cies by the French and the English in the middle of the seventeenth century. 
Both sought to create and enforce monopolies for their own ships, with the 
result that the Dutch advantage as the main carrier in the Atlantic began to 
erode. Morgan shows how important state protection was to the development 
of the British Atlantic economy, and also highlights important intersections 
with the frequency of warfare. Elsewhere, Roitman has suggested that it 
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mattered whether Jews lived under English or Dutch rule, and whether the 
state acted to protect their rights. She also focuses our attention on citizenship 
and the many different forms citizenship could take.23 The example of the 
Jews points to the legal and administrative structures that circumscribed peo-
ple’s lives in the Western Atlantic. Roitman and Ben-Ur’s study of adultery 
within the Jewish communities in Suriname, Curaçao, and Amsterdam reveals 
three legal systems at work: colonial, metropolitan, and that of the Jewish com-
munity itself.24
Fourth, thinking about the Atlantic world through the prism of the Dutch 
experience offers a variety of new geographical perspectives. In the seven-
teenth century, the Dutch were a real Atlantic power: they had trading posts 
and settlements and diplomatic ties and whaling enterprises and territory in 
all four quadrants of the Atlantic. In the depth and breadth of their activity, the 
Dutch were unlike any other European state. The Portuguese came closest, 
with their exploitation of the fisheries giving them a claim to a similarly pan-
Atlantic empire. Moreover, when we consider the Dutch and the Portuguese 
and their experiences in the Atlantic, Africa comes to the fore. Indeed, it is the 
starting point for thinking about Portuguese activity in the Atlantic, and for 
the Dutch, the trading posts of the gold coast were also valuable. Might an 
Atlantic history with themes drawn from Dutch and Portuguese experiences 
give us a way to rethink what the Atlantic world looks like with Africa fully 
incorporated?
A second geographic dimension that the Dutch bring to a reconceptualized 
Atlantic history is the relationship between Atlantic and global history. As 
global and transnational approaches have become increasingly popular among 
historians, it has become challenging for historians to distinguish the regional 
from the global and to set the regional in global context. At the same time, 
transnational approaches offer an exciting intellectual opportunity to revisit 
important events and processes in global contexts.25 The problematic category 
of the “Atlantic” is nicely showcased in Schmidt’s essay. Schmidt argues that for 
the Dutch we might be better served in thinking of the world beyond Europe, 
not specifically the Atlantic, since the Dutch seem to have been particularly 
active in creating an exotic world for Europeans to purchase – selling, as Post 
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did, an exotiscape. Some notable recent works focused on the Atlantic world 
have included chapters on global history, as did the second edition of the 
British Atlantic World in 2009.26 Here the Dutch may offer a salutary example.
Transnational themes have special salience for the Dutch, with their global 
enterprises in this era, and in light of their greater financial success in the East 
Indies. There are some interesting points of contrast and connection to the 
world of the Dutch East Indies. Dutch men did not, it seems, take indigenous 
women as wives and sexual partners in the West Indies to the extent they did 
in the East Indies.27 Roitman and Ben-Ur, however, point to the importance of 
mixed race people in Curaçao and Suriname, and to the existence of Creole 
populations who resembled the population of places such as Batavia. Their 
essay suggests that closer examination of sexual and domestic relations in the 
Dutch Atlantic might offer new points for comparison.
One final geographic question remains: Where is the Dutch Atlantic? The 
editors limited the Dutch Atlantic to places controlled by the wic. The editors 
make a case for what is excluded in this volume, both in terms of chronology 
(for the most part, the era before 1680) and geography (the Cape, North 
America, the fisheries). The Dutch Atlantic that emerges in this volume con-
tains places that were Dutch-controlled ports with tiny Dutch populations 
who spoke other European languages or creoles as important sites in the Dutch 
Atlantic. At the same time, however, the editors excluded places with vastly 
larger Dutch and Dutch-descended populations, such as New York (North 
America contained some 100,000 people of Dutch descent by 1789) or the Cape 
Colony. These essays leave us with the challenge of trying to think about 
aspects of Dutch culture in the Atlantic without examining those parts of the 
Atlantic where Dutch family migration might have permitted more compo-
nents of Dutch culture to survive. Considering places where people did speak 
Dutch, for example, might help shed light on the cultural patterns and power 
dynamics at work in those many locales in the Dutch Atlantic world where 
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inhabitants spoke other languages. Dutch whaling and fishing activities, more-
over, might offer more good opportunities to consider intercultural interac-
tions, since the North Atlantic fisheries were often multinational places.
The Dutch were also essential to the workings of other empires and their 
own Atlantic circuits. Marzagalli’s essay raises the tantalizing question of 
whether it might be beneficial to think of Bordeaux as a Dutch nodal point. If 
the Dutch were important to foreign ports and places, so, too, were non-Dutch 
places essential to the development of the Dutch Atlantic. Numerous contri-
butions in this volume, for example, suggest that Barbados played an impor-
tant role in the development of Dutch settlements, as did the North American 
mainland. Dutch settlements such as Suriname might likewise be considered 
as extensions of the English Atlantic, at least in terms of the dependence of 
Suriname on North American shipping.
To be sure, this volume is not exhaustive, nor indeed was it intended to be. 
The work has a specific geography, chronology, goal, and focus. In these 
respects, a variety of topics are not included here which one imagines are also 
important to the history of the Dutch Atlantic. The themes of the volume 
ended up privileging Europeans and European activity in the Atlantic world, 
and thus slaves and slavery and indigenous people do not receive as much 
attention as one might have anticipated. The chronology of the project, empha-
sizing the period after 1680, means that we hear less about the Dutch Atlantic 
at war that we might have if the period of the three Anglo-Dutch wars had 
been included more fully.28 These wars were essential in recalibrating the bal-
ance between the English and the Dutch, and in reallocating territory – in cre-
ating, in short, the geographic terrain of the Dutch Atlantic as it existed in 1680. 
The seventeenth century was also important in shaping how the Dutch became 
participants in the Atlantic. Christian Koot argues that the Dutch sought to 
benefit from English knowledge and expertise, permitting English soldiers to 
leave their positions with Dutch forces in order to serve as Virginia governors, 
on the expectation that they would profit from this arrangement. This seven-
teenth-century history is more than a backdrop; it was formative to the charac-
teristics of the Dutch Atlantic as they had matured by 1680.
Another important subject that receives short shrift in this volume is reli-
gion. The absence is conspicuous largely because it is so difficult to imagine 
studying some of the other imperial Atlantics without looking at the impor-
tance of European religions in their development and in their self-images – 
the French, the Spanish, the British, the Portuguese – both as something 
shared by Europeans and European Creoles and something that was part of 
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how some Europeans interacted with non-European people. Evangelical 
missions yoked to commercial enterprises, conquests, and occupations gave 
different expanding kingdoms distinctive modes of cultural interaction 
through religious languages, symbols, and beliefs.29 Religious affiliation 
came for some to be markers of identity. For the British, for example, 
Protestantism became an important expression of ethnic, national, and ulti-
mately imperial identity, even if there were English Catholics throughout the 
Atlantic.30 Confessional identities also served Protestants and Catholics as a 
language of difference and a justification for aggression, seen most vividly in 
the emergence of the “Black Legend” during the Dutch revolt, and in the 
importance of Northern European Protestant claims to liberate Amerindians 
from conversion to Catholicism.31 The Puritan-dominated Massachusetts 
Bay Company took this message to heart, placing an Indian at the center of 
their company seal, with the words “Come over and help us” contained in the 
cartouche around his head.32
The absence of attention to religion in the Dutch world in these essays, with 
the notable exception of Ben-Ur and Roitman’s contribution, is striking, in 
light of the attention paid by scholars to religion, and especially toleration, in 
the Dutch Republic. Intimations of religious cultures, of the important way 
religious beliefs and institutions tightened sinews linking far-flung places in 
the Atlantic, and of how people drew on religious beliefs and communities to 
devise new cultural forms and practices around the Atlantic appear in these 
essays. But overall, the relative paucity of attention to religion in this volume 
points to one important area for historians to explore.33
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A final subject of considerable importance for the history of the Dutch 
Republic but barely visible in the history of the Dutch Atlantic is environmen-
tal history. In contrast, important interpretations of Netherlands society, cul-
ture, and politics place environmental history, specifically the cooperation 
essential to water management, at the heart of a particular kind of egalitarian 
and cooperative society.34 Economic and social structures and racial hierar-
chies in Dutch colonies, settlements, and port towns in the western Atlantic 
point to dramatically different patterns than those that prevailed in the 
Netherlands. How, if at all, did environmental features affect these patterns?
The subject of environmental history is relatively new for Atlantic history, 
but the Dutch Atlantic seems to be a promising subject for historians to inves-
tigate.35 Experts at modifying their environment, turning sea into dry land, 
marsh into arable field, and flood-prone regions into safe havens through 
aggressive engineering, the Dutch were the consummate innovators and engi-
neers. An emphasis on their commercial acumen and their important role in 
the carrying trades of the Atlantic has shifted attention away from settlement 
and agricultural activity, but there are indications that the Dutch in the Atlantic 
deployed the same strategies of draining land to create polders and irrigating 
to improve cultivation which they had developed at home. When the Dutch 
seized Suriname from the English in 1667, for example, the geographic center 
of habitation and cultivation shifted. The English had lived up the region’s four 
main rivers. The more fertile land downstream was too wet for the English to 
farm. The Dutch, however, brought their expertise to bear on this predicament. 
They used systems of dikes and canals to put swampy coastal lands into culti-
vation, creating polders after 1700 and ultimately shifting all plantation activity 
to the coastal areas after 1740.36 Dutch occupation changed settlement pat-
terns and agricultural activity in the colony, altering the region’s environment.
The potential Suriname’s history offers for innovative environmental inter-
pretations is also suggested in a 1995 essay by Gert Oostindie and Alex van 
Stipriaan on slavery in “hydraulic” societies, by which they mean societies 
defined by the ubiquity of water, both that redirected for plantation use and 
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free-flowing water itself. They argue that hydraulic aspects should be consid-
ered when understanding the demography of a given slave population. 
Moreover, they depict numerous ways in which living in a water-dominated 
environment affected cultural features including language, religion, and 
music.37 These glimpses at Suriname’s environmental history suggest that 
there might well be an environmental history of the Dutch Atlantic waiting to 
be written: one that encompasses agricultural, commercial, and maritime 
activities and that builds on and extends the important history of people and 
the environment in the Netherlands.
Many features of the Dutch Atlantic world as depicted in this volume coin-
cide neatly with current interests in “entangled” Atlantics – looking at interac-
tions across borders, engaging in multilingual research. Such an approach 
renders the Atlantic by necessity more polyglot and, sometimes, more hetero-
geneous; it brings into focus boundary crossers and middlemen, statuses long 
believed to be Dutch specializations. But there is a risk in emphasizing these 
qualities too much. Historians of colonial British North America might recog-
nize a pattern from their own field, once dominated by the study of the puri-
tans of New England; when interests shifted to the planters, servants, and 
slaves of the tobacco Chesapeake (in the 1970s) and then to the polyglot, reli-
giously diverse, mixed European inhabitants of the so-called “Middle Colonies” 
of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware in the 1980s, historians argued in 
turn for the importance of the regions they studied by boasting that region was 
the source of important attributes (liberalism, racism, tolerance, pluralism, 
democracy, take your pick) of modern American society, or that one particular 
region was “normative” in terms of American development.38 Each region, its 
proponents argued at different times, spoke to a larger American experience, 
and historians projected onto U.S. history as a whole the qualities of their own 
region of interest. But interests change; ideas about what the attributes of U.S. 
history were and are continue to be as hotly debated as ever. So, too, perhaps, 
with the Atlantic world. Right now, transnational history and entanglement 
are the rage, putting cross-cultural interactions at the center of historical anal-
ysis, and making Atlantic history look very “Dutch,” but these trends are not 
likely to endure forever.
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This thought-provoking volume on the Dutch Atlantic invites us to think 
more deeply about the varied nature of the Atlantic, its many different cul-
tures, populations, economies, labor regimes, domestic arrangements, and any 
number of other features. Roitman and Oostindie hoped as part of their inves-
tigation to demonstrate the significance of the Dutch Atlantic for the 
Netherlands, and many of these essays suggest important repercussions. Yet in 
terms of setting and occasionally modeling future research agendas, the Dutch 
Atlantic might be even more important to Atlantic history than it is to the 
history of the Netherlands. A study of the Dutch in the Atlantic world reveals 
just the kind of Atlantic history that people have been calling for – entangled, 
international, multilingual, networked, connected. If on the one hand we 
might have envisioned a book on the Dutch Atlantic in 2002, when the British 
Atlantic volume appeared, on the other hand what we will end up with is 
a series of books on the Dutch Atlantic in 2014 and beyond which will sketch 
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